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Refuse the MCP server addresses this check already means to refuse (#206)

beardthelionbc049c121563
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index de47d231..5e37bf41 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -166,6 +166,28 @@ without a word, because the input path looks for a viewer before it looks for an
A close now stops casting only when the socket closing is the one that was casting.
+### An MCP server address that points inside the deployment is refused in three more spellings
+
+Adding an MCP server by URL is checked before the address is stored, because that form is otherwise a
+way to point the deployment at its own network. The check compared the literal hostname, and three
+spellings of an address it means to refuse were getting through.
+
+A trailing dot is the root-anchored form of the same name and reaches the same place, but it changed
+the string enough that every rule missed it, so `https://localhost./`, `https://printer.local./` and
+`https://metadata.google.internal./` were all accepted. `kubernetes.default.svc`, which is how a
+service is addressed from inside a cluster, carries dots and none of the listed suffixes, so it read
+as an ordinary vendor name.
+
+The third is worth acting on rather than just noting. A credential typed into the address itself,
+`https://user:[email protected]/mcp`, was accepted, and the address is stored and named in the
+trail as given. Audit redaction works on field names and `url` is not one of the sensitive ones, so
+the token was written to `mcp_servers` and to an audit row in clear text. The trail is append-only by
+design, so that row cannot be deleted afterwards: **a deployment where somebody has done this should
+treat that credential as disclosed and rotate it.** The address field now refuses a credential and
+points at the token field instead.
+
+A deployment that reaches its MCP servers by ordinary vendor hostnames sees no difference.
+
## 0.0.4
### A click citing a ref this deployment cannot resolve is refused
diff --git a/server/src/plugins/catalogue.ts b/server/src/plugins/catalogue.ts
index c63140f8..3c81ef4d 100644
--- a/server/src/plugins/catalogue.ts
+++ b/server/src/plugins/catalogue.ts
@@ -276,7 +276,21 @@ export function customUrlRefusal(raw: string): string | null {
return "An MCP server must be reached over https.";
}
- const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();
+ // Userinfo is not part of the host, so none of the host rules below would look at it, and what is
+ // typed here is stored verbatim: addCustomServer writes the string into mcp_servers.url and into
+ // the configuration.changed audit payload, whose redaction keys on the field name rather than the
+ // value. A secret written this way would sit in the trail in clear text. The refusal deliberately
+ // does not echo the URL back.
+ if (url.username || url.password) {
+ return "Put the credential in the token field rather than in the address.";
+ }
+
+ // A trailing dot is the root-anchored spelling of the same name and resolves to the same place, so
+ // they are stripped here rather than added to each comparison below. Without it "localhost."
+ // misses the equality test, "vault.internal." misses the suffix tests, and "database." picks up
+ // the dot that the single-label test keys on, so the fully qualified form of every name this
+ // function refuses walks straight through it.
+ const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.+$/, "");
// Bracketed IPv6 arrives with the brackets already stripped by URL, so the colon test catches it.
if (host.includes(":") || /^[0-9.]+$/.test(host)) {
@@ -289,6 +303,9 @@ export function customUrlRefusal(raw: string): string | null {
host.endsWith(".internal") ||
host.endsWith(".local") ||
host.endsWith(".localdomain") ||
+ // How a Kubernetes service is addressed from inside the cluster. It carries dots and none of
+ // the suffixes above, so without this it reads as an ordinary vendor name.
+ host.endsWith(".svc") ||
!host.includes(".")
) {
return "That address is not reachable from outside this network.";
diff --git a/server/tests/plugin-catalogue.test.ts b/server/tests/plugin-catalogue.test.ts
index 5836ae6c..a122a5a7 100644
--- a/server/tests/plugin-catalogue.test.ts
+++ b/server/tests/plugin-catalogue.test.ts
@@ -232,6 +232,58 @@ describe("a URL an administrator typed", () => {
expect(customUrlRefusal("https://printer.local/mcp")).not.toBeNull();
});
+ test("the fully qualified spelling of those names is refused too", () => {
+ // A trailing dot is the root-anchored form of the same name and resolves to the same place, so
+ // every rule above has to see through it. It defeats them in two different ways: the suffix
+ // tests stop matching because the string now ends in the dot, and "database." acquires the dot
+ // that the single-label test keys on.
+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://localhost./mcp")).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://database./mcp")).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://vault.internal./mcp")).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://printer.local./mcp")).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(
+ customUrlRefusal("https://metadata.google.internal./computeMetadata/v1/"),
+ ).not.toBeNull();
+ // More than one, because stripping a single dot leaves a string that still misses every rule.
+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://localhost../mcp")).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(customUrlRefusal("https://vault.internal.../mcp")).not.toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ test("an in-cluster service name is refused", () => {
+ // .svc is how a Kubernetes service is addressed from inside the cluster. It has dots and none
+ // of the other suffixes, so it reads as an ordinary vendor name.
+ expect(
+ customUrlRefusal("https://kubernetes.default.svc/mcp"),
+ ).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(
+ customUrlRefusal("https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local/mcp"),
+ ).not.toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ test("a credential in the URL is refused", () => {
+ // Userinfo is not part of the host, so every rule above passes it, and addCustomServer then
+ // writes the string it was given into mcp_servers.url and into the configuration.changed audit
+ // payload. Audit redaction keys on the field name and "url" is not sensitive, so the secret
+ // would sit in the trail in clear text.
+ expect(
+ customUrlRefusal("https://oauth:[email protected]/mcp"),
+ ).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(
+ customUrlRefusal("https://[email protected]/mcp"),
+ ).not.toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ test("refusing a credential in the URL does not repeat the credential", () => {
+ // The refusal is rendered to the administrator and can reach a log, so it must not carry the
+ // thing it exists to reject.
+ const refusal = customUrlRefusal(
+ "https://oauth:[email protected]/mcp",
+ );
+ expect(refusal).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(refusal).not.toContain("s3cret");
+ expect(refusal).not.toContain("oauth");
+ });
+
test("nonsense is refused rather than thrown", () => {
expect(customUrlRefusal("not a url")).toBe("That is not a URL.");
});