Open-source AI coworkers that each get a computer of their own: a browser, files and tools, with every action decided before it happens and recorded after. Bring any AG-UI agent.
Keep the database off the network a Bot's shell is on (#218)
beardthelion73ddf542b32f
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex ecd611c5..3ab6e5e2 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -8,6 +8,33 @@ Newest first. `Unreleased` is what is on `main` and not yet tagged.## Unreleased+### A Bot's computer is no longer on the same network as the database++Compose declared no networks, so every service shared one and reached the others by service name.+One of those services is the container a Bot's shell runs in, and another is PostgreSQL, whose+username and password are in the same file. A shell reaches whatever its container reaches, so a Bot+could open `postgres:5432` and authenticate: the audit trail, the policy store and the agent tables,+from the one container whose job is to run what a Bot asks for. The role Compose creates is the+instance owner, so the trail's append-only trigger was no defence either, being something its owner+can drop.++PostgreSQL and `migrate`, the only service that reaches it by name, are now on a `data` network of+their own. Everything else stays where it was. Nothing changes for a deployment that runs the API+server on the host, which reaches the database through the published port and never used the shared+network for it. **A deployment that runs the server inside Compose has to join that service to both+networks**, which is the one place the two are meant to meet.++The published port is now on loopback, as every other port in that file already was. Taking the+database off the Bots' network removes the name, not the address: a container's default gateway is+the host, and a port published on every interface answers there. From inside the computer container,+the gateway on `5432` accepted a connection and began authenticating as `openbot` on `openbot`, with+the password in the same file. **A deployment that reached the database from another machine over+this port has to reach it another way**, which is what publishing it on every interface was doing.++This does not reach back in time. A deployment that has been running with the two on one network+should assume a Bot could have read or written the database, and look at the trail with that in+mind.+### Name the private addresses an agent may live atRefusing `AGENT_COMPUTER_ALLOW_PRIVATE_HOSTS` in production closed a hole and took something withdiff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.ymlindex a832ffc0..e2e7cfbc 100644--- a/docker-compose.yml+++ b/docker-compose.yml@@ -1,12 +1,30 @@services:postgres:image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17+ # Off the network the Bots are on, because a Bot's computer is on it and a Bot has a shell.+ #+ # With no `networks:` anywhere, Compose puts every service on one network with DNS by service+ # name, so `agent-computer` could open `postgres:5432` and the credentials three lines below are+ # in this file. That is the audit trail, the policy store and the agent tables, reachable from+ # the one container whose whole job is to run what a Bot asks for. `agent-computer/src/shell.ts`+ # says it plainly: isolation is the container's job, a shell can reach whatever the container+ # can reach.+ #+ # `migrate` is the only service that reaches this by name, so the two of them are all that+ # belongs here. Everything else that needs the database is outside this file: the API server+ # runs on the host in local development and connects through the published port below.environment:POSTGRES_DB: openbotPOSTGRES_USER: openbotPOSTGRES_PASSWORD: openbotports:- - "${POSTGRES_PORT:-5432}:5432"+ # Loopback, like every other port in this file, and for the reason the network split above+ # exists. Published on every interface, this is reachable from the Bot's computer at the+ # container's default gateway, which is the host: taking `postgres` off that network removes+ # the name and leaves the address. Proven from inside `agent-computer`, where the gateway on+ # :5432 answered and began authenticating as `openbot` on `openbot`, with the password in+ # this file. The server on the host still reaches it, because that is what loopback is.+ - "127.0.0.1:${POSTGRES_PORT:-5432}:5432"volumes:- postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/datahealthcheck:@@ -14,6 +32,8 @@ services:interval: 5stimeout: 5sretries: 10+ networks:+ - datamigrate:build:@@ -26,6 +46,8 @@ services:postgres:condition: service_healthyrestart: "no"+ networks:+ - data# The Bot's computer is long-lived so browser sessions remain signed in across turns.agent-computer:@@ -233,6 +255,16 @@ services:timeout: 5sretries: 5+networks:+ # The database and the one service that reaches it by name. Nothing a Bot can reach is on it.+ #+ # A deployment that runs the API server inside Compose rather than on the host puts that service+ # on both this and `default`, which is the one place the two are meant to meet.+ data:+ # Everything else, which is where `default` already put it. Named here only so that adding a+ # service without a `networks:` key keeps landing beside the Bots rather than beside the database.+ default:+volumes:postgres-data:agent-workspace:diff --git a/docs/architecture.md b/docs/architecture.mdindex 9a0759b7..e8dc5a5c 100644--- a/docs/architecture.md+++ b/docs/architecture.md@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ startup.`agent-computer` requires `COMPUTER_TOKEN` and permits only `/health` without it. Docker Compose binds it to `127.0.0.1:4100`.+Compose puts it on a different network from PostgreSQL. A Bot has a shell, and a shell reaches whatever its container reaches, so the database is on a `data` network carrying only itself and `migrate`, and everything else is on `default`. A deployment that runs the API server inside Compose rather than on the host joins it to both, which is the one place the two meet.+With `COMPUTER_SUPERVISOR_URL`, each Bot gets its own computer container, workspace volume, and browser profile. Without it, all Bots share `AGENT_COMPUTER_URL`.A command on the computer inherits PATH, locale and terminal names, and the proxy variables, not the rest of the process environment. Userinfo is stripped from a proxy URL. `COMPUTER_SHELL_ENV` names anything else a deployment wants passed.