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Open-source AI coworkers that each get a computer of their own: a browser, files and tools, with every action decided before it happens and recorded after. Bring any AG-UI agent.

Keep the database off the network a Bot's shell is on (#218)

beardthelion73ddf542b32f
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index ecd611c5..3ab6e5e2 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -8,6 +8,33 @@ Newest first. `Unreleased` is what is on `main` and not yet tagged.
## Unreleased
+### A Bot's computer is no longer on the same network as the database
+
+Compose declared no networks, so every service shared one and reached the others by service name.
+One of those services is the container a Bot's shell runs in, and another is PostgreSQL, whose
+username and password are in the same file. A shell reaches whatever its container reaches, so a Bot
+could open `postgres:5432` and authenticate: the audit trail, the policy store and the agent tables,
+from the one container whose job is to run what a Bot asks for. The role Compose creates is the
+instance owner, so the trail's append-only trigger was no defence either, being something its owner
+can drop.
+
+PostgreSQL and `migrate`, the only service that reaches it by name, are now on a `data` network of
+their own. Everything else stays where it was. Nothing changes for a deployment that runs the API
+server on the host, which reaches the database through the published port and never used the shared
+network for it. **A deployment that runs the server inside Compose has to join that service to both
+networks**, which is the one place the two are meant to meet.
+
+The published port is now on loopback, as every other port in that file already was. Taking the
+database off the Bots' network removes the name, not the address: a container's default gateway is
+the host, and a port published on every interface answers there. From inside the computer container,
+the gateway on `5432` accepted a connection and began authenticating as `openbot` on `openbot`, with
+the password in the same file. **A deployment that reached the database from another machine over
+this port has to reach it another way**, which is what publishing it on every interface was doing.
+
+This does not reach back in time. A deployment that has been running with the two on one network
+should assume a Bot could have read or written the database, and look at the trail with that in
+mind.
+
### Name the private addresses an agent may live at
Refusing `AGENT_COMPUTER_ALLOW_PRIVATE_HOSTS` in production closed a hole and took something with
diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.yml
index a832ffc0..e2e7cfbc 100644
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@@ -1,12 +1,30 @@
services:
postgres:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17
+ # Off the network the Bots are on, because a Bot's computer is on it and a Bot has a shell.
+ #
+ # With no `networks:` anywhere, Compose puts every service on one network with DNS by service
+ # name, so `agent-computer` could open `postgres:5432` and the credentials three lines below are
+ # in this file. That is the audit trail, the policy store and the agent tables, reachable from
+ # the one container whose whole job is to run what a Bot asks for. `agent-computer/src/shell.ts`
+ # says it plainly: isolation is the container's job, a shell can reach whatever the container
+ # can reach.
+ #
+ # `migrate` is the only service that reaches this by name, so the two of them are all that
+ # belongs here. Everything else that needs the database is outside this file: the API server
+ # runs on the host in local development and connects through the published port below.
environment:
POSTGRES_DB: openbot
POSTGRES_USER: openbot
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: openbot
ports:
- - "${POSTGRES_PORT:-5432}:5432"
+ # Loopback, like every other port in this file, and for the reason the network split above
+ # exists. Published on every interface, this is reachable from the Bot's computer at the
+ # container's default gateway, which is the host: taking `postgres` off that network removes
+ # the name and leaves the address. Proven from inside `agent-computer`, where the gateway on
+ # :5432 answered and began authenticating as `openbot` on `openbot`, with the password in
+ # this file. The server on the host still reaches it, because that is what loopback is.
+ - "127.0.0.1:${POSTGRES_PORT:-5432}:5432"
volumes:
- postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
@@ -14,6 +32,8 @@ services:
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 10
+ networks:
+ - data
migrate:
build:
@@ -26,6 +46,8 @@ services:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
restart: "no"
+ networks:
+ - data
# The Bot's computer is long-lived so browser sessions remain signed in across turns.
agent-computer:
@@ -233,6 +255,16 @@ services:
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
+networks:
+ # The database and the one service that reaches it by name. Nothing a Bot can reach is on it.
+ #
+ # A deployment that runs the API server inside Compose rather than on the host puts that service
+ # on both this and `default`, which is the one place the two are meant to meet.
+ data:
+ # Everything else, which is where `default` already put it. Named here only so that adding a
+ # service without a `networks:` key keeps landing beside the Bots rather than beside the database.
+ default:
+
volumes:
postgres-data:
agent-workspace:
diff --git a/docs/architecture.md b/docs/architecture.md
index 9a0759b7..e8dc5a5c 100644
--- a/docs/architecture.md
+++ b/docs/architecture.md
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ startup.
`agent-computer` requires `COMPUTER_TOKEN` and permits only `/health` without it. Docker Compose binds it to `127.0.0.1:4100`.
+Compose puts it on a different network from PostgreSQL. A Bot has a shell, and a shell reaches whatever its container reaches, so the database is on a `data` network carrying only itself and `migrate`, and everything else is on `default`. A deployment that runs the API server inside Compose rather than on the host joins it to both, which is the one place the two meet.
+
With `COMPUTER_SUPERVISOR_URL`, each Bot gets its own computer container, workspace volume, and browser profile. Without it, all Bots share `AGENT_COMPUTER_URL`.
A command on the computer inherits PATH, locale and terminal names, and the proxy variables, not the rest of the process environment. Userinfo is stripped from a proxy URL. `COMPUTER_SHELL_ENV` names anything else a deployment wants passed.