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Open-source AI coworkers that each get a computer of their own: a browser, files and tools, with every action decided before it happens and recorded after. Bring any AG-UI agent.

Take a proxy password with a bare % as written instead of failing every command (#692)

Omkar Chebale104cc4be4c16
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 45104457..fc493d2d 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@ Newest first. `Unreleased` is what is on `main` and not yet tagged.
## Unreleased
+### A proxy password containing `%` no longer stops every shell command
+
+A proxy password with a `%` that does not start an escape, such as `p%zz`, made decoding it throw.
+- In the computer's shell, which strips proxy credentials before every command, every `/exec`
+ failed as a result.
+- Resolving a Bot's egress proxy failed the same way.
+
+Such a password is now taken as written, and it is still kept out of the shell's environment.
+
### Revoking a credential twice says so, instead of answering a server error
Revoking a credential that was already revoked, or that does not exist, now answers 404 with the
diff --git a/agent-computer/src/egress.ts b/agent-computer/src/egress.ts
index 02f7e085..7fff9bc3 100644
--- a/agent-computer/src/egress.ts
+++ b/agent-computer/src/egress.ts
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ export function splitProxyCredentials(raw: string): Egress {
}
}
- const username = url.username ? decodeURIComponent(url.username) : undefined;
- const password = url.password ? decodeURIComponent(url.password) : undefined;
+ const username = url.username ? decodeUserinfo(url.username) : undefined;
+ const password = url.password ? decodeUserinfo(url.password) : undefined;
url.username = "";
url.password = "";
@@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ export function splitProxyCredentials(raw: string): Egress {
};
}
+/**
+ * A proxy username or password, percent-decoded where it was percent-encoded.
+ *
+ * A `%` not followed by two hex digits is a character somebody typed, not an escape, and
+ * `decodeURIComponent` throws `URIError` on it. That escaped every caller here, which only catches
+ * `TypeError`, and since the shell strips credentials from the proxy variables before every
+ * command, one such password made every `/exec` fail. As written is what was meant.
+ */
+function decodeUserinfo(value: string): string {
+ try {
+ return decodeURIComponent(value);
+ } catch (e) {
+ if (e instanceof URIError) return value;
+ throw e;
+ }
+}
+
/**
* The label for a Bot's egress, for people and for the admin list.
*
diff --git a/agent-computer/tests/egress.test.ts b/agent-computer/tests/egress.test.ts
index c5a57b28..a4f7f4f5 100644
--- a/agent-computer/tests/egress.test.ts
+++ b/agent-computer/tests/egress.test.ts
@@ -91,6 +91,22 @@ describe("resolving a Bot's proxy", () => {
expect(proxy?.server).toBe("proxy.internal:8080");
});
+ test.each([
+ ["http://bot:p%[email protected]:8080", "http://proxy.internal:8080"],
+ ["bot:p%[email protected]:8080", "proxy.internal:8080"],
+ ])("a password with a bare %% is kept as written: %s", (raw, server) => {
+ // A `%` that does not start an escape is a character somebody typed. Decoding it threw a
+ // URIError, which nothing here caught, so every command the shell ran failed along with it.
+ expect(egressFor("sales", { EGRESS_PROXY_SALES: raw })).toEqual({
+ server,
+ username: "bot",
+ password: "p%zz",
+ });
+ expect(egressLabel("sales", { EGRESS_PROXY_SALES: raw })).toBe(
+ "proxy.internal:8080",
+ );
+ });
+
test("something that is not addressable at all is still passed through", () => {
expect(egressFor("sales", { EGRESS_PROXY_SALES: "::::" })).toEqual({
server: "::::",
diff --git a/agent-computer/tests/shell.test.ts b/agent-computer/tests/shell.test.ts
index 959c3506..2533dd76 100644
--- a/agent-computer/tests/shell.test.ts
+++ b/agent-computer/tests/shell.test.ts
@@ -126,6 +126,21 @@ describe("what a command inherits", () => {
expect(JSON.stringify(env)).not.toContain("p@ss");
});
+ test("a proxy password with a bare % is still stripped, and does not stop the command", () => {
+ // Decoding `p%zz` threw a URIError past the redaction, so building the environment failed
+ // and every command with it. It must not fail, and it must not fall back to passing the password.
+ const env = environmentForCommand(
+ source({
+ HTTP_PROXY: "http://bot:p%[email protected]:8080",
+ HTTPS_PROXY: "bot:p%[email protected]:8443",
+ }),
+ workspaceHome,
+ );
+ expect(env.HTTP_PROXY).toBe("http://proxy.internal:8080");
+ expect(env.HTTPS_PROXY).toBe("proxy.internal:8443");
+ expect(JSON.stringify(env)).not.toContain("p%zz");
+ });
+
test("a proxy URL's userinfo does not pass when it was written without a scheme", () => {
// `HTTPS_PROXY=bot:[email protected]:8443` is a shape curl and wget accept. `new URL` reads
// it as the scheme `bot:` and a path, so the redaction above found no userinfo to strip and the