Self-improving AI Employees for everyone
Python ai-agentsai-employeeai-employeesassistantautonomous-agentsco-employeescompanygrok-botinstinctloop-agentsmuseown-your-datapersonalself-hosted
"""Unit tests for ``services.plugin.identifiers``.
Locks the contract for ``NODE_TYPE_PATTERN`` / ``is_valid_node_type``
— the input sanitizer that gates URL-facing plugin lookups
(``GET /api/schemas/nodes/{node_type}/icon`` etc.). A regression here
would re-open the ``py/path-injection`` CodeQL alerts that fixed
``server/nodes/_visuals.py:get_plugin_icon_path`` cleared.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import pytest
from services.plugin.identifiers import NODE_TYPE_PATTERN, is_valid_node_type
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Positive cases — every shape registered ``BaseNode.type`` values take
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value",
[
# Real-world examples from the registry.
"aiAgent",
"openaiChatModel",
"anthropicChatModel",
"geminiChatModel",
"claude_code_agent",
"browser",
"gmaps_create",
"gmaps_nearby_places",
"whatsappSend",
"twitterReceive",
"fileRead",
# Edge shapes still inside the contract.
"A",
"_leading_underscore",
"x1",
"snake_case_lots_of_underscores",
"camelCaseMixed123",
],
)
def test_accepts_valid_identifiers(value: str) -> None:
assert is_valid_node_type(value) is True
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Negative cases — every shape an attacker might try via URL injection
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value",
[
"", # empty
"1leading_digit", # digit prefix
"with space", # whitespace
"with-hyphen", # hyphen (not a Python identifier char)
"with.dot", # dot (path separator on URLs)
"with/slash", # path separator
"with\\backslash", # Windows separator
"..", # parent-dir token
"../etc/passwd", # classic traversal
"..\\windows\\system32", # Windows traversal
"foo\x00bar", # null byte truncation
"foo\nbar", # newline / CRLF injection
"foo\rbar",
"%2e%2e%2fetc", # URL-encoded traversal
" leading_space",
"trailing_space ",
"tab\there",
"foo;bar", # command separator
"foo|bar", # pipe
"$VAR", # shell expansion
"${HOME}",
"foo'bar", # quote
'foo"bar',
"foo`bar", # backtick (command substitution)
],
)
def test_rejects_traversal_and_injection_vectors(value: str) -> None:
assert is_valid_node_type(value) is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Defensive type-check — URL params can be ``None`` if a typed dict
# decoder hands forward a missing key.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize("value", [None, 123, b"aiAgent", ["aiAgent"], object()])
def test_rejects_non_string(value) -> None:
assert is_valid_node_type(value) is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Wire-format invariant — the pattern string is consumed verbatim by
# FastAPI's ``Path(pattern=...)`` constraint in routers/schemas.py.
# Re-compiling here proves the string is a valid regex and verifies the
# two consumers (FastAPI side + Python side) match on a few canonical
# values.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_pattern_string_is_valid_regex() -> None:
compiled = re.compile(NODE_TYPE_PATTERN)
assert compiled.fullmatch("aiAgent") is not None
assert compiled.fullmatch("../etc/passwd") is None
def test_pattern_string_anchors_full_match_only() -> None:
"""``fullmatch`` semantics — the ``^`` / ``$`` anchors must not
allow ``re.search`` to find the pattern as a substring of a hostile
URL value. FastAPI's ``pattern=`` uses ``re.match`` (anchored at
start only), but the ``$`` anchor blocks suffix injection."""
compiled = re.compile(NODE_TYPE_PATTERN)
assert compiled.fullmatch("aiAgent/../etc/passwd") is None
assert compiled.fullmatch("aiAgent\x00../etc") is None