Open-source AI coworkers that each get a computer of their own: a browser, files and tools, with every action decided before it happens and recorded after. Bring any AG-UI agent.
import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
import { inspectToolArguments } from "../src/plugins/content-governance";
describe("MCP tool argument content governance", () => {
test("allows ordinary nested business data", () => {
expect(
inspectToolArguments({
query: "quarterly report",
filters: { ownerEmail: "[email protected]", limit: 25 },
rows: [{ customer: "Acme", amount: 1200 }],
}),
).toEqual({ safe: true });
});
test("reports a sensitive field without returning its value", () => {
const secret = "do-not-copy-this-value";
const result = inspectToolArguments({ nested: { apiKey: secret } });
expect(result).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "sensitive_content",
findings: [{ category: "credential_field", path: "$.nested.apiKey" }],
});
expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(secret);
});
test("detects provider tokens embedded in otherwise ordinary text", () => {
const result = inspectToolArguments({
message: `please use sk-${"a".repeat(32)} for this request`,
});
expect(result).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "sensitive_content",
findings: [{ category: "provider_token", path: "$.message" }],
});
});
test("detects authorization headers and private keys", () => {
const result = inspectToolArguments({
headers: ["Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.payload.signature"],
material: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nredacted",
});
expect(result).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "sensitive_content",
findings: [
{ category: "authorization_header", path: "$.headers[0]" },
{ category: "private_key", path: "$.material" },
],
});
});
test("detects credential material in a property name without recording it", () => {
const secret = `ghp_${"a".repeat(32)}`;
const result = inspectToolArguments({
nested: { [secret]: "ordinary value" },
});
expect(result).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "sensitive_content",
findings: [
{
category: "provider_token",
path: "$.nested.[property]",
},
],
});
expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(secret);
});
test("does not copy arbitrary property names into audit-safe paths", () => {
const privateKey = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nredacted";
const result = inspectToolArguments({
"[email protected]": { material: privateKey },
});
expect(result).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "sensitive_content",
findings: [{ category: "private_key", path: "$.[property].material" }],
});
expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain("[email protected]");
});
test("fails closed on cyclic in-process input", () => {
const args: Record<string, unknown> = {};
args.self = args;
expect(inspectToolArguments(args)).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "inspection_limit",
findings: [],
});
});
test("fails closed before scanning oversized strings or property names", () => {
const oversized = "a".repeat(64 * 1024 + 1);
expect(inspectToolArguments({ text: oversized })).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "inspection_limit",
findings: [],
});
expect(inspectToolArguments({ [oversized]: "value" })).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "inspection_limit",
findings: [],
});
});
test("blocks a credential field carrying the conventional non-standard header prefix", () => {
const secret = "do-not-copy-this-value";
const result = inspectToolArguments({
headers: { "x-api-key": secret },
});
expect(result).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "sensitive_content",
findings: [{ category: "credential_field", path: "$.headers.x-api-key" }],
});
expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(secret);
});
test.each([
"X-API-Key",
"x-auth-token",
"authToken",
"auth_token",
"api_secret",
"bearer_token",
"passwd",
"pwd",
"secret_key",
"session_token",
"signing_key",
"ssh_key",
])("blocks %s as a spelling of a name already listed", (field) => {
const result = inspectToolArguments({ [field]: "do-not-copy-this-value" });
expect(result).toMatchObject({ safe: false, reason: "sensitive_content" });
expect(result).toMatchObject({
findings: [{ category: "credential_field" }],
});
});
test.each([
"query",
"url",
"path",
"token_count",
"max_tokens",
"tokenizer",
"x_axis",
"x_offset",
"xml",
"secretary",
])("allows %s, which only resembles a credential name", (field) => {
expect(inspectToolArguments({ [field]: "ordinary value" })).toEqual({
safe: true,
});
});
test.each([
"Basic onboarding checklist",
"basic setup guide",
"Basic auth broken on staging",
" basic training for new hires",
"Bearer of bad news: the launch slips a week",
"Bearer responsibilities",
])(
"allows %s, which only starts with an authorization scheme name",
(text) => {
expect(inspectToolArguments({ title: text })).toEqual({ safe: true });
},
);
test.each([
["a Basic credential", `Basic ${btoa("aladdin:open sesame")}`],
["a lowercase basic credential", `basic ${btoa("user:pass")}`],
[
"a Bearer token followed by text",
"Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.payload.signature is the one to use",
],
["an opaque bearer token", `bearer ${"a1".repeat(12)}`],
["a bearer token with no digits", "Bearer QmFzZVRva2VuV2l0aE5vRGlnaXRz"],
])("still refuses %s", (_label, value) => {
expect(inspectToolArguments({ value })).toEqual({
safe: false,
reason: "sensitive_content",
findings: [{ category: "authorization_header", path: "$.value" }],
});
});
});