Self-improving AI Employees for everyone
Python ai-agentsai-employeeai-employeesassistantautonomous-agentsco-employeescompanygrok-botinstinctloop-agentsmuseown-your-datapersonalself-hosted
fix(security): clear 13 CodeQL alerts (Tier 1 + 2 + 5)
trohitg02704b575b8a
diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.ymlindex 09a4e3a2..fcc3bdc7 100644--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml@@ -9,6 +9,12 @@ on:pull_request:branches: [main]+# Minimum-privilege GITHUB_TOKEN for the implicit calls inside+# actions (checkout, etc.). Reusable workflows called below declare+# their own permissions; this one needs read-only at most.+permissions:+ contents: read+jobs:predeploy:uses: ./.github/workflows/predeploy.ymldiff --git a/.github/workflows/docs.yml b/.github/workflows/docs.ymlindex e465bf12..718a004c 100644--- a/.github/workflows/docs.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/docs.yml@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ on:- 'docs-MachinaOs/**'workflow_dispatch:+permissions:+ contents: read+jobs:deploy:runs-on: ubuntu-latestdiff --git a/.github/workflows/predeploy.yml b/.github/workflows/predeploy.ymlindex a1c15e90..8eed612c 100644--- a/.github/workflows/predeploy.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/predeploy.yml@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ name: Predeployon:workflow_call:+permissions:+ contents: read+jobs:build-and-lint:runs-on: ubuntu-latestdiff --git a/.github/workflows/test-install.yml b/.github/workflows/test-install.ymlindex 4cdefbb6..5480ea13 100644--- a/.github/workflows/test-install.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/test-install.yml@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ on:workflow_dispatch:workflow_call:+permissions:+ contents: read+jobs:# Test npm install from registry (post-release)test-npm-install:diff --git a/server/nodejs/src/index.ts b/server/nodejs/src/index.tsindex 202876ff..a79d4f06 100644--- a/server/nodejs/src/index.ts+++ b/server/nodejs/src/index.ts@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@import express, { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';import vm from 'node:vm';-import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';import path from 'node:path';import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';@@ -65,6 +65,14 @@ app.post('/execute', (req: Request, res: Response) => {try {const context = vm.createContext(sandbox);+ // This service IS the sandboxed JS executor for the pythonExecutor /+ // javascriptExecutor workflow nodes. Node's `vm` is not a security+ // boundary (per https://nodejs.org/api/vm.html#vmcreatecontextcontextobject-options);+ // the deployment context is: server binds to localhost only (line 16,+ // default 'localhost') and is invoked exclusively by the same-machine+ // Python backend via NodeJSClient. Public network exposure is the+ // operator's responsibility.+ // codeql[js/code-injection]vm.runInContext(code, context, { timeout, filename: 'user-code.js' });res.json({@@ -83,7 +91,11 @@ app.post('/execute', (req: Request, res: Response) => {}});-// Install packages - package list from request+// Install packages - package list from request.+// Localhost-only service (see server.listen at the bottom); same trust+// boundary as the /execute sandbox. No request-rate limiting because the+// only caller is the same-machine Python backend.+// codeql[js/missing-rate-limiting]app.post('/packages/install', (req: Request, res: Response) => {const { packages } = req.body as { packages: string[] };@@ -100,17 +112,22 @@ app.post('/packages/install', (req: Request, res: Response) => {}try {- execSync(`npm install ${packages.join(' ')}`, { cwd: USER_PACKAGES_DIR, timeout: 60000 });+ // execFileSync (argv array, no shell) instead of execSync with template+ // string. The regex above already validates names, but going through+ // execFileSync removes the shell from the path entirely as+ // defense-in-depth.+ execFileSync('npm', ['install', ...packages], { cwd: USER_PACKAGES_DIR, timeout: 60000 });res.json({ success: true, message: `Installed: ${packages.join(', ')}` });} catch (error) {res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) });}});-// List packages+// List packages — same localhost-only trust boundary as above.+// codeql[js/missing-rate-limiting]app.get('/packages', (_req: Request, res: Response) => {try {- const output = execSync('npm list --json --depth=0', { cwd: USER_PACKAGES_DIR, encoding: 'utf-8' });+ const output = execFileSync('npm', ['list', '--json', '--depth=0'], { cwd: USER_PACKAGES_DIR, encoding: 'utf-8' });res.json({ success: true, packages: JSON.parse(output).dependencies || {} });} catch {res.json({ success: true, packages: {} });diff --git a/server/nodes/android/_router.py b/server/nodes/android/_router.pyindex 558e1a6b..20152e4c 100644--- a/server/nodes/android/_router.py+++ b/server/nodes/android/_router.py@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@"""Android System Services routes."""-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends+import re++from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPExceptionfrom pydantic import BaseModel, Fieldfrom typing import Dict, Any@@ -11,6 +13,20 @@ from services.plugin.deps import get_android_servicelogger = get_logger(__name__)router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/android", tags=["android"])+# ADB device IDs: USB serials (alphanumeric), TCP "host:port" (digits + dots+# + colon), or "emulator-NNNN". All are safe characters but we lock the+# accepted set explicitly so untrusted input can't slip a flag or path+# separator into the argv list we pass to subprocess.run. Anything outside+# `[A-Za-z0-9._:-]` (and longer than 64 chars) is rejected with 400.+_DEVICE_ID_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,64}$")+++def _validate_device_id(device_id: str) -> str:+ """Return device_id if it matches the ADB device-id shape, else 400."""+ if not _DEVICE_ID_PATTERN.fullmatch(device_id):+ raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid device_id")+ return device_id+class AndroidServiceRequest(BaseModel):"""Request model for Android service execution."""@@ -195,9 +211,12 @@ async def setup_port_forwarding(device_port: int = 8888):"""Setup ADB port forwarding for Android device communication."""+ device_id = _validate_device_id(device_id)import subprocesstry:# Setup port forwarding: adb -s device_id forward tcp:local_port tcp:device_port+ # device_id passes _DEVICE_ID_PATTERN above; subprocess.run is called+ # with an argv list (no shell), so no further interpolation risk.cmd = ["adb", "-s", device_id, "forward", f"tcp:{local_port}", f"tcp:{device_port}"]result = subprocess.run(