Open-source AI coworkers that each get a computer of their own: a browser, files and tools, with every action decided before it happens and recorded after. Bring any AG-UI agent.
import {
type CredentialExecutor,
type CredentialSecretReader,
type CredentialStore,
decryptSecret,
encryptSecret,
} from "../credentials";
/**
* The key a customer's agent sits behind.
*
* A bearer token for an external agent is a credential, and
* this deployment already has one place that knows how to hold a credential: encrypted at rest,
* revocable, listed for an operator, and never returned to a browser. Putting it in `configuration`
* next to the endpoint would make it readable by anything that can read an agent, including the
* admin API that lists them, and there would be no way to revoke it without editing the agent.
*
* The vault holds the value. The agent's configuration holds only the
* credential's id and the header name, because the name is not a secret and the surface needs to
* show "sends an Authorization header" without being able to show what it sends.
*
* It is never read back to a person. There is no endpoint that returns it and no field that
* repopulates with it: the edit form shows that a key is set, and setting a new one replaces it. A
* secret a UI can display is a secret in a screenshot.
*/
export type AgentAuth = {
/** The header to send, e.g. `Authorization`. Not secret. */
header: string;
/** The vault row holding the value. */
credentialId: string;
};
/** How an agent's auth is recorded in its `configuration`. Value never appears here. */
export function authFromConfiguration(
configuration: unknown,
): AgentAuth | null {
if (!configuration || typeof configuration !== "object") return null;
const auth = (configuration as { auth?: unknown }).auth;
if (!auth || typeof auth !== "object") return null;
const { header, credentialId } = auth as {
header?: unknown;
credentialId?: unknown;
};
return typeof header === "string" && typeof credentialId === "string"
? { header, credentialId }
: null;
}
/**
* Put an agent's key in the vault and return the reference to store on the agent.
*
* `keyId` is the agent's own id, so an operator listing credentials can see which agent a row belongs
* to without joining anything.
*/
export async function storeAgentAuth(input: {
store: CredentialStore;
encryptionKey: string;
agentId: string;
header: string;
value: string;
/**
* The credential the agent's configuration currently names, if any. Present
* on an edit that replaces the key, absent on first creation.
*
* Whether it is still live is checked here rather than assumed, because the
* configuration keeps naming a credential an administrator has revoked from
* the Credentials page. Rotating onto a revoked row is refused by the vault,
* so trusting the reference would leave that agent's key impossible to
* replace: every later edit would fail on the same stale id.
*/
previousCredentialId?: string;
/**
* The transaction to write in, when the caller has one.
*
* Agent edits are a transaction over `agents` and `agent_profiles`, and the
* credential is part of that same change. Written outside it, the key would
* commit even where the edit that asked for it rolled back.
*/
executor?: CredentialExecutor;
}): Promise<AgentAuth> {
const value = {
kind: "agent" as const,
provider: "ag-ui",
keyId: input.agentId,
// The header name is metadata precisely because it is not a secret; keeping it here makes the
// vault row self-describing for later audit.
metadata: { header: input.header },
encryptedValue: await encryptSecret(input.encryptionKey, input.value),
};
// A live previous credential is rotated, so the agent never holds two. Any
// other case inserts: the partial unique index permits it, because there is
// no live row for this agent to collide with.
const rotates =
input.previousCredentialId !== undefined &&
(await input.store.isLive(input.previousCredentialId, input.executor));
const credential = rotates
? await input.store.rotate(
{
...value,
previousCredentialId: input.previousCredentialId as string,
},
input.executor,
)
: await input.store.create(value, input.executor);
return { header: input.header, credentialId: credential.id };
}
/**
* Retire the key an edit has just replaced.
*
* Rotating a key is the standard answer to a suspected leak, and it only answers it if the old
* credential stops working. Editing a Bot's key used to write a new vault row and repoint the agent
* at it, leaving the previous one decryptable and still valid with nothing listing it and no way to
* reach it: the honest answer to "is that leaked key still live" was yes. The vault also grew one
* unrevoked secret per edit per Bot.
*
* Takes both configurations rather than a credential id, so the caller cannot get the direction
* wrong and revoke the key it has just stored. Does nothing when the id has not changed, which is an
* edit that left the key alone.
*
* Never throws. The new key is already stored and the Bot already works; a vault that would not
* accept the revocation is worth saying loudly and is not worth failing an edit that has succeeded.
*
* Takes the caller's transaction where there is one, and must be given it whenever the caller holds
* a lock on the row being retired. On a pooled connection the revoke is a second session competing
* with the caller's own open transaction: it waits for a lock only that transaction can release, and
* the transaction cannot commit while it is awaiting this call. Nothing breaks that, so the edit
* hangs to the statement timeout and the timeout is then reported here as a key still live.
*/
export async function retireReplacedKey(
store: Pick<CredentialStore, "revoke">,
previous: Record<string, unknown>,
next: Record<string, unknown>,
executor?: CredentialExecutor,
): Promise<void> {
const before = credentialIdOf(previous);
const after = credentialIdOf(next);
if (!before || before === after) return;
try {
await store.revoke(before, executor);
} catch (error) {
console.error(
JSON.stringify({
type: "agent-key-revoke-failed",
credentialId: before,
note: "A Bot's key was replaced and the one it replaced is still live in the vault. Revoke it by hand.",
error: String(error),
}),
);
}
}
/** The vault row an agent configuration points at, if it points at one. */
function credentialIdOf(
configuration: Record<string, unknown>,
): string | undefined {
const auth = configuration.auth as { credentialId?: unknown } | undefined;
return typeof auth?.credentialId === "string" ? auth.credentialId : undefined;
}
/**
* The headers to send to this agent, or none.
*
* A revoked or missing credential sends nothing rather than guessing. The run then fails at the
* agent with its own 401, which is the truthful outcome: the key is gone. Substituting an empty
* header or falling back to no auth would turn a revoked key into a confusing agent error
* with no mention of the key anywhere.
*/
export async function agentAuthHeaders(input: {
reader: CredentialSecretReader;
encryptionKey: string;
auth: AgentAuth | null;
}): Promise<Record<string, string> | undefined> {
if (!input.auth) return undefined;
const stored = await input.reader.readSecret(input.auth.credentialId);
if (!stored || stored.revokedAt) return undefined;
return {
[input.auth.header]: await decryptSecret(
input.encryptionKey,
stored.encryptedValue,
),
};
}