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Refuse the MCP server addresses this check already means to refuse (#206)
beardthelionbc049c121563
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex de47d231..5e37bf41 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -166,6 +166,28 @@ without a word, because the input path looks for a viewer before it looks for anA close now stops casting only when the socket closing is the one that was casting.+### An MCP server address that points inside the deployment is refused in three more spellings++Adding an MCP server by URL is checked before the address is stored, because that form is otherwise a+way to point the deployment at its own network. The check compared the literal hostname, and three+spellings of an address it means to refuse were getting through.++A trailing dot is the root-anchored form of the same name and reaches the same place, but it changed+the string enough that every rule missed it, so `https://localhost./`, `https://printer.local./` and+`https://metadata.google.internal./` were all accepted. `kubernetes.default.svc`, which is how a+service is addressed from inside a cluster, carries dots and none of the listed suffixes, so it read+as an ordinary vendor name.++The third is worth acting on rather than just noting. A credential typed into the address itself,+`https://user:[email protected]/mcp`, was accepted, and the address is stored and named in the+trail as given. Audit redaction works on field names and `url` is not one of the sensitive ones, so+the token was written to `mcp_servers` and to an audit row in clear text. The trail is append-only by+design, so that row cannot be deleted afterwards: **a deployment where somebody has done this should+treat that credential as disclosed and rotate it.** The address field now refuses a credential and+points at the token field instead.++A deployment that reaches its MCP servers by ordinary vendor hostnames sees no difference.+## 0.0.4### A click citing a ref this deployment cannot resolve is refuseddiff --git a/server/src/plugins/catalogue.ts b/server/src/plugins/catalogue.tsindex c63140f8..3c81ef4d 100644--- a/server/src/plugins/catalogue.ts+++ b/server/src/plugins/catalogue.ts@@ -276,7 +276,21 @@ export function customUrlRefusal(raw: string): string | null {return "An MCP server must be reached over https.";}- const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();+ // Userinfo is not part of the host, so none of the host rules below would look at it, and what is+ // typed here is stored verbatim: addCustomServer writes the string into mcp_servers.url and into+ // the configuration.changed audit payload, whose redaction keys on the field name rather than the+ // value. A secret written this way would sit in the trail in clear text. The refusal deliberately+ // does not echo the URL back.+ if (url.username || url.password) {+ return "Put the credential in the token field rather than in the address.";+ }++ // A trailing dot is the root-anchored spelling of the same name and resolves to the same place, so+ // they are stripped here rather than added to each comparison below. Without it "localhost."+ // misses the equality test, "vault.internal." misses the suffix tests, and "database." picks up+ // the dot that the single-label test keys on, so the fully qualified form of every name this+ // function refuses walks straight through it.+ const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.+$/, "");// Bracketed IPv6 arrives with the brackets already stripped by URL, so the colon test catches it.if (host.includes(":") || /^[0-9.]+$/.test(host)) {@@ -289,6 +303,9 @@ export function customUrlRefusal(raw: string): string | null {host.endsWith(".internal") ||host.endsWith(".local") ||host.endsWith(".localdomain") ||+ // How a Kubernetes service is addressed from inside the cluster. It carries dots and none of+ // the suffixes above, so without this it reads as an ordinary vendor name.+ host.endsWith(".svc") ||!host.includes(".")) {return "That address is not reachable from outside this network.";diff --git a/server/tests/plugin-catalogue.test.ts b/server/tests/plugin-catalogue.test.tsindex 5836ae6c..a122a5a7 100644--- a/server/tests/plugin-catalogue.test.ts+++ b/server/tests/plugin-catalogue.test.ts@@ -232,6 +232,58 @@ describe("a URL an administrator typed", () => {expect(customUrlRefusal("https://printer.local/mcp")).not.toBeNull();});+ test("the fully qualified spelling of those names is refused too", () => {+ // A trailing dot is the root-anchored form of the same name and resolves to the same place, so+ // every rule above has to see through it. It defeats them in two different ways: the suffix+ // tests stop matching because the string now ends in the dot, and "database." acquires the dot+ // that the single-label test keys on.+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://localhost./mcp")).not.toBeNull();+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://database./mcp")).not.toBeNull();+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://vault.internal./mcp")).not.toBeNull();+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://printer.local./mcp")).not.toBeNull();+ expect(+ customUrlRefusal("https://metadata.google.internal./computeMetadata/v1/"),+ ).not.toBeNull();+ // More than one, because stripping a single dot leaves a string that still misses every rule.+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://localhost../mcp")).not.toBeNull();+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://vault.internal.../mcp")).not.toBeNull();+ });++ test("an in-cluster service name is refused", () => {+ // .svc is how a Kubernetes service is addressed from inside the cluster. It has dots and none+ // of the other suffixes, so it reads as an ordinary vendor name.+ expect(+ customUrlRefusal("https://kubernetes.default.svc/mcp"),+ ).not.toBeNull();+ expect(+ customUrlRefusal("https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local/mcp"),+ ).not.toBeNull();+ });++ test("a credential in the URL is refused", () => {+ // Userinfo is not part of the host, so every rule above passes it, and addCustomServer then+ // writes the string it was given into mcp_servers.url and into the configuration.changed audit+ // payload. Audit redaction keys on the field name and "url" is not sensitive, so the secret+ // would sit in the trail in clear text.+ expect(+ customUrlRefusal("https://oauth:[email protected]/mcp"),+ ).not.toBeNull();+ expect(+ customUrlRefusal("https://[email protected]/mcp"),+ ).not.toBeNull();+ });++ test("refusing a credential in the URL does not repeat the credential", () => {+ // The refusal is rendered to the administrator and can reach a log, so it must not carry the+ // thing it exists to reject.+ const refusal = customUrlRefusal(+ "https://oauth:[email protected]/mcp",+ );+ expect(refusal).not.toBeNull();+ expect(refusal).not.toContain("s3cret");+ expect(refusal).not.toContain("oauth");+ });+test("nonsense is refused rather than thrown", () => {expect(customUrlRefusal("not a url")).toBe("That is not a URL.");});