Open-source AI coworkers that each get a computer of their own: a browser, files and tools, with every action decided before it happens and recorded after. Bring any AG-UI agent.
/**
* Take the secrets out of a shell command before it is kept or exported.
*
* The approach is the one secret scanners use (gitleaks, detect-secrets, GitHub secret scanning):
* known token shapes by prefix, then credentials by the name they are passed under, then anything in
* a URL's userinfo. Each match is replaced with `[REDACTED]` in place, so the command stays readable
* ("curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]' https://api.example.com") and an investigator can see
* what was run without the record becoming a credential store.
*
* Deliberately over-eager. A redacted word that was not a secret costs a reader a guess; a secret
* that survived costs a rotation.
*/
const REDACTED = "[REDACTED]";
/** Token shapes with a vendor prefix or a fixed form. */
const TOKEN_SHAPES: RegExp[] = [
/-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
/\b(AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g, // AWS access key id
/\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,255}\b/g, // GitHub
/\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,255}\b/g,
/\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/g, // GitLab
/\bxox[abposr]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/g, // Slack
/\bsk-(proj-|ant-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/g, // OpenAI, Anthropic
/\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/g, // Google API key
/\b(sk|rk)_(live|test)_[0-9a-zA-Z]{16,}\b/g, // Stripe
/\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/g,
/\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b/g, // JWT
];
/** Names a credential is usually passed under, as an assignment, a flag or a header. */
const SECRET_NAME =
"(?:[A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:PASSWORD|PASSWD|PWD|SECRET|TOKEN|API[_-]?KEY|APIKEY|ACCESS[_-]?KEY|PRIVATE[_-]?KEY|CREDENTIALS?|AUTH)[A-Za-z0-9_]*)";
const RULES: [RegExp, (match: string, ...groups: string[]) => string][] = [
// Authorization headers: `Authorization: Bearer x`, `-H "Authorization: Basic x"`.
[
/(authorization\s*[:=]\s*(?:bearer|basic|token|digest)?\s*)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s'"]+)/gi,
(_match, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
[
/(x-api-key\s*[:=]\s*)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s'"]+)/gi,
(_m, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
/*
* Credentials passed positionally: the value is the word after the flag, so nothing in the command
* names it and the rules below cannot see it. Tool-anchored, and checked before them because a
* generic rule can mistake an attached short-form password for a flag name — `redis-cli -asecret`
* reads as a flag called `-asecret`, and the rule for a flag named after a secret then redacts the
* word after it instead of the password.
*
* Each of these refuses a value that begins with `-`, so a flag left bare, which asks for the
* password interactively, does not swallow the flag that follows it. And each ends where its
* command does: at a line break, which starts another command whose `-p` is a port again, though
* not at a line continued with a backslash, which is the same command.
*/
// `-psecret` for mysql and friends. Nothing separates them: a space means the password is asked for
// at the prompt and the word after `-p` is the database, so only the attached form is redacted.
[
/(\bmysql(?:dump)?\b(?:[^|;&\\\r\n]|\\[\s\S])*?(?:[ \t]|\\\r?\n)-p)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s'"-]\S*)/g,
(_m, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
// `docker login -p secret`, where `-p` is the password rather than a port.
[
/(\bdocker(?:[ \t]|\\\r?\n)+login\b(?:[^|;&\\\r\n]|\\[\s\S])*?(?:[ \t]|\\\r?\n)-p[ \t]*)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s'"-]\S*)/gi,
(_m, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
// `sshpass -p secret ssh user@host`, where `-p` is the password handed to ssh. Only sshpass's own
// options are read, `-f file`, `-d fd` and `-P prompt` with the word after them, so the command it
// wraps keeps its `-p` and `-P`, which are ports. Case matters here: `-P` is sshpass's prompt.
[
/(\bsshpass(?:(?:[ \t]|\\\r?\n)+(?:-[fdP][ \t]*(?:"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s'"-]\S*)|-[^\sp]\S*))*?(?:[ \t]|\\\r?\n)+-p[ \t]*)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s'"-]\S*)/g,
(_m, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
// `redis-cli -a secret`, `-asecret` and `--pass secret`, the same shape under redis-cli's names.
[
/(\bredis-cli\b(?:[^|;&\\\r\n]|\\[\s\S])*?(?:[ \t]|\\\r?\n)(?:-a[ \t]*|--pass(?:=|[ \t]+)))("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s'"-]\S*)/gi,
(_m, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
// A quoted key in a JSON body: `-d '{"password":"x"}'`, or `-d "{\\"password\\":\\"x\\"}"` once the
// shell quoting around it has escaped the inner quotes. The rule below stops at the closing quote
// of the key, so it never saw these.
[
new RegExp(
`(\\\\?["']${SECRET_NAME}\\\\?["']\\s*:\\s*)(\\\\"[^"\\\\]*\\\\"|"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\\s,}'"\\\\]+)`,
"gi",
),
(_m, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
// `NAME=value`, `export NAME=value`, `--name=value`, `NAME: value`.
[
new RegExp(
`((?:--?)?${SECRET_NAME}\\s*[=:]\\s*)(?!\\[REDACTED\\]|(?:bearer|basic|token|digest)\\s)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\\s'"]+)`,
"gi",
),
(_m, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
// `--password value`, `--token value`.
[
new RegExp(
`(--?${SECRET_NAME}\\s+)("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\\s'"-][^\\s'"]*)`,
"gi",
),
(_m, lead) => `${lead}${REDACTED}`,
],
// `curl -u user:password`, and the other ways curl takes it: `-uuser:password`,
// `--user=user:password`, `--proxy-user user:password`, and any of them with the pair in quotes.
// curl's short form for the proxy is `-U`, which is deliberately not here: `-U` is a user agent to
// wget and an unrelated flag to ssh, and a pair like `wget -U Mozilla:5` is not a credential.
[
/(\s(?:-u\s*|--user(?:=|\s+)|--proxy-user(?:=|\s+)))(?:"([^":]*):[^"]*"|'([^':]*):[^']*'|([^\s:"']+):\S+)/g,
(_m, lead, doubleQuoted, singleQuoted, bare) => {
const user = doubleQuoted ?? singleQuoted ?? bare;
return `${lead}${user}:${REDACTED}`;
},
],
// Userinfo in any URL: `https://user:pass@host`. The user is optional, because
// `redis://:pass@host` is how a password-only scheme is written.
[
/([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)([^\s/@:]*):([^\s/@]+)@/gi,
(_m, scheme, user) => `${scheme}${user}:${REDACTED}@`,
],
];
export function scrubCommand(command: string): string {
let scrubbed = command;
for (const shape of TOKEN_SHAPES)
scrubbed = scrubbed.replace(shape, REDACTED);
for (const [pattern, replace] of RULES) {
scrubbed = scrubbed.replace(
pattern,
replace as (substring: string, ...args: string[]) => string,
);
}
return scrubbed;
}