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1Password credential sources
OpenCompany retains its encrypted local credential database. A provider can instead enroll an approved 1Password field reference. The application database stores references, ownership, model metadata and public endpoint configuration; it never stores resolved values. Distributed mode accepts these static bindings and configured browser logins, and rejects local/inline/ambient secrets, OAuth refresh stores and machine-local CLI login sessions.
Provisioning and authorization
The pin is 1Password CLI 2.40.0, the official stable release dated 2026-10-01. Use the credential UI's installation command or services.credentials.provision.ensure_cli() during deployment provisioning. This follows the existing project-local pooch download pattern and downloads the versioned official archive into <DATA_DIR>/packages/onepassword/2.40.0.
The executable is verified before execution. Windows uses valid Authenticode with the 1Password/AgileBits publisher; macOS uses Apple's code-signing verification and the publisher Team ID. Linux requires GnuPG, the archive's op.sig, and an exact signature by fingerprint 3FEF9748469ADBE15DA7CA80AC2D62742012EA22. Provisioning retrieves that exact public key into a private verification keyring. A verified install records its SHA-256, which subsequent reads check. An externally supplied executable must pass publisher verification too; manually installed Linux binaries need their corresponding op.sig and the approved verification key. No unverified binary receives a secret-service token.
Set ONEPASSWORD_CLI_PATH to an absolute path when using an operator-provisioned executable. onepassword_status verifies signature/integrity and the pinned version only: it does not sign in, enumerate a vault or resolve a field. Installation and status failures expose fixed error messages, without raw command streams.
ONEPASSWORD_READ_TIMEOUT_SECONDS defaults to 30 (allowed range 1–300).
Each private stdout/stderr pipe is bounded to 64 KiB. Keep bootstrap tokens
in trusted deployment secret configuration; do not put them in graph JSON,
node parameters, serialized Settings or an exported database manifest.
Local defaults use ONEPASSWORD_AUTH_MODE=desktop. Enable CLI integration in the desktop app; optionally select an account with ONEPASSWORD_ACCOUNT. Desktop authorization is broader than an individual OpenCompany binding, so application ownership and binding restrictions are checked independently. A backend running under another operating-system user, a headless service, or an expired/denied desktop grant must be authorized appropriately; there is no fallback to a different account or old local key.
Distributed mode requires ONEPASSWORD_AUTH_MODE=service_account. Supply OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN through trusted deployment configuration, using a dedicated automation vault with read-only field/item access. The private resolver passes it only to its own child process. It deliberately excludes Connect variables, session variables, ambient provider keys and debug options. Ordinary application subprocesses strip every case-insensitive OP_* variable after environment merges; browser processes retain their stricter existing allowlists. Never wrap browser-use in op run or generate a plaintext op inject template.
Enrolling API credentials
Choose 1Password in a supported provider's existing credential panel and enter op://<vault-ID>/<item-ID>/<field>. Named OpenAI-compatible endpoints additionally accept a public base URL and endpoint name. References require vault/item IDs; OTP query parameters and arbitrary CLI options are unsupported. Validation resolves privately, probes the upstream provider, and saves the reference and safe model metadata only after success.
The generic adapter supports a single static API key. Providers that need additional credential fields, custom validation, OAuth or CLI-managed sessions require an explicitly audited adapter and otherwise remain local-only; their existing local forms keep working. This includes multi-field WhatsApp Business credentials. Native model, Apify, Mobile model and speech runtime callers use execution-time resolution with the trusted principal. Dictation availability and employee provider/endpoint catalogues use principal-scoped metadata only.
AuthService.get_credential_source, has_valid_key, get_stored_models and get_model_params read saved metadata without resolving a field. get_api_key preserves the legacy local form behavior but returns no resolved value for a 1Password source. Only resolve_api_key is a runtime secret accessor. Provider Activities call it at execution time, with the authenticated principal; workflow preparation, catalogue reads and model dropdowns use metadata. Unavailable/revoked references fail explicitly and never fall back to an old key. Values have no application-level decrypted cache, so later resolution sees rotation and revocation.
The private subprocess uses fixed op read --no-newline arguments, no shell, closed stdin and bounded private output pipes. It preserves Unicode, leading/trailing whitespace and embedded newlines. Timeouts and cancellation terminate and wait for the child. Errors distinguish unavailable CLI, invalid references, authorization, rate limits and resolution failures through safe codes/messages; raw stdout/stderr are never logged, persisted or returned.
Website login bindings
The Browser profiles panel enrolls username/password references with an exact login origin, a success origin/path and optional success selector. A binding may be restricted to a profile, workflow or employee; server resource authorization validates those restrictions. Saving a website binding does not retrieve a password or grant a desktop authorization. Model-visible discovery returns opaque IDs, labels, origins and supported fields, excluding vault/item references and values.
- Open Credentials → Browser profiles and the website login bindings section.
- Enter a label, exact login origin and approved ID-based username/password references. Select a profile restriction when the login belongs to one profile.
- Configure the expected success origin/path and, where appropriate, a stable success selector. Automated login is limited to a single top-frame form with current username, password and submit references.
- Save the binding, then submit the Browser task. The agent discovers its opaque ID; the owner requests desktop authorization or uses its scoped service account only during private runtime resolution.
Catalogue reads return binding IDs and safe metadata, not saved website secret references. Replacing a website binding requires fresh references; existing workflow/employee restrictions are preserved. Deleting or changing enrollment during an authorization wait invalidates the pending resolution. Use takeover for an unconfigured form, multi-step login, MFA or passkeys.
The browser owner first reads nonsecret metadata with get_browser_credential_binding and enforces policy, Ask first, task ownership and the current login target. It then persists a nonsecret sensitive-login latch, suspends the browser-use daemon and drains/gates captures and page metadata. Only after that can resolve_browser_credentials resolve values for the private CDP fill flow. Resolution rechecks ownership, scopes and the current enrollment after authorization waits. The browser revalidates the tab/frame/targets and origin before effects.
Passwords are filled through the existing private CDP connection. During this phase snapshots, page text, screenshots, vision, WebMCP and ordinary browser operations remain gated. A configured private success check ends the phase. An uncertain submit, changed target, failed suspension or unconfirmed completion retains the gate and requests human login. Ask first/read-only policies never receive an autofill bypass. Multi-step login, MFA and passkeys use existing human takeover.
Before observations resume, private checks require the configured success cues, removal of sensitive fields and no reflected password in the URL or page content. Values are preserved exactly; if the browser normalizes an input, the runtime refuses submission. If the gate remains, Close browser for manual login confirms shutdown before clearing it. Reopen and take control. Owner restart restores the nonsecret gate; it does not replay a fill or assume that prior tab/element references remain valid.
Verification and limits
Automated credential tests use fake subprocesses and nonsecret fixtures: no developer vault is read. Canaries cover exact value preservation, CLI argument/environment containment, bounded pipes, cancellation, safe errors, metadata-only reads, per-call rotation, scoped bindings, revoked enrollment during authorization, and absence of cluster fallback. Browser tests separately cover gated captures and private CDP login.
An isolated Windows smoke test provisioned the official 2.40.0 archive, verified its valid Agilebits publisher signature before executing it, and passed ensure_cli() plus doctor() with {available: true, version: "2.40.0", auth_mode: "desktop"}. This test only executed version inspection; it performed no desktop authorization, service-account authentication or vault access. The verifier excludes inherited PowerShell module paths so a backend launched from PowerShell 7 can also use the Windows PowerShell fallback safely. macOS/Linux publisher verification still needs platform acceptance.
Live desktop authorization remains a deployment acceptance check on the actual backend user/process and supported OS. A signed CLI pin does not establish vault permissions. Run explicitly authorized GitHub login/read-only issue summarization and Gmail human login/invoice summarization smoke tests only after controlled-fixture acceptance. Do not log actual credentials, vault contents or sign-in URLs during smoke testing.
Official references: CLI installation and verification, release notes, read command, desktop authorization, service accounts and Connect precedence.