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Open-source AI coworkers that each get a computer of their own: a browser, files and tools, with every action decided before it happens and recorded after. Bring any AG-UI agent.

Block credential fields spelled with the `x-` header prefix (#450)

kevin06c9376a64ec
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index dba57a68..8911e11e 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ Newest first. `Unreleased` is what is on `main` and not yet tagged.
## Unreleased
+### An MCP call carrying `x-api-key` is stopped the same as one carrying `api-key`
+
+The check that keeps credentials out of MCP tool arguments compared each argument name against a
+list, and `api-key` was on it while `x-api-key` was not -- so the spelling that is more obviously a
+credential header was the one that went out. `x-` is the conventional prefix for a non-standard
+header and says nothing about the value, so it is now dropped before the comparison. The same pass
+adds the spellings of names already on the list that were missing from it: `passwd` and `pwd` for
+`password`, `auth_token` and `bearer_token` and `session_token` for `token`, `api_secret` and
+`secret_key` and `signing_key` for `secret`, and `ssh_key` for `private_key`. Nothing new counts as
+a credential: an argument named `x_axis`, `token_count`, `max_tokens` or `secretary` is passed as
+before.
+
### One command to stop what `start.sh` started
Stopping the local stack meant four commands read off the end of a successful start, and the one
diff --git a/server/src/plugins/content-governance.ts b/server/src/plugins/content-governance.ts
index 7b8e6381..b22cae93 100644
--- a/server/src/plugins/content-governance.ts
+++ b/server/src/plugins/content-governance.ts
@@ -26,24 +26,43 @@ export type ToolArgumentInspection =
findings: SensitiveArgumentFinding[];
};
+// Each entry is a spelling of a field already named here, not a widening of what counts as a
+// credential: `passwd` is `password`, `api_secret` is `secret`, `ssh_key` is `private_key`. A tool
+// argument carrying one of these carries the same thing under a different name.
const sensitiveFieldNames = new Set([
"access_token",
"accesstoken",
"api_key",
+ "api_secret",
"apikey",
+ "apisecret",
+ "auth_token",
"authorization",
+ "authtoken",
+ "bearer_token",
+ "bearertoken",
"client_secret",
"clientsecret",
"credential",
"credentials",
"id_token",
"idtoken",
+ "passwd",
"password",
"private_key",
"privatekey",
+ "pwd",
"refresh_token",
"refreshtoken",
"secret",
+ "secret_key",
+ "secretkey",
+ "session_token",
+ "sessiontoken",
+ "signing_key",
+ "signingkey",
+ "ssh_key",
+ "sshkey",
"token",
]);
@@ -61,7 +80,12 @@ const MAX_FINDINGS = 20;
const MAX_STRING_LENGTH = 64 * 1024;
function normalizedFieldName(value: string): string {
- return value.toLowerCase().replace(/[-.\s]/g, "_");
+ const normalized = value.toLowerCase().replace(/[-.\s]/g, "_");
+ // `x_` is the conventional prefix for a non-standard header and says nothing about the value, so
+ // `x-api-key` is the same field as `api-key`. Without this the list caught `api-key` -- which
+ // normalises exactly onto `api_key` -- and let through the spelling that is more obviously a
+ // credential, not less.
+ return normalized.startsWith("x_") ? normalized.slice(2) : normalized;
}
function categoryForValue(value: string): SensitiveArgumentCategory | null {
diff --git a/server/tests/content-governance.test.ts b/server/tests/content-governance.test.ts
index 9138f954..77128307 100644
--- a/server/tests/content-governance.test.ts
+++ b/server/tests/content-governance.test.ts
@@ -110,4 +110,57 @@ describe("MCP tool argument content governance", () => {
findings: [],
});
});
+
+ test("blocks a credential field carrying the conventional non-standard header prefix", () => {
+ const secret = "do-not-copy-this-value";
+ const result = inspectToolArguments({
+ headers: { "x-api-key": secret },
+ });
+
+ expect(result).toEqual({
+ safe: false,
+ reason: "sensitive_content",
+ findings: [{ category: "credential_field", path: "$.headers.x-api-key" }],
+ });
+ expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(secret);
+ });
+
+ test.each([
+ "X-API-Key",
+ "x-auth-token",
+ "authToken",
+ "auth_token",
+ "api_secret",
+ "bearer_token",
+ "passwd",
+ "pwd",
+ "secret_key",
+ "session_token",
+ "signing_key",
+ "ssh_key",
+ ])("blocks %s as a spelling of a name already listed", (field) => {
+ const result = inspectToolArguments({ [field]: "do-not-copy-this-value" });
+
+ expect(result).toMatchObject({ safe: false, reason: "sensitive_content" });
+ expect(result).toMatchObject({
+ findings: [{ category: "credential_field" }],
+ });
+ });
+
+ test.each([
+ "query",
+ "url",
+ "path",
+ "token_count",
+ "max_tokens",
+ "tokenizer",
+ "x_axis",
+ "x_offset",
+ "xml",
+ "secretary",
+ ])("allows %s, which only resembles a credential name", (field) => {
+ expect(inspectToolArguments({ [field]: "ordinary value" })).toEqual({
+ safe: true,
+ });
+ });
});