AI-powered virtual executive team — a single coherent executive persona backed by 8 specialist agents (FastAPI + Next.js).
feat(chat): let a later-registered adapter cut its own old chat history (#416)
Rufus07d6af53ab01
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/api/main.py b/packages/core/openexecutive/api/main.pyindex 2c7978a6..869139c3 100644--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/api/main.py+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/api/main.py@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncIterator[None]:# same quiet-gap rule new messages follow (memory.conversations).from openexecutive.memory.conversations import split_existing_streamstry:- split_existing_streams()+ await asyncio.to_thread(split_existing_streams)except Exception:logging.getLogger("openexecutive").exception("chat-app conversation split failed")diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/architecture-facts.yaml b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/architecture-facts.yamlindex 40d9c0e4..1ac6a8e5 100644--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/architecture-facts.yaml+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/architecture-facts.yaml@@ -6993,6 +6993,11 @@ integrations:once per DB (app_migrations): old history is cut by the samerule, each part titled from its first message, a read-mail lockcarried to every part with mail_read_at unknown (fails closed).+ • An adapter outside the package registers its streams with+ conversation_ids.register_rolling and runs+ split_existing_streams(migration=<its own name>, only=<its base+ ids>) once, since the built-in sweep may have run before it+ registered. Boot runs the sweep off the event loop (to_thread).channel_access: |Channel access splits into INBOUND (does the message reach theExecutive at all?) and OUTBOUND (can the Executive reply via thediff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/integrations.json b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/integrations.jsonindex cdbca091..2a2f63f3 100644--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/integrations.json+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/integrations.json@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@{"section_id": "integrations","title": "Integrations",- "markdown": "External channels connect callers to the Executive. Each inbound adapter resolves the sender to a Person — the chat adapters via `find_person_by_{slack,discord,telegram}_id`, the email poller via `people.identity.resolve_email_sender` (a primary address or an alias, then the company-domain rule; see Org) — and threads `person_id` into `Executive.chat()`. A sender who resolves to nobody is no longer simply dropped: see **New senders (roster requests)** below.\n\n### Inbound channels\n\n- **Slack** (`integrations.slack_bot`) — async Bolt socket-mode (`AsyncApp` + `AsyncSocketModeHandler`) embedded in the lifespan; responds to `@mention`s, DMs, and thread continuations, with per-conversation session memory (see **Conversation state** below). Text only: there is no interactivity endpoint and no Block Kit, so nothing Slack sends carries a button.\n- **Discord** (`integrations.discord_bot`) — discord.py gateway embedded in the lifespan; per-thread auto-titling, session-scoped memory, author attribution, configurable `@mention` thread promotion.\n- **Telegram** — webhook gating + per-chat history.\n- **Google Chat** — webhook + service-account auth. It resolves no approval gates and has no roster gate (the webhook authenticates Google, not the sender), and it never populates the session's trusted alert ids, so `ack_alert`'s trust check — which now runs on every session rather than only those declaring an `origin_channel` — refuses there by default, and its `<channel>` block says plainly that a sign-off cannot be answered from it.\n- **Email** (`integrations.email_poller`) — MCP poll loop over the Executive's own mailbox — Gmail via `workspace-mcp` or Outlook via `ms-365-mcp-server`, chosen by `EMAIL_PROVIDER` (see *Workspace providers* below); it starts only once the MCP gateway is up, never surfaces Reply-To redirects, filters auto-replies. Its sessions carry `origin_channel=\"email\"`: the untrusted-content policy (`orchestrator.content_trust`) reads that tag to tell mail from the principal's own surfaces — left empty, as it once was, every stranger's body reached the decision extractor as the principal's words. The mail goes into the turn inside an `<untrusted_content source=\"email\" author=\"<sender>\" author_verified=\"no\">` block that says it carries none of the principal's authority, with the framing line and any `[POLICY]` notice outside it; mail from the principal's primary address that Gmail authenticated (`dmarc=pass`) is their own words — but only their new text goes in unwrapped: when the mail quotes or forwards another message (`_new_text_lines` cut something), the message as received follows in an `<untrusted_content source=\"email_quoted\">` block, since a stranger's text they replied to or passed on is not theirs. While the Executive is paused (`scheduler.pause`) it skips each poll and leaves the inbox unread, so held mail is processed on the first poll after resume; the chat adapters above are not paused. The Executive sees the whole message; peer memory records only `_email_memory_text` — the subject, the sender's new text (cut at the first quoted or forwarded message) and the attachment filenames — parsed from the rendered message with any trailing `--- REPLY ---` block dropped first, without backtracking-prone regexes, since the text is sender-controlled, and only for a rostered sender, the only kind with a peer to record into. The poller's `integration_inbound` row keeps the mail's text for the audit log, the way the reply's `chat_turn` row keeps the Executive's answer: `full.message` is the sender's new text (what web chat keeps for a turn), `full.attachments` the attachment filenames, and `details.preview` the first 120 characters of the new text, so /audit shows what was asked next to what was answered (the summary still reads `Inbound email from <sender>: <subject>`). The whole body with its quoted chain (`full.body`) is kept only on a row private to the principal: the chain is other people's mail — a contact's, on the principal's reply to one — and every signed-in user reads a public row. Each field is cut by its escaped JSON length (20,000 characters of text, 8,000 of attachment names), the measure the logger's 64 KB cap uses, so a long mail in a non-Latin script loses its tail rather than the row's structure. Outbound, the principal briefs and the client-rotation digest are emailed through the same gateway with the configured backend's send tool (`google_workspace__send_gmail_message` or `microsoft_365__send-mail`, via `workspace.registry.send_from_executive`, from the Executive's own mailbox to the principal's address, subject `<brief title> — <date>`, the date in the user's zone) as formatted HTML — rendered from the brief's Markdown with raw HTML and images off, so text quoted from outside shows as text and opening the email loads nothing remote. Email is first when the principal prefers it, and otherwise the backup after every chat channel, tried only when Slack, Discord and Telegram are missing or fail; an in-band error from the tool counts as a failed send and the next channel is tried. An emailed brief is not a DM, so the per-Person outbound guard below does not apply — the gateway's roster egress gate does.\n\n Two senders get their own framing. Mail from one of the principal's **contacts** (a `kind=\"contact\"` People row — see Org) replaces the non-roster `[POLICY]` notice with a contact one: it names them (name and role/company), says not to reply unless the principal asks and not to tell anyone else, and asks for a summary for the principal instead. Both this turn and the forwarded-by-principal turn below are marked `Session.private_to_principal`: they can email, DM or invite only the principal, an alert they raise is private to the principal, and they are not offered the tools that reach anyone else or start work outside the turn (`schedule_tools.PRIVATE_TURN_WITHHELD_TOOLS`: broadcasts, meeting bookings, workflows, follow-ups, watches, artifacts, goal updates, skill drafts, connecting a new MCP server), and of the MCP tools only Google Workspace reads and the gated Gmail send (see MCP below). Every audit row about such mail is private to the principal (see Audit Log), the poller's two `integration_inbound` rows included (`_private_to_principal_mail`), so the audit log's other readers see none of it. The poller holds `audit.private_rows` for the whole handling of such a mail, because some rows are written before the turn binds its private session: the knowledge retrieval quotes the mail's From line, subject and opening. The rows themselves read exactly like an outside sender's: the `integration_inbound` row is the non-roster one (`accepted_non_roster`), and the notice opens with the non-roster notice's exact sentence. The poller handles each message with no session bound, so one message's private turn never marks the next message's rows. The turn stays unattributed (`person_id` None — no peer memory, no co-presence), and the gateway refuses mail to a contact on a poller turn anyway. Mail **forwarded by the principal** — the sender resolves to the principal and `_new_text_lines` reports a forwarded message — is wrapped in a `<forwarded_by_principal>` block: summarise it, draft a reply the principal could send (as text in the reply, never sent or saved as a Gmail draft), note any commitment or date, and offer to add the original sender as a contact (confirmed from the web app or the principal's Slack / Discord, since an ordinary email turn cannot change the People list — the one email that can is the principal's tokened reply to a roster-request email, which is parsed before any model turn; see below). The reply still goes to the principal only. The From header is unauthenticated, so this framing grants nothing: a spoofed \"forward\" just gets the real principal a summary.\n\nSlack, Discord, and Telegram are roster-gated on inbound: an unrostered sender's message never reaches the Executive (`details.outcome=\"rejected_unknown_sender\"`). The gates look up **team members only** — a contact's Slack, Discord or Telegram id is treated as unknown, so a contact can never talk to the bot (nor count as a co-present peer). What happens next is the roster request below — except for a contact, a thread continuation, a Telegram group or an unverified Telegram webhook, which stay silent. Email is not inbound-gated — non-roster mail flows through with a `[POLICY]` notice so triage can classify it. Slack/Discord thread continuations pass the shared `integrations.response_gate` (utility-fast model, biased toward replying). Slack only continues a thread it has replied in: it reads the thread with `conversations_replies` (5 s bound) and looks for its own user id, which `auth_test` resolves at startup. If that lookup fails, mentions and DMs still work and thread continuations stop until a retry succeeds (`slack_bot._resolve_bot_user_id`, at most once a minute, from the channel `message` listener). When Slack doesn't return the thread in time, the thread's stored history (`slack:thread:{channel}:{thread_ts}`, written on every turn the bot answers there) stands in: with history, a rostered sender gets an ephemeral \"I couldn't read this thread just now… @-mention me\" and the drop is audited (`outcome=dropped_thread_unreadable`). A thread the bot never answered in stays silent. A message the gate skips is audited (`outcome=skipped_gate`, with the gate's reason) and gets an :eyes: reaction (`reactions_add`, which needs the bot's `reactions:write` scope; without it the reaction is skipped), so a sender the gate misjudged can see the message was read and @-mention the bot.\n\n**No link previews on replies.** The Executive's replies go out with previews off — Telegram `sendMessage` carries `link_preview_options.is_disabled`, Slack's reply `say` passes `unfurl_links=False` / `unfurl_media=False`, and every Discord reply send passes `suppress_embeds=True`. The direct messages the Executive starts are the same: `send_slack_dm` posts with `unfurl_links=False` / `unfurl_media=False`, and Discord's `send_dm` sets the `SUPPRESS_EMBEDS` flag on each chunk, so a reminder or a brief sent by DM carries no preview either. Otherwise the chat service fetches a link in the text on its own, so a reply that quotes someone's mail (Act as me reads it) could carry data to a sender's server with no click. The web chat does the same for images: `Message.tsx` loads only an image the app itself serves (`lib/markdownImages.loadsInline`) and shows any other as a link.\n\n### New senders (roster requests)\n\nSomeone who writes in and is not on the People list — and is not one of the principal's contacts — is **held, acknowledged and asked about** instead of dropped (`integrations.roster_intake.intake` over the `people.roster_requests` ledger; lifecycle in Org). Each adapter calls it after its gate:\n\n- **Slack** — a DM or an `@mention` (not a thread continuation: the bot was not addressed there). The name and profile email come from `users_info` (5 s timeout). The acknowledgement goes in the DM, or as an **ephemeral** message for a mention, so nobody else in the channel learns who is and is not on the roster. The held event keeps only a fixed set of keys (text, user, channel, ts, thread, files).\n- **Discord** — a DM or a mention (not a thread the bot merely follows). The acknowledgement goes in the DM, or by DM for a channel mention; `/ask` answers the interaction with an ephemeral acknowledgement first (Discord allows 3 s), then holds the prompt. Its old \"ask the admin to add you\" reply is gone.\n- **Telegram** — only a **private** chat, and only when `TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is set and valid: Telegram identifies the chat rather than the sender, and without the secret anyone could forge an update. A group, or an unverified webhook, stays silent as before. Attachment file ids are held and downloaded only on replay.\n- **Email** — non-roster mail that is not private to the principal (so never a contact's) and does not look machine-sent (`looks_automated`: a no-reply / notifications / billing-style local part, a `List-Id` / `List-Unsubscribe` / `Auto-Submitted` / bulk `Precedence` header, or a DMARC failure). The mail is **still triaged** by the Executive on this pass; its `[POLICY]` notice now says the sender was already told their message is waiting and the principal was asked who they are, so the model raises no second alert just to add them, and that the email will come back once they are added.\n\nEvery path skips a contact first (`find_person_by_*_id(..., include_contacts=True)`, or the email poller's private-mail rule): a contact has no chat access and gets no request and no acknowledgement, and the team-visible `rejected_unknown_sender` / `accepted_non_roster` rows read the same for a contact as for a stranger.\n\n**The acknowledgement** is one fixed text (`roster_intake.ACK_TEXT` — \"your message arrived … waiting for confirmation\"), never the model and never an echo of what they wrote, so a forged sender gains nothing by triggering it. It is sent at most once per sender per `ROSTER_ACK_WINDOW_DAYS` (7) and at most `ROSTER_ACK_DAILY_CAP` (20) a day across all senders (`claim_ack`, one transaction; a failed send releases its claim). An email acknowledgement is the one send the MCP gateway lets reach an address off the roster: `send_email_ack` sets `mcp_gateway.roster_ack_grant`, a one-shot ContextVar grant that admits a single `send_gmail_message` with exactly the granted recipient (a plain string, no list), subject and body and no other key, then is spent (audited `integration_outbound`, `kind: roster_ack`, private). An email sender is acknowledged only when Gmail authenticated them: once `claim_ack` succeeds, the poller's `send_ack` re-reads the mail as raw MIME and needs Gmail's own topmost `Authentication-Results` reporting `dmarc=pass` for the From domain (`fact_confirmation.sender_authenticated`, fail-closed). The printed headers the poller reads never carry that header, so without the second read a forged From would draw the acknowledgement to whoever it names — backscatter from the Executive's mailbox. An unauthenticated sender makes `send_ack` raise `roster_intake.AckWithheld`: the claim is released, and they are held silently. `authenticated_by_gmail` strips quoted strings and comments before reading the verdict — Gmail copies the envelope sender and DKIM tags into its own stamp, and a quoted local part could otherwise carry a fake `dmarc=pass` — and needs exactly one `dmarc=` verdict reading exactly `dmarc=pass header.from=<domain>` (Gmail may follow it with its own `dara=` resinfo, so its position is not checked). Residual: when Gmail writes no verdict at all (a From domain without DMARC) and echoes an unsanitised `;dmarc=pass header.from=…` elsewhere in its stamp, that echo would read as the verdict; bounded by the acknowledgement caps. A withheld acknowledgement is audited `roster_ack_withheld`. `intake` acknowledges before surfacing the card and telling the principal, and both follow the request's `ack_sent_at`: a withheld, failed or capped acknowledgement reads \"haven't been told anything yet\" on the Today card, in the principal's prompt and in the email `[POLICY]` notice.\n\n**Telling the principal.** A new request puts a private card on the principal's `/today` (see Today) and pushes a prompt on their delivery plan — preferred chat DM, then the others, then email — for a chat sender or an email sender on the company's own domain; an outside email sender waits on the card, as does everything past `ROSTER_REQUEST_DAILY_CAP` (30) pushes a day (the same cap bounds how many requests open a day; a declined sender is not raised again for 30 days). A chat prompt can be answered in place (\"that's Annamarie, add her to the team\"). An email prompt carries a one-time token (`RR-` + 20 base32 characters, stored hashed); the poller checks every inbound mail for one **before** triage (`try_email_roster_answer`): the reply must come from the principal's primary address exactly (not an alias, not the company-domain rule), carry the token of a pending request, not be an automatic reply, and not fail DMARC where the header is visible; and is parsed by `parse_decision`'s `roster_identity` shape — anything else falls through to the ordinary path. The token is hidden (`RR-[hidden]`) in every other Google Workspace result the gateway returns — the confirmation sits in the Executive's Sent folder, and any turn could otherwise read it — except the poller's own fetch of an inbound message (`mcp_gateway.reveal_roster_tokens`); a token-bearing mail that is not an answer is scrubbed before triage.\n\n**Replay.** Once the principal answers (web card, chat tool, email reply) — or a People-page / `upsert_person` write makes the sender match someone (`after_roster_write`) — the held messages are replayed through the adapter that received them (`register_replayer`: Slack re-runs the held event, Discord and Telegram their held text, email re-fetches the message from Gmail and handles it as mail from a known sender), oldest first, now attributed to the new Person. A teammate gets every held message; a new contact only held email (it takes the private contact path; held chat is dropped); a decline drops everything. Replays run in a **fresh `contextvars.Context`**: the answer may have come from the principal's own verified turn, and a stranger's message must never be read with the principal's session — and their contacts — still bound.\n\n### Standing facts by email (confirm by reply)\n\nThe principal can ask for a standing fact, a retirement or a company-profile edit by email, and the fact tools check it exactly as in chat (the own-words gates run on `_email_memory_text`, the sender's new text, not the quoted chain or attachments). An email's From line proves nothing, though, and a standing fact is read by every later prompt as the principal's own account. So an emailed change is **held, never applied**, until the principal's own mailbox confirms it (`integrations.fact_confirmation`, `memory.facts.fact_confirmations`):\n\n- **Who may ask.** The poller stamps every email turn with `Session.email_from` (the bare lowercased From address) and `email_authenticated`. The text the poller reads never carries `Authentication-Results` (workspace-mcp prints a fixed set of headers), so for mail claiming the principal's primary address it reads the message again as raw MIME (`fact_confirmation.sender_authenticated`) and requires Gmail's own stamp: the **topmost** `Authentication-Results` header (Gmail adds it on receipt, above anything the sender wrote), authserv-id `mx.google.com`, reporting `dmarc=pass` for the From address's domain, with the raw From matching (`authenticated_by_gmail`). It fails closed: no header, `dmarc=none`, a temporary error or a failed read all leave the turn unauthenticated. Mail from anyone else costs no second read and is never authenticated. `fact_tools._gate` admits an email turn only from the principal's **primary** address, exactly (no alias, no company-domain rule), authenticated, and not private to the principal (mail they forwarded stays refused, as do contacts, teammates and unknown senders).\n- **The hold.** The tool returns `awaiting_confirmation` (no action chip, and the model is told to say nothing has changed). `request_confirmation` stores the change with the SHA-256 of a fresh one-time token (`FC-` + 20 base32 characters, 100 bits; 7-day expiry; at most 10 waiting at once) and emails the token to the principal's roster address, outside any turn's outbound context. A profile edit is dry-run first, so one that cannot apply is reported in the turn, before any email goes out. If the email fails, nothing is held.\n- **Keeping the token from any model.** The tool result never carries it, and `mcp_gateway.hide_roster_tokens` now scrubs `FC-` tokens as well as `RR-` ones (`FC-[hidden]`) from every Google Workspace result except the poller's own fetch of an inbound message. Act as me's reads of the principal's own Gmail, where the confirmation email lands, hide them too (`delegation.gmail.parse_message` and the thread search), so the drafting model never sees a live token either.\n- **The reply.** `_handle_one_email` hands every message to `try_email_fact_confirmation` right after the roster-answer check, before any model turn. It acts only on a reply from the principal's primary address carrying the token of a **pending** confirmation. A made-up, spent, cancelled or expired reference matches nothing and falls through to the ordinary path with the token hidden, so no old or forged token can make the Executive email the principal. A reply with a live token is read again as raw MIME (`read_raw`) and must pass the same Gmail DMARC check as the request; one that doesn't (or whose raw read fails) is refused, the change keeps waiting, and the principal is told. Then an **automatic reply** is consumed quietly — no answer, no model turn, the change keeps waiting: the printed headers catch a Gmail vacation reply (`Precedence: bulk`), and the raw headers catch what they don't show (`automatic_reply`: `Auto-Submitted` other than `no`, `X-Auto-Response-Suppress` and similar, `Precedence: auto_reply`, an out-of-office subject), since an Exchange out-of-office echoes the token from the principal's own address and may well say \"I'll confirm on my return\". The raw message starts at the tool's exact separator line (`\\n\\n--- RAW MIME ---\\n`), so a sender-written Subject imitating it cannot supply the headers. CONFIRM (or yes / approve) applies the change through `fact_tools.apply_confirmed`, the same apply step chat uses. CANCEL (or no) drops it, and an unclear reply leaves it waiting. The principal gets a one-line result either way. A compare-and-set on the row means two replies can apply it only once.\n- **Audit.** Private `fact_confirmation` rows record held / applied / cancelled / refused. The applied change also writes the fact tools' usual private rows, with `source_channel=\"email\"` as its provenance.\n\n### Checking a channel is set up\n\nSettings → Setup status (`GET /setup/status`, `api/setup_checks.py`) gives each channel a light and a plain-language fix. It tests the credentials with one free read-only call — Slack `auth.test`; Telegram `getMe`, then `getWebhookInfo` (is a webhook registered, is it this app's `/webhook/telegram`, did a delivery fail in the past day); Discord `users/@me`, only while the bot is still connecting — and reads what the lifespan left on `app.state`: the Slack socket's `is_connected()`, the Discord bot's `is_ready()` together with its gateway socket being open (discord.py stays ready while it reconnects after a drop), or the exception its task stopped with (`LoginFailure`, `PrivilegedIntentsRequired`), and the MCP gateway. A listening Slack is amber while the listener hasn't resolved its own user id (`slack_bot.bot_user_id()`), since thread continuations are off until it does. Because inbound is roster-gated, a connected Slack, Discord or Telegram is amber while nobody on the roster has its id (`slack_user_id`, `discord_user_id`, `telegram_chat_id`), or when its latest `integration_inbound` row is a `Rejected: …` from the past day whose sender still isn't on the roster — the page shows the sender's id, never message text. Local login with no `TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is red for Telegram, since the local-login gate turns its webhook away. Google Chat and Gmail are checked from configuration: a numeric project number and a readable service-account key; the OAuth client (or service-account key) the workspace-mcp child signs in with.\n\nA channel setting written `KEY= # note` in a `.env` file arrives as the note's text, because python-dotenv strips only a comment that follows a value. `Settings` reads such a value as unset for the Slack, Telegram, Discord and Google Chat credentials, so the line no longer switches a channel on with its own comment as the token. `TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is the exception, because read as unset a junk secret would turn the webhook's check off. It is kept instead, and since Telegram can only ever send 1–256 of `A-Z a-z 0-9 _ -` (what `setWebhook` accepts), a secret outside that set — a leftover comment, a pasted `<value from Step 2>` — could only be matched by someone who guessed it: while it is set the webhook refuses every update, neither the local-login gate nor the roster tools count it as proof (`Settings.telegram_webhook_secret_valid`), and Setup status shows it red (`.env.example` shipped four such lines; the notes now sit on their own lines).\n\n### Conversation state\n\nEvery adapter keys a deterministic `session_id` off the conversation surface and replays that session's stored turns into `Session.conversation_history`, so a follow-up (\"yes, go ahead\") lands with the question still in context. Slack's ids are `slack:dm:{user}`, `slack:thread:{channel}:{thread_ts}`, and `slack:channel:{channel}:{user}` for a mention that starts a thread; because the bot's reply roots a Slack thread at that message's `ts`, the turn is double-written to that thread's session too, so the first continuation inside it is not cold. A reply inside a thread THAT PERSON ROOTED also offers the parent `slack:channel:{channel}:{user}` id when matching an approval gate, since a gate raised on the mention recorded that session while the answer arrives under the thread's. The root-author check is load-bearing: widening on \"threaded and not a DM\" alone offered one person's channel session inside any thread in that channel, so a remark they made to a colleague could resolve their open gate and post the run's title into that colleague's thread. Discord has the same shape — its auto-thread router promotes a mention reply into a bot-owned thread — and the same alias. An @-mention inside a DM is handled once, by the DM path: Slack fires both events, and taking both forked the conversation across two session ids. The same id is the audit grouping key and the scope passed to `format_for_prompt`. A per-session `asyncio.Lock` serializes turns within one conversation — the inflight semaphore caps fan-out across the workspace, which does nothing to stop two messages in the same thread from both reading history before either writes it. Persistence happens after the reply is sent and its failure is logged, never surfaced: the user already has their answer.\n\n**Conversations within a chat app.** A Telegram chat, a Slack or Discord DM and a person's @mentions in one channel (`slack:channel:…`, `discord:channel:…`) are each one endless stream, so they are cut into conversations (`memory.conversations`, shared helpers in `integrations/conversations.py`). Each adapter computes the stream's base id as before and asks `conversation_for` which conversation a message belongs to: the newest, unless the stream has been quiet for two hours (`CONVERSATION_GAP`), when the next one starts. The first conversation keeps the bare base id; later ones add `~2`, `~3`, … (`memory.conversation_ids`). A whole message of `/new`, \"new chat\" or \"new conversation\" starts a fresh one instead of a turn and is answered with the name of the one it ended; the new row has no messages and stays off the Chats page until its first turn. After a conversation's first exchange `title_after_turn` names it in the background with `utils.session_title.generate_session_title` (the first words of the message if that fails), as a web chat's first turn does. Threads (`slack:thread:…`, `discord:thread:…`), email and every other id are left whole. What has to see the whole stream compares base ids: the inbound resolver, so an approval asked before a cut is answered after it, and the session-scoped decisions and advice `format_for_prompt` renders. At boot `split_existing_streams` cuts history saved before this by the same rule, once (`app_migrations`), titling each part from its first message and carrying a read-mail lock to every part.\n\nThis was absent on Slack until #136. Every message built a fresh `Session` and minted a per-*message* id (`thread_ts` falls back to the message's own `ts`, so a DM never repeated one), which meant a multi-turn confirmation could not work: the Executive asked whether to send a briefing to Slack, the user said yes, and the next turn had no record of the question.\n\n### What the model is told about the channel\n\nChat adapters pass a `<channel>` block (`integrations.channel_context`) in the **user turn** — never a cached system block. It names the surface, states that the person cannot see the app's cards or buttons, and draws the line the assistant kept crossing: briefing proposals and alerts are actioned on the briefing page; a proposal that books something can only be approved there; a workflow sign-off the Executive is explicitly waiting on *can* be answered in the conversation. The principal's DMs on Slack, Discord and Telegram also receive the open-alert digest (`briefing.context.format_open_alerts_for_prompt`) as the `<briefing>` block, gated to DMs because the board is company-wide and a shared channel must not pull it in. That digest is the ONLY trusted source of an `alert_id` for `ack_alert`. The briefing page's `[Discuss mode — alert_id=N]` primer is a pointer to which item is under discussion, not authority on its own: the server accepts that id only if it is also on the live board it derived itself. An id appearing anywhere else, including inside an alert's own body, is not trusted: alerts are minted from inbound email and chat, so their bodies are attacker-controlled. Two mechanisms enforce that rather than one prompt rule. Every field the digest interpolates is collapsed to a single line, because a newline in an attacker-written headline, suggested action, tag or review note would otherwise forge a whole extra `[N]` line — a fabricated instruction to clear somebody else's alert. And the live board the server derived is recorded on the session, so `ack_alert` refuses any id outside it — on EVERY session, web included; the web previously had no check at all. The recorded set is the whole live board (the cap `/today` renders as cards), not just the rows the digest printed, so a card past the digest's 30-row render cap is still ackable rather than sending the principal back to the page. Be precise about what this buys: it stops an id that is invented, closed, snoozed or expired, including one quoted out of an attacker-written alert body. It does NOT stop the model being argued into acking the wrong LIVE card — one alert's body can still make a case about another id that is genuinely open. Scoping trust to the single item under discussion would need the primer id carried server-side, which it is not.\n\n### Handler failures\n\nAn adapter's catch-all replies \"I encountered an error processing your request.\" On Slack that used to be the whole story — one uncorrelated log line, no audit row, and an unguarded error-send that could itself escape into Bolt. It now logs with the session, sender, channel, thread and mode, and writes an `integration_inbound` row with `details.outcome=\"handler_error\"`, joining the inbound row under the same `session_id`. Upstream, a single crashing tool handler no longer takes the turn down at all: the orchestrator's tool gathers use `return_exceptions=True`, hand the model an error `tool_result`, and audit it with `ok=false` (cancellation is re-raised, not swallowed).\n\n### Attachments\n\n`integrations.attachments` handles web chat, Discord, Telegram, Slack and Google Chat. Images become Anthropic vision blocks; documents (PDF/DOCX/TXT/MD/CSV) are inlined into the turn that carried them — inside an `<untrusted_content source=\"attachment\" author=\"<name>\">` block (`content_trust.wrap_untrusted`, whose closing tag the text cannot forge), under an `[Attached: <name>]` label, which the open-loop pass reads as \"not the speaker's words\" and the decision extractor strips before it reads the turn — and indexed into the ChromaDB `inbound_attachments` collection. 20 MB/file cap; web chat uses `POST /chat/upload`.\n\n**Scanned PDFs** are read, not reported empty. A PDF with no text layer goes through `knowledge.pdf_reader`: with `PDF_PROVIDER_READING=true` (opt-in, off by default) the deployment's own model reads it through its provider's PDF support (Anthropic natively, OpenRouter's `file-parser`, a local server only with `LOCAL_PDF_INPUT`); otherwise, and as the fallback, local OCR (pypdfium2 + RapidOCR, offline, no key) — so every deployment converts them. The label then reads `(converted from scanned pages)`, and an unreadable one says why. The index takes the text already extracted for the turn, so a scan is converted once. A file a channel delivered (everything here except `POST /chat/upload`, where the signed-in user sends it) converts at most `PDF_INBOUND_MAX_PAGES` (30) pages and draws on a rolling `PDF_INBOUND_PAGES_PER_HOUR` (300) budget shared by all senders, so sending scans cannot run up unbounded model spend or CPU.\n\nPer channel:\n- **Slack** — a `file_share` message (previously dropped outright for its `subtype`) is handled like any message; files download only after the roster gate and the response gate, with the bot token sent only to `https://files.slack.com/` (needs the `files:read` scope). History and peer memory record the words plus `(Attached files: …)`, never a document's text.\n- **Google Chat** — uploaded attachments download through `media.download` with the reply credentials (`chat.bot`), checked against the 20 MB cap per chunk, 5 per message; an attachment-only message is no longer dropped. The webhook authenticates Google, not the sender, so files are read only when the event's `user.email` is on the People roster (a team member); anyone else's files are named to the Executive, never downloaded. A Drive file shared into a message is left to the Drive tools, with its id.\n- **Email** — the poller (`integrations.email_attachments`) downloads up to 5 readable attachments of the message itself via `get_gmail_attachment_content` — workspace-mcp in stdio mode saves the file and answers `Saved to: <path>`, which must start its line, be the last such line and end in the answer's `Saved filename:` (the answer echoes the sender-chosen attachment name first, and a name carrying `Saved to: /…` must not redirect the read), then resolve inside the tool download folders — and appends their text to the turn (15k chars each). Only for a sender the principal knows (team, contact, principal); a stranger's files stay a list. It runs outside the model loop, so it works on private turns without adding the attachment tool to `PRIVATE_TURN_MCP_TOOLS`.\n- Anything else (a Drive PDF, a skipped attachment) — the Executive's `read_document` tool.\n\nIndexed chunks are keyed on `attachment:<bare filename>` and tagged `type=attachment`. An attachment's name is chosen by whoever sent the message and the name is the chunk-id namespace, so without the prefix an inbound `strategy-2026.md` would upsert over the curated company document of that name. The prefix separates inbound content from curated uploads and keeps provenance visible; it does not separate senders from one another.\n\nIsolation is the **collection**: `retriever.retrieve` never queries `inbound_attachments` at all, so an attachment cannot resurface as company knowledge in a later, unrelated turn. Attachment processing is roster-gated on Discord too — it previously ran before the gate, so an unrostered sender's file was downloaded and indexed before their message was dropped. These rows still have no operator surface: they are never written to `company/docs/`, so `GET /documents` does not list them.\n\nThis replaced a domain-based scheme that did not work. The chunks lived in `company_docs` under a domain outside the specialist set, on the premise that an unrecognised domain matched no filter. It matched every one — `ChromaDBStore.query` attaches a `where` clause only when a domain filter is present, and an Executive-level retrieval passes none — so attachments came back under “From your company documents”, top-ranked and indistinguishable from a curated upload. Legacy rows are migrated across on boot.\n\n### MCP gateway & outbound\n\nMCP runs in **both directions**. As a *client*, `orchestrator.mcp_gateway.MCPGateway` proxies MCP servers (Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Outlook mail and calendar — whatever `mcp_servers.json` configures) as Executive tools, with egress gating on Gmail recipients, Calendar attendees, Drive share grantees, and Microsoft 365 recipients/attendees against the roster (and a refusal of public / whole-domain Drive sharing). The Gmail gate also accepts only a fixed set of argument keys, so workspace-mcp's `reply_all` (recipients taken from the thread, never checked) and `forward_message_id` / `include_forwarded_attachments` (forwarding any inbox message) are refused; a reply is `thread_id` plus an explicit, roster-checked `to`. Three more refusals close paths around those gates: every Apps Script tool (code running as the Executive's account, outside the gates, and since workspace-mcp 1.29.0 schedulable to keep running); any argument that makes the server fetch a URL (`fileUrl` / `file_url` on the Drive and import tools, a Gmail attachment given as a `url`), since the fetch can carry data out in its query string before any recipient gate matters; and text Google would mail to someone the roster never checked (`rsvp_comment` to an event's organizer, an out-of-office `decline_message` to whoever invites the Executive). Every gate reads its arguments by normalized spelling: workspace-mcp 1.29.0 renames a camelCase key such as `Attendees`, `userGoogleEmail` or `rsvpComment` to the real parameter, so a gate matching the exact key would never see it. Arguments that are not a JSON object are refused for the same reason. Google-side fetches are refused too: any key ending in `url` / `uri` at any depth whose value has a URL scheme (a Slides image or page background, a Docs or Forms image; a document hyperlink and a meeting link are stored, not fetched, and pass, as does a Drive file id), (a value is a URL after the characters a URL parser strips are removed, and `//host` counts), and on every tool that can write cells — the Sheets tools and the Drive create / update / import tools, which turn CSV into a Sheet — any string anywhere holding a formula call that fetches (`IMPORTDATA`, `IMPORTXML`, `IMPORTHTML`, `IMPORTFEED`, `IMAGE`), JSON-encoded or mid-CSV included: a string argument that encodes JSON is read as the server decodes it (one too large to read is refused), text is also scanned with character references decoded and comments / CDATA removed, and an upload that would become a native Sheet may only be text `content` — a `base64_content` or server-side `file_path` upload there is refused, since an XLSX hides its formulas behind zip members and XML encodings; a PNG to Drive or a DOCX to Docs is untouched. Not covered, unverified: whether Drive's HTML / Markdown import fetches an `<img src>` when it converts `content` into a Doc. A `manage_event` call that names no attendees is sent with `send_updates=\"none\"`, so the event's existing guests are not emailed text the gate never checked. The allow-list (`_egress_sets`, built by `_roster_allow_set` as a `people.identity.RosterAllow`) is every team member's email and email aliases plus the Executive's own address, always, and — for a teammate — any address on one of the company's own domains whose local part (`+tag` dropped) matches theirs, the same rule inbound mail is matched by; a **contact's** email joins it only when `people_tools.contacts_reachable_now()` is true — a turn the principal started on a verified surface (web chat, their own Slack or Discord, a verified private Telegram chat), or inside `grant_contact_egress()` (the decisions approve route, when the approver is the principal). On any other turn — an inbound email, a teammate, the scheduler, a workflow, the alert review — a contact's address is refused exactly like a stranger's, so the refusal cannot reveal that it belongs to a contact (contacts are private to the principal). The single exception to the roster rule is the fixed roster-request acknowledgement above, under its one-shot `roster_ack_grant`. A turn about the principal's private mail (`Session.private_to_principal`) narrows the list to the principal's own address and the Executive's. Such a turn may call only the MCP tools in `schedule_tools.PRIVATE_TURN_MCP_TOOLS`: Google Workspace reads (`search_gmail_messages`, `get_gmail_message_content`, `get_events`, `list_calendars`, `query_freebusy`, and the Drive, Docs and Sheets reads such as `search_drive_files`, `get_drive_file_content`, `get_doc_content` and `read_sheet_values`) and the two Gmail tools this gate narrows to the principal (`send_gmail_message`, `draft_gmail_message`). It is an exact allow-list, not a server: workspace-mcp runs at the `complete` tier, where a Google Chat message to a space, a Docs, Sheets or Drive write into a file already shared with others, `manage_event` on a shared calendar (its gate checks attendees and pins notifications, nothing else) reaches people with no recipient check; and every other server has none at all (a Slack or Notion server, the default `fetch` server, whose URL can carry the turn's content, a server loaded at runtime). Its `search_tools` results show only the allowed tools (`workflows.tool_catalog.filter_search_results`; output it cannot parse reads as no match), and a `call_tool` naming anything else is refused with an error tool_result and an audit row private to the principal (`schedule_tools.private_turn_withholds`), a missing name included. `search_tools` and `call_tool` stay offered, so the tool list and its cached prefix do not change. The typed calendar tool (`_resolve_attendees`) and the chat DM tools (`message_person`, `send_telegram_message`, `send_discord_dm` and their person-id recovery) apply the same rule — a contact's id reads as an unknown one off the principal's turn — and a private turn may DM or invite only the principal (`PRIVATE_TURN_REFUSAL` otherwise); `message_person` never falls back to a \"Needs you\" alert for a contact, who cannot sign in to see it. The Google Workspace server (`workspace-mcp`) behind those Gmail/Calendar/Drive tools runs **co-located inside the API** as a stdio child of the gateway — fitting the single-tenant model (one install = one company = one exec Google account), so there's no separate service to operate. It's baked into the API image and launched by `docker/workspace-mcp-launch.sh`, which selects single-user OAuth (token persisted at `/data/google_credentials`) or service-account domain-wide delegation from `GWORKSPACE_AUTH_MODE`. The optional `WORKSPACE_MCP_TOOLS` (comma-separated service names, default `all`) limits which Google services it loads. The gateway forwards the Google secrets to the child via `_FORWARDED_ENV_VARS`. Every `google_workspace__*` call acts as the Executive's own account. workspace-mcp takes the acting account per call (`user_google_email`) and nothing used to check it, so under domain-wide delegation a model-chosen address could open anyone's mailbox in the domain; `mcp_gateway._check_acting_account` now refuses a value naming any other address — before every other gate, with an `integration_outbound_blocked` audit row. An absent value stays allowed (the server's own account).\n\n**What the model is told is connected.** `MCPGateway.start()` records the configured server names (`server_names`), and the Executive renders them with the channel settings into block 0's *Connected Systems* section (`prompts.connected_systems`; see the caching section). While Google is connected that section pins the Google tool names the Executive uses constantly (`GOOGLE_TOOL_MANIFEST`) and tells it to call them with `call_tool` directly, with no `search_tools` round trip. extensible-mcp only runs a tool one of the session's searches has returned, and remembers it for the session's life, so the gateway does that discovery itself: the lifespan starts `MCPGateway.prime_pinned_tools()` in the background once the gateway is up with `google_workspace` configured (an exact-name search per pinned tool, the way `workflows.tool_catalog.resolve` does it; a name the search no longer finds is logged as workspace-mcp drift). A pinned call that still comes back with extensible-mcp's \"has not been discovered via search_tools\" refusal, for example before priming finished, is discovered and retried once. That happens after every gate has passed the same arguments, and only for pinned names: any other tool still needs the model's own search, and nothing here widens what a call may do, including the private-turn allow-list.\n\n**Microsoft 365** is the Outlook twin: `@softeria/ms-365-mcp-server` (a Node package, pinned) is installed in a throwaway Node build stage and only the `node` binary plus the package are copied into the API image, launched by `docker/ms365-mcp-launch.sh` as the `microsoft_365` entry with an **explicit tool allow-list** (`--enabled-tools`, an anchored regex) rather than the upstream `mail,calendar` preset — that preset also registers inbox forwarding rules, mailbox settings (external auto-reply), calendar sharing and event forwarding, which can address people the gateway never sees. Exactly the Outlook mail + calendar tools and the OneDrive tools are exposed (`microsoft_365__send-mail`, `microsoft_365__create-calendar-event`, `microsoft_365__search-onedrive-files`, …; hyphenated Graph endpoint aliases, proxied verbatim), and every admitted tool is either roster-gated or carries no recipient; the gate also covers the excluded writers in case an operator widens the list. Both servers can be configured at once. Auth is the MSAL device-code flow against the operator's own Entra app registration (`MS365_MCP_CLIENT_ID` is required; the server's built-in public client is refused); the refresh token persists at `/data/ms365_credentials` and is seeded once with `ms365-mcp-launch.sh --login` from inside the container — the server has a native device-code CLI, so there is no mint script and nothing to copy. The launcher scrubs the literal `$VAR` placeholders extensible-mcp leaves for unset variables (otherwise MSAL would be handed `$MS365_MCP_TENANT_ID` as an authority), and `MS365_MCP_EXPECTED_USERNAME` pins the bound mailbox. The egress gate for this family walks Graph's nested shapes (`body.Message.toRecipients[].emailAddress.address`, `body.attendees[]…`) — every email-shaped string outside the free-text fields must be on the roster, control characters and non-ASCII addresses are refused, unforeseen keys are still scanned (fail-closed) — and covers the whole write surface: send, reply, reply-all, forward, every draft tool, `update-mail-message` (it can PATCH recipients onto a draft) and create-/update-calendar-event; reads and `delete-calendar-event` (the only cancel path) pass through. Graph's reply, reply-all and send-draft actions carry no recipient in their arguments (the recipient is whoever the referenced `messageId` names), so for those the gate first reads the referenced message through the server and roster-checks the recipients Graph will derive (`replyTo` else `from` for a reply; `replyTo` and `from` together, plus the original to/cc, for reply-all; the draft's own to/cc/bcc for send-draft), refusing on any lookup failure; RSVP and cancel actions get the same treatment through an event lookup, because their comment is emailed to the organizer or every attendee; `download-bytes` is pinned to mail attachment bytes and OneDrive file content (`/drives/{id}/items/{id}/content`, optionally Graph's `?format=pdf` rendering), and a OneDrive result comes back as the file's extracted text rather than base64 — the attachment pin is what makes the poller's promise that an unrostered sender cannot be auto-replied to hold on Outlook as it does on Gmail; and the rendered inbound text quotes any forged `--- REPLY ---` line inside a body so the persona only ever reads the real block. Every mail write's `from`, `sender` and `replyTo` may name only the Executive's own address (the Outlook twin of the Gmail acting-account pin), so the model cannot send as a rostered colleague's mailbox or steer replies elsewhere; and `move-mail-message` into Deleted Items, Junk Email or Recoverable Items is refused, so a move cannot trash mail ungated. The server registers its account tools whatever its tool allow-list says, so the gateway itself refuses `login`, `logout`, `select-account` and `remove-account` (audited like any other refusal) and drops them from `search_tools` results — a chat turn cannot sign the mailbox out, switch accounts or start a sign-in; setup is only the launcher's `--login`, and the read-only `verify-login` / `list-accounts` stay callable. The example config's hyphenated patterns still deny `delete-mail-*`, `logout`, `remove-account` and `download-bytes-to-file` as defense in depth. A successful `send-mail` records the same outbound-context linkage Gmail does.\n\n**OneDrive in chat** (opt-in with `MS365_MCP_ONEDRIVE=true` and a fresh `--login`, since the server asks for its tools' permissions on every token refresh and a sign-in without file consent would otherwise fail mail and calendar too) matches what the Executive can do on Google Drive: search, list a folder, read a file, upload and edit, create folders, move, rename, copy and share; there is no delete tool. The launcher adds `Files.Read.All` at sign-in (`--extra-scopes`), so folders shared *with* the Executive can be read too; writes (upload, new folder, move, copy) land only in the Executive's own drives, checked against `list-drives` at call time, so a planted instruction cannot save company files into a stranger's shared folder. Sharing is gated like Drive sharing: `share-drive-item` invitees must be People on the roster and named by email (an `objectId` or `alias` grantee is refused, since nothing can check it), no `owner` role, and `create-drive-item-share-link` must be scoped to specific people (`scope: \"users\"`): an anonymous or whole-organization link, or one with no scope (the tenant default), is refused. An invite must require sign-in and grant only view or edit, a link must be a view or edit link, and `search-onedrive-files` takes plain words only, since its query goes into the request path unencoded.\n\nAs a *server*, `openexecutive.mcp_server` exposes OE's own company context and specialist council to external MCP clients at `/mcp` — the inverse direction; see the dedicated **MCP Server** section. The gateway launches extensible-mcp as a `uvx` subprocess whose fastembed tool-search index uses an embedding model baked into the API image and loaded offline, so it no longer re-downloads that model from the Hugging Face Hub on every cold start. extensible-mcp is pinned twice over: to a commit, which fixes its own code, and with `--exclude-newer`, which fixes the resolution of its dependencies — without the cutoff uvx re-resolves them against PyPI on every networked start, so a new release of any of them would reach running deployments on restart. Both live in `_EXTENSIBLE_MCP_LAUNCH_ARGS` in `orchestrator/mcp_gateway.py`, the Dockerfile's pre-warm uses the same arguments (a unit test enforces the match), so an image whose pre-warm succeeded starts the gateway with no network. The pre-warm is best-effort (`|| true`): an image built while GitHub was unreachable fetches the pinned commit on its first start instead. Updating the gateway is a deliberate bump of the commit and cutoff; `uv` itself is not pinned. Because the MCP stdio client does not inherit the parent environment, `MCPGateway.start()` explicitly forwards the embedding-cache/offline env vars (`FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH`, `HF_HUB_OFFLINE`, …) into the child.\n\n**Emailing an artifact.** A Gmail send or draft may carry `attachments=[{\"artifact_id\": \"alert:12\", \"as\"?: \"docx\"}]`. `call_tool` runs the recipient gate first; only if it passes does `_expand_artifact_attachments` replace each such entry with the rendered file (`content` base64 + `filename` + `mime_type`, workspace-mcp's own attachment shape), produced by `artifact_records.render_artifact_file` — the same renderer as `/artifacts/{id}/download`. Only artifact rows resolve (never an arbitrary alert), links have no file, and an entry mixing `artifact_id` with other keys is refused. A stringified or single-object `attachments` is normalised first, so an artifact entry can never reach workspace-mcp unexpanded (it would silently drop it). At most 5 distinct artifacts per email (repeats are dropped) and 15 MB rendered in total; rendering runs off the event loop via `asyncio.to_thread`. A refusal writes `artifact_attachment_refused`; a successful send writes `artifact_attached` — both carry the recipients. Other attachment entries pass through unchanged. The same expansion serves the Microsoft 365 mail writes: the entry becomes a Graph `#microsoft.graph.fileAttachment` (`name`, `contentType`, `contentBytes`) placed where Graph expects it for that tool (`body.Message.attachments` for `send-mail`, reply, forward and the createReply drafts; `body.attachments` for `create-draft-email`), whether the model put it at the top level or inside the message; an entry anywhere else, one on `update-mail-message` or `send-draft-message` (their requests cannot carry attachments), or one behind a body that is not an object is refused rather than forwarded unexpanded.\n\n**Enablement, and why it degrades instead of dying.** `MCP_ENABLED` left unset is inferred from the presence of `mcp_servers_config_path` — dropping an `mcp_servers.json` next to `profile.yaml` turns MCP on with no further configuration. An **explicit** setting always wins in both directions: `MCP_ENABLED=false` keeps MCP off with the file still in place. It did not: `_resolve_mcp` tested `not self.mcp_enabled`, which cannot tell \"never set\" from \"set to false\", so the file's presence silently overrode the operator. The file is probed through `config.mcp_config_file_present`, never `Path.exists` directly — that re-raises an EACCES on a parent directory, and from inside a validator that comes out of `Settings()` itself, which `api/main.py` calls at module level. The check now reads `model_fields_set` (the fields the env actually supplied) and stores that on a private attr behind the read-only `mcp_auto_enabled` property, because the validator's own assignment joins that set and would otherwise make every auto-enable look explicit downstream.\n\nStartup is **best-effort**, in `main._start_mcp_gateway`. Two checks come before the subprocess: MCP off is a no-op, and a config defining no servers under `mcpServers` is logged and skipped — extensible-mcp's own loader raises on that and exits, and because the child is already gone the only thing that surfaces is anyio's \"Attempted to exit cancel scope in a different task\" from `stdio_client` unwinding, a traceback naming nothing about configuration. The start is also bounded (120s, generous because that child may still clone extensible-mcp on a cold start if the image's pre-warm failed): `ClientSession` carries no `read_timeout_seconds`, so `initialize()` waits forever on a child that is *alive but silent*, and an unbounded wait is a lifespan that never yields — the same healthcheck-never-passes symptom, which no `except` can see. A gateway that fails anyway is logged at ERROR with the config path, the servers it named, and whether the config file or an explicit `MCP_ENABLED` turned MCP on, then torn down under its own timeout; the API boots **without MCP tools and without the email poller** rather than refusing to boot. The guard catches `BaseException`, not `Exception`, re-raising a bare `CancelledError` first: the original failure came from anyio, which wraps a task group's failures in `BaseExceptionGroup` as soon as one is a `BaseException` — and that group is not an `Exception`, so `except Exception` would miss the very shape this contains. The teardown is contained too, since it runs from inside that `except` and would otherwise replace the actionable log with the crash it prevents. `configured_server_names` never raises either, and deliberately catches broadly: it reads an operator-owned path during startup, where an exception is the crash loop rather than a bug report — `Path.is_file` re-raises an EACCES on a parent directory, and `json.loads` answers deeply-nested input with `RecursionError`, which is not a `ValueError`. It tests `is_file()` so a directory or a symlink to a FIFO is never opened, and caps the read at 1 MiB. That exception used to propagate out of the lifespan and kill the container — under `restart: unless-stopped`, a crash loop whose only outward symptom was a healthcheck that never passed. Outbound tools: per-Person DMs (`send_slack_dm`, `send_discord_dm`, `send_telegram_message`) plus room-targeted `send_department_message` and `send_company_broadcast`. All three per-Person DMs refuse a recipient id that matches no non-archived Person row (`schedule_tools._dm_recipient_on_roster`), which is what stops untrusted content in a turn — inbound mail, a chat message, a knowledge document — from directing a DM at an arbitrary workspace member. `send_slack_dm` previously consulted the roster only when the turn was already private to the principal, so on an ordinary turn it applied no roster check at all while its Discord and Telegram siblings did; the room-targeted tools are deliberately ungated, since those channels are team-visible. The per-Person DMs are additionally rate-limited and de-duplicated by the outbound anti-spam guard (below).\n\n### Outbound anti-spam guard\n\nEvery per-Person DM passes a deterministic guard (`orchestrator.outbound_guard.check_outbound_allowed`) after the roster gate and recipient-id recovery but before the network send — the single chokepoint **all** proactive DM paths reach (ad-hoc chat sends, the scheduler's followup/nudge dispatch, principal-brief delivery, the reflection turn, and research-finding routing). On a violation it returns a human-readable reason and the handler **suppresses** the send (`{\"status\":\"suppressed\",\"reason\":…}`), writes a `tool_invocation` audit row with `suppressed=true`, and writes **no** `done` activity row — so a blocked attempt never counts toward its own rate cap, and the Executive can read the reason and hold or `schedule_followup` for the recipient's next window. Three controls: **content dedup** (a near-identical message — whitespace/case-normalized, first 160 chars — already sent to the same recipient within `OUTBOUND_DEDUP_WINDOW_MINUTES`, default 360); a **per-recipient rate cap** (`OUTBOUND_MAX_PER_RECIPIENT_PER_WINDOW`, default 5, over `OUTBOUND_RATE_WINDOW_MINUTES`, default 60); and **quiet hours / availability** (`OUTBOUND_RESPECT_QUIET_HOURS`, default on — refuse while the recipient is on leave or outside their `people.channel` availability windows, surfacing the next open window). Delivery history is read from the existing `status='done'` `scheduled_actions` rows (`episodic.recent_sends_for_channel_ref`), so there is no new table. The guard is **fail-open**: any internal lookup error returns \"allow\", so it can never turn a working send into a crash or a silently-dropped message. Principal briefs and the internal heartbeat kinds use the `__internal__` channel and never reach these handlers, so they are unaffected.\n\n### Calendar & video links\n\nThe Executive books meetings through two typed tools over the configured calendar backend (`CALENDAR_PROVIDER`: Google Calendar via `manage_event`, or Outlook via `create-calendar-event` — see *Workspace providers*). `create_calendar_event` schedules a **future** meeting (propose→approve by default, or auto-execute once that decision class is promoted) and may be used proactively when a stalled goal warrants a sync. `create_instant_meeting` spins up an **impromptu call starting now**, auto-executing without the approval step and skipping the business-hours/horizon caps, so the Executive can hand back a join link immediately. Both attach a video-meeting link by default (`add_video_link`; opt out for in-person) — a **Google Meet** link parsed from the created event's `conferenceData`, or a **Microsoft Teams** link from `onlineMeeting.joinUrl` — surfaced to the caller plus persisted on the decision ledger as `meet_link`. The tool descriptions are static, backend-neutral text, so the cached tool block never depends on settings; the pre-rename `add_google_meet` key is still honoured for old ledger rows. Either way the caps that matter still hold — roster membership, principal-protection, max attendees, and a daily booking ceiling.\n\n**Around-the-meeting participation.** The Executive doesn't join the call as a live voice; instead, on every successful booking it schedules a best-effort post-meeting follow-up (~5 min after the end) that DMs a human attendee asking for a quick recap — key decisions and action items. The reply flows back through the same cross-session DM context linkage described below, so the Executive can act on it (summarize, follow up) in a later turn. No meeting-transcript or Drive integration is required.\n\n### Workspace providers\n\nThe Executive can *discover* any mail or calendar tool the gateway exposes, but three code paths call a fixed backend with no model in the loop and used to spell Gmail tool names inline: the inbound mailbox poller (list unread → fetch → mark read), alert email dispatch plus the scheduler's email send-tool hint, and the typed booking tools plus the approval-time conflict check. `integrations.workspace` puts those behind two Protocols (`MailProvider`, `CalendarProvider`) with one module per backend (`google.py`, `microsoft.py`) and a registry keyed on `EMAIL_PROVIDER` / `CALENDAR_PROVIDER` — separate switches (Outlook mail with a Google calendar is legitimate), both defaulting to `google`, so an existing install changes nothing until an operator opts in. The Google backend is the old inline code moved verbatim; tests pin its argument dicts byte-for-byte. The Microsoft backend polls only the Inbox folder (`list-mail-folder-messages` with `isRead eq false`, never the all-folders listing that includes Junk), converts Graph's HTML bodies to text with a real parser, lists a message's attachments so the names appear in the same `N. name (mime, size KB)` shape Gmail's text uses (and reach peer memory), marks read with `update-mail-message`, sends through `send-mail`'s nested shape, books with `isOnlineMeeting` + `onlineMeetingProvider=teamsForBusiness`, cancels with `delete-calendar-event`, and answers the advisory conflict check from the Executive's **own** calendar view (delegated permissions cannot read attendees' free/busy — narrower than Google's `query_freebusy`).\n\nEvery backend renders an inbound message into the same `Subject:` / `From:` / `To:` / `Cc:` + `--- BODY ---` text the persona already expects, and the poller adds a `--- REPLY ---` block naming the exact reply tool and threading ids for *that* message (Gmail: `send_gmail_message` + `thread_id`; Outlook: `reply-mail-message` + `messageId`) after the mail's `<untrusted_content>` block, never inside it. The block rides in the user turn — which is what lets the cached persona say \"use the reply tool in the REPLY block\" instead of naming a vendor tool — and the scheduler's proactive-email trigger names the backend's send tool the same way. Providers never raise on a malformed backend response (they return empty / `None` / `{\"error\": …}`), so one bad cycle never kills a loop, and a chosen backend whose MCP server is missing from `mcp_servers.json` is logged at startup and skipped by the poller: fail-soft, never a boot failure. The poller's newer checks run on that rendered text for both backends (contacts and private turns, roster requests and their emailed answers, the audit row), with three Outlook differences that fail closed: no sender is ever authenticated (the `dmarc=pass` read is Gmail's), so there is no acknowledgement to an unknown sender, no emailed fact confirmation and no principal-authenticated mail; attachments stay a list (the download is Gmail's); and the brief's calendar block is skipped (its listing is Google Calendar's). The code's own emails to the principal (roster prompts, fact confirmations, scheduled deliveries) go through `workspace.registry.send_from_executive`, and `runner.email_ready` follows `EMAIL_PROVIDER`. A private turn's allow-list (`schedule_tools.PRIVATE_TURN_MCP_TOOLS`) and Act as me's mail-touched reads include the Outlook twins of the Gmail and Calendar tools, and roster answer tokens are hidden from Microsoft 365 results as from Google's.\n\n### Cross-session DM context\n\nWhen the principal says \"DM Alex about X\" in one session, OE sends the DM and — if a live conversation is active and the recipient is not one of the principal's contacts (a contact cannot DM the bot, and quoting the principal's conversation into their email reply's unattended turn would put it in the audit log) — records an `outbound_context` linkage row (recipient, full outbound text, originating session id). Email is covered too but recorded one layer deeper — there is no `send_email` tool, so the linkage is written in `orchestrator.mcp_gateway` after a successful `google_workspace__send_gmail_message` or `microsoft_365__send-mail`, one row per `to`/`cc` recipient keyed by the bare lowercased address (OE's own address skipped). When Alex later replies on the 1:1 DM path — or by email — the shared helper `integrations.inbound_hydration.hydrate_user_message` (called by the Discord, Telegram, and Slack handlers, and by the email poller keyed on the sender address) looks up the most-recent `open` linkage for that sender within 72h and prepends an `<outbound_reply_context>` block — the outbound text plus a backstory excerpt from the originating session — to the message handed to `Executive.chat()`. So OE knows what the reply is about instead of starting from an empty per-person session. The block is context for the LLM turn only: peer memory strips it before recording what the person said (`strip_outbound_reply_context`, applied in `sync_turn`, `sync_department_turn` and to the prefetch query), so the Executive's own DM is never attributed to the person who replied to it. The block lands in the user turn (caching rule) and is injected into a copy only — the pristine reply is persisted to history. The linkage is one-shot (consumed on first matched reply, race-safe) so an unrelated later DM isn't re-hydrated. This is deterministic and independent of the per-person `peer_memory` (Honcho) layer.\n\nEvery adapter that persists a turn (Slack, Discord, Telegram, and the web route) records the message's **resolved sender** on `chat_messages.sender_person_id` — the rostered Person the adapter matched, or NULL for an unrostered sender — independently of the session owner, which falls back to the principal on Discord and Telegram so those threads stay visible. Attunement's open loops and feedback rely on this so an outsider's words are never read as someone on the roster's.\n\n### OneDrive folder sync\n\nThe Microsoft twin of the Drive folder sync below (`knowledge.onedrive_sync`, `ONEDRIVE_SYNC_ENABLED`; setup in `docs/onedrive_sync_setup.md`). It copies the files in `ONEDRIVE_SYNC_FOLDERS` (`<drive id>/<item id>` pairs; `openexecutive onedrive-folder <link>` resolves a sharing link) into the isolated `onedrive_docs` collection on its own heartbeat, and shows them on the knowledge page as \"OneDrive\" rows with a **Sync now** button. Microsoft has no service account that sees only what is shared with it (app-only Graph access covers the whole tenant), so it reads as the Executive's own Microsoft 365 sign-in, and the folder list is the scope. It never stores a credential: each tick asks the launcher for a token (`ms365-mcp-launch.sh --access-token`, which runs `docker/ms365-access-token.mjs` through the server's own token cache and will only mint file-read tokens), keeps it in memory, and sends it only to Graph. `knowledge.onedrive_client` issues GETs only, follows a paging link only back to Graph, and fetches a file's pre-authenticated download link without the token; errors never carry that link. PowerPoint and older Office formats are read through Graph's PDF rendering.\n\n### Google Drive folder sync\n\nThe synced files show on the knowledge page's Company documents list as \"Google Drive\" rows (sync time, last edit in Drive, an Open in Drive link and a text view), and the page's source card shows the last run, any sign-in error or count of files that failed to sync, and a **Sync now** button that runs one tick on demand.\n\n\nSeparate from the Drive tools the gateway proxies. The optional folder sync (`knowledge.drive_sync`, `DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLED`; setup in `docs/drive_sync_setup.md`) copies the files in `DRIVE_SYNC_FOLDER_IDS` into the isolated `drive_docs` knowledge collection on a scheduler heartbeat, so the Executive knows those folders without searching Drive live (see RAG). It calls the Drive v3 API directly (`knowledge.drive_client`, `httpx`) as a **service account** with the `drive.readonly` scope (`DRIVE_SYNC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_FILE`), not as the Executive's own account through workspace-mcp. Google enforces the folder scope, because the account sees only what is shared with it, and the sync can change nothing. Structured JSON means no display text to parse, and every file or folder id is checked against `[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,128}` before it goes into a URL or a query. The two paths meet in two places. A synced chunk carries its Drive file id and sync time, so the Executive can open the live file with its own `get_drive_file_content`. The setup doc says to share each synced folder with the Executive's account too, so that live open works.\n\n### Confluence space sync\n\nThe optional Confluence sync (`knowledge.confluence_sync`, `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_ENABLED`; setup in `docs/confluence_sync_setup.md`) copies the pages of the spaces in `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_SPACE_KEYS` into the isolated `confluence_wiki` knowledge collection on a scheduler heartbeat, so the Executive knows the company wiki without a tool call (see RAG). It works with Confluence Cloud and Server/Data Center: `knowledge.confluence_client` calls the v1 REST API both serve, directly with `httpx`, signing in with a personal access token (Server/DC) or a username and API token (Cloud). It reads only, never follows a redirect (so the token stays on the configured site), streams responses with a 20 MB cap, and checks page ids and space keys before they reach a URL or a CQL query. The URL must be `https://` unless `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_ALLOW_HTTP` is set, and `CONFLUENCE_SSL_VERIFY` takes `true`, `false` or a CA bundle path for a private certificate authority. With `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_PUBLIC_HOSTS_ONLY` (off by default, for an install where whoever sets the URL must not reach the backend's own network) every request resolves the site's host, refuses it when any address is not public (loopback, private, link-local, shared), and connects to the checked address with the site's name kept for the Host header and the TLS certificate check, directly rather than through a proxy. `confluence_client.config_problem` is the same settings check the app runs at start, for a caller that writes these settings on someone's behalf.\n\nIt is separate from a Confluence MCP server such as mcp-atlassian, which a deployment can add to `mcp_servers.json` for live reads and edits in chat. The two share the env names `CONFLUENCE_URL`, `CONFLUENCE_PERSONAL_TOKEN`, `CONFLUENCE_USERNAME`, `CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN` and `CONFLUENCE_SSL_VERIFY`, so one set of values serves both, and a synced chunk carries its page id so the Executive can open the live page with such a tool. A Confluence token is a user's, and what the sync reads becomes retrievable by everyone who talks to the Executive, so the space list is required and pages with a read restriction (their own or a parent's) are skipped unless `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_SKIP_RESTRICTED=false`. That keeps any existing member's token safe to use, without a dedicated licence. Manual runs: `openexecutive sync-confluence` / `purge-confluence`.\n\n### Your own Gmail or Outlook (Act as me)\n\nA second, separate mail connection, for **Act as me** (see **Act as Me (Delegation)**): a person's *own* mailbox, which `delegation.gmail.DelegateGmail` reads and drafts into over the Gmail REST API. It is never registered with the MCP gateway, so the model can reach it only through the typed `ghostwrite_email` handler — never by tool name through `call_tool`. The credential is one file per person in `DELEGATION_GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS_DIR` (default `company/delegation_google/`, `/data/delegation_google` in Docker), minted on a computer with a browser by `scripts/connect-own-gmail.py --email <you>` with the Executive's own OAuth client and the scopes `gmail.readonly` and `gmail.compose` — the same seed-it-yourself flow as the Executive's token, since the API serves no OAuth callback. It never lives in `WORKSPACE_MCP_CREDENTIALS_DIR`, where workspace-mcp picks a credential by address.\n\nEvery use re-checks with Google that the credential opens the mailbox on the person's People entry, and refuses outright when that address is the Executive's own: a shared mailbox would make everything the Executive writes look like theirs. Drafts are threaded (`In-Reply-To`, `References` of whole ids ending with the parent, `threadId`) and stamped `X-OE-Ghostwritten`; the only send is `drafts.send` of an existing draft by id, when the person taps Send on its reply card (`delegation.reply_send`). A Gmail rate limit, even as a 403, is an error to retry rather than a reconnect. The voice learner and the thread shown to the ghostwriter keep only each sender's own words through `email_poller.sender_new_text`, the poller's quoted-reply stripper made public. Setup status shows it as **Your own mailbox (Act as me)**.\n\nThe same file can instead hold an Outlook sign-in (`\"provider\": \"microsoft\"`), minted by `scripts/connect-own-outlook.py --email <you>` with a device-code sign-in on the Executive's own Entra app (`MS365_MCP_CLIENT_ID`, `MS365_MCP_TENANT_ID`, default `common`) and the delegated scopes `User.Read`, `Mail.ReadWrite`, `Mail.Send` and `offline_access`. `delegation.gmail.gmail_for` then hands back `delegation.outlook.DelegateOutlook`, which talks to Microsoft Graph directly — never the Microsoft 365 MCP server the Executive's own Outlook uses — with the same methods and the same one send: Graph's `send` on an existing draft, with no body. Microsoft rotates the refresh token on use and the new one is written back into the file. A sender counts as verified only from the topmost `Authentication-Results`, the one Exchange wrote, and only mail in their Sent Items counts as theirs.",+ "markdown": "External channels connect callers to the Executive. Each inbound adapter resolves the sender to a Person — the chat adapters via `find_person_by_{slack,discord,telegram}_id`, the email poller via `people.identity.resolve_email_sender` (a primary address or an alias, then the company-domain rule; see Org) — and threads `person_id` into `Executive.chat()`. A sender who resolves to nobody is no longer simply dropped: see **New senders (roster requests)** below.\n\n### Inbound channels\n\n- **Slack** (`integrations.slack_bot`) — async Bolt socket-mode (`AsyncApp` + `AsyncSocketModeHandler`) embedded in the lifespan; responds to `@mention`s, DMs, and thread continuations, with per-conversation session memory (see **Conversation state** below). Text only: there is no interactivity endpoint and no Block Kit, so nothing Slack sends carries a button.\n- **Discord** (`integrations.discord_bot`) — discord.py gateway embedded in the lifespan; per-thread auto-titling, session-scoped memory, author attribution, configurable `@mention` thread promotion.\n- **Telegram** — webhook gating + per-chat history.\n- **Google Chat** — webhook + service-account auth. It resolves no approval gates and has no roster gate (the webhook authenticates Google, not the sender), and it never populates the session's trusted alert ids, so `ack_alert`'s trust check — which now runs on every session rather than only those declaring an `origin_channel` — refuses there by default, and its `<channel>` block says plainly that a sign-off cannot be answered from it.\n- **Email** (`integrations.email_poller`) — MCP poll loop over the Executive's own mailbox — Gmail via `workspace-mcp` or Outlook via `ms-365-mcp-server`, chosen by `EMAIL_PROVIDER` (see *Workspace providers* below); it starts only once the MCP gateway is up, never surfaces Reply-To redirects, filters auto-replies. Its sessions carry `origin_channel=\"email\"`: the untrusted-content policy (`orchestrator.content_trust`) reads that tag to tell mail from the principal's own surfaces — left empty, as it once was, every stranger's body reached the decision extractor as the principal's words. The mail goes into the turn inside an `<untrusted_content source=\"email\" author=\"<sender>\" author_verified=\"no\">` block that says it carries none of the principal's authority, with the framing line and any `[POLICY]` notice outside it; mail from the principal's primary address that Gmail authenticated (`dmarc=pass`) is their own words — but only their new text goes in unwrapped: when the mail quotes or forwards another message (`_new_text_lines` cut something), the message as received follows in an `<untrusted_content source=\"email_quoted\">` block, since a stranger's text they replied to or passed on is not theirs. While the Executive is paused (`scheduler.pause`) it skips each poll and leaves the inbox unread, so held mail is processed on the first poll after resume; the chat adapters above are not paused. The Executive sees the whole message; peer memory records only `_email_memory_text` — the subject, the sender's new text (cut at the first quoted or forwarded message) and the attachment filenames — parsed from the rendered message with any trailing `--- REPLY ---` block dropped first, without backtracking-prone regexes, since the text is sender-controlled, and only for a rostered sender, the only kind with a peer to record into. The poller's `integration_inbound` row keeps the mail's text for the audit log, the way the reply's `chat_turn` row keeps the Executive's answer: `full.message` is the sender's new text (what web chat keeps for a turn), `full.attachments` the attachment filenames, and `details.preview` the first 120 characters of the new text, so /audit shows what was asked next to what was answered (the summary still reads `Inbound email from <sender>: <subject>`). The whole body with its quoted chain (`full.body`) is kept only on a row private to the principal: the chain is other people's mail — a contact's, on the principal's reply to one — and every signed-in user reads a public row. Each field is cut by its escaped JSON length (20,000 characters of text, 8,000 of attachment names), the measure the logger's 64 KB cap uses, so a long mail in a non-Latin script loses its tail rather than the row's structure. Outbound, the principal briefs and the client-rotation digest are emailed through the same gateway with the configured backend's send tool (`google_workspace__send_gmail_message` or `microsoft_365__send-mail`, via `workspace.registry.send_from_executive`, from the Executive's own mailbox to the principal's address, subject `<brief title> — <date>`, the date in the user's zone) as formatted HTML — rendered from the brief's Markdown with raw HTML and images off, so text quoted from outside shows as text and opening the email loads nothing remote. Email is first when the principal prefers it, and otherwise the backup after every chat channel, tried only when Slack, Discord and Telegram are missing or fail; an in-band error from the tool counts as a failed send and the next channel is tried. An emailed brief is not a DM, so the per-Person outbound guard below does not apply — the gateway's roster egress gate does.\n\n Two senders get their own framing. Mail from one of the principal's **contacts** (a `kind=\"contact\"` People row — see Org) replaces the non-roster `[POLICY]` notice with a contact one: it names them (name and role/company), says not to reply unless the principal asks and not to tell anyone else, and asks for a summary for the principal instead. Both this turn and the forwarded-by-principal turn below are marked `Session.private_to_principal`: they can email, DM or invite only the principal, an alert they raise is private to the principal, and they are not offered the tools that reach anyone else or start work outside the turn (`schedule_tools.PRIVATE_TURN_WITHHELD_TOOLS`: broadcasts, meeting bookings, workflows, follow-ups, watches, artifacts, goal updates, skill drafts, connecting a new MCP server), and of the MCP tools only Google Workspace reads and the gated Gmail send (see MCP below). Every audit row about such mail is private to the principal (see Audit Log), the poller's two `integration_inbound` rows included (`_private_to_principal_mail`), so the audit log's other readers see none of it. The poller holds `audit.private_rows` for the whole handling of such a mail, because some rows are written before the turn binds its private session: the knowledge retrieval quotes the mail's From line, subject and opening. The rows themselves read exactly like an outside sender's: the `integration_inbound` row is the non-roster one (`accepted_non_roster`), and the notice opens with the non-roster notice's exact sentence. The poller handles each message with no session bound, so one message's private turn never marks the next message's rows. The turn stays unattributed (`person_id` None — no peer memory, no co-presence), and the gateway refuses mail to a contact on a poller turn anyway. Mail **forwarded by the principal** — the sender resolves to the principal and `_new_text_lines` reports a forwarded message — is wrapped in a `<forwarded_by_principal>` block: summarise it, draft a reply the principal could send (as text in the reply, never sent or saved as a Gmail draft), note any commitment or date, and offer to add the original sender as a contact (confirmed from the web app or the principal's Slack / Discord, since an ordinary email turn cannot change the People list — the one email that can is the principal's tokened reply to a roster-request email, which is parsed before any model turn; see below). The reply still goes to the principal only. The From header is unauthenticated, so this framing grants nothing: a spoofed \"forward\" just gets the real principal a summary.\n\nSlack, Discord, and Telegram are roster-gated on inbound: an unrostered sender's message never reaches the Executive (`details.outcome=\"rejected_unknown_sender\"`). The gates look up **team members only** — a contact's Slack, Discord or Telegram id is treated as unknown, so a contact can never talk to the bot (nor count as a co-present peer). What happens next is the roster request below — except for a contact, a thread continuation, a Telegram group or an unverified Telegram webhook, which stay silent. Email is not inbound-gated — non-roster mail flows through with a `[POLICY]` notice so triage can classify it. Slack/Discord thread continuations pass the shared `integrations.response_gate` (utility-fast model, biased toward replying). Slack only continues a thread it has replied in: it reads the thread with `conversations_replies` (5 s bound) and looks for its own user id, which `auth_test` resolves at startup. If that lookup fails, mentions and DMs still work and thread continuations stop until a retry succeeds (`slack_bot._resolve_bot_user_id`, at most once a minute, from the channel `message` listener). When Slack doesn't return the thread in time, the thread's stored history (`slack:thread:{channel}:{thread_ts}`, written on every turn the bot answers there) stands in: with history, a rostered sender gets an ephemeral \"I couldn't read this thread just now… @-mention me\" and the drop is audited (`outcome=dropped_thread_unreadable`). A thread the bot never answered in stays silent. A message the gate skips is audited (`outcome=skipped_gate`, with the gate's reason) and gets an :eyes: reaction (`reactions_add`, which needs the bot's `reactions:write` scope; without it the reaction is skipped), so a sender the gate misjudged can see the message was read and @-mention the bot.\n\n**No link previews on replies.** The Executive's replies go out with previews off — Telegram `sendMessage` carries `link_preview_options.is_disabled`, Slack's reply `say` passes `unfurl_links=False` / `unfurl_media=False`, and every Discord reply send passes `suppress_embeds=True`. The direct messages the Executive starts are the same: `send_slack_dm` posts with `unfurl_links=False` / `unfurl_media=False`, and Discord's `send_dm` sets the `SUPPRESS_EMBEDS` flag on each chunk, so a reminder or a brief sent by DM carries no preview either. Otherwise the chat service fetches a link in the text on its own, so a reply that quotes someone's mail (Act as me reads it) could carry data to a sender's server with no click. The web chat does the same for images: `Message.tsx` loads only an image the app itself serves (`lib/markdownImages.loadsInline`) and shows any other as a link.\n\n### New senders (roster requests)\n\nSomeone who writes in and is not on the People list — and is not one of the principal's contacts — is **held, acknowledged and asked about** instead of dropped (`integrations.roster_intake.intake` over the `people.roster_requests` ledger; lifecycle in Org). Each adapter calls it after its gate:\n\n- **Slack** — a DM or an `@mention` (not a thread continuation: the bot was not addressed there). The name and profile email come from `users_info` (5 s timeout). The acknowledgement goes in the DM, or as an **ephemeral** message for a mention, so nobody else in the channel learns who is and is not on the roster. The held event keeps only a fixed set of keys (text, user, channel, ts, thread, files).\n- **Discord** — a DM or a mention (not a thread the bot merely follows). The acknowledgement goes in the DM, or by DM for a channel mention; `/ask` answers the interaction with an ephemeral acknowledgement first (Discord allows 3 s), then holds the prompt. Its old \"ask the admin to add you\" reply is gone.\n- **Telegram** — only a **private** chat, and only when `TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is set and valid: Telegram identifies the chat rather than the sender, and without the secret anyone could forge an update. A group, or an unverified webhook, stays silent as before. Attachment file ids are held and downloaded only on replay.\n- **Email** — non-roster mail that is not private to the principal (so never a contact's) and does not look machine-sent (`looks_automated`: a no-reply / notifications / billing-style local part, a `List-Id` / `List-Unsubscribe` / `Auto-Submitted` / bulk `Precedence` header, or a DMARC failure). The mail is **still triaged** by the Executive on this pass; its `[POLICY]` notice now says the sender was already told their message is waiting and the principal was asked who they are, so the model raises no second alert just to add them, and that the email will come back once they are added.\n\nEvery path skips a contact first (`find_person_by_*_id(..., include_contacts=True)`, or the email poller's private-mail rule): a contact has no chat access and gets no request and no acknowledgement, and the team-visible `rejected_unknown_sender` / `accepted_non_roster` rows read the same for a contact as for a stranger.\n\n**The acknowledgement** is one fixed text (`roster_intake.ACK_TEXT` — \"your message arrived … waiting for confirmation\"), never the model and never an echo of what they wrote, so a forged sender gains nothing by triggering it. It is sent at most once per sender per `ROSTER_ACK_WINDOW_DAYS` (7) and at most `ROSTER_ACK_DAILY_CAP` (20) a day across all senders (`claim_ack`, one transaction; a failed send releases its claim). An email acknowledgement is the one send the MCP gateway lets reach an address off the roster: `send_email_ack` sets `mcp_gateway.roster_ack_grant`, a one-shot ContextVar grant that admits a single `send_gmail_message` with exactly the granted recipient (a plain string, no list), subject and body and no other key, then is spent (audited `integration_outbound`, `kind: roster_ack`, private). An email sender is acknowledged only when Gmail authenticated them: once `claim_ack` succeeds, the poller's `send_ack` re-reads the mail as raw MIME and needs Gmail's own topmost `Authentication-Results` reporting `dmarc=pass` for the From domain (`fact_confirmation.sender_authenticated`, fail-closed). The printed headers the poller reads never carry that header, so without the second read a forged From would draw the acknowledgement to whoever it names — backscatter from the Executive's mailbox. An unauthenticated sender makes `send_ack` raise `roster_intake.AckWithheld`: the claim is released, and they are held silently. `authenticated_by_gmail` strips quoted strings and comments before reading the verdict — Gmail copies the envelope sender and DKIM tags into its own stamp, and a quoted local part could otherwise carry a fake `dmarc=pass` — and needs exactly one `dmarc=` verdict reading exactly `dmarc=pass header.from=<domain>` (Gmail may follow it with its own `dara=` resinfo, so its position is not checked). Residual: when Gmail writes no verdict at all (a From domain without DMARC) and echoes an unsanitised `;dmarc=pass header.from=…` elsewhere in its stamp, that echo would read as the verdict; bounded by the acknowledgement caps. A withheld acknowledgement is audited `roster_ack_withheld`. `intake` acknowledges before surfacing the card and telling the principal, and both follow the request's `ack_sent_at`: a withheld, failed or capped acknowledgement reads \"haven't been told anything yet\" on the Today card, in the principal's prompt and in the email `[POLICY]` notice.\n\n**Telling the principal.** A new request puts a private card on the principal's `/today` (see Today) and pushes a prompt on their delivery plan — preferred chat DM, then the others, then email — for a chat sender or an email sender on the company's own domain; an outside email sender waits on the card, as does everything past `ROSTER_REQUEST_DAILY_CAP` (30) pushes a day (the same cap bounds how many requests open a day; a declined sender is not raised again for 30 days). A chat prompt can be answered in place (\"that's Annamarie, add her to the team\"). An email prompt carries a one-time token (`RR-` + 20 base32 characters, stored hashed); the poller checks every inbound mail for one **before** triage (`try_email_roster_answer`): the reply must come from the principal's primary address exactly (not an alias, not the company-domain rule), carry the token of a pending request, not be an automatic reply, and not fail DMARC where the header is visible; and is parsed by `parse_decision`'s `roster_identity` shape — anything else falls through to the ordinary path. The token is hidden (`RR-[hidden]`) in every other Google Workspace result the gateway returns — the confirmation sits in the Executive's Sent folder, and any turn could otherwise read it — except the poller's own fetch of an inbound message (`mcp_gateway.reveal_roster_tokens`); a token-bearing mail that is not an answer is scrubbed before triage.\n\n**Replay.** Once the principal answers (web card, chat tool, email reply) — or a People-page / `upsert_person` write makes the sender match someone (`after_roster_write`) — the held messages are replayed through the adapter that received them (`register_replayer`: Slack re-runs the held event, Discord and Telegram their held text, email re-fetches the message from Gmail and handles it as mail from a known sender), oldest first, now attributed to the new Person. A teammate gets every held message; a new contact only held email (it takes the private contact path; held chat is dropped); a decline drops everything. Replays run in a **fresh `contextvars.Context`**: the answer may have come from the principal's own verified turn, and a stranger's message must never be read with the principal's session — and their contacts — still bound.\n\n### Standing facts by email (confirm by reply)\n\nThe principal can ask for a standing fact, a retirement or a company-profile edit by email, and the fact tools check it exactly as in chat (the own-words gates run on `_email_memory_text`, the sender's new text, not the quoted chain or attachments). An email's From line proves nothing, though, and a standing fact is read by every later prompt as the principal's own account. So an emailed change is **held, never applied**, until the principal's own mailbox confirms it (`integrations.fact_confirmation`, `memory.facts.fact_confirmations`):\n\n- **Who may ask.** The poller stamps every email turn with `Session.email_from` (the bare lowercased From address) and `email_authenticated`. The text the poller reads never carries `Authentication-Results` (workspace-mcp prints a fixed set of headers), so for mail claiming the principal's primary address it reads the message again as raw MIME (`fact_confirmation.sender_authenticated`) and requires Gmail's own stamp: the **topmost** `Authentication-Results` header (Gmail adds it on receipt, above anything the sender wrote), authserv-id `mx.google.com`, reporting `dmarc=pass` for the From address's domain, with the raw From matching (`authenticated_by_gmail`). It fails closed: no header, `dmarc=none`, a temporary error or a failed read all leave the turn unauthenticated. Mail from anyone else costs no second read and is never authenticated. `fact_tools._gate` admits an email turn only from the principal's **primary** address, exactly (no alias, no company-domain rule), authenticated, and not private to the principal (mail they forwarded stays refused, as do contacts, teammates and unknown senders).\n- **The hold.** The tool returns `awaiting_confirmation` (no action chip, and the model is told to say nothing has changed). `request_confirmation` stores the change with the SHA-256 of a fresh one-time token (`FC-` + 20 base32 characters, 100 bits; 7-day expiry; at most 10 waiting at once) and emails the token to the principal's roster address, outside any turn's outbound context. A profile edit is dry-run first, so one that cannot apply is reported in the turn, before any email goes out. If the email fails, nothing is held.\n- **Keeping the token from any model.** The tool result never carries it, and `mcp_gateway.hide_roster_tokens` now scrubs `FC-` tokens as well as `RR-` ones (`FC-[hidden]`) from every Google Workspace result except the poller's own fetch of an inbound message. Act as me's reads of the principal's own Gmail, where the confirmation email lands, hide them too (`delegation.gmail.parse_message` and the thread search), so the drafting model never sees a live token either.\n- **The reply.** `_handle_one_email` hands every message to `try_email_fact_confirmation` right after the roster-answer check, before any model turn. It acts only on a reply from the principal's primary address carrying the token of a **pending** confirmation. A made-up, spent, cancelled or expired reference matches nothing and falls through to the ordinary path with the token hidden, so no old or forged token can make the Executive email the principal. A reply with a live token is read again as raw MIME (`read_raw`) and must pass the same Gmail DMARC check as the request; one that doesn't (or whose raw read fails) is refused, the change keeps waiting, and the principal is told. Then an **automatic reply** is consumed quietly — no answer, no model turn, the change keeps waiting: the printed headers catch a Gmail vacation reply (`Precedence: bulk`), and the raw headers catch what they don't show (`automatic_reply`: `Auto-Submitted` other than `no`, `X-Auto-Response-Suppress` and similar, `Precedence: auto_reply`, an out-of-office subject), since an Exchange out-of-office echoes the token from the principal's own address and may well say \"I'll confirm on my return\". The raw message starts at the tool's exact separator line (`\\n\\n--- RAW MIME ---\\n`), so a sender-written Subject imitating it cannot supply the headers. CONFIRM (or yes / approve) applies the change through `fact_tools.apply_confirmed`, the same apply step chat uses. CANCEL (or no) drops it, and an unclear reply leaves it waiting. The principal gets a one-line result either way. A compare-and-set on the row means two replies can apply it only once.\n- **Audit.** Private `fact_confirmation` rows record held / applied / cancelled / refused. The applied change also writes the fact tools' usual private rows, with `source_channel=\"email\"` as its provenance.\n\n### Checking a channel is set up\n\nSettings → Setup status (`GET /setup/status`, `api/setup_checks.py`) gives each channel a light and a plain-language fix. It tests the credentials with one free read-only call — Slack `auth.test`; Telegram `getMe`, then `getWebhookInfo` (is a webhook registered, is it this app's `/webhook/telegram`, did a delivery fail in the past day); Discord `users/@me`, only while the bot is still connecting — and reads what the lifespan left on `app.state`: the Slack socket's `is_connected()`, the Discord bot's `is_ready()` together with its gateway socket being open (discord.py stays ready while it reconnects after a drop), or the exception its task stopped with (`LoginFailure`, `PrivilegedIntentsRequired`), and the MCP gateway. A listening Slack is amber while the listener hasn't resolved its own user id (`slack_bot.bot_user_id()`), since thread continuations are off until it does. Because inbound is roster-gated, a connected Slack, Discord or Telegram is amber while nobody on the roster has its id (`slack_user_id`, `discord_user_id`, `telegram_chat_id`), or when its latest `integration_inbound` row is a `Rejected: …` from the past day whose sender still isn't on the roster — the page shows the sender's id, never message text. Local login with no `TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is red for Telegram, since the local-login gate turns its webhook away. Google Chat and Gmail are checked from configuration: a numeric project number and a readable service-account key; the OAuth client (or service-account key) the workspace-mcp child signs in with.\n\nA channel setting written `KEY= # note` in a `.env` file arrives as the note's text, because python-dotenv strips only a comment that follows a value. `Settings` reads such a value as unset for the Slack, Telegram, Discord and Google Chat credentials, so the line no longer switches a channel on with its own comment as the token. `TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is the exception, because read as unset a junk secret would turn the webhook's check off. It is kept instead, and since Telegram can only ever send 1–256 of `A-Z a-z 0-9 _ -` (what `setWebhook` accepts), a secret outside that set — a leftover comment, a pasted `<value from Step 2>` — could only be matched by someone who guessed it: while it is set the webhook refuses every update, neither the local-login gate nor the roster tools count it as proof (`Settings.telegram_webhook_secret_valid`), and Setup status shows it red (`.env.example` shipped four such lines; the notes now sit on their own lines).\n\n### Conversation state\n\nEvery adapter keys a deterministic `session_id` off the conversation surface and replays that session's stored turns into `Session.conversation_history`, so a follow-up (\"yes, go ahead\") lands with the question still in context. Slack's ids are `slack:dm:{user}`, `slack:thread:{channel}:{thread_ts}`, and `slack:channel:{channel}:{user}` for a mention that starts a thread; because the bot's reply roots a Slack thread at that message's `ts`, the turn is double-written to that thread's session too, so the first continuation inside it is not cold. A reply inside a thread THAT PERSON ROOTED also offers the parent `slack:channel:{channel}:{user}` id when matching an approval gate, since a gate raised on the mention recorded that session while the answer arrives under the thread's. The root-author check is load-bearing: widening on \"threaded and not a DM\" alone offered one person's channel session inside any thread in that channel, so a remark they made to a colleague could resolve their open gate and post the run's title into that colleague's thread. Discord has the same shape — its auto-thread router promotes a mention reply into a bot-owned thread — and the same alias. An @-mention inside a DM is handled once, by the DM path: Slack fires both events, and taking both forked the conversation across two session ids. The same id is the audit grouping key and the scope passed to `format_for_prompt`. A per-session `asyncio.Lock` serializes turns within one conversation — the inflight semaphore caps fan-out across the workspace, which does nothing to stop two messages in the same thread from both reading history before either writes it. Persistence happens after the reply is sent and its failure is logged, never surfaced: the user already has their answer.\n\n**Conversations within a chat app.** A Telegram chat, a Slack or Discord DM and a person's @mentions in one channel (`slack:channel:…`, `discord:channel:…`) are each one endless stream, so they are cut into conversations (`memory.conversations`, shared helpers in `integrations/conversations.py`). Each adapter computes the stream's base id as before and asks `conversation_for` which conversation a message belongs to: the newest, unless the stream has been quiet for two hours (`CONVERSATION_GAP`), when the next one starts. The first conversation keeps the bare base id; later ones add `~2`, `~3`, … (`memory.conversation_ids`). A whole message of `/new`, \"new chat\" or \"new conversation\" starts a fresh one instead of a turn and is answered with the name of the one it ended; the new row has no messages and stays off the Chats page until its first turn. After a conversation's first exchange `title_after_turn` names it in the background with `utils.session_title.generate_session_title` (the first words of the message if that fails), as a web chat's first turn does. Threads (`slack:thread:…`, `discord:thread:…`), email and every other id are left whole. What has to see the whole stream compares base ids: the inbound resolver, so an approval asked before a cut is answered after it, and the session-scoped decisions and advice `format_for_prompt` renders. At boot `split_existing_streams` cuts history saved before this by the same rule, once (`app_migrations`), titling each part from its first message and carrying a read-mail lock to every part. An adapter installed outside the package adds its streams with `conversation_ids.register_rolling` and cuts its own old history once, with its own migration name and an `only` filter for its base ids, because the built-in sweep may already have run without it.\n\nThis was absent on Slack until #136. Every message built a fresh `Session` and minted a per-*message* id (`thread_ts` falls back to the message's own `ts`, so a DM never repeated one), which meant a multi-turn confirmation could not work: the Executive asked whether to send a briefing to Slack, the user said yes, and the next turn had no record of the question.\n\n### What the model is told about the channel\n\nChat adapters pass a `<channel>` block (`integrations.channel_context`) in the **user turn** — never a cached system block. It names the surface, states that the person cannot see the app's cards or buttons, and draws the line the assistant kept crossing: briefing proposals and alerts are actioned on the briefing page; a proposal that books something can only be approved there; a workflow sign-off the Executive is explicitly waiting on *can* be answered in the conversation. The principal's DMs on Slack, Discord and Telegram also receive the open-alert digest (`briefing.context.format_open_alerts_for_prompt`) as the `<briefing>` block, gated to DMs because the board is company-wide and a shared channel must not pull it in. That digest is the ONLY trusted source of an `alert_id` for `ack_alert`. The briefing page's `[Discuss mode — alert_id=N]` primer is a pointer to which item is under discussion, not authority on its own: the server accepts that id only if it is also on the live board it derived itself. An id appearing anywhere else, including inside an alert's own body, is not trusted: alerts are minted from inbound email and chat, so their bodies are attacker-controlled. Two mechanisms enforce that rather than one prompt rule. Every field the digest interpolates is collapsed to a single line, because a newline in an attacker-written headline, suggested action, tag or review note would otherwise forge a whole extra `[N]` line — a fabricated instruction to clear somebody else's alert. And the live board the server derived is recorded on the session, so `ack_alert` refuses any id outside it — on EVERY session, web included; the web previously had no check at all. The recorded set is the whole live board (the cap `/today` renders as cards), not just the rows the digest printed, so a card past the digest's 30-row render cap is still ackable rather than sending the principal back to the page. Be precise about what this buys: it stops an id that is invented, closed, snoozed or expired, including one quoted out of an attacker-written alert body. It does NOT stop the model being argued into acking the wrong LIVE card — one alert's body can still make a case about another id that is genuinely open. Scoping trust to the single item under discussion would need the primer id carried server-side, which it is not.\n\n### Handler failures\n\nAn adapter's catch-all replies \"I encountered an error processing your request.\" On Slack that used to be the whole story — one uncorrelated log line, no audit row, and an unguarded error-send that could itself escape into Bolt. It now logs with the session, sender, channel, thread and mode, and writes an `integration_inbound` row with `details.outcome=\"handler_error\"`, joining the inbound row under the same `session_id`. Upstream, a single crashing tool handler no longer takes the turn down at all: the orchestrator's tool gathers use `return_exceptions=True`, hand the model an error `tool_result`, and audit it with `ok=false` (cancellation is re-raised, not swallowed).\n\n### Attachments\n\n`integrations.attachments` handles web chat, Discord, Telegram, Slack and Google Chat. Images become Anthropic vision blocks; documents (PDF/DOCX/TXT/MD/CSV) are inlined into the turn that carried them — inside an `<untrusted_content source=\"attachment\" author=\"<name>\">` block (`content_trust.wrap_untrusted`, whose closing tag the text cannot forge), under an `[Attached: <name>]` label, which the open-loop pass reads as \"not the speaker's words\" and the decision extractor strips before it reads the turn — and indexed into the ChromaDB `inbound_attachments` collection. 20 MB/file cap; web chat uses `POST /chat/upload`.\n\n**Scanned PDFs** are read, not reported empty. A PDF with no text layer goes through `knowledge.pdf_reader`: with `PDF_PROVIDER_READING=true` (opt-in, off by default) the deployment's own model reads it through its provider's PDF support (Anthropic natively, OpenRouter's `file-parser`, a local server only with `LOCAL_PDF_INPUT`); otherwise, and as the fallback, local OCR (pypdfium2 + RapidOCR, offline, no key) — so every deployment converts them. The label then reads `(converted from scanned pages)`, and an unreadable one says why. The index takes the text already extracted for the turn, so a scan is converted once. A file a channel delivered (everything here except `POST /chat/upload`, where the signed-in user sends it) converts at most `PDF_INBOUND_MAX_PAGES` (30) pages and draws on a rolling `PDF_INBOUND_PAGES_PER_HOUR` (300) budget shared by all senders, so sending scans cannot run up unbounded model spend or CPU.\n\nPer channel:\n- **Slack** — a `file_share` message (previously dropped outright for its `subtype`) is handled like any message; files download only after the roster gate and the response gate, with the bot token sent only to `https://files.slack.com/` (needs the `files:read` scope). History and peer memory record the words plus `(Attached files: …)`, never a document's text.\n- **Google Chat** — uploaded attachments download through `media.download` with the reply credentials (`chat.bot`), checked against the 20 MB cap per chunk, 5 per message; an attachment-only message is no longer dropped. The webhook authenticates Google, not the sender, so files are read only when the event's `user.email` is on the People roster (a team member); anyone else's files are named to the Executive, never downloaded. A Drive file shared into a message is left to the Drive tools, with its id.\n- **Email** — the poller (`integrations.email_attachments`) downloads up to 5 readable attachments of the message itself via `get_gmail_attachment_content` — workspace-mcp in stdio mode saves the file and answers `Saved to: <path>`, which must start its line, be the last such line and end in the answer's `Saved filename:` (the answer echoes the sender-chosen attachment name first, and a name carrying `Saved to: /…` must not redirect the read), then resolve inside the tool download folders — and appends their text to the turn (15k chars each). Only for a sender the principal knows (team, contact, principal); a stranger's files stay a list. It runs outside the model loop, so it works on private turns without adding the attachment tool to `PRIVATE_TURN_MCP_TOOLS`.\n- Anything else (a Drive PDF, a skipped attachment) — the Executive's `read_document` tool.\n\nIndexed chunks are keyed on `attachment:<bare filename>` and tagged `type=attachment`. An attachment's name is chosen by whoever sent the message and the name is the chunk-id namespace, so without the prefix an inbound `strategy-2026.md` would upsert over the curated company document of that name. The prefix separates inbound content from curated uploads and keeps provenance visible; it does not separate senders from one another.\n\nIsolation is the **collection**: `retriever.retrieve` never queries `inbound_attachments` at all, so an attachment cannot resurface as company knowledge in a later, unrelated turn. Attachment processing is roster-gated on Discord too — it previously ran before the gate, so an unrostered sender's file was downloaded and indexed before their message was dropped. These rows still have no operator surface: they are never written to `company/docs/`, so `GET /documents` does not list them.\n\nThis replaced a domain-based scheme that did not work. The chunks lived in `company_docs` under a domain outside the specialist set, on the premise that an unrecognised domain matched no filter. It matched every one — `ChromaDBStore.query` attaches a `where` clause only when a domain filter is present, and an Executive-level retrieval passes none — so attachments came back under “From your company documents”, top-ranked and indistinguishable from a curated upload. Legacy rows are migrated across on boot.\n\n### MCP gateway & outbound\n\nMCP runs in **both directions**. As a *client*, `orchestrator.mcp_gateway.MCPGateway` proxies MCP servers (Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Outlook mail and calendar — whatever `mcp_servers.json` configures) as Executive tools, with egress gating on Gmail recipients, Calendar attendees, Drive share grantees, and Microsoft 365 recipients/attendees against the roster (and a refusal of public / whole-domain Drive sharing). The Gmail gate also accepts only a fixed set of argument keys, so workspace-mcp's `reply_all` (recipients taken from the thread, never checked) and `forward_message_id` / `include_forwarded_attachments` (forwarding any inbox message) are refused; a reply is `thread_id` plus an explicit, roster-checked `to`. Three more refusals close paths around those gates: every Apps Script tool (code running as the Executive's account, outside the gates, and since workspace-mcp 1.29.0 schedulable to keep running); any argument that makes the server fetch a URL (`fileUrl` / `file_url` on the Drive and import tools, a Gmail attachment given as a `url`), since the fetch can carry data out in its query string before any recipient gate matters; and text Google would mail to someone the roster never checked (`rsvp_comment` to an event's organizer, an out-of-office `decline_message` to whoever invites the Executive). Every gate reads its arguments by normalized spelling: workspace-mcp 1.29.0 renames a camelCase key such as `Attendees`, `userGoogleEmail` or `rsvpComment` to the real parameter, so a gate matching the exact key would never see it. Arguments that are not a JSON object are refused for the same reason. Google-side fetches are refused too: any key ending in `url` / `uri` at any depth whose value has a URL scheme (a Slides image or page background, a Docs or Forms image; a document hyperlink and a meeting link are stored, not fetched, and pass, as does a Drive file id), (a value is a URL after the characters a URL parser strips are removed, and `//host` counts), and on every tool that can write cells — the Sheets tools and the Drive create / update / import tools, which turn CSV into a Sheet — any string anywhere holding a formula call that fetches (`IMPORTDATA`, `IMPORTXML`, `IMPORTHTML`, `IMPORTFEED`, `IMAGE`), JSON-encoded or mid-CSV included: a string argument that encodes JSON is read as the server decodes it (one too large to read is refused), text is also scanned with character references decoded and comments / CDATA removed, and an upload that would become a native Sheet may only be text `content` — a `base64_content` or server-side `file_path` upload there is refused, since an XLSX hides its formulas behind zip members and XML encodings; a PNG to Drive or a DOCX to Docs is untouched. Not covered, unverified: whether Drive's HTML / Markdown import fetches an `<img src>` when it converts `content` into a Doc. A `manage_event` call that names no attendees is sent with `send_updates=\"none\"`, so the event's existing guests are not emailed text the gate never checked. The allow-list (`_egress_sets`, built by `_roster_allow_set` as a `people.identity.RosterAllow`) is every team member's email and email aliases plus the Executive's own address, always, and — for a teammate — any address on one of the company's own domains whose local part (`+tag` dropped) matches theirs, the same rule inbound mail is matched by; a **contact's** email joins it only when `people_tools.contacts_reachable_now()` is true — a turn the principal started on a verified surface (web chat, their own Slack or Discord, a verified private Telegram chat), or inside `grant_contact_egress()` (the decisions approve route, when the approver is the principal). On any other turn — an inbound email, a teammate, the scheduler, a workflow, the alert review — a contact's address is refused exactly like a stranger's, so the refusal cannot reveal that it belongs to a contact (contacts are private to the principal). The single exception to the roster rule is the fixed roster-request acknowledgement above, under its one-shot `roster_ack_grant`. A turn about the principal's private mail (`Session.private_to_principal`) narrows the list to the principal's own address and the Executive's. Such a turn may call only the MCP tools in `schedule_tools.PRIVATE_TURN_MCP_TOOLS`: Google Workspace reads (`search_gmail_messages`, `get_gmail_message_content`, `get_events`, `list_calendars`, `query_freebusy`, and the Drive, Docs and Sheets reads such as `search_drive_files`, `get_drive_file_content`, `get_doc_content` and `read_sheet_values`) and the two Gmail tools this gate narrows to the principal (`send_gmail_message`, `draft_gmail_message`). It is an exact allow-list, not a server: workspace-mcp runs at the `complete` tier, where a Google Chat message to a space, a Docs, Sheets or Drive write into a file already shared with others, `manage_event` on a shared calendar (its gate checks attendees and pins notifications, nothing else) reaches people with no recipient check; and every other server has none at all (a Slack or Notion server, the default `fetch` server, whose URL can carry the turn's content, a server loaded at runtime). Its `search_tools` results show only the allowed tools (`workflows.tool_catalog.filter_search_results`; output it cannot parse reads as no match), and a `call_tool` naming anything else is refused with an error tool_result and an audit row private to the principal (`schedule_tools.private_turn_withholds`), a missing name included. `search_tools` and `call_tool` stay offered, so the tool list and its cached prefix do not change. The typed calendar tool (`_resolve_attendees`) and the chat DM tools (`message_person`, `send_telegram_message`, `send_discord_dm` and their person-id recovery) apply the same rule — a contact's id reads as an unknown one off the principal's turn — and a private turn may DM or invite only the principal (`PRIVATE_TURN_REFUSAL` otherwise); `message_person` never falls back to a \"Needs you\" alert for a contact, who cannot sign in to see it. The Google Workspace server (`workspace-mcp`) behind those Gmail/Calendar/Drive tools runs **co-located inside the API** as a stdio child of the gateway — fitting the single-tenant model (one install = one company = one exec Google account), so there's no separate service to operate. It's baked into the API image and launched by `docker/workspace-mcp-launch.sh`, which selects single-user OAuth (token persisted at `/data/google_credentials`) or service-account domain-wide delegation from `GWORKSPACE_AUTH_MODE`. The optional `WORKSPACE_MCP_TOOLS` (comma-separated service names, default `all`) limits which Google services it loads. The gateway forwards the Google secrets to the child via `_FORWARDED_ENV_VARS`. Every `google_workspace__*` call acts as the Executive's own account. workspace-mcp takes the acting account per call (`user_google_email`) and nothing used to check it, so under domain-wide delegation a model-chosen address could open anyone's mailbox in the domain; `mcp_gateway._check_acting_account` now refuses a value naming any other address — before every other gate, with an `integration_outbound_blocked` audit row. An absent value stays allowed (the server's own account).\n\n**What the model is told is connected.** `MCPGateway.start()` records the configured server names (`server_names`), and the Executive renders them with the channel settings into block 0's *Connected Systems* section (`prompts.connected_systems`; see the caching section). While Google is connected that section pins the Google tool names the Executive uses constantly (`GOOGLE_TOOL_MANIFEST`) and tells it to call them with `call_tool` directly, with no `search_tools` round trip. extensible-mcp only runs a tool one of the session's searches has returned, and remembers it for the session's life, so the gateway does that discovery itself: the lifespan starts `MCPGateway.prime_pinned_tools()` in the background once the gateway is up with `google_workspace` configured (an exact-name search per pinned tool, the way `workflows.tool_catalog.resolve` does it; a name the search no longer finds is logged as workspace-mcp drift). A pinned call that still comes back with extensible-mcp's \"has not been discovered via search_tools\" refusal, for example before priming finished, is discovered and retried once. That happens after every gate has passed the same arguments, and only for pinned names: any other tool still needs the model's own search, and nothing here widens what a call may do, including the private-turn allow-list.\n\n**Microsoft 365** is the Outlook twin: `@softeria/ms-365-mcp-server` (a Node package, pinned) is installed in a throwaway Node build stage and only the `node` binary plus the package are copied into the API image, launched by `docker/ms365-mcp-launch.sh` as the `microsoft_365` entry with an **explicit tool allow-list** (`--enabled-tools`, an anchored regex) rather than the upstream `mail,calendar` preset — that preset also registers inbox forwarding rules, mailbox settings (external auto-reply), calendar sharing and event forwarding, which can address people the gateway never sees. Exactly the Outlook mail + calendar tools and the OneDrive tools are exposed (`microsoft_365__send-mail`, `microsoft_365__create-calendar-event`, `microsoft_365__search-onedrive-files`, …; hyphenated Graph endpoint aliases, proxied verbatim), and every admitted tool is either roster-gated or carries no recipient; the gate also covers the excluded writers in case an operator widens the list. Both servers can be configured at once. Auth is the MSAL device-code flow against the operator's own Entra app registration (`MS365_MCP_CLIENT_ID` is required; the server's built-in public client is refused); the refresh token persists at `/data/ms365_credentials` and is seeded once with `ms365-mcp-launch.sh --login` from inside the container — the server has a native device-code CLI, so there is no mint script and nothing to copy. The launcher scrubs the literal `$VAR` placeholders extensible-mcp leaves for unset variables (otherwise MSAL would be handed `$MS365_MCP_TENANT_ID` as an authority), and `MS365_MCP_EXPECTED_USERNAME` pins the bound mailbox. The egress gate for this family walks Graph's nested shapes (`body.Message.toRecipients[].emailAddress.address`, `body.attendees[]…`) — every email-shaped string outside the free-text fields must be on the roster, control characters and non-ASCII addresses are refused, unforeseen keys are still scanned (fail-closed) — and covers the whole write surface: send, reply, reply-all, forward, every draft tool, `update-mail-message` (it can PATCH recipients onto a draft) and create-/update-calendar-event; reads and `delete-calendar-event` (the only cancel path) pass through. Graph's reply, reply-all and send-draft actions carry no recipient in their arguments (the recipient is whoever the referenced `messageId` names), so for those the gate first reads the referenced message through the server and roster-checks the recipients Graph will derive (`replyTo` else `from` for a reply; `replyTo` and `from` together, plus the original to/cc, for reply-all; the draft's own to/cc/bcc for send-draft), refusing on any lookup failure; RSVP and cancel actions get the same treatment through an event lookup, because their comment is emailed to the organizer or every attendee; `download-bytes` is pinned to mail attachment bytes and OneDrive file content (`/drives/{id}/items/{id}/content`, optionally Graph's `?format=pdf` rendering), and a OneDrive result comes back as the file's extracted text rather than base64 — the attachment pin is what makes the poller's promise that an unrostered sender cannot be auto-replied to hold on Outlook as it does on Gmail; and the rendered inbound text quotes any forged `--- REPLY ---` line inside a body so the persona only ever reads the real block. Every mail write's `from`, `sender` and `replyTo` may name only the Executive's own address (the Outlook twin of the Gmail acting-account pin), so the model cannot send as a rostered colleague's mailbox or steer replies elsewhere; and `move-mail-message` into Deleted Items, Junk Email or Recoverable Items is refused, so a move cannot trash mail ungated. The server registers its account tools whatever its tool allow-list says, so the gateway itself refuses `login`, `logout`, `select-account` and `remove-account` (audited like any other refusal) and drops them from `search_tools` results — a chat turn cannot sign the mailbox out, switch accounts or start a sign-in; setup is only the launcher's `--login`, and the read-only `verify-login` / `list-accounts` stay callable. The example config's hyphenated patterns still deny `delete-mail-*`, `logout`, `remove-account` and `download-bytes-to-file` as defense in depth. A successful `send-mail` records the same outbound-context linkage Gmail does.\n\n**OneDrive in chat** (opt-in with `MS365_MCP_ONEDRIVE=true` and a fresh `--login`, since the server asks for its tools' permissions on every token refresh and a sign-in without file consent would otherwise fail mail and calendar too) matches what the Executive can do on Google Drive: search, list a folder, read a file, upload and edit, create folders, move, rename, copy and share; there is no delete tool. The launcher adds `Files.Read.All` at sign-in (`--extra-scopes`), so folders shared *with* the Executive can be read too; writes (upload, new folder, move, copy) land only in the Executive's own drives, checked against `list-drives` at call time, so a planted instruction cannot save company files into a stranger's shared folder. Sharing is gated like Drive sharing: `share-drive-item` invitees must be People on the roster and named by email (an `objectId` or `alias` grantee is refused, since nothing can check it), no `owner` role, and `create-drive-item-share-link` must be scoped to specific people (`scope: \"users\"`): an anonymous or whole-organization link, or one with no scope (the tenant default), is refused. An invite must require sign-in and grant only view or edit, a link must be a view or edit link, and `search-onedrive-files` takes plain words only, since its query goes into the request path unencoded.\n\nAs a *server*, `openexecutive.mcp_server` exposes OE's own company context and specialist council to external MCP clients at `/mcp` — the inverse direction; see the dedicated **MCP Server** section. The gateway launches extensible-mcp as a `uvx` subprocess whose fastembed tool-search index uses an embedding model baked into the API image and loaded offline, so it no longer re-downloads that model from the Hugging Face Hub on every cold start. extensible-mcp is pinned twice over: to a commit, which fixes its own code, and with `--exclude-newer`, which fixes the resolution of its dependencies — without the cutoff uvx re-resolves them against PyPI on every networked start, so a new release of any of them would reach running deployments on restart. Both live in `_EXTENSIBLE_MCP_LAUNCH_ARGS` in `orchestrator/mcp_gateway.py`, the Dockerfile's pre-warm uses the same arguments (a unit test enforces the match), so an image whose pre-warm succeeded starts the gateway with no network. The pre-warm is best-effort (`|| true`): an image built while GitHub was unreachable fetches the pinned commit on its first start instead. Updating the gateway is a deliberate bump of the commit and cutoff; `uv` itself is not pinned. Because the MCP stdio client does not inherit the parent environment, `MCPGateway.start()` explicitly forwards the embedding-cache/offline env vars (`FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH`, `HF_HUB_OFFLINE`, …) into the child.\n\n**Emailing an artifact.** A Gmail send or draft may carry `attachments=[{\"artifact_id\": \"alert:12\", \"as\"?: \"docx\"}]`. `call_tool` runs the recipient gate first; only if it passes does `_expand_artifact_attachments` replace each such entry with the rendered file (`content` base64 + `filename` + `mime_type`, workspace-mcp's own attachment shape), produced by `artifact_records.render_artifact_file` — the same renderer as `/artifacts/{id}/download`. Only artifact rows resolve (never an arbitrary alert), links have no file, and an entry mixing `artifact_id` with other keys is refused. A stringified or single-object `attachments` is normalised first, so an artifact entry can never reach workspace-mcp unexpanded (it would silently drop it). At most 5 distinct artifacts per email (repeats are dropped) and 15 MB rendered in total; rendering runs off the event loop via `asyncio.to_thread`. A refusal writes `artifact_attachment_refused`; a successful send writes `artifact_attached` — both carry the recipients. Other attachment entries pass through unchanged. The same expansion serves the Microsoft 365 mail writes: the entry becomes a Graph `#microsoft.graph.fileAttachment` (`name`, `contentType`, `contentBytes`) placed where Graph expects it for that tool (`body.Message.attachments` for `send-mail`, reply, forward and the createReply drafts; `body.attachments` for `create-draft-email`), whether the model put it at the top level or inside the message; an entry anywhere else, one on `update-mail-message` or `send-draft-message` (their requests cannot carry attachments), or one behind a body that is not an object is refused rather than forwarded unexpanded.\n\n**Enablement, and why it degrades instead of dying.** `MCP_ENABLED` left unset is inferred from the presence of `mcp_servers_config_path` — dropping an `mcp_servers.json` next to `profile.yaml` turns MCP on with no further configuration. An **explicit** setting always wins in both directions: `MCP_ENABLED=false` keeps MCP off with the file still in place. It did not: `_resolve_mcp` tested `not self.mcp_enabled`, which cannot tell \"never set\" from \"set to false\", so the file's presence silently overrode the operator. The file is probed through `config.mcp_config_file_present`, never `Path.exists` directly — that re-raises an EACCES on a parent directory, and from inside a validator that comes out of `Settings()` itself, which `api/main.py` calls at module level. The check now reads `model_fields_set` (the fields the env actually supplied) and stores that on a private attr behind the read-only `mcp_auto_enabled` property, because the validator's own assignment joins that set and would otherwise make every auto-enable look explicit downstream.\n\nStartup is **best-effort**, in `main._start_mcp_gateway`. Two checks come before the subprocess: MCP off is a no-op, and a config defining no servers under `mcpServers` is logged and skipped — extensible-mcp's own loader raises on that and exits, and because the child is already gone the only thing that surfaces is anyio's \"Attempted to exit cancel scope in a different task\" from `stdio_client` unwinding, a traceback naming nothing about configuration. The start is also bounded (120s, generous because that child may still clone extensible-mcp on a cold start if the image's pre-warm failed): `ClientSession` carries no `read_timeout_seconds`, so `initialize()` waits forever on a child that is *alive but silent*, and an unbounded wait is a lifespan that never yields — the same healthcheck-never-passes symptom, which no `except` can see. A gateway that fails anyway is logged at ERROR with the config path, the servers it named, and whether the config file or an explicit `MCP_ENABLED` turned MCP on, then torn down under its own timeout; the API boots **without MCP tools and without the email poller** rather than refusing to boot. The guard catches `BaseException`, not `Exception`, re-raising a bare `CancelledError` first: the original failure came from anyio, which wraps a task group's failures in `BaseExceptionGroup` as soon as one is a `BaseException` — and that group is not an `Exception`, so `except Exception` would miss the very shape this contains. The teardown is contained too, since it runs from inside that `except` and would otherwise replace the actionable log with the crash it prevents. `configured_server_names` never raises either, and deliberately catches broadly: it reads an operator-owned path during startup, where an exception is the crash loop rather than a bug report — `Path.is_file` re-raises an EACCES on a parent directory, and `json.loads` answers deeply-nested input with `RecursionError`, which is not a `ValueError`. It tests `is_file()` so a directory or a symlink to a FIFO is never opened, and caps the read at 1 MiB. That exception used to propagate out of the lifespan and kill the container — under `restart: unless-stopped`, a crash loop whose only outward symptom was a healthcheck that never passed. Outbound tools: per-Person DMs (`send_slack_dm`, `send_discord_dm`, `send_telegram_message`) plus room-targeted `send_department_message` and `send_company_broadcast`. All three per-Person DMs refuse a recipient id that matches no non-archived Person row (`schedule_tools._dm_recipient_on_roster`), which is what stops untrusted content in a turn — inbound mail, a chat message, a knowledge document — from directing a DM at an arbitrary workspace member. `send_slack_dm` previously consulted the roster only when the turn was already private to the principal, so on an ordinary turn it applied no roster check at all while its Discord and Telegram siblings did; the room-targeted tools are deliberately ungated, since those channels are team-visible. The per-Person DMs are additionally rate-limited and de-duplicated by the outbound anti-spam guard (below).\n\n### Outbound anti-spam guard\n\nEvery per-Person DM passes a deterministic guard (`orchestrator.outbound_guard.check_outbound_allowed`) after the roster gate and recipient-id recovery but before the network send — the single chokepoint **all** proactive DM paths reach (ad-hoc chat sends, the scheduler's followup/nudge dispatch, principal-brief delivery, the reflection turn, and research-finding routing). On a violation it returns a human-readable reason and the handler **suppresses** the send (`{\"status\":\"suppressed\",\"reason\":…}`), writes a `tool_invocation` audit row with `suppressed=true`, and writes **no** `done` activity row — so a blocked attempt never counts toward its own rate cap, and the Executive can read the reason and hold or `schedule_followup` for the recipient's next window. Three controls: **content dedup** (a near-identical message — whitespace/case-normalized, first 160 chars — already sent to the same recipient within `OUTBOUND_DEDUP_WINDOW_MINUTES`, default 360); a **per-recipient rate cap** (`OUTBOUND_MAX_PER_RECIPIENT_PER_WINDOW`, default 5, over `OUTBOUND_RATE_WINDOW_MINUTES`, default 60); and **quiet hours / availability** (`OUTBOUND_RESPECT_QUIET_HOURS`, default on — refuse while the recipient is on leave or outside their `people.channel` availability windows, surfacing the next open window). Delivery history is read from the existing `status='done'` `scheduled_actions` rows (`episodic.recent_sends_for_channel_ref`), so there is no new table. The guard is **fail-open**: any internal lookup error returns \"allow\", so it can never turn a working send into a crash or a silently-dropped message. Principal briefs and the internal heartbeat kinds use the `__internal__` channel and never reach these handlers, so they are unaffected.\n\n### Calendar & video links\n\nThe Executive books meetings through two typed tools over the configured calendar backend (`CALENDAR_PROVIDER`: Google Calendar via `manage_event`, or Outlook via `create-calendar-event` — see *Workspace providers*). `create_calendar_event` schedules a **future** meeting (propose→approve by default, or auto-execute once that decision class is promoted) and may be used proactively when a stalled goal warrants a sync. `create_instant_meeting` spins up an **impromptu call starting now**, auto-executing without the approval step and skipping the business-hours/horizon caps, so the Executive can hand back a join link immediately. Both attach a video-meeting link by default (`add_video_link`; opt out for in-person) — a **Google Meet** link parsed from the created event's `conferenceData`, or a **Microsoft Teams** link from `onlineMeeting.joinUrl` — surfaced to the caller plus persisted on the decision ledger as `meet_link`. The tool descriptions are static, backend-neutral text, so the cached tool block never depends on settings; the pre-rename `add_google_meet` key is still honoured for old ledger rows. Either way the caps that matter still hold — roster membership, principal-protection, max attendees, and a daily booking ceiling.\n\n**Around-the-meeting participation.** The Executive doesn't join the call as a live voice; instead, on every successful booking it schedules a best-effort post-meeting follow-up (~5 min after the end) that DMs a human attendee asking for a quick recap — key decisions and action items. The reply flows back through the same cross-session DM context linkage described below, so the Executive can act on it (summarize, follow up) in a later turn. No meeting-transcript or Drive integration is required.\n\n### Workspace providers\n\nThe Executive can *discover* any mail or calendar tool the gateway exposes, but three code paths call a fixed backend with no model in the loop and used to spell Gmail tool names inline: the inbound mailbox poller (list unread → fetch → mark read), alert email dispatch plus the scheduler's email send-tool hint, and the typed booking tools plus the approval-time conflict check. `integrations.workspace` puts those behind two Protocols (`MailProvider`, `CalendarProvider`) with one module per backend (`google.py`, `microsoft.py`) and a registry keyed on `EMAIL_PROVIDER` / `CALENDAR_PROVIDER` — separate switches (Outlook mail with a Google calendar is legitimate), both defaulting to `google`, so an existing install changes nothing until an operator opts in. The Google backend is the old inline code moved verbatim; tests pin its argument dicts byte-for-byte. The Microsoft backend polls only the Inbox folder (`list-mail-folder-messages` with `isRead eq false`, never the all-folders listing that includes Junk), converts Graph's HTML bodies to text with a real parser, lists a message's attachments so the names appear in the same `N. name (mime, size KB)` shape Gmail's text uses (and reach peer memory), marks read with `update-mail-message`, sends through `send-mail`'s nested shape, books with `isOnlineMeeting` + `onlineMeetingProvider=teamsForBusiness`, cancels with `delete-calendar-event`, and answers the advisory conflict check from the Executive's **own** calendar view (delegated permissions cannot read attendees' free/busy — narrower than Google's `query_freebusy`).\n\nEvery backend renders an inbound message into the same `Subject:` / `From:` / `To:` / `Cc:` + `--- BODY ---` text the persona already expects, and the poller adds a `--- REPLY ---` block naming the exact reply tool and threading ids for *that* message (Gmail: `send_gmail_message` + `thread_id`; Outlook: `reply-mail-message` + `messageId`) after the mail's `<untrusted_content>` block, never inside it. The block rides in the user turn — which is what lets the cached persona say \"use the reply tool in the REPLY block\" instead of naming a vendor tool — and the scheduler's proactive-email trigger names the backend's send tool the same way. Providers never raise on a malformed backend response (they return empty / `None` / `{\"error\": …}`), so one bad cycle never kills a loop, and a chosen backend whose MCP server is missing from `mcp_servers.json` is logged at startup and skipped by the poller: fail-soft, never a boot failure. The poller's newer checks run on that rendered text for both backends (contacts and private turns, roster requests and their emailed answers, the audit row), with three Outlook differences that fail closed: no sender is ever authenticated (the `dmarc=pass` read is Gmail's), so there is no acknowledgement to an unknown sender, no emailed fact confirmation and no principal-authenticated mail; attachments stay a list (the download is Gmail's); and the brief's calendar block is skipped (its listing is Google Calendar's). The code's own emails to the principal (roster prompts, fact confirmations, scheduled deliveries) go through `workspace.registry.send_from_executive`, and `runner.email_ready` follows `EMAIL_PROVIDER`. A private turn's allow-list (`schedule_tools.PRIVATE_TURN_MCP_TOOLS`) and Act as me's mail-touched reads include the Outlook twins of the Gmail and Calendar tools, and roster answer tokens are hidden from Microsoft 365 results as from Google's.\n\n### Cross-session DM context\n\nWhen the principal says \"DM Alex about X\" in one session, OE sends the DM and — if a live conversation is active and the recipient is not one of the principal's contacts (a contact cannot DM the bot, and quoting the principal's conversation into their email reply's unattended turn would put it in the audit log) — records an `outbound_context` linkage row (recipient, full outbound text, originating session id). Email is covered too but recorded one layer deeper — there is no `send_email` tool, so the linkage is written in `orchestrator.mcp_gateway` after a successful `google_workspace__send_gmail_message` or `microsoft_365__send-mail`, one row per `to`/`cc` recipient keyed by the bare lowercased address (OE's own address skipped). When Alex later replies on the 1:1 DM path — or by email — the shared helper `integrations.inbound_hydration.hydrate_user_message` (called by the Discord, Telegram, and Slack handlers, and by the email poller keyed on the sender address) looks up the most-recent `open` linkage for that sender within 72h and prepends an `<outbound_reply_context>` block — the outbound text plus a backstory excerpt from the originating session — to the message handed to `Executive.chat()`. So OE knows what the reply is about instead of starting from an empty per-person session. The block is context for the LLM turn only: peer memory strips it before recording what the person said (`strip_outbound_reply_context`, applied in `sync_turn`, `sync_department_turn` and to the prefetch query), so the Executive's own DM is never attributed to the person who replied to it. The block lands in the user turn (caching rule) and is injected into a copy only — the pristine reply is persisted to history. The linkage is one-shot (consumed on first matched reply, race-safe) so an unrelated later DM isn't re-hydrated. This is deterministic and independent of the per-person `peer_memory` (Honcho) layer.\n\nEvery adapter that persists a turn (Slack, Discord, Telegram, and the web route) records the message's **resolved sender** on `chat_messages.sender_person_id` — the rostered Person the adapter matched, or NULL for an unrostered sender — independently of the session owner, which falls back to the principal on Discord and Telegram so those threads stay visible. Attunement's open loops and feedback rely on this so an outsider's words are never read as someone on the roster's.\n\n### OneDrive folder sync\n\nThe Microsoft twin of the Drive folder sync below (`knowledge.onedrive_sync`, `ONEDRIVE_SYNC_ENABLED`; setup in `docs/onedrive_sync_setup.md`). It copies the files in `ONEDRIVE_SYNC_FOLDERS` (`<drive id>/<item id>` pairs; `openexecutive onedrive-folder <link>` resolves a sharing link) into the isolated `onedrive_docs` collection on its own heartbeat, and shows them on the knowledge page as \"OneDrive\" rows with a **Sync now** button. Microsoft has no service account that sees only what is shared with it (app-only Graph access covers the whole tenant), so it reads as the Executive's own Microsoft 365 sign-in, and the folder list is the scope. It never stores a credential: each tick asks the launcher for a token (`ms365-mcp-launch.sh --access-token`, which runs `docker/ms365-access-token.mjs` through the server's own token cache and will only mint file-read tokens), keeps it in memory, and sends it only to Graph. `knowledge.onedrive_client` issues GETs only, follows a paging link only back to Graph, and fetches a file's pre-authenticated download link without the token; errors never carry that link. PowerPoint and older Office formats are read through Graph's PDF rendering.\n\n### Google Drive folder sync\n\nThe synced files show on the knowledge page's Company documents list as \"Google Drive\" rows (sync time, last edit in Drive, an Open in Drive link and a text view), and the page's source card shows the last run, any sign-in error or count of files that failed to sync, and a **Sync now** button that runs one tick on demand.\n\n\nSeparate from the Drive tools the gateway proxies. The optional folder sync (`knowledge.drive_sync`, `DRIVE_SYNC_ENABLED`; setup in `docs/drive_sync_setup.md`) copies the files in `DRIVE_SYNC_FOLDER_IDS` into the isolated `drive_docs` knowledge collection on a scheduler heartbeat, so the Executive knows those folders without searching Drive live (see RAG). It calls the Drive v3 API directly (`knowledge.drive_client`, `httpx`) as a **service account** with the `drive.readonly` scope (`DRIVE_SYNC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_FILE`), not as the Executive's own account through workspace-mcp. Google enforces the folder scope, because the account sees only what is shared with it, and the sync can change nothing. Structured JSON means no display text to parse, and every file or folder id is checked against `[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,128}` before it goes into a URL or a query. The two paths meet in two places. A synced chunk carries its Drive file id and sync time, so the Executive can open the live file with its own `get_drive_file_content`. The setup doc says to share each synced folder with the Executive's account too, so that live open works.\n\n### Confluence space sync\n\nThe optional Confluence sync (`knowledge.confluence_sync`, `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_ENABLED`; setup in `docs/confluence_sync_setup.md`) copies the pages of the spaces in `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_SPACE_KEYS` into the isolated `confluence_wiki` knowledge collection on a scheduler heartbeat, so the Executive knows the company wiki without a tool call (see RAG). It works with Confluence Cloud and Server/Data Center: `knowledge.confluence_client` calls the v1 REST API both serve, directly with `httpx`, signing in with a personal access token (Server/DC) or a username and API token (Cloud). It reads only, never follows a redirect (so the token stays on the configured site), streams responses with a 20 MB cap, and checks page ids and space keys before they reach a URL or a CQL query. The URL must be `https://` unless `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_ALLOW_HTTP` is set, and `CONFLUENCE_SSL_VERIFY` takes `true`, `false` or a CA bundle path for a private certificate authority. With `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_PUBLIC_HOSTS_ONLY` (off by default, for an install where whoever sets the URL must not reach the backend's own network) every request resolves the site's host, refuses it when any address is not public (loopback, private, link-local, shared), and connects to the checked address with the site's name kept for the Host header and the TLS certificate check, directly rather than through a proxy. `confluence_client.config_problem` is the same settings check the app runs at start, for a caller that writes these settings on someone's behalf.\n\nIt is separate from a Confluence MCP server such as mcp-atlassian, which a deployment can add to `mcp_servers.json` for live reads and edits in chat. The two share the env names `CONFLUENCE_URL`, `CONFLUENCE_PERSONAL_TOKEN`, `CONFLUENCE_USERNAME`, `CONFLUENCE_API_TOKEN` and `CONFLUENCE_SSL_VERIFY`, so one set of values serves both, and a synced chunk carries its page id so the Executive can open the live page with such a tool. A Confluence token is a user's, and what the sync reads becomes retrievable by everyone who talks to the Executive, so the space list is required and pages with a read restriction (their own or a parent's) are skipped unless `CONFLUENCE_SYNC_SKIP_RESTRICTED=false`. That keeps any existing member's token safe to use, without a dedicated licence. Manual runs: `openexecutive sync-confluence` / `purge-confluence`.\n\n### Your own Gmail or Outlook (Act as me)\n\nA second, separate mail connection, for **Act as me** (see **Act as Me (Delegation)**): a person's *own* mailbox, which `delegation.gmail.DelegateGmail` reads and drafts into over the Gmail REST API. It is never registered with the MCP gateway, so the model can reach it only through the typed `ghostwrite_email` handler — never by tool name through `call_tool`. The credential is one file per person in `DELEGATION_GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS_DIR` (default `company/delegation_google/`, `/data/delegation_google` in Docker), minted on a computer with a browser by `scripts/connect-own-gmail.py --email <you>` with the Executive's own OAuth client and the scopes `gmail.readonly` and `gmail.compose` — the same seed-it-yourself flow as the Executive's token, since the API serves no OAuth callback. It never lives in `WORKSPACE_MCP_CREDENTIALS_DIR`, where workspace-mcp picks a credential by address.\n\nEvery use re-checks with Google that the credential opens the mailbox on the person's People entry, and refuses outright when that address is the Executive's own: a shared mailbox would make everything the Executive writes look like theirs. Drafts are threaded (`In-Reply-To`, `References` of whole ids ending with the parent, `threadId`) and stamped `X-OE-Ghostwritten`; the only send is `drafts.send` of an existing draft by id, when the person taps Send on its reply card (`delegation.reply_send`). A Gmail rate limit, even as a 403, is an error to retry rather than a reconnect. The voice learner and the thread shown to the ghostwriter keep only each sender's own words through `email_poller.sender_new_text`, the poller's quoted-reply stripper made public. Setup status shows it as **Your own mailbox (Act as me)**.\n\nThe same file can instead hold an Outlook sign-in (`\"provider\": \"microsoft\"`), minted by `scripts/connect-own-outlook.py --email <you>` with a device-code sign-in on the Executive's own Entra app (`MS365_MCP_CLIENT_ID`, `MS365_MCP_TENANT_ID`, default `common`) and the delegated scopes `User.Read`, `Mail.ReadWrite`, `Mail.Send` and `offline_access`. `delegation.gmail.gmail_for` then hands back `delegation.outlook.DelegateOutlook`, which talks to Microsoft Graph directly — never the Microsoft 365 MCP server the Executive's own Outlook uses — with the same methods and the same one send: Graph's `send` on an existing draft, with no body. Microsoft rotates the refresh token on use and the new one is written back into the file. A sender counts as verified only from the topmost `Authentication-Results`, the one Exchange wrote, and only mail in their Sent Items counts as theirs.","mermaid": "flowchart TD\n Channels[\"Slack / Discord<br/>Telegram / GChat / Email\"]\n Resolve[\"find_person_by_*_id\"]\n Gate[\"roster gate\"]\n Drop[\"drop\"]\n Hold[\"roster request<br/>(hold + fixed ack,<br/>ask the principal)\"]\n Exec[\"Executive.chat()\"]\n Attach[\"attachments<br/>(vision / inbound_attachments)\"]\n MCP[\"MCP gateway\"]\n GW[\"Google Workspace<br/>(workspace-mcp child)\"]\n M365[\"Microsoft 365<br/>(ms-365-mcp-server child:<br/>Outlook + OneDrive)\"]\n WP[\"workspace providers<br/>(poller / alerts / booking)\"]\n Guard[\"outbound anti-spam guard<br/>(dedup / rate cap / quiet hours)\"]\n Out[\"DM / department<br/>/ broadcast tools\"]\n Channels --> Resolve\n Resolve --> Gate\n Gate -- \"unknown sender\" --> Hold\n Hold -- \"approved: replay\" --> Exec\n Hold -- \"contact / declined\" --> Drop\n Gate -- \"Person\" --> Exec\n Gate --> Attach\n Attach --> Exec\n Exec --> MCP\n MCP -- \"roster egress gate\" --> GW\n MCP -- \"roster egress gate\" --> M365\n WP -- \"EMAIL_PROVIDER / CALENDAR_PROVIDER\" --> MCP\n WP --> Exec\n Exec --> Guard\n Guard -- \"suppress\" --> Drop\n Guard -- \"allow\" --> Out\n Out --> Channels\n Own[(\"Principal's own Gmail<br/>(Act as me: REST, drafts only)\")]\n Exec -- \"ghostwrite_email\" --> Own\n class Channels entry\n class Resolve compute\n class Gate compute\n class Drop external\n class Hold compute\n class Exec hot\n class Attach compute\n class MCP external\n class GW external\n class M365 external\n class WP compute\n class Guard compute\n class Out compute\n class Own external","generated_at": "2026-10-09T18:00:00Z"}diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/memory/conversations.py b/packages/core/openexecutive/memory/conversations.pyindex 57436915..8dd31d0c 100644--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/memory/conversations.py+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/memory/conversations.py@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Executive's replayed history starts clean.from __future__ import annotationsimport logging+from collections.abc import Callablefrom datetime import UTC, datetime, timedeltafrom pathlib import Pathfrom typing import Any@@ -148,10 +149,16 @@ def split_existing_streams(*,gap: timedelta = CONVERSATION_GAP,db_path: Path | None = None,+ migration: str = _SPLIT_MIGRATION,+ only: Callable[[str], bool] | None = None,) -> int:"""One-shot: cut every chat-app stream saved before conversations existedby the same quiet-gap rule. Returns how many new conversations it made.+ An adapter that registers its streams later (``register_rolling``) cuts+ its own history once with its own ``migration`` name and an ``only``+ filter for its base ids, since this sweep may already have run without it.+Messages move to their conversation's id; the first conversation keepsthe base id. Nothing else moves: decisions and advice are read across thewhole stream anyway (``conversation_ids.family_clause``), and the Drive@@ -168,7 +175,7 @@ def split_existing_streams(with _get_conn(resolved) as conn:claimed = conn.execute("INSERT OR IGNORE INTO app_migrations (name, applied_at) VALUES (?, ?)",- (_SPLIT_MIGRATION, datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()),+ (migration, datetime.now(UTC).isoformat()),)if claimed.rowcount == 0:return 0@@ -179,6 +186,8 @@ def split_existing_streams(base = str(stream["session_id"])if not is_rolling(base) or base_session_id(base) != base:continue+ if only is not None and not only(base):+ continuemessages = conn.execute("SELECT id, role, content, created_at FROM chat_messages ""WHERE session_id = ? ORDER BY id",diff --git a/packages/core/tests/unit/test_chat_conversations.py b/packages/core/tests/unit/test_chat_conversations.pyindex 766ae051..4b7ec6a4 100644--- a/packages/core/tests/unit/test_chat_conversations.py+++ b/packages/core/tests/unit/test_chat_conversations.py@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ def test_ids_round_trip() -> None:def test_only_chat_app_streams_roll() -> None:assert is_rolling("telegram:-100") and is_rolling("slack:channel:C1:U1")assert is_rolling("discord:dm:9") and is_rolling("discord:channel:5:9")- for sid in ("4f1c2a", "slack:thread:C1:1.2", "discord:thread:5", "email:t1", "google_chat:spaces/x"):+ for sid in ("4f1c2a", "slack:thread:C1:1.2", "discord:thread:5", "email:t1", "pigeon:dm:x"):assert not is_rolling(sid)assert base_session_id(sid) == sid@@ -181,9 +181,9 @@ def test_later_turns_keep_the_title(db: Path) -> None:# ── one-shot split of old history ────────────────────────────────────────-def _old_stream(db: Path, mail_private: bool = False) -> None:+def _old_stream(db: Path, mail_private: bool = False, base: str = BASE) -> None:t0 = datetime(2026, 3, 1, 9, 0, tzinfo=UTC)- session_store.create_session(BASE, "Telegram Dana", t0.isoformat(), caller_person_id=OWNER, db_path=db)+ session_store.create_session(base, "Telegram Dana", t0.isoformat(), caller_person_id=OWNER, db_path=db)plan = [(t0, "user", "Draft a reply to the landlord"),(t0 + timedelta(minutes=1), "assistant", "Here's a draft."),@@ -200,10 +200,10 @@ def _old_stream(db: Path, mail_private: bool = False) -> None:for at, role, text in plan:conn.execute("INSERT INTO chat_messages (session_id, role, content, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",- (BASE, role, text, at.isoformat()),+ (base, role, text, at.isoformat()),)if mail_private:- conn.execute("UPDATE sessions SET mail_private = 1, mail_read_at = 3 WHERE session_id = ?", (BASE,))+ conn.execute("UPDATE sessions SET mail_private = 1, mail_read_at = 3 WHERE session_id = ?", (base,))def test_old_history_is_cut_by_the_same_rule(db: Path) -> None:@@ -231,6 +231,30 @@ def test_a_mail_read_lock_carries_to_every_part(db: Path) -> None:assert session_store.mail_read_at(sid, db_path=db) is None+def test_streams_registered_later_are_cut_by_their_own_sweep(+ db: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch+) -> None:+ from openexecutive.memory import conversation_ids++ monkeypatch.setattr(conversation_ids, "_extra_streams", [])+ _old_stream(db, base="pigeon:dm:7")+ # The built-in sweep ran before the adapter registered: nothing to cut.+ assert conversations.split_existing_streams(db_path=db) == 0+ _old_stream(db)+ conversation_ids.register_rolling(lambda sid: sid.startswith("pigeon:dm:"))++ def is_pigeon(base: str) -> bool:+ return base.startswith("pigeon:dm:")++ made = conversations.split_existing_streams(db_path=db, migration="pigeon-split", only=is_pigeon)+ assert made == 2+ ids = {s["session_id"] for s in session_store.list_sessions(OWNER, db_path=db)}+ assert {"pigeon:dm:7", "pigeon:dm:7~2", "pigeon:dm:7~3", BASE} <= ids+ # `only` kept the sweep to the adapter's streams.+ assert f"{BASE}~2" not in ids+ assert conversations.split_existing_streams(db_path=db, migration="pigeon-split", only=is_pigeon) == 0++def test_web_chats_and_threads_are_not_cut(db: Path) -> None:for sid in ("4f1c2a", "slack:thread:C1:1.2"):_turn(db, sid, NOW - timedelta(days=2))