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fix(security): close two open CodeQL py/path-injection alerts on plugin-icon resolution

trohitg7700f87eaeed
diff --git a/server/nodes/_visuals.py b/server/nodes/_visuals.py
index f3668d2e..6327e13c 100644
--- a/server/nodes/_visuals.py
+++ b/server/nodes/_visuals.py
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ import json
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict, Optional
+from services.plugin.identifiers import is_valid_node_type
+
_VISUALS_PATH = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "visuals.json"
@@ -99,6 +101,8 @@ def get_plugin_meta(node_type: str, key: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[dict
"""
from services.node_registry import get_node_class
+ if not is_valid_node_type(node_type):
+ return None
cls = get_node_class(node_type)
if cls is None:
return None
@@ -156,6 +160,8 @@ def get_plugin_icon_path(node_type: str, variant: str = "light") -> Optional[Pat
# itself doesn't import _visuals, but plugin modules import both).
from services.node_registry import get_node_class
+ if not is_valid_node_type(node_type):
+ return None
cls = get_node_class(node_type)
if cls is None:
return None
diff --git a/server/routers/schemas.py b/server/routers/schemas.py
index 60dcae84..36992a95 100644
--- a/server/routers/schemas.py
+++ b/server/routers/schemas.py
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ the design rationale and docs-internal/schema_source_of_truth_rfc.md
for the frontend consumer (useNodeOutputSchemaQuery).
"""
-from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Query, Response
+from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Path, Query, Response
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
from nodes._visuals import get_plugin_icon_path
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from services.node_output_schemas import (
list_node_types_with_schema,
)
from services.node_spec import get_node_spec, list_node_groups, list_node_types_with_spec
+from services.plugin.identifiers import NODE_TYPE_PATTERN
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/schemas", tags=["schemas"])
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ async def get_credential_icon(provider: str):
@router.get("/nodes/{node_type}/icon")
async def get_node_icon(
- node_type: str,
+ node_type: str = Path(..., pattern=NODE_TYPE_PATTERN),
variant: str = Query("light", pattern="^(light|dark)$"),
):
"""Return the plugin folder's co-located ``icon.svg``.
diff --git a/server/services/plugin/identifiers.py b/server/services/plugin/identifiers.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..13e8fc0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/server/services/plugin/identifiers.py
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"""Shape validation for plugin identifiers used in URL routes + lookups.
+
+Plugin node types (and credential provider ids) follow Python-identifier
+rules: a letter or underscore followed by word characters. URL-facing
+routes (``GET /api/schemas/nodes/{node_type}/icon`` etc.) and internal
+helpers (``nodes._visuals.get_plugin_icon_path`` etc.) both validate
+against this constraint to reject path-traversal injections at the
+boundary.
+
+Why this lives here (not inline at each callsite):
+
+- One source of truth for the regex pattern. FastAPI consumes the raw
+ pattern string via ``Path(pattern=...)``; Python code consumes the
+ pre-compiled validator via :func:`is_valid_node_type`. Keeping the
+ pattern in one module guarantees the route-level and function-level
+ checks stay in lockstep.
+- Recognised by CodeQL's ``py/path-injection`` taint analysis as a
+ sanitizer — the canonical "regex fullmatch on user input" pattern
+ (see https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/python/py-path-injection/).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from typing import Final
+
+
+# Letter/underscore then word chars — the shape every registered
+# ``BaseNode.type`` and ``Credential.id`` follows. Exposed as a raw
+# string so FastAPI's ``Path(pattern=...)`` / ``Query(pattern=...)``
+# can consume it directly.
+NODE_TYPE_PATTERN: Final[str] = r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$"
+
+_NODE_TYPE_RE: Final[re.Pattern[str]] = re.compile(NODE_TYPE_PATTERN)
+
+
+def is_valid_node_type(value: str) -> bool:
+ """True if ``value`` matches :data:`NODE_TYPE_PATTERN`.
+
+ Treats ``None`` / non-string input as invalid (defensive — the
+ type hint is ``str`` but callers may forward URL params verbatim).
+ """
+ if not isinstance(value, str):
+ return False
+ return bool(_NODE_TYPE_RE.fullmatch(value))
+
+
+__all__ = ["NODE_TYPE_PATTERN", "is_valid_node_type"]
diff --git a/server/tests/services/test_identifiers.py b/server/tests/services/test_identifiers.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ae88e21d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/server/tests/services/test_identifiers.py
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+"""Unit tests for ``services.plugin.identifiers``.
+
+Locks the contract for ``NODE_TYPE_PATTERN`` / ``is_valid_node_type``
+— the input sanitizer that gates URL-facing plugin lookups
+(``GET /api/schemas/nodes/{node_type}/icon`` etc.). A regression here
+would re-open the ``py/path-injection`` CodeQL alerts that fixed
+``server/nodes/_visuals.py:get_plugin_icon_path`` cleared.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+
+import pytest
+
+from services.plugin.identifiers import NODE_TYPE_PATTERN, is_valid_node_type
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Positive cases — every shape registered ``BaseNode.type`` values take
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+ "value",
+ [
+ # Real-world examples from the registry.
+ "aiAgent",
+ "openaiChatModel",
+ "anthropicChatModel",
+ "geminiChatModel",
+ "claude_code_agent",
+ "browser",
+ "gmaps_create",
+ "gmaps_nearby_places",
+ "whatsappSend",
+ "twitterReceive",
+ "fileRead",
+ # Edge shapes still inside the contract.
+ "A",
+ "_leading_underscore",
+ "x1",
+ "snake_case_lots_of_underscores",
+ "camelCaseMixed123",
+ ],
+)
+def test_accepts_valid_identifiers(value: str) -> None:
+ assert is_valid_node_type(value) is True
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Negative cases — every shape an attacker might try via URL injection
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+ "value",
+ [
+ "", # empty
+ "1leading_digit", # digit prefix
+ "with space", # whitespace
+ "with-hyphen", # hyphen (not a Python identifier char)
+ "with.dot", # dot (path separator on URLs)
+ "with/slash", # path separator
+ "with\\backslash", # Windows separator
+ "..", # parent-dir token
+ "../etc/passwd", # classic traversal
+ "..\\windows\\system32", # Windows traversal
+ "foo\x00bar", # null byte truncation
+ "foo\nbar", # newline / CRLF injection
+ "foo\rbar",
+ "%2e%2e%2fetc", # URL-encoded traversal
+ " leading_space",
+ "trailing_space ",
+ "tab\there",
+ "foo;bar", # command separator
+ "foo|bar", # pipe
+ "$VAR", # shell expansion
+ "${HOME}",
+ "foo'bar", # quote
+ "foo\"bar",
+ "foo`bar", # backtick (command substitution)
+ ],
+)
+def test_rejects_traversal_and_injection_vectors(value: str) -> None:
+ assert is_valid_node_type(value) is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Defensive type-check — URL params can be ``None`` if a typed dict
+# decoder hands forward a missing key.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
[email protected]("value", [None, 123, b"aiAgent", ["aiAgent"], object()])
+def test_rejects_non_string(value) -> None:
+ assert is_valid_node_type(value) is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Wire-format invariant — the pattern string is consumed verbatim by
+# FastAPI's ``Path(pattern=...)`` constraint in routers/schemas.py.
+# Re-compiling here proves the string is a valid regex and verifies the
+# two consumers (FastAPI side + Python side) match on a few canonical
+# values.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_pattern_string_is_valid_regex() -> None:
+ compiled = re.compile(NODE_TYPE_PATTERN)
+ assert compiled.fullmatch("aiAgent") is not None
+ assert compiled.fullmatch("../etc/passwd") is None
+
+
+def test_pattern_string_anchors_full_match_only() -> None:
+ """``fullmatch`` semantics — the ``^`` / ``$`` anchors must not
+ allow ``re.search`` to find the pattern as a substring of a hostile
+ URL value. FastAPI's ``pattern=`` uses ``re.match`` (anchored at
+ start only), but the ``$`` anchor blocks suffix injection."""
+ compiled = re.compile(NODE_TYPE_PATTERN)
+ assert compiled.fullmatch("aiAgent/../etc/passwd") is None
+ assert compiled.fullmatch("aiAgent\x00../etc") is None