Open-source AI coworkers that each get a computer of their own: a browser, files and tools, with every action decided before it happens and recorded after. Bring any AG-UI agent.
import { reasonWithoutStatement } from "../../db/query-failure";
import { catalogueEntry } from "../catalogue";
import {
connectedAccountsUrlFor,
readConnectState,
redeemAuthorizationCode,
redirectUriFor,
} from "../oauth";
import type { PluginRouteContext } from "./context";
/** Where a vendor sends a person back after consent. */
export function mountOAuthCallbackRoute({
routes,
store,
connect,
}: PluginRouteContext) {
/**
* Where the vendor sends somebody back.
*
* Deliberately not behind `requireUser`. The person arrives on a redirect from another company's
* server, and whose connection this is comes from the sealed state rather than from whatever
* session the browser happens to be carrying — which is what stops a callback delivered to the
* wrong browser from attaching one person's Google account to another person's row.
*
* Having no session is what makes the access check below necessary. Every other route asks the
* question by being behind a guard; this one has to ask it out loud.
*
* Every failure ends the same way: back at Settings with a word about what happened, and nothing
* written. There is no useful distinction here for the person between a forged state and an expired
* one, and spelling out which is which tells anybody probing this endpoint how far they got.
*/
routes.get("/oauth/callback", async (context) => {
const failed = connectedAccountsUrlFor(connect?.appUrl, {
failed: true,
});
if (!connect?.publicUrl) return context.redirect(failed);
/*
* EVERY WAY OUT OF THIS HANDLER IS A REDIRECT, AND THE `try` IS WHAT MAKES THAT TRUE.
*
* CRITERION. No request to this endpoint ends without a `Location`.
*
* REASON. The header above says every failure ends the same way, and that was true of
* every failure this handler ASKED for and of none of the failures its questions could
* raise. `personHasAccess` reaches the people store and `oauthClientFor` reaches the
* vault, and either of them throwing put somebody who had just consented at another
* company on a bodyless 500 with no `Location` at all — no page, no notice, nothing to
* press, and a browser left on this API's origin, which locally serves no pages at all.
* It is the exact answer this route exists to make impossible: `redeemAuthorizationCode`
* guards its own `fetch` against it in as many words, and the vault write below was given
* a `catch` for it — one call at a time, which is the shape that keeps leaving one out.
*
* SO IT IS THE WHOLE BODY RATHER THAN EACH CALL. A blanket `catch` is a promise about the
* route; a per-call one is a promise about the calls somebody remembered. Nothing is
* written before the vault, so a failure anywhere above it leaves the same nothing behind
* as an unreadable state does, and the person is told the same sentence either way.
*
* THE PERSON LEARNS NOTHING NEW FROM IT, deliberately, for the reason the header gives:
* there is no useful distinction here between a forged state and a store that would not
* answer, and spelling out which is which tells anybody probing this endpoint how far they
* got. The console is where the difference survives, and it carries the error stringified
* and nothing else — not the state, which names a person, and not the code, which is one
* redemption away from a refresh token.
*/
try {
const code = context.req.query("code");
const state = await readConnectState(
context.req.query("state") ?? "",
connect.encryptionKey,
);
if (!code || !state) return context.redirect(failed);
/*
* Is the person in the state still somebody here?
*
* Asked here, before the code is redeemed and before anything is written, because a state is
* good for ten minutes and access can end inside them. Removing somebody deny-lists their
* address, deletes their sessions and retires the credentials they had already granted — and
* none of that reaches a consent already in flight at the vendor. Without this, that consent
* comes back and writes a fresh, live refresh token belonging to somebody who no longer has
* access, which nothing downstream will ever revoke because nothing knows it was created.
*
* The same anonymous failure as an unreadable state. Whether an address is deny-listed is not a
* fact this endpoint owes an unauthenticated caller.
*/
if (!(await connect.personHasAccess(state.userId))) {
return context.redirect(failed);
}
const entry = catalogueEntry(state.serverId);
if (entry?.auth.kind !== "user-oauth") return context.redirect(failed);
const client = await store.oauthClientFor(state.serverId);
if (!client) return context.redirect(failed);
const grant = await redeemAuthorizationCode({
tokenUrl: entry.auth.tokenUrl,
clientId: client.clientId,
clientSecret: client.clientSecret,
code,
redirectUri: redirectUriFor(connect.publicUrl),
verifier: state.verifier,
});
if (!grant) return context.redirect(failed);
/*
* The last thing that can fail, answered the same way as everything before it.
*
* A vault that will not take the grant is this deployment's problem, not the person's, and they
* have already done their part at the vendor. Unhandled, this threw past the handler and gave
* them the bare 500 that every other failure on this route was written to avoid, on the one
* path where they had most reason to think it had worked.
*
* Told, because unlike the refusals above this one is nobody's fault but ours, and the person's
* sentence deliberately says nothing about which failure it was. The refresh token is not
* logged: it is the one thing here worth stealing, and the row it belonged to was never written.
*/
try {
await store.recordConnection({
serverId: state.serverId,
userId: state.userId,
refreshToken: grant.refreshToken,
scope: grant.scope,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error(
JSON.stringify({
type: "oauth-connection-not-recorded",
serverId: state.serverId,
note: "A person consented and the grant could not be stored. They were sent back to Settings with a failure and will have to connect again.",
/*
* READ THROUGH {@link reasonWithoutStatement}, BECAUSE THE FAILURE THIS LINE EXISTS FOR
* IS THE ONE WHOSE MESSAGE CARRIES THE REFRESH TOKEN.
*
* `recordConnection` runs `swapUserCredential` → `credentials.create/rotate`, whose
* bound parameters include `encryptedValue: await encryptSecret(key, refreshToken)`.
* drizzle wraps a driver failure as a `DrizzleQueryError` whose own message is
* `Failed query: insert into "credentials" … params: …, <the envelope>, …`, so
* `String(error)` here put the envelope on this deployment's stdout and into whatever
* sink collects it — for a person who was correctly told nothing was saved. Two consent
* callbacks for one `(serverId, userId)` landing together, or a statement timeout on
* the insert, is all it takes.
*
* The helper answers the driver's own complaint instead — `duplicate key value violates
* unique constraint`, `canceling statement due to statement timeout` — which is the
* useful half and names nothing anybody sent.
*/
error: reasonWithoutStatement(error),
}),
);
return context.redirect(failed);
}
return context.redirect(
connectedAccountsUrlFor(
connect.appUrl,
{ serverId: state.serverId },
// From the sealed state, so the destination is one this deployment chose, not the browser.
state.returnTo,
),
);
} catch (error) {
console.error(
JSON.stringify({
type: "oauth-callback-failed",
note: "A person came back from a consent screen and a check on this route raised instead of answering. They were sent back to Settings with a failure, nothing was written, and they will have to connect again.",
// The outer catch of the branch above, so it stands over the same write and needs the
// same door. See the note on `oauth-connection-not-recorded`.
error: reasonWithoutStatement(error),
}),
);
return context.redirect(failed);
}
});
}