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ci(dependabot): disable all update PRs; keep the ecosystem map only
trohitg8724eab7ff3d
diff --git a/.github/dependabot.yml b/.github/dependabot.ymlindex beebac45..16a7f982 100644--- a/.github/dependabot.yml+++ b/.github/dependabot.yml@@ -1,71 +1,51 @@-# Dependabot policy: SECURITY UPDATES ONLY.+# Dependabot is DISABLED by policy (2026-09-12): no version-update PRs and no+# security-update PRs. Dependencies move by hand, alongside test runs:+# JS -> bump the range in the relevant package.json (or the top-level+# `overrides` block for transitive pins), `bun install`, run tests+# pip -> `uv lock --upgrade-package <name>` in server/, `uv sync`, tests+# Alerts stay visible in the repository's Security tab.#-# Version-update PRs are deliberately disabled (open-pull-requests-limit: 0).-# History: weekly version bumps produced 12-26 PRs/week, ~89% closed unmerged-# (105 PRs May-Aug 2026; see docs-internal/ci_cd.md "Dependency update-# policy"). Dependencies move deliberately, alongside test runs - not-# piecemeal. Security PRs are NOT affected by the limit or the schedule:-# they open as soon as a fixable vulnerability is disclosed.+# Why this file still exists: without an entry for a directory, Dependabot+# routes that directory's alerts to whatever updater it guesses, and for a+# bun.lock tree it guesses npm_and_yarn, which cannot read bun.lock and fails+# every run ("can't update vulnerable dependencies for projects without a+# lockfile or pinned version requirement", desktop/vitest, 2026-09-11). The+# entries below keep every surface mapped to the right ecosystem while the+# `ignore: "*"` rule stops every PR, security updates included.#-# Do not "fix" the 0 limits without reading the ci_cd.md section first.+# Turning Dependabot's security-update attempts off entirely is a repository+# setting (Settings > Code security > Dependabot), not something this file+# can do; see docs-internal/ci_cd.md "Dependency update policy".version: 2updates:- # bun - the root bun workspace covers package.json, client/, and- # server/nodejs/ through the single bun.lock. (A former `/server`- # entry pointed at a manifest deleted in d0e1b816 and was removed.)- # NOTE: the bun ecosystem supports version updates only - Dependabot- # does NOT open security-update PRs for bun.lock (alerts still fire- # from the dependency graph). The top-level `overrides` block in- # package.json is this repo's actual security-pin remediation channel.- package-ecosystem: bundirectory: /schedule:- interval: weekly+ interval: monthlyopen-pull-requests-limit: 0- groups:- bun-security:- applies-to: security-updates- patterns: ["*"]+ ignore:+ - dependency-name: "*"- # bun - the desktop shell is a standalone bun package with its own- # bun.lock (deliberately not a root workspace member). Without this entry- # Dependabot routed the desktop's security alerts to its npm_and_yarn- # updater, which cannot read bun.lock and failed every run with- # "can't update vulnerable dependencies for projects without a lockfile- # or pinned version requirement" (the 2026-09-11 vitest alert). The same- # caveat as the root applies: alerts fire, remediation is a manual bump.- package-ecosystem: bundirectory: /desktopschedule:- interval: weekly+ interval: monthlyopen-pull-requests-limit: 0- groups:- desktop-bun-security:- applies-to: security-updates- patterns: ["*"]+ ignore:+ - dependency-name: "*"- # pip - the server runtime. Authoritative manifest: server/pyproject.toml;- # the committed requirements.txt (a `uv export` of the transitive tree)- # doubles as the pinned surface security updates can patch. (A former root- # `pip: /` entry never updated the root CLI pyproject - its >= floors need- # no PRs - and only re-bumped server/requirements.txt, duplicating this- # entry's PRs; it was removed.)- package-ecosystem: pipdirectory: /serverschedule:- interval: weekly+ interval: monthlyopen-pull-requests-limit: 0- groups:- pip-security:- applies-to: security-updates- patterns: ["*"]+ ignore:+ - dependency-name: "*"- package-ecosystem: github-actionsdirectory: /schedule:- interval: weekly+ interval: monthlyopen-pull-requests-limit: 0- groups:- actions-security:- applies-to: security-updates- patterns: ["*"]+ ignore:+ - dependency-name: "*"diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.mdindex dabd3be1..9eef3ab6 100644--- a/CONTRIBUTING.md+++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ The desktop shell has its own package: `cd desktop && bun install && bun run sta**Known differences from pnpm** (the workspace migrated from pnpm@9 to [email protected]):- **No strict-peer-dependencies equivalent.** bun never errors on peer conflicts, so the check that kept client `typescript` inside typescript-eslint's peer range is gone from install time — the CLI test locking client `typescript` to `^5` (`cli/tests/test_release_pipeline_config.py`) is now the only guard.-- **Dependabot's `bun` ecosystem does version updates only — no security-update PRs.** Alerts still fire; remediation goes through the top-level `overrides` block in the root `package.json` (the pins formerly under `pnpm.overrides`).+- **Dependabot is disabled (no PRs of any kind).** Alerts still show in the Security tab; remediation is a hand bump, through the top-level `overrides` block in the root `package.json` for transitive JS pins (the pins formerly under `pnpm.overrides`) or `uv lock --upgrade-package` for the server. See [ci_cd.md](docs-internal/ci_cd.md) "Dependency update policy".- **`--bun` is not enabled anywhere — but Node is dev/CI-only now.** Everything shipped runs on bun: the `company` shim (`bin/cli.js`, `#!/usr/bin/env bun`), the JS executor sidecar (`bun build --target=bun` bundle), the plugin CLIs `bun add`ed into `~/.opencompany/packages/` (`server/core/js_runtime.py`) and the end-user install itself. Node (CI installs 22) is kept only so bun can run vite / vitest / eslint / playwright / electron-builder on it via their node shebangs when it is present — vitest and eslint have open bugs on the bun runtime (oven-sh/bun#20762, #13346) — and `company build` reports Node as optional (bun runs the build tools itself when it is absent). A trial of `--bun` for `vite dev` only remains a documented follow-up; never for vitest/eslint.Full setup and scripts reference: [SETUP.md](docs-internal/SETUP.md) - [SCRIPTS.md](docs-internal/SCRIPTS.md)diff --git a/docs-internal/ci_cd.md b/docs-internal/ci_cd.mdindex 111c7dac..77ea90a2 100644--- a/docs-internal/ci_cd.md+++ b/docs-internal/ci_cd.md@@ -202,49 +202,43 @@ folder — both the folder and the workflow are gone.| `.github/workflows/desktop-ci.yml` | Desktop shell checks on PRs: typecheck, unit, invariants, build, Playwright smoke || `.github/workflows/desktop-release.yml` | Tag-triggered desktop installers (NSIS / DMG+zip / AppImage+deb) into a draft release, then undraft. Separate from `release.yml` so npm publish is never blocked || `.github/actions/setup/action.yml` | Composite: bun + Node + Python + uv + editable CLI install |-| `.github/dependabot.yml` | **Security updates only** — version-update PRs disabled; see below |+| `.github/dependabot.yml` | **Dependabot disabled** — every entry ignores `*`, so no version or security PRs; the entries exist only to keep alerts routed to the right updater; see below || `.python-version` | Toolchain pin (`3.12`) — single source of truth |----## Dependency update policy (security-only)--Dependabot raises **security PRs only**; routine version bumps are disabled-(`open-pull-requests-limit: 0` on every entry — the limit affects version-updates only; security PRs are exempt from both the limit and the schedule-and are grouped per ecosystem via `applies-to: security-updates`).--Four entries cover the real surfaces: `bun /` (bun workspace spans root +-`client/` + `server/nodejs/`), `bun /desktop` (the standalone desktop-package with its own `bun.lock`), `pip /server` (authoritative-`server/pyproject.toml`; the committed `requirements.txt` export is the-transitive-pin surface security fixes patch), `github-actions /`. A former-`pip: /` entry (duplicate churn against `server/requirements.txt`) and a-dead `npm: /server` entry were removed.--**Caveat on the `bun` ecosystem**: Dependabot's `bun` support does version-updates only — it never raises security-update PRs, so the security-only-posture above yields no automated PRs at all for the JS workspace. Alerts-still fire; the remediation channel is the top-level `overrides` block in-the root `package.json` (the ranged pins formerly under `pnpm.overrides`)-plus a hand bump of the affected range. Do not expect the "Dependabot-Updates" workflow to do it: before `bun /desktop` existed, a desktop alert-(vitest, 2026-09-11) was routed to the `npm_and_yarn` updater, which cannot-read `bun.lock`, sees only the `^` range in `package.json`, and fails every-run with "can't update vulnerable dependencies for projects without a-lockfile or pinned version requirement". The fix was the bump itself-(`bun add -d vitest@^4.1.11` in `desktop/`, `^4.1.11` in `client/`), which-closes the alert and stops the job.--Repo-level alerts + security updates must stay enabled — verify with-`gh api repos/zeenie-ai/OpenCompany/vulnerability-alerts` (204 = enabled).--Re-enable version updates deliberately, never by just deleting the limits:-raise `open-pull-requests-limit`, set `schedule.interval: monthly`, add-`groups` with `patterns: ["*"]` + `update-types: [minor, patch]`, and-`cooldown: {semver-major-days: 30}`. Stored comment-ignores (`mcp` 2.x,-`websockets` 17.x) are inspectable via `@dependabot show <dep> ignore-conditions`.+## Dependency update policy (Dependabot disabled)++Dependabot opens **no pull requests**, neither version bumps nor security+updates (disabled 2026-09-12). Every entry in `.github/dependabot.yml`+carries `open-pull-requests-limit: 0` and `ignore: dependency-name: "*"`;+the ignore rule is what also stops security-update PRs. Dependencies move+by hand, alongside test runs:++- JS: bump the range in the relevant `package.json` (or the top-level+ `overrides` block in the root manifest for transitive pins), `bun install`,+ run the suites.+- pip: `uv lock --upgrade-package <name>` in `server/`, `uv sync`, run the+ suites (`predeploy.yml` runs `uv lock --check`).++The file is kept rather than deleted because of how alerts are routed:+a directory with no entry gets whatever updater Dependabot guesses, and for+a `bun.lock` tree it guesses `npm_and_yarn`, which cannot read `bun.lock`+and fails every run ("can't update vulnerable dependencies for projects+without a lockfile or pinned version requirement", the desktop vitest alert+of 2026-09-11). The four entries (`bun /`, `bun /desktop`, `pip /server`,+`github-actions /`) keep every surface mapped to the right ecosystem so+that never happens again.++Alerts themselves still appear in the repository's Security tab; they are+useful and cost nothing. Dependabot's own security-update attempts are a+repository setting (Settings > Code security > Dependabot), not something+the config file controls; turn them off there if the "Dependabot Updates"+job should stop running entirely.++Re-enable updates deliberately, never by just deleting the ignore rules:+raise `open-pull-requests-limit`, add `groups` with `patterns: ["*"]` ++`update-types: [minor, patch]`, and `cooldown: {semver-major-days: 30}`.---