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AI-powered virtual executive team — a single coherent executive persona backed by 8 specialist agents (FastAPI + Next.js).

Enforce ack_alert's trust check on every session, not just chat adapters

Rufusf9ac0f74b58d
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/api/routes/chat.py b/packages/core/openexecutive/api/routes/chat.py
index 4549aff5..abda4ff6 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/api/routes/chat.py
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/api/routes/chat.py
@@ -274,13 +274,18 @@ async def _run_chat_turn(
# the principal clicked or named (the items behind the /today "What's
# going on" narrative). Sync SQLite read off the event loop; the
# formatter swallows its own errors, so this is belt-and-suspenders.
- from openexecutive.briefing.context import format_open_alerts_for_prompt
+ from openexecutive.briefing.context import render_and_trust
+ # `render_and_trust` also records on the session exactly which alert
+ # ids this block named. `ack_alert` accepts nothing else, so a web turn
+ # that skipped this step could not clear a card at all — and, before
+ # the trusted set was recorded here, could clear ANY id, including one
+ # an inbound email wrote into an alert body.
# return_exceptions=True so a digest raising never discards the others —
# each formatter already swallows its own errors, this just guards the
# to_thread wrappers themselves.
results = await asyncio.gather(
- asyncio.to_thread(format_open_alerts_for_prompt),
+ asyncio.to_thread(render_and_trust, session),
return_exceptions=True,
)
digests: list[str] = []
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/architecture-facts.yaml b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/architecture-facts.yaml
index e091f441..2a0a4f11 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/architecture-facts.yaml
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/architecture-facts.yaml
@@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ routing:
side-effecting tool so a chip surfaces in the live stream
("Approved proposal #N" / "Dismissed proposal #N"). The button-driven
Approve / Dismiss path on the briefing page still acks via the HTTP
+ TRUST: the server-side check runs on EVERY session, not only those with an origin_channel. It previously skipped web sessions, so the browser — the surface the principal actually uses — had no check and the model could ack any id, including one an inbound email wrote into an alert body that the Discuss handoff quoted into the turn. `briefing.context.render_and_trust` is the single place that renders the digest AND records the ids it named onto session.trusted_alert_ids; the web chat route and the channel adapters both go through it, so the block shown and the set accepted cannot drift. An empty trusted set refuses everything, which is the safe default for a turn that was shown no board (non-DM / non-principal channel turns, or a digest that failed to build). The digest additionally names recently closed alerts in an 'Already handled' tail so the Executive can say an item is already cleared instead of sending the principal to dismiss it again; those ids are NOT added to the trusted set.
route — the tool exists for the chat-driven path that the model
self-detects from natural-language approval. The same feedback loop as
the HTTP ack applies: a `dismissed` on a watch-sourced alert lowers
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/integrations.json b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/integrations.json
index f3203ee0..f7c95b0b 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/integrations.json
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/integrations.json
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"section_id": "integrations",
"title": "Integrations",
- "markdown": "External channels connect callers to the Executive. Each inbound adapter resolves the sender to a Person via `find_person_by_{slack,discord,telegram,email}_id` and threads `person_id` into `Executive.chat()`.\n\n### Inbound channels\n\n- **Slack** (`integrations.slack_bot`) — async Bolt socket-mode (`AsyncApp` + `AsyncSocketModeHandler`) embedded in the lifespan; responds to `@mention`s, DMs, and thread continuations, with per-conversation session memory (see **Conversation state** below). Text only: there is no interactivity endpoint and no Block Kit, so nothing Slack sends carries a button.\n- **Discord** (`integrations.discord_bot`) — discord.py gateway embedded in the lifespan; per-thread auto-titling, session-scoped memory, author attribution, configurable `@mention` thread promotion.\n- **Telegram** — webhook gating + per-chat history.\n- **Google Chat** — webhook + service-account auth. It resolves no approval gates and has no roster gate (the webhook authenticates Google, not the sender), so its session declares `origin_channel` purely to make `ack_alert`'s trust check refuse there, and its `<channel>` block says plainly that a sign-off cannot be answered from it.\n- **Email** (`integrations.email_poller`) — IMAP poll loop; strips Reply-To, filters auto-replies.\n\nSlack, Discord, and Telegram are roster-gated on inbound: an unrostered sender's message is silently dropped (`details.outcome=\"rejected_unknown_sender\"`). Email is not inbound-gated — non-roster mail flows through with a `[POLICY]` notice so triage can classify it. Slack/Discord thread continuations pass the shared `integrations.response_gate` (utility-fast model, biased toward replying).\n\n### Conversation state\n\nEvery adapter keys a deterministic `session_id` off the conversation surface and replays that session's stored turns into `Session.conversation_history`, so a follow-up (\"yes, go ahead\") lands with the question still in context. Slack's ids are `slack:dm:{user}`, `slack:thread:{channel}:{thread_ts}`, and `slack:channel:{channel}:{user}` for a mention that starts a thread; because the bot's reply roots a Slack thread at that message's `ts`, the turn is double-written to that thread's session too, so the first continuation inside it is not cold. A reply inside a thread THAT PERSON ROOTED also offers the parent `slack:channel:{channel}:{user}` id when matching an approval gate, since a gate raised on the mention recorded that session while the answer arrives under the thread's. The root-author check is load-bearing: widening on \"threaded and not a DM\" alone offered one person's channel session inside any thread in that channel, so a remark they made to a colleague could resolve their open gate and post the run's title into that colleague's thread. Discord has the same shape — its auto-thread router promotes a mention reply into a bot-owned thread — and the same alias. An @-mention inside a DM is handled once, by the DM path: Slack fires both events, and taking both forked the conversation across two session ids. The same id is the audit grouping key and the scope passed to `format_for_prompt`. A per-session `asyncio.Lock` serializes turns within one conversation — the inflight semaphore caps fan-out across the workspace, which does nothing to stop two messages in the same thread from both reading history before either writes it. Persistence happens after the reply is sent and its failure is logged, never surfaced: the user already has their answer.\n\nThis was absent on Slack until #136. Every message built a fresh `Session` and minted a per-*message* id (`thread_ts` falls back to the message's own `ts`, so a DM never repeated one), which meant a multi-turn confirmation could not work: the Executive asked whether to send a briefing to Slack, the user said yes, and the next turn had no record of the question.\n\n### What the model is told about the channel\n\nChat adapters pass a `<channel>` block (`integrations.channel_context`) in the **user turn** — never a cached system block. It names the surface, states that the person cannot see the app's cards or buttons, and draws the line the assistant kept crossing: briefing proposals and alerts are actioned on the briefing page; a proposal that books something can only be approved there; a workflow sign-off the Executive is explicitly waiting on *can* be answered in the conversation. The principal's DMs on Slack, Discord and Telegram also receive the open-alert digest (`briefing.context.format_open_alerts_for_prompt`) as the `<briefing>` block, gated to DMs because the board is company-wide and a shared channel must not pull it in. That digest is one of the only two trusted sources of an `alert_id` for `ack_alert` — the other is the briefing page's `[Discuss mode — alert_id=N]` primer. An id appearing anywhere else, including inside an alert's own body, is not trusted: alerts are minted from inbound email and chat, so their bodies are attacker-controlled. Two mechanisms enforce that rather than one prompt rule. Every field the digest interpolates is collapsed to a single line, because a newline in an attacker-written headline, suggested action, tag or review note would otherwise forge a whole extra `[N]` line — a fabricated instruction to clear somebody else's alert. And the ids the block actually named are recorded on the session, so on a chat channel `ack_alert` refuses any other id outright, whatever the model was persuaded of. Web sessions are unaffected: the Discuss handoff acks over HTTP first, so its alert is no longer unread and would not appear in a digest.\n\n### Handler failures\n\nAn adapter's catch-all replies \"I encountered an error processing your request.\" On Slack that used to be the whole story — one uncorrelated log line, no audit row, and an unguarded error-send that could itself escape into Bolt. It now logs with the session, sender, channel, thread and mode, and writes an `integration_inbound` row with `details.outcome=\"handler_error\"`, joining the inbound row under the same `session_id`. Upstream, a single crashing tool handler no longer takes the turn down at all: the orchestrator's tool gathers use `return_exceptions=True`, hand the model an error `tool_result`, and audit it with `ok=false` (cancellation is re-raised, not swallowed).\n\n### Attachments\n\n`integrations.attachments` handles web chat, Discord, and Telegram. Images become Anthropic vision blocks; documents (PDF/DOCX/TXT/MD/CSV) are inlined into the turn that carried them and indexed into the ChromaDB `inbound_attachments` collection. 20 MB/file cap; web chat uses `POST /chat/upload`.\n\nIndexed chunks are keyed on `attachment:<bare filename>` and tagged `type=attachment`. An attachment's name is chosen by whoever sent the message and the name is the chunk-id namespace, so without the prefix an inbound `strategy-2026.md` would upsert over the curated company document of that name. The prefix separates inbound content from curated uploads and keeps provenance visible; it does not separate senders from one another.\n\nIsolation is the **collection**: `retriever.retrieve` never queries `inbound_attachments` at all, so an attachment cannot resurface as company knowledge in a later, unrelated turn. Attachment processing is roster-gated on Discord too — it previously ran before the gate, so an unrostered sender's file was downloaded and indexed before their message was dropped. These rows still have no operator surface: they are never written to `company/docs/`, so `GET /documents` does not list them.\n\nThis replaced a domain-based scheme that did not work. The chunks lived in `company_docs` under a domain outside the specialist set, on the premise that an unrecognised domain matched no filter. It matched every one — `ChromaDBStore.query` attaches a `where` clause only when a domain filter is present, and an Executive-level retrieval passes none — so attachments came back under “From your company documents”, top-ranked and indistinguishable from a curated upload. Legacy rows are migrated across on boot.\n\n### MCP gateway & outbound\n\nMCP runs in **both directions**. As a *client*, `orchestrator.mcp_gateway.MCPGateway` proxies MCP servers (Gmail, Calendar, Drive — whatever `mcp_servers.json` configures) as Executive tools, with egress gating on Gmail recipients, Calendar attendees, and Drive share grantees against the roster (and a refusal of public / whole-domain Drive sharing). The Google Workspace server (`workspace-mcp`) behind those Gmail/Calendar/Drive tools runs **co-located inside the API** as a stdio child of the gateway — fitting the single-tenant model (one install = one company = one exec Google account), so there's no separate service to operate. It's baked into the API image and launched by `docker/workspace-mcp-launch.sh`, which selects single-user OAuth (token persisted at `/data/google_credentials`) or service-account domain-wide delegation from `GWORKSPACE_AUTH_MODE`. The gateway forwards the Google secrets to the child via `_FORWARDED_ENV_VARS`. As a *server*, `openexecutive.mcp_server` exposes OE's own company context and specialist council to external MCP clients at `/mcp` — the inverse direction; see the dedicated **MCP Server** section. The gateway launches extensible-mcp as a `uvx` subprocess whose fastembed tool-search index uses an embedding model baked into the API image and loaded offline, so it no longer re-downloads that model from the Hugging Face Hub on every cold start. Because the MCP stdio client does not inherit the parent environment, `MCPGateway.start()` explicitly forwards the embedding-cache/offline env vars (`FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH`, `HF_HUB_OFFLINE`, …) into the child.\n\n**Enablement, and why it degrades instead of dying.** `MCP_ENABLED` left unset is inferred from the presence of `mcp_servers_config_path` — dropping an `mcp_servers.json` next to `profile.yaml` turns MCP on with no further configuration. An **explicit** setting always wins in both directions: `MCP_ENABLED=false` keeps MCP off with the file still in place. It did not: `_resolve_mcp` tested `not self.mcp_enabled`, which cannot tell \"never set\" from \"set to false\", so the file's presence silently overrode the operator. The file is probed through `config.mcp_config_file_present`, never `Path.exists` directly — that re-raises an EACCES on a parent directory, and from inside a validator that comes out of `Settings()` itself, which `api/main.py` calls at module level. The check now reads `model_fields_set` (the fields the env actually supplied) and stores that on a private attr behind the read-only `mcp_auto_enabled` property, because the validator's own assignment joins that set and would otherwise make every auto-enable look explicit downstream.\n\nStartup is **best-effort**, in `main._start_mcp_gateway`. Two checks come before the subprocess: MCP off is a no-op, and a config defining no servers under `mcpServers` is logged and skipped — extensible-mcp's own loader raises on that and exits, and because the child is already gone the only thing that surfaces is anyio's \"Attempted to exit cancel scope in a different task\" from `stdio_client` unwinding, a traceback naming nothing about configuration. The start is also bounded (120s, generous because that child may clone extensible-mcp on a cold start): `ClientSession` carries no `read_timeout_seconds`, so `initialize()` waits forever on a child that is *alive but silent*, and an unbounded wait is a lifespan that never yields — the same healthcheck-never-passes symptom, which no `except` can see. A gateway that fails anyway is logged at ERROR with the config path, the servers it named, and whether the config file or an explicit `MCP_ENABLED` turned MCP on, then torn down under its own timeout; the API boots **without MCP tools and without the email poller** rather than refusing to boot. The guard catches `BaseException`, not `Exception`, re-raising a bare `CancelledError` first: the original failure came from anyio, which wraps a task group's failures in `BaseExceptionGroup` as soon as one is a `BaseException` — and that group is not an `Exception`, so `except Exception` would miss the very shape this contains. The teardown is contained too, since it runs from inside that `except` and would otherwise replace the actionable log with the crash it prevents. `configured_server_names` never raises either, and deliberately catches broadly: it reads an operator-owned path during startup, where an exception is the crash loop rather than a bug report — `Path.is_file` re-raises an EACCES on a parent directory, and `json.loads` answers deeply-nested input with `RecursionError`, which is not a `ValueError`. It tests `is_file()` so a directory or a symlink to a FIFO is never opened, and caps the read at 1 MiB. That exception used to propagate out of the lifespan and kill the container — under `restart: unless-stopped`, a crash loop whose only outward symptom was a healthcheck that never passed. Outbound tools: per-Person DMs (`send_slack_dm`, `send_discord_dm`, `send_telegram_message`) plus room-targeted `send_department_message` and `send_company_broadcast`. The per-Person DMs are additionally rate-limited and de-duplicated by the outbound anti-spam guard (below).\n\n### Outbound anti-spam guard\n\nEvery per-Person DM passes a deterministic guard (`orchestrator.outbound_guard.check_outbound_allowed`) after the roster gate and recipient-id recovery but before the network send — the single chokepoint **all** proactive DM paths reach (ad-hoc chat sends, the scheduler's followup/nudge dispatch, principal-brief delivery, the reflection turn, and research-finding routing). On a violation it returns a human-readable reason and the handler **suppresses** the send (`{\"status\":\"suppressed\",\"reason\":…}`), writes a `tool_invocation` audit row with `suppressed=true`, and writes **no** `done` activity row — so a blocked attempt never counts toward its own rate cap, and the Executive can read the reason and hold or `schedule_followup` for the recipient's next window. Three controls: **content dedup** (a near-identical message — whitespace/case-normalized, first 160 chars — already sent to the same recipient within `OUTBOUND_DEDUP_WINDOW_MINUTES`, default 360); a **per-recipient rate cap** (`OUTBOUND_MAX_PER_RECIPIENT_PER_WINDOW`, default 5, over `OUTBOUND_RATE_WINDOW_MINUTES`, default 60); and **quiet hours / availability** (`OUTBOUND_RESPECT_QUIET_HOURS`, default on — refuse while the recipient is on leave or outside their `people.channel` availability windows, surfacing the next open window). Delivery history is read from the existing `status='done'` `scheduled_actions` rows (`episodic.recent_sends_for_channel_ref`), so there is no new table. The guard is **fail-open**: any internal lookup error returns \"allow\", so it can never turn a working send into a crash or a silently-dropped message. Principal briefs and the internal heartbeat kinds use the `__internal__` channel and never reach these handlers, so they are unaffected.\n\n### Calendar & Google Meet\n\nThe Executive books meetings through two typed tools over the Calendar MCP. `create_calendar_event` schedules a **future** meeting (propose→approve by default, or auto-execute once that decision class is promoted) and may be used proactively when a stalled goal warrants a sync. `create_instant_meeting` spins up an **impromptu call starting now**, auto-executing without the approval step and skipping the business-hours/horizon caps, so the Executive can hand back a join link immediately. Both attach a **Google Meet** link by default (`add_google_meet`; opt out for in-person), parsed from the created event's `conferenceData` and surfaced to the caller plus persisted on the decision ledger. Either way the caps that matter still hold — roster membership, principal-protection, max attendees, and a daily booking ceiling.\n\n**Around-the-meeting participation.** The Executive doesn't join the call as a live voice; instead, on every successful booking it schedules a best-effort post-meeting follow-up (~5 min after the end) that DMs a human attendee asking for a quick recap — key decisions and action items. The reply flows back through the same cross-session DM context linkage described below, so the Executive can act on it (summarize, follow up) in a later turn. No meeting-transcript or Drive integration is required.\n\n### Cross-session DM context\n\nWhen the principal says \"DM Alex about X\" in one session, OE sends the DM and — if a live conversation is active — records an `outbound_context` linkage row (recipient, full outbound text, originating session id). Email is covered too but recorded one layer deeper — there is no `send_email` tool, so the linkage is written in `orchestrator.mcp_gateway` after a successful `google_workspace__send_gmail_message`, one row per `to`/`cc` recipient keyed by the bare lowercased address (OE's own address skipped). When Alex later replies on the 1:1 DM path — or by email — the shared helper `integrations.inbound_hydration.hydrate_user_message` (called by the Discord, Telegram, and Slack handlers, and by the email poller keyed on the sender address) looks up the most-recent `open` linkage for that sender within 72h and prepends an `<outbound_reply_context>` block — the outbound text plus a backstory excerpt from the originating session — to the message handed to `Executive.chat()`. So OE knows what the reply is about instead of starting from an empty per-person session. The block lands in the user turn (caching rule) and is injected into a copy only — the pristine reply is persisted to history. The linkage is one-shot (consumed on first matched reply, race-safe) so an unrelated later DM isn't re-hydrated. This is deterministic and independent of the per-person `peer_memory` (Honcho) layer.",
+ "markdown": "External channels connect callers to the Executive. Each inbound adapter resolves the sender to a Person via `find_person_by_{slack,discord,telegram,email}_id` and threads `person_id` into `Executive.chat()`.\n\n### Inbound channels\n\n- **Slack** (`integrations.slack_bot`) — async Bolt socket-mode (`AsyncApp` + `AsyncSocketModeHandler`) embedded in the lifespan; responds to `@mention`s, DMs, and thread continuations, with per-conversation session memory (see **Conversation state** below). Text only: there is no interactivity endpoint and no Block Kit, so nothing Slack sends carries a button.\n- **Discord** (`integrations.discord_bot`) — discord.py gateway embedded in the lifespan; per-thread auto-titling, session-scoped memory, author attribution, configurable `@mention` thread promotion.\n- **Telegram** — webhook gating + per-chat history.\n- **Google Chat** — webhook + service-account auth. It resolves no approval gates and has no roster gate (the webhook authenticates Google, not the sender), and it never populates the session's trusted alert ids, so `ack_alert`'s trust check — which now runs on every session rather than only those declaring an `origin_channel` — refuses there by default, and its `<channel>` block says plainly that a sign-off cannot be answered from it.\n- **Email** (`integrations.email_poller`) — IMAP poll loop; strips Reply-To, filters auto-replies.\n\nSlack, Discord, and Telegram are roster-gated on inbound: an unrostered sender's message is silently dropped (`details.outcome=\"rejected_unknown_sender\"`). Email is not inbound-gated — non-roster mail flows through with a `[POLICY]` notice so triage can classify it. Slack/Discord thread continuations pass the shared `integrations.response_gate` (utility-fast model, biased toward replying).\n\n### Conversation state\n\nEvery adapter keys a deterministic `session_id` off the conversation surface and replays that session's stored turns into `Session.conversation_history`, so a follow-up (\"yes, go ahead\") lands with the question still in context. Slack's ids are `slack:dm:{user}`, `slack:thread:{channel}:{thread_ts}`, and `slack:channel:{channel}:{user}` for a mention that starts a thread; because the bot's reply roots a Slack thread at that message's `ts`, the turn is double-written to that thread's session too, so the first continuation inside it is not cold. A reply inside a thread THAT PERSON ROOTED also offers the parent `slack:channel:{channel}:{user}` id when matching an approval gate, since a gate raised on the mention recorded that session while the answer arrives under the thread's. The root-author check is load-bearing: widening on \"threaded and not a DM\" alone offered one person's channel session inside any thread in that channel, so a remark they made to a colleague could resolve their open gate and post the run's title into that colleague's thread. Discord has the same shape — its auto-thread router promotes a mention reply into a bot-owned thread — and the same alias. An @-mention inside a DM is handled once, by the DM path: Slack fires both events, and taking both forked the conversation across two session ids. The same id is the audit grouping key and the scope passed to `format_for_prompt`. A per-session `asyncio.Lock` serializes turns within one conversation — the inflight semaphore caps fan-out across the workspace, which does nothing to stop two messages in the same thread from both reading history before either writes it. Persistence happens after the reply is sent and its failure is logged, never surfaced: the user already has their answer.\n\nThis was absent on Slack until #136. Every message built a fresh `Session` and minted a per-*message* id (`thread_ts` falls back to the message's own `ts`, so a DM never repeated one), which meant a multi-turn confirmation could not work: the Executive asked whether to send a briefing to Slack, the user said yes, and the next turn had no record of the question.\n\n### What the model is told about the channel\n\nChat adapters pass a `<channel>` block (`integrations.channel_context`) in the **user turn** — never a cached system block. It names the surface, states that the person cannot see the app's cards or buttons, and draws the line the assistant kept crossing: briefing proposals and alerts are actioned on the briefing page; a proposal that books something can only be approved there; a workflow sign-off the Executive is explicitly waiting on *can* be answered in the conversation. The principal's DMs on Slack, Discord and Telegram also receive the open-alert digest (`briefing.context.format_open_alerts_for_prompt`) as the `<briefing>` block, gated to DMs because the board is company-wide and a shared channel must not pull it in. That digest is one of the only two trusted sources of an `alert_id` for `ack_alert` — the other is the briefing page's `[Discuss mode — alert_id=N]` primer. An id appearing anywhere else, including inside an alert's own body, is not trusted: alerts are minted from inbound email and chat, so their bodies are attacker-controlled. Two mechanisms enforce that rather than one prompt rule. Every field the digest interpolates is collapsed to a single line, because a newline in an attacker-written headline, suggested action, tag or review note would otherwise forge a whole extra `[N]` line — a fabricated instruction to clear somebody else's alert. And the ids the block actually named are recorded on the session, so on a chat channel `ack_alert` refuses any other id outright, whatever the model was persuaded of. Web sessions are unaffected: the Discuss handoff acks over HTTP first, so its alert is no longer unread and would not appear in a digest.\n\n### Handler failures\n\nAn adapter's catch-all replies \"I encountered an error processing your request.\" On Slack that used to be the whole story — one uncorrelated log line, no audit row, and an unguarded error-send that could itself escape into Bolt. It now logs with the session, sender, channel, thread and mode, and writes an `integration_inbound` row with `details.outcome=\"handler_error\"`, joining the inbound row under the same `session_id`. Upstream, a single crashing tool handler no longer takes the turn down at all: the orchestrator's tool gathers use `return_exceptions=True`, hand the model an error `tool_result`, and audit it with `ok=false` (cancellation is re-raised, not swallowed).\n\n### Attachments\n\n`integrations.attachments` handles web chat, Discord, and Telegram. Images become Anthropic vision blocks; documents (PDF/DOCX/TXT/MD/CSV) are inlined into the turn that carried them and indexed into the ChromaDB `inbound_attachments` collection. 20 MB/file cap; web chat uses `POST /chat/upload`.\n\nIndexed chunks are keyed on `attachment:<bare filename>` and tagged `type=attachment`. An attachment's name is chosen by whoever sent the message and the name is the chunk-id namespace, so without the prefix an inbound `strategy-2026.md` would upsert over the curated company document of that name. The prefix separates inbound content from curated uploads and keeps provenance visible; it does not separate senders from one another.\n\nIsolation is the **collection**: `retriever.retrieve` never queries `inbound_attachments` at all, so an attachment cannot resurface as company knowledge in a later, unrelated turn. Attachment processing is roster-gated on Discord too — it previously ran before the gate, so an unrostered sender's file was downloaded and indexed before their message was dropped. These rows still have no operator surface: they are never written to `company/docs/`, so `GET /documents` does not list them.\n\nThis replaced a domain-based scheme that did not work. The chunks lived in `company_docs` under a domain outside the specialist set, on the premise that an unrecognised domain matched no filter. It matched every one — `ChromaDBStore.query` attaches a `where` clause only when a domain filter is present, and an Executive-level retrieval passes none — so attachments came back under “From your company documents”, top-ranked and indistinguishable from a curated upload. Legacy rows are migrated across on boot.\n\n### MCP gateway & outbound\n\nMCP runs in **both directions**. As a *client*, `orchestrator.mcp_gateway.MCPGateway` proxies MCP servers (Gmail, Calendar, Drive — whatever `mcp_servers.json` configures) as Executive tools, with egress gating on Gmail recipients, Calendar attendees, and Drive share grantees against the roster (and a refusal of public / whole-domain Drive sharing). The Google Workspace server (`workspace-mcp`) behind those Gmail/Calendar/Drive tools runs **co-located inside the API** as a stdio child of the gateway — fitting the single-tenant model (one install = one company = one exec Google account), so there's no separate service to operate. It's baked into the API image and launched by `docker/workspace-mcp-launch.sh`, which selects single-user OAuth (token persisted at `/data/google_credentials`) or service-account domain-wide delegation from `GWORKSPACE_AUTH_MODE`. The gateway forwards the Google secrets to the child via `_FORWARDED_ENV_VARS`. As a *server*, `openexecutive.mcp_server` exposes OE's own company context and specialist council to external MCP clients at `/mcp` — the inverse direction; see the dedicated **MCP Server** section. The gateway launches extensible-mcp as a `uvx` subprocess whose fastembed tool-search index uses an embedding model baked into the API image and loaded offline, so it no longer re-downloads that model from the Hugging Face Hub on every cold start. Because the MCP stdio client does not inherit the parent environment, `MCPGateway.start()` explicitly forwards the embedding-cache/offline env vars (`FASTEMBED_CACHE_PATH`, `HF_HUB_OFFLINE`, …) into the child.\n\n**Enablement, and why it degrades instead of dying.** `MCP_ENABLED` left unset is inferred from the presence of `mcp_servers_config_path` — dropping an `mcp_servers.json` next to `profile.yaml` turns MCP on with no further configuration. An **explicit** setting always wins in both directions: `MCP_ENABLED=false` keeps MCP off with the file still in place. It did not: `_resolve_mcp` tested `not self.mcp_enabled`, which cannot tell \"never set\" from \"set to false\", so the file's presence silently overrode the operator. The file is probed through `config.mcp_config_file_present`, never `Path.exists` directly — that re-raises an EACCES on a parent directory, and from inside a validator that comes out of `Settings()` itself, which `api/main.py` calls at module level. The check now reads `model_fields_set` (the fields the env actually supplied) and stores that on a private attr behind the read-only `mcp_auto_enabled` property, because the validator's own assignment joins that set and would otherwise make every auto-enable look explicit downstream.\n\nStartup is **best-effort**, in `main._start_mcp_gateway`. Two checks come before the subprocess: MCP off is a no-op, and a config defining no servers under `mcpServers` is logged and skipped — extensible-mcp's own loader raises on that and exits, and because the child is already gone the only thing that surfaces is anyio's \"Attempted to exit cancel scope in a different task\" from `stdio_client` unwinding, a traceback naming nothing about configuration. The start is also bounded (120s, generous because that child may clone extensible-mcp on a cold start): `ClientSession` carries no `read_timeout_seconds`, so `initialize()` waits forever on a child that is *alive but silent*, and an unbounded wait is a lifespan that never yields — the same healthcheck-never-passes symptom, which no `except` can see. A gateway that fails anyway is logged at ERROR with the config path, the servers it named, and whether the config file or an explicit `MCP_ENABLED` turned MCP on, then torn down under its own timeout; the API boots **without MCP tools and without the email poller** rather than refusing to boot. The guard catches `BaseException`, not `Exception`, re-raising a bare `CancelledError` first: the original failure came from anyio, which wraps a task group's failures in `BaseExceptionGroup` as soon as one is a `BaseException` — and that group is not an `Exception`, so `except Exception` would miss the very shape this contains. The teardown is contained too, since it runs from inside that `except` and would otherwise replace the actionable log with the crash it prevents. `configured_server_names` never raises either, and deliberately catches broadly: it reads an operator-owned path during startup, where an exception is the crash loop rather than a bug report — `Path.is_file` re-raises an EACCES on a parent directory, and `json.loads` answers deeply-nested input with `RecursionError`, which is not a `ValueError`. It tests `is_file()` so a directory or a symlink to a FIFO is never opened, and caps the read at 1 MiB. That exception used to propagate out of the lifespan and kill the container — under `restart: unless-stopped`, a crash loop whose only outward symptom was a healthcheck that never passed. Outbound tools: per-Person DMs (`send_slack_dm`, `send_discord_dm`, `send_telegram_message`) plus room-targeted `send_department_message` and `send_company_broadcast`. The per-Person DMs are additionally rate-limited and de-duplicated by the outbound anti-spam guard (below).\n\n### Outbound anti-spam guard\n\nEvery per-Person DM passes a deterministic guard (`orchestrator.outbound_guard.check_outbound_allowed`) after the roster gate and recipient-id recovery but before the network send — the single chokepoint **all** proactive DM paths reach (ad-hoc chat sends, the scheduler's followup/nudge dispatch, principal-brief delivery, the reflection turn, and research-finding routing). On a violation it returns a human-readable reason and the handler **suppresses** the send (`{\"status\":\"suppressed\",\"reason\":…}`), writes a `tool_invocation` audit row with `suppressed=true`, and writes **no** `done` activity row — so a blocked attempt never counts toward its own rate cap, and the Executive can read the reason and hold or `schedule_followup` for the recipient's next window. Three controls: **content dedup** (a near-identical message — whitespace/case-normalized, first 160 chars — already sent to the same recipient within `OUTBOUND_DEDUP_WINDOW_MINUTES`, default 360); a **per-recipient rate cap** (`OUTBOUND_MAX_PER_RECIPIENT_PER_WINDOW`, default 5, over `OUTBOUND_RATE_WINDOW_MINUTES`, default 60); and **quiet hours / availability** (`OUTBOUND_RESPECT_QUIET_HOURS`, default on — refuse while the recipient is on leave or outside their `people.channel` availability windows, surfacing the next open window). Delivery history is read from the existing `status='done'` `scheduled_actions` rows (`episodic.recent_sends_for_channel_ref`), so there is no new table. The guard is **fail-open**: any internal lookup error returns \"allow\", so it can never turn a working send into a crash or a silently-dropped message. Principal briefs and the internal heartbeat kinds use the `__internal__` channel and never reach these handlers, so they are unaffected.\n\n### Calendar & Google Meet\n\nThe Executive books meetings through two typed tools over the Calendar MCP. `create_calendar_event` schedules a **future** meeting (propose→approve by default, or auto-execute once that decision class is promoted) and may be used proactively when a stalled goal warrants a sync. `create_instant_meeting` spins up an **impromptu call starting now**, auto-executing without the approval step and skipping the business-hours/horizon caps, so the Executive can hand back a join link immediately. Both attach a **Google Meet** link by default (`add_google_meet`; opt out for in-person), parsed from the created event's `conferenceData` and surfaced to the caller plus persisted on the decision ledger. Either way the caps that matter still hold — roster membership, principal-protection, max attendees, and a daily booking ceiling.\n\n**Around-the-meeting participation.** The Executive doesn't join the call as a live voice; instead, on every successful booking it schedules a best-effort post-meeting follow-up (~5 min after the end) that DMs a human attendee asking for a quick recap — key decisions and action items. The reply flows back through the same cross-session DM context linkage described below, so the Executive can act on it (summarize, follow up) in a later turn. No meeting-transcript or Drive integration is required.\n\n### Cross-session DM context\n\nWhen the principal says \"DM Alex about X\" in one session, OE sends the DM and — if a live conversation is active — records an `outbound_context` linkage row (recipient, full outbound text, originating session id). Email is covered too but recorded one layer deeper — there is no `send_email` tool, so the linkage is written in `orchestrator.mcp_gateway` after a successful `google_workspace__send_gmail_message`, one row per `to`/`cc` recipient keyed by the bare lowercased address (OE's own address skipped). When Alex later replies on the 1:1 DM path — or by email — the shared helper `integrations.inbound_hydration.hydrate_user_message` (called by the Discord, Telegram, and Slack handlers, and by the email poller keyed on the sender address) looks up the most-recent `open` linkage for that sender within 72h and prepends an `<outbound_reply_context>` block — the outbound text plus a backstory excerpt from the originating session — to the message handed to `Executive.chat()`. So OE knows what the reply is about instead of starting from an empty per-person session. The block lands in the user turn (caching rule) and is injected into a copy only — the pristine reply is persisted to history. The linkage is one-shot (consumed on first matched reply, race-safe) so an unrelated later DM isn't re-hydrated. This is deterministic and independent of the per-person `peer_memory` (Honcho) layer.",
"mermaid": "flowchart TD\n Channels[\"Slack / Discord<br/>Telegram / GChat / Email\"]\n Resolve[\"find_person_by_*_id\"]\n Gate[\"roster gate\"]\n Drop[\"drop unrostered\"]\n Exec[\"Executive.chat()\"]\n Attach[\"attachments<br/>(vision / inbound_attachments)\"]\n MCP[\"MCP gateway\"]\n Guard[\"outbound anti-spam guard<br/>(dedup / rate cap / quiet hours)\"]\n Out[\"DM / department<br/>/ broadcast tools\"]\n Channels --> Resolve\n Resolve --> Gate\n Gate -- \"unknown sender\" --> Drop\n Gate -- \"Person\" --> Exec\n Gate --> Attach\n Attach --> Exec\n Exec --> MCP\n Exec --> Guard\n Guard -- \"suppress\" --> Drop\n Guard -- \"allow\" --> Out\n Out --> Channels\n class Channels entry\n class Resolve compute\n class Gate compute\n class Drop external\n class Exec hot\n class Attach compute\n class MCP external\n class Guard compute\n class Out compute",
"generated_at": "2026-09-18T20:53:36.069050+00:00"
}
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/lifecycle.json b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/lifecycle.json
index 00ed779b..006dd006 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/lifecycle.json
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/lifecycle.json
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"section_id": "lifecycle",
"title": "Request Lifecycle",
- "markdown": "A single chat message makes a full round-trip through the API, the orchestrator's tool-use loop, a parallel specialist fan-out, and synthesis — all streamed back as server-sent events.\n\n### Steps\n\n1. **Arrival** — the client posts to `POST /chat` (`openexecutive.api.routes.chat`). The turn carries a `<current_speaker>` hint resolved from the caller's `person_id`, plus a `<briefing>` digest of current open alerts (built in parallel with RAG/episodic/peer-memory fetches) so the Executive can discuss any item shown on the `/today` briefing page A turn arriving from a chat adapter instead of the web app also carries a `<channel>` block naming the surface and stating which approvals can be completed there; on Slack the `<briefing>` digest is gated to the principal's DMs. All three ride in the **user turn**, never a cached system block.\n2. **Tool-use loop** — the `Executive` calls Claude. For a cross-domain question the assistant turn emits multiple `consult_specialist` tool-use blocks at once.\n3. **Parallel fan-out** — `openexecutive.orchestrator.router.route_parallel` dispatches those calls concurrently, bounded by `MAX_PARALLEL_SPECIALISTS`; calls past the cap get a skip tool_result.\n4. **Per-specialist RAG** — each specialist runs its own domain-filtered ChromaDB query, then reasons over the retrieved chunks and returns analysis as a tool_result.\n5. **Synthesis** — the Executive feeds the tool_results back to Claude and streams one coherent reply; a `thinking` keepalive covers the specialist round.\n6. **Optional committee review** — when enabled, `Executive.stream_chat_with_committee()` runs a silent draft, parallel reviewer critiques, then a streamed revision pass.\n7. **Side effects** — any side-effecting tool call surfaces an `action_taken` chip; the stream closes with a `done` event. One side-effecting tool is gated server-side rather than by its description: on a turn that arrived from a chat channel, `ack_alert` will only accept an `alert_id` the session recorded as having been shown to the model this turn — and it fails closed, so an id it cannot even parse is refused rather than waved through to the handler's own parse. The unattended passes (the nightly reflection, the research synthesis) do not carry the tool at all, because they set no origin channel and so would not be checked.\n8. **Tool failures** — a handler that raises instead of returning its JSON error is isolated: both tool gathers run with `return_exceptions=True`, the model gets an error `tool_result` naming only the exception's TYPE — a message can carry a filesystem path, a validation error echoing the input, or a third-party HTTP body, and anything in model context can be quoted back to the user, so the full repr stays in the log and the audit row — and the failure is audited with `ok=false`. Only `CancelledError` is re-raised, so turn-timeout and client-disconnect handling still work. Before this one crashing tool aborted the whole turn, which reached the user as an unexplained apology with no audit row (#136).\n\nWeb search, when invoked on the Anthropic path, executes inside the Anthropic API itself (`web_search_20250305`) and returns within the same generation; for any model routed via OpenRouter the same tool becomes OpenRouter's `openrouter:web_search` server tool, which also runs inside the generation with the same search cap and domain lists.",
+ "markdown": "A single chat message makes a full round-trip through the API, the orchestrator's tool-use loop, a parallel specialist fan-out, and synthesis — all streamed back as server-sent events.\n\n### Steps\n\n1. **Arrival** — the client posts to `POST /chat` (`openexecutive.api.routes.chat`). The turn carries a `<current_speaker>` hint resolved from the caller's `person_id`, plus a `<briefing>` digest of current open alerts (built in parallel with RAG/episodic/peer-memory fetches) so the Executive can discuss any item shown on the `/today` briefing page A turn arriving from a chat adapter instead of the web app also carries a `<channel>` block naming the surface and stating which approvals can be completed there; on Slack the `<briefing>` digest is gated to the principal's DMs. All three ride in the **user turn**, never a cached system block.\n2. **Tool-use loop** — the `Executive` calls Claude. For a cross-domain question the assistant turn emits multiple `consult_specialist` tool-use blocks at once.\n3. **Parallel fan-out** — `openexecutive.orchestrator.router.route_parallel` dispatches those calls concurrently, bounded by `MAX_PARALLEL_SPECIALISTS`; calls past the cap get a skip tool_result.\n4. **Per-specialist RAG** — each specialist runs its own domain-filtered ChromaDB query, then reasons over the retrieved chunks and returns analysis as a tool_result.\n5. **Synthesis** — the Executive feeds the tool_results back to Claude and streams one coherent reply; a `thinking` keepalive covers the specialist round.\n6. **Optional committee review** — when enabled, `Executive.stream_chat_with_committee()` runs a silent draft, parallel reviewer critiques, then a streamed revision pass.\n7. **Side effects** — any side-effecting tool call surfaces an `action_taken` chip; the stream closes with a `done` event. One side-effecting tool is gated server-side rather than by its description: `ack_alert` will only accept an `alert_id` the session recorded as having been shown to the model this turn — and it fails closed, so an id it cannot even parse is refused rather than waved through to the handler's own parse. That check runs on **every** session. It used to run only on turns that arrived from a chat channel, keyed on `origin_channel`, which the browser never sets — so the web, the surface the principal actually uses, was unchecked and the model could ack any id, including one quoted out of an alert body by the briefing page's Discuss handoff. A session that was shown no board has an empty trusted set and can ack nothing, so the unattended passes (the nightly reflection, the research synthesis) are now refused by default — they also still withhold the tool outright, which is belt-and-braces rather than the only thing stopping them.\n8. **Tool failures** — a handler that raises instead of returning its JSON error is isolated: both tool gathers run with `return_exceptions=True`, the model gets an error `tool_result` naming only the exception's TYPE — a message can carry a filesystem path, a validation error echoing the input, or a third-party HTTP body, and anything in model context can be quoted back to the user, so the full repr stays in the log and the audit row — and the failure is audited with `ok=false`. Only `CancelledError` is re-raised, so turn-timeout and client-disconnect handling still work. Before this one crashing tool aborted the whole turn, which reached the user as an unexplained apology with no audit row (#136).\n\nWeb search, when invoked on the Anthropic path, executes inside the Anthropic API itself (`web_search_20250305`) and returns within the same generation; for any model routed via OpenRouter the same tool becomes OpenRouter's `openrouter:web_search` server tool, which also runs inside the generation with the same search cap and domain lists.",
"mermaid": "sequenceDiagram\n participant C as Client\n participant API as FastAPI /chat\n participant E as Executive\n participant CL as Claude\n participant S as Specialists\n participant KB as ChromaDB\n C->>API: POST /chat message\n API->>E: start turn\n E->>CL: messages (tool-use loop)\n CL-->>E: consult_specialist calls\n E->>S: route_parallel fan-out\n S->>KB: domain-filtered RAG\n KB-->>S: chunks\n S-->>E: analysis tool_results\n E->>CL: synthesize\n CL-->>E: streamed reply\n E-->>API: SSE chunks then done\n API-->>C: streamed response",
"generated_at": "2026-09-18T20:54:42.334412+00:00"
}
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/today.json b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/today.json
index fc5766aa..e9c4cbd5 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/today.json
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/architecture/prebuilt/today.json
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"section_id": "today",
"title": "Today / Morning Brief",
- "markdown": "`openexecutive.api.routes.today` serves the morning brief — a one-screen, read-only view of what is happening across the org. It is the default landing surface (the Next.js root renders `<Briefing>`).\n\n`GET /today` returns `TodayResponse` assembled by `_build_today()`, which is synchronous and caller-agnostic:\n\n- **`departments`** — per-department goal health, rolling up each department's goal counts (`total`, `at_risk`, `off_track`) plus its awaiting-workflow count, and `attention_goals`: the actual off-track/at-risk goals (worst first, capped at 3) with `key_result`, `current`, `target`, and `status`, so the briefing's Department card shows *which* goal is off and how far without a click. Empty for healthy/inactive departments.\n- **`people`** — an attention-ranked roster. Each person carries `awaiting_action` count, soonest SLA, a `status` (`on_leave` / `needs_reply` / `awaiting` / `clear`), reachability, `overdue`, a server `priority` sort key, and a cached one-line `insight`. Sorted by `(-priority, full_name)`.\n- **`proposals`** — the *live* unread alerts (workflow approvals, triage-classified inbound, Executive signals, flagged artifacts, and gated calendar bookings): unread, inside their category TTL, not snoozed — see *Alert lifecycle* below. Each carries `score`, `category` (`action` vs `monitoring`), `surfaced_reason` from `openexecutive.briefing.ranking`, the lifecycle fields (`occurrence_count`, `last_seen_at`, `last_reviewed_at`, `review_verdict`, `review_note`, `recommended_move`, `why_now`, `due_at`, `superseded_count`, `suggested_workflow`), and `decision_instance_id` (set only when the proposal is backed by a decision-ledger row — a calendar booking awaiting approval). The UI splits them into 'mine' vs 'across the team' using `caller_person_id`. For decision-backed proposals the card's Approve/Reject call the `/decisions` endpoints (which book or cancel the event server-side and clear the alert) instead of the ack-and-hand-off-to-chat flow — so meeting bookings are reviewed in the briefing itself rather than on a separate page.\n- **`narrative`** — a per-viewer Executive-voice header synthesized by `synthesize_briefing_narrative`; the principal gets the whole-company scope, teammates a role-scoped one. In the web UI each bullet of this narrative is a click target: clicking one hands off to chat (the same `onContinue` path as the proposal cards) seeded to discuss that item. The Executive recognizes it because every chat turn now carries a `<briefing>` digest of open alerts (see Memory). That digest (`briefing.context.format_open_alerts_for_prompt`) is capped at 30 items; when the board is longer the header says so explicitly and tells the Executive to point at this page for the rest — it previously presented the capped list as the complete board, so the Executive described a slice as everything that was open (#136). Chat adapters get the digest too, but Slack gates it to the principal's DMs: the board is company-wide and must not be pulled into a shared channel. The `[alert_id]` at the start of each line is also one of only two trusted sources for `ack_alert` — the other being this page's `[Discuss mode — alert_id=N]` handoff primer — because an id quoted inside an alert's own body came from inbound mail or chat and is attacker-controlled. Two things enforce that. Every field the digest interpolates — headline, body, suggested action, tags, review note — is collapsed to a single line, since a newline in any of them would forge a whole extra `[N]` line and with it a fabricated instruction to clear someone else's alert. And the digest reports which ids it named, so a chat session records them and `ack_alert` refuses anything else.\n- **`in_flight`** / **`awaiting`** — upcoming Executive commitments and people we are waiting on.\n- **`handled_overnight`** — the autonomous moves the Executive *completed* since the last delivered morning brief: the alert review's (routed, nudged, escalated, drafted, merged, closed) plus the research watch policy's (`watching` — a watch added on its own because it was grounded in company data; `stopped_watching` — a research watch auto-disabled as noisy or dead; no alert id, re-enable from `/watchlist`). A `changed` verdict (the review rewrote an open alert's headline / body / severity) is deliberately **not** here: the alert is still open in \"Needs you\" and its card carries the note, so the brief reports it under \"what changed\" (a REWRITTEN block) rather than as done. Each row is structured, not just a sentence: `kind`, the audit `summary` (nudge bookkeeping marker stripped), `at`, `alert_id`, `event_type` (for a pre-filtered `/audit` deep link), `headline` (the alert's headline at move time; a watch's slug), `target` (person name for routed / nudged, survivor headline for merged, new severity for escalated, draft title, workflow name), `detail` (the cited evidence or the watch policy's reason), `outcome` (`resolved` | `dismissed` for a close, `proposed` for a route that went through the authority gate), `evidence_ref` (S1 / R2 / A3), `superseded_by_alert_id`, and `status` — the alert's lifecycle state **now** (`open` = live in the queue per `lifecycle.is_live` | `resolved` | `dismissed` | `expired` | `merged` | `acked` | `inactive` for snoozed / past-TTL rows), looked up per row so a close the principal already undid renders as reopened instead of offering a second Undo, and a \"still open\" jump link only appears when there is a card to land on. The morning brief also carries a one-line count of research watch suggestions waiting on `/watchlist`.\n\nThe route resolves the caller from `x-caller-email`, then attaches the viewer-scoped narrative in a `BackgroundTask` so the request never blocks on an LLM call. `GET /today/activity` returns the recent self-initiated action rail — merged from fired scheduled actions (DMs, follow-ups, nudges, cadences), logged decisions, saved advice, completed workflow runs (briefings/check-ins/research), kicked-off initiatives, resolved gated decisions, and raised alerts, so it reflects all of the Executive's activity rather than just dispatched messages. The Pulse page (`/memories`) polls it (limit 100) every ~20s so new events stream into the 'Recent activity' card, which scrolls internally at a fixed height instead of growing the page. The `morning_brief` workflow calls `_build_today()` directly to build the standalone DM (via a different, enumerated prompt). `GET /morning-brief` is a deprecated alias.\n\n## Alert lifecycle & the Executive review\n\nAlerts used to be write-once: raised, then never looked at again, so the \"Needs you\" queue grew without bound and the briefs re-listed it daily. Three things now keep it live:\n\n- **Time-to-live** (`openexecutive.alerts.lifecycle`). Action items expire after `ALERT_TTL_DAYS_ACTION` (14 d), unrouted low/medium monitoring signals after `ALERT_TTL_DAYS_MONITORING` (3 d). Every surface reads `list_live_alerts` (the same predicate the scheduler's 15-minute sweep persists as status `expired`), so `/today` is right even before the sweep runs. Artifacts and decision-backed alerts are exempt. `POST /alerts/{id}/reopen` is the Undo.\n- **Coalescing** (`alerts.pipeline` + `store.coalesce_alert`). A repeat of an open alert with the same `(source, dedup_key)` updates that row — `occurrence_count`, `last_seen_at`, severity max — instead of stacking a second card, and only re-pings when severity rose to high/urgent. Monitoring alerts carry a stable `watch:<slug>` key, so one watch means one card.\n- **The review** (`openexecutive.alerts.review`, heartbeat `alert_review_scan`, every 6 h and right before the morning brief). For each open alert the Executive sees what changed since it was raised — newer signals from the same watch, related alerts, activity since, the roster with SLAs, department authority — and returns a verdict (relevant / changed / resolved / stale) plus a recommended move. Deterministic policy then acts: **route** (assign + DM the owner; `propose_via_alert` for propose-only departments), **nudge**, **escalate** (severity + `due_at` + DM the principal only), **draft** (`draft_artifact`), **suggest a workflow** (a link, never a run), **merge** (`superseded_by_alert_id`), or **resolve** — only on high confidence citing a server-minted evidence ref (a newer signal, a related alert, an activity item shown for that alert); free text never closes a card, and anything weaker is annotated `likely_stale`, demoted 30 ranking points, and left for one click. Everything that came from outside is rendered as inert data inside the review prompt, so an injected email body cannot steer the batch. Board / comp / legal matters only ever go to a scope-holder or the principal and keep their text. Route and escalate are idempotent across passes, every DM carries an \"[Alert review] Re: …\" header, outbound moves are capped per pass, passes are single-flight, `ALERT_REVIEW_ENABLED=false` stops every caller, every move is audited with its evidence and prior state, and a distinct `resolved` status keeps Executive closes separate from `ack` (user approved).\n\nOn the page, cards read as decisions: the one-line \"what changed since you last looked\" (`review_note`) leads, the recommended move is the primary control (Nudge <owner> → chat; Run <workflow> → `/jobs/<name>`), with chips for age, seen ×N, why-now / due, folded-in and draft-ready, a \"Reviewed <ago>\" footer, and an amber Likely-stale treatment with one-click Dismiss. \"Needs you\" shows *Start here* + 8 cards + \"Show N more\", a \"Dismiss N older than 7 days\" footer (explicit ids to `POST /alerts/bulk-ack` — never a server-side age sweep, which would hit teammates' routed items), and \"Re-check relevance\" (`POST /alerts/review`). The handled rail (anchor of the \"Executive handled N overnight\" pill) is deliberately one sentence by default: a first-person heading built from counts only — \"Since your last brief: N off your plate (closes still standing, and merges whose survivor is not itself listed; a merge into a listed survivor counts on that survivor's row), N in others' hands (routed / nudged), N waiting on you (escalated)\", plus \"N drafts ready\", \"N workflows suggested\", \"N watch changes\", \"N other moves\" (a kind the UI does not know) and \"N back on your plate\" (a close that is open again) when present — with the rows behind a \"details\" disclosure, and nothing rendered at all when the grouped rows are empty. The pure logic (grouping, headline, links) lives in `packages/ui/src/lib/handled.ts` and is covered by `npm test`. Expanded, it shows one first-person row per alert (\"Resolved *X* — evidence\", \"Dismissed *X* as stale — evidence\", \"Handed *X* to Dana Kim\" / \"Proposed *X* to Dana Kim (awaiting their approval)\", \"Chased Dana Kim on *X*\", \"Raised *X* to high\", \"Drafted *T* from *X*\", \"Folded *X* into *Y*\", \"Started watching *slug*\"), escalations first; rows sharing an alert collapse to the newest move with the others as an \"also …\" trailer — a close always keeps the visible slot (it carries Undo), otherwise an escalation beats routed / nudged / drafted; a merge whose survivor is listed becomes \"N duplicates folded in\" on the survivor. Every row links its `evidence_ref` (or \"evidence\") to `/audit?event_type=…&q=…` (the audit page pre-fills those filters from the query string), a still-open row jumps to its card (`#alert-<id>`), drafted rows link `/artifacts`, watch rows `/watchlist`. Undo is offered only while the close still stands (`status` not `open`); a reverted close shows \"Reopened\". Dismissing a watch-sourced alert lowers that watch's `trust_score` (which discounts ranking and is shown to the review as evidence); the ack body may carry `mute_topic`.\n\n## Multi-client practice section\n\nIn multi-client practice mode (2+ client slots — see the Client Companies section), the response gains an additive `practice_clients` list: rollup cards for the **parked** clients (overdue follow-ups, awaiting replies, unread alerts, onboarding due soon, renewal countdowns), each stamped with the save point its data reflects. Single-company installs always receive an empty list and the UI renders nothing.",
+ "markdown": "`openexecutive.api.routes.today` serves the morning brief — a one-screen, read-only view of what is happening across the org. It is the default landing surface (the Next.js root renders `<Briefing>`).\n\n`GET /today` returns `TodayResponse` assembled by `_build_today()`, which is synchronous and caller-agnostic:\n\n- **`departments`** — per-department goal health, rolling up each department's goal counts (`total`, `at_risk`, `off_track`) plus its awaiting-workflow count, and `attention_goals`: the actual off-track/at-risk goals (worst first, capped at 3) with `key_result`, `current`, `target`, and `status`, so the briefing's Department card shows *which* goal is off and how far without a click. Empty for healthy/inactive departments.\n- **`people`** — an attention-ranked roster. Each person carries `awaiting_action` count, soonest SLA, a `status` (`on_leave` / `needs_reply` / `awaiting` / `clear`), reachability, `overdue`, a server `priority` sort key, and a cached one-line `insight`. Sorted by `(-priority, full_name)`.\n- **`proposals`** — the *live* unread alerts (workflow approvals, triage-classified inbound, Executive signals, flagged artifacts, and gated calendar bookings): unread, inside their category TTL, not snoozed — see *Alert lifecycle* below. Each carries `score`, `category` (`action` vs `monitoring`), `surfaced_reason` from `openexecutive.briefing.ranking`, the lifecycle fields (`occurrence_count`, `last_seen_at`, `last_reviewed_at`, `review_verdict`, `review_note`, `recommended_move`, `why_now`, `due_at`, `superseded_count`, `suggested_workflow`), and `decision_instance_id` (set only when the proposal is backed by a decision-ledger row — a calendar booking awaiting approval). The UI splits them into 'mine' vs 'across the team' using `caller_person_id`. For decision-backed proposals the card's Approve/Reject call the `/decisions` endpoints (which book or cancel the event server-side and clear the alert) instead of the ack-and-hand-off-to-chat flow — so meeting bookings are reviewed in the briefing itself rather than on a separate page.\n- **`narrative`** — a per-viewer Executive-voice header synthesized by `synthesize_briefing_narrative`; the principal gets the whole-company scope, teammates a role-scoped one. In the web UI each bullet of this narrative is a click target: clicking one hands off to chat (the same `onContinue` path as the proposal cards) seeded to discuss that item. The Executive recognizes it because every chat turn now carries a `<briefing>` digest of open alerts (see Memory). That digest (`briefing.context.format_open_alerts_for_prompt`) is capped at 30 items; when the board is longer the header says so explicitly and tells the Executive to point at this page for the rest — it previously presented the capped list as the complete board, so the Executive described a slice as everything that was open (#136). Chat adapters get the digest too, but Slack gates it to the principal's DMs: the board is company-wide and must not be pulled into a shared channel. The `[alert_id]` at the start of each line is also one of only two trusted sources for `ack_alert` — the other being this page's `[Discuss mode — alert_id=N]` handoff primer — because an id quoted inside an alert's own body came from inbound mail or chat and is attacker-controlled. Two things enforce that. Every field the digest interpolates — headline, body, suggested action, tags, review note — is collapsed to a single line, since a newline in any of them would forge a whole extra `[N]` line and with it a fabricated instruction to clear someone else's alert. And the digest reports which ids it named, so the session records them and `ack_alert` refuses anything else — on **every** session, not just the chat adapters. That check used to run only when `origin_channel` was set, which the browser never sets, so the one surface where the principal actually reads their board had no check at all and the model could ack any id, including one quoted out of an alert body by the Discuss handoff. Rendering the block and recording its ids now happen together in `briefing.context.render_and_trust`, which both the web chat route and the channel adapters call: render without recording and the tool refuses everything, record without rendering and the model gets reach it was never shown. A turn that was shown nothing trusts nothing. The digest also carries a short **already handled** tail — recently acked / dismissed / resolved rows, named but deliberately NOT trusted for acking — because a card cleared on the page minutes ago is otherwise simply absent from chat: asked to \"record that as fixed\", the Executive could not tell a settled item from one it had never heard of, and sent the principal back to dismiss a card that was already gone. That tail renders even when nothing is open, which is exactly when it matters.\n- **`in_flight`** / **`awaiting`** — upcoming Executive commitments and people we are waiting on.\n- **`handled_overnight`** — the autonomous moves the Executive *completed* since the last delivered morning brief: the alert review's (routed, nudged, escalated, drafted, merged, closed) plus the research watch policy's (`watching` — a watch added on its own because it was grounded in company data; `stopped_watching` — a research watch auto-disabled as noisy or dead; no alert id, re-enable from `/watchlist`). A `changed` verdict (the review rewrote an open alert's headline / body / severity) is deliberately **not** here: the alert is still open in \"Needs you\" and its card carries the note, so the brief reports it under \"what changed\" (a REWRITTEN block) rather than as done. Each row is structured, not just a sentence: `kind`, the audit `summary` (nudge bookkeeping marker stripped), `at`, `alert_id`, `event_type` (for a pre-filtered `/audit` deep link), `headline` (the alert's headline at move time; a watch's slug), `target` (person name for routed / nudged, survivor headline for merged, new severity for escalated, draft title, workflow name), `detail` (the cited evidence or the watch policy's reason), `outcome` (`resolved` | `dismissed` for a close, `proposed` for a route that went through the authority gate), `evidence_ref` (S1 / R2 / A3), `superseded_by_alert_id`, and `status` — the alert's lifecycle state **now** (`open` = live in the queue per `lifecycle.is_live` | `resolved` | `dismissed` | `expired` | `merged` | `acked` | `inactive` for snoozed / past-TTL rows), looked up per row so a close the principal already undid renders as reopened instead of offering a second Undo, and a \"still open\" jump link only appears when there is a card to land on. The morning brief also carries a one-line count of research watch suggestions waiting on `/watchlist`.\n\nThe route resolves the caller from `x-caller-email`, then attaches the viewer-scoped narrative in a `BackgroundTask` so the request never blocks on an LLM call. `GET /today/activity` returns the recent self-initiated action rail — merged from fired scheduled actions (DMs, follow-ups, nudges, cadences), logged decisions, saved advice, completed workflow runs (briefings/check-ins/research), kicked-off initiatives, resolved gated decisions, and raised alerts, so it reflects all of the Executive's activity rather than just dispatched messages. The Pulse page (`/memories`) polls it (limit 100) every ~20s so new events stream into the 'Recent activity' card, which scrolls internally at a fixed height instead of growing the page. The `morning_brief` workflow calls `_build_today()` directly to build the standalone DM (via a different, enumerated prompt). `GET /morning-brief` is a deprecated alias.\n\n## Alert lifecycle & the Executive review\n\nAlerts used to be write-once: raised, then never looked at again, so the \"Needs you\" queue grew without bound and the briefs re-listed it daily. Three things now keep it live:\n\n- **Time-to-live** (`openexecutive.alerts.lifecycle`). Action items expire after `ALERT_TTL_DAYS_ACTION` (14 d), unrouted low/medium monitoring signals after `ALERT_TTL_DAYS_MONITORING` (3 d). Every surface reads `list_live_alerts` (the same predicate the scheduler's 15-minute sweep persists as status `expired`), so `/today` is right even before the sweep runs. Artifacts and decision-backed alerts are exempt. `POST /alerts/{id}/reopen` is the Undo.\n- **Coalescing** (`alerts.pipeline` + `store.coalesce_alert`). A repeat of an open alert with the same `(source, dedup_key)` updates that row — `occurrence_count`, `last_seen_at`, severity max — instead of stacking a second card, and only re-pings when severity rose to high/urgent. Monitoring alerts carry a stable `watch:<slug>` key, so one watch means one card.\n- **The review** (`openexecutive.alerts.review`, heartbeat `alert_review_scan`, every 6 h and right before the morning brief). For each open alert the Executive sees what changed since it was raised — newer signals from the same watch, related alerts, activity since, the roster with SLAs, department authority — and returns a verdict (relevant / changed / resolved / stale) plus a recommended move. Deterministic policy then acts: **route** (assign + DM the owner; `propose_via_alert` for propose-only departments), **nudge**, **escalate** (severity + `due_at` + DM the principal only), **draft** (`draft_artifact`), **suggest a workflow** (a link, never a run), **merge** (`superseded_by_alert_id`), or **resolve** — only on high confidence citing a server-minted evidence ref (a newer signal, a related alert, an activity item shown for that alert); free text never closes a card, and anything weaker is annotated `likely_stale`, demoted 30 ranking points, and left for one click. Everything that came from outside is rendered as inert data inside the review prompt, so an injected email body cannot steer the batch. Board / comp / legal matters only ever go to a scope-holder or the principal and keep their text. Route and escalate are idempotent across passes, every DM carries an \"[Alert review] Re: …\" header, outbound moves are capped per pass, passes are single-flight, `ALERT_REVIEW_ENABLED=false` stops every caller, every move is audited with its evidence and prior state, and a distinct `resolved` status keeps Executive closes separate from `ack` (user approved).\n\nOn the page, cards read as decisions: the one-line \"what changed since you last looked\" (`review_note`) leads, the recommended move is the primary control (Nudge <owner> → chat; Run <workflow> → `/jobs/<name>`), with chips for age, seen ×N, why-now / due, folded-in and draft-ready, a \"Reviewed <ago>\" footer, and an amber Likely-stale treatment with one-click Dismiss. \"Needs you\" shows *Start here* + 8 cards + \"Show N more\", a \"Dismiss N older than 7 days\" footer (explicit ids to `POST /alerts/bulk-ack` — never a server-side age sweep, which would hit teammates' routed items), and \"Re-check relevance\" (`POST /alerts/review`). The handled rail (anchor of the \"Executive handled N overnight\" pill) is deliberately one sentence by default: a first-person heading built from counts only — \"Since your last brief: N off your plate (closes still standing, and merges whose survivor is not itself listed; a merge into a listed survivor counts on that survivor's row), N in others' hands (routed / nudged), N waiting on you (escalated)\", plus \"N drafts ready\", \"N workflows suggested\", \"N watch changes\", \"N other moves\" (a kind the UI does not know) and \"N back on your plate\" (a close that is open again) when present — with the rows behind a \"details\" disclosure, and nothing rendered at all when the grouped rows are empty. The pure logic (grouping, headline, links) lives in `packages/ui/src/lib/handled.ts` and is covered by `npm test`. Expanded, it shows one first-person row per alert (\"Resolved *X* — evidence\", \"Dismissed *X* as stale — evidence\", \"Handed *X* to Dana Kim\" / \"Proposed *X* to Dana Kim (awaiting their approval)\", \"Chased Dana Kim on *X*\", \"Raised *X* to high\", \"Drafted *T* from *X*\", \"Folded *X* into *Y*\", \"Started watching *slug*\"), escalations first; rows sharing an alert collapse to the newest move with the others as an \"also …\" trailer — a close always keeps the visible slot (it carries Undo), otherwise an escalation beats routed / nudged / drafted; a merge whose survivor is listed becomes \"N duplicates folded in\" on the survivor. Every row links its `evidence_ref` (or \"evidence\") to `/audit?event_type=…&q=…` (the audit page pre-fills those filters from the query string), a still-open row jumps to its card (`#alert-<id>`), drafted rows link `/artifacts`, watch rows `/watchlist`. Undo is offered only while the close still stands (`status` not `open`); a reverted close shows \"Reopened\". Dismissing a watch-sourced alert lowers that watch's `trust_score` (which discounts ranking and is shown to the review as evidence); the ack body may carry `mute_topic`.\n\n## Multi-client practice section\n\nIn multi-client practice mode (2+ client slots — see the Client Companies section), the response gains an additive `practice_clients` list: rollup cards for the **parked** clients (overdue follow-ups, awaiting replies, unread alerts, onboarding due soon, renewal countdowns), each stamped with the save point its data reflects. Single-company installs always receive an empty list and the UI renders nothing.",
"mermaid": "flowchart TD\n REQ[\"GET /today\"]\n BUILD[\"_build_today()\"]\n DEPTS[\"departments<br/>(per-dept goal health)\"]\n ROSTER[\"people<br/>(attention-ranked roster)\"]\n PROPS[\"proposals<br/>(unread alerts, routed)\"]\n INFLIGHT[\"in_flight<br/>(pending follow-ups / nudges)\"]\n AWAIT[\"awaiting<br/>(replies we await)\"]\n NARR[\"viewer-scoped narrative (BackgroundTask)\"]\n MB[\"morning_brief workflow\"]\n REQ --> BUILD\n BUILD --> DEPTS\n BUILD --> ROSTER\n BUILD --> PROPS\n BUILD --> INFLIGHT\n BUILD --> AWAIT\n REQ -->|\"resolve caller, attach\"| NARR\n MB -->|\"calls directly for standalone DM\"| BUILD\n class REQ entry\n class BUILD compute\n class DEPTS storage\n class ROSTER storage\n class PROPS storage\n class INFLIGHT storage\n class AWAIT storage\n class NARR compute\n class MB compute",
"generated_at": "2026-09-18T20:28:52.031310+00:00"
}
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/briefing/context.py b/packages/core/openexecutive/briefing/context.py
index b4a4c78c..309b13a1 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/briefing/context.py
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/briefing/context.py
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ not snoozed — see ``alerts.lifecycle.list_live_alerts``).
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from pathlib import Path
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -28,6 +29,21 @@ _BODY_SNIPPET_CHARS = 200
# unread items at once; the ceiling just bounds the per-turn token cost.
_MAX_ALERTS = 30
+# Recently-closed items the digest names so the Executive can recognise work
+# the principal already settled. Without these, a card acked from the briefing
+# page a few minutes ago is simply absent from chat: asked to "record that as
+# fixed", the Executive cannot tell an already-handled item from one it has
+# never heard of, and sends the principal back to the page to click Dismiss on
+# a card that is already gone.
+#
+# Bounded by both a count and an age. `alerts` has no closed-at column, so the
+# window is on `created_at` — an old alert closed today will not appear. That
+# is the conservative direction: the block can omit a handled item, never
+# invent one.
+_MAX_HANDLED = 8
+_HANDLED_WINDOW = timedelta(days=3)
+_HANDLED_STATUSES = frozenset({"ack", "dismissed", "resolved"})
+
def _one_line(value: str | None) -> str:
"""Collapse a field to a single line of single-spaced text.
@@ -71,6 +87,7 @@ def format_open_alerts_for_prompt(
from openexecutive.alerts.lifecycle import list_live_alerts
from openexecutive.briefing.ranking import score_and_categorize
+ now = datetime.now(UTC)
try:
# Fetch one more than we render so we can tell a full board from a
# truncated one. Without this the header below claims the list is the
@@ -113,7 +130,9 @@ def format_open_alerts_for_prompt(
rendered_ids.append(alert.id)
if not lines:
- return ""
+ # An empty board is exactly when the handled block matters most: the
+ # principal just cleared everything and is still talking about it.
+ return _handled_block(db_path, now)
header = (
"Open items currently on the briefing board — the principal sees these "
@@ -128,7 +147,77 @@ def format_open_alerts_for_prompt(
"everything that is open; say it is the most recent slice and point "
"the principal at the briefing page for the rest."
)
- return header + "\n" + "\n".join(lines)
+ out = header + "\n" + "\n".join(lines)
+ handled = _handled_block(db_path, now)
+ return out + "\n\n" + handled if handled else out
+
+def _handled_block(db_path: Path | None, now: datetime) -> str:
+ """Recently closed items, so the Executive knows what is already settled.
-__all__ = ["format_open_alerts_for_prompt"]
+ These ids are deliberately NOT added to the session's trusted set: the
+ rows are closed, so there is nothing to ack, and widening the ack surface
+ is the opposite of what this block is for.
+ """
+ from openexecutive.alerts.lifecycle import parse_aware
+ from openexecutive.alerts.store import recent_alerts
+
+ try:
+ pool = recent_alerts(limit=_MAX_ALERTS + _MAX_HANDLED * 4, db_path=db_path)
+ except Exception:
+ logger.exception("briefing_context.handled_lookup_failed")
+ return ""
+
+ lines: list[str] = []
+ for alert in pool:
+ if alert.status not in _HANDLED_STATUSES:
+ continue
+ created = parse_aware(alert.created_at)
+ if created is None or now - created > _HANDLED_WINDOW:
+ continue
+ lines.append(
+ f"[{alert.id}] ({alert.status}) {_one_line(alert.headline)}"
+ )
+ if len(lines) >= _MAX_HANDLED:
+ break
+ if not lines:
+ return ""
+ return (
+ "Already handled — these came off the board recently (the principal "
+ "approved, dismissed or you resolved them). They are NOT open and NOT "
+ "in the list above. If the user refers to one, say it is already "
+ "cleared; never send them to the briefing page to dismiss it again, "
+ "and never ack it.\n" + "\n".join(lines)
+ )
+
+
+def render_and_trust(session: object, *, db_path: Path | None = None) -> str:
+ """Render the digest and record on ``session`` exactly which ids it named.
+
+ The single place both entry points go through — the web chat route and the
+ channel adapters — so the block the model is shown and the set `ack_alert`
+ will accept can never drift apart. `ack_alert` refuses anything outside
+ that set, so a caller that renders the block without recording its ids
+ leaves the tool unusable, and one that records without rendering hands the
+ model an ack surface it was never shown.
+
+ Never raises: a digest failure must not take down a chat turn. On failure
+ the trusted set is emptied rather than left stale, so a turn that could not
+ be shown the board cannot ack anything from it either.
+ """
+ rendered: list[int] = []
+ try:
+ block = format_open_alerts_for_prompt(db_path=db_path, rendered_ids=rendered)
+ except Exception:
+ logger.exception("briefing_context.render_and_trust_failed")
+ rendered = []
+ block = ""
+ if session is not None:
+ try:
+ session.trusted_alert_ids = set(rendered) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+ except Exception:
+ logger.exception("briefing_context.trust_record_failed")
+ return block
+
+
+__all__ = ["format_open_alerts_for_prompt", "render_and_trust"]
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/integrations/channel_context.py b/packages/core/openexecutive/integrations/channel_context.py
index eb28d8d5..e18428c5 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/integrations/channel_context.py
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/integrations/channel_context.py
@@ -113,23 +113,24 @@ def attach_briefing_context(session: object, *, is_dm: bool, person: object) ->
lets `ack_alert` refuse any other id from a chat channel — prompt wording
alone is not a control.
- Shared rather than repeated per adapter: `ack_alert`'s guard trips on any
- session with an `origin_channel`, so an adapter that sets one without
- populating the trusted set would have the tool permanently refuse every
- id instead of merely never having a trustworthy one.
+ Shared rather than repeated per adapter: `ack_alert`'s guard trips on
+ EVERY session, so an adapter that renders this block without populating the
+ trusted set would have the tool permanently refuse every id. The rendering
+ and the recording therefore happen together, in
+ `briefing.context.render_and_trust`, which the web chat route also uses.
+
+ A non-DM or non-principal turn returns "" WITHOUT recording anything, so
+ the trusted set stays empty and `ack_alert` refuses — correct, since the
+ board is company-wide and was never shown to them.
Synchronous SQLite — call it via ``asyncio.to_thread``. Never raises.
"""
if not is_dm or not getattr(person, "is_principal", False):
return ""
try:
- from openexecutive.briefing.context import format_open_alerts_for_prompt
+ from openexecutive.briefing.context import render_and_trust
- rendered: list[int] = []
- block = format_open_alerts_for_prompt(rendered_ids=rendered)
- if session is not None:
- session.trusted_alert_ids = set(rendered) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
- return block
+ return render_and_trust(session)
except Exception:
logger.exception("channel_context: could not build the briefing block")
return ""
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/integrations/google_chat.py b/packages/core/openexecutive/integrations/google_chat.py
index de026c20..134c71ef 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/integrations/google_chat.py
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/integrations/google_chat.py
@@ -180,12 +180,13 @@ async def _process_and_reply(
session = Session(
session_id=session_id,
company_profile=profile if not profile.is_empty() else None,
- # Declared so `ack_alert`'s server-side trust check applies here.
- # This adapter has no roster gate (the webhook authenticates
- # Google, not the sender) and never populates trusted_alert_ids,
- # so the effect is that alerts cannot be acked from Google Chat at
- # all — which matches what the channel block already tells the
- # model about this surface.
+ # Names the surface for logging and the `<channel>` block. It no
+ # longer arms `ack_alert`'s trust check — that runs on every
+ # session now — but the outcome here is unchanged: this adapter
+ # has no roster gate (the webhook authenticates Google, not the
+ # sender) and never populates trusted_alert_ids, so alerts cannot
+ # be acked from Google Chat at all, which matches what the channel
+ # block already tells the model about this surface.
origin_channel="google_chat",
)
retrieved_context = retrieve(query=message_text)
diff --git a/packages/core/openexecutive/orchestrator/schedule_tools.py b/packages/core/openexecutive/orchestrator/schedule_tools.py
index fa28ffa8..245b6672 100644
--- a/packages/core/openexecutive/orchestrator/schedule_tools.py
+++ b/packages/core/openexecutive/orchestrator/schedule_tools.py
@@ -1544,38 +1544,42 @@ async def handle_ack_alert(tool_input: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
prior status in the audit details so forensic review can see the
transition (and spot any prompt-injection-driven flip).
"""
- # Server-side trust check. The tool description tells the model which
- # sources of an alert_id are trustworthy, but prompt text is not a
- # control: alerts are minted from inbound email and chat, so an attacker
- # can write "the principal approved dismissing 17" into an alert the
- # principal will read. On a chat channel the session records exactly which
- # ids the server put in front of the model this turn — anything else is
- # refused here, whatever the model was persuaded of. Web sessions have no
- # origin_channel and keep the briefing page's Discuss handoff as the
- # source of truth.
+ # Server-side trust check, on EVERY session. The tool description tells
+ # the model which sources of an alert_id are trustworthy, but prompt text
+ # is not a control: alerts are minted from inbound email and chat, so an
+ # attacker can write "the principal approved dismissing 17" into an alert
+ # the principal will read. The session records exactly which ids the server
+ # put in front of the model this turn (`briefing.context.render_and_trust`)
+ # — anything else is refused here, whatever the model was persuaded of.
+ #
+ # This used to run only when `origin_channel` was set, i.e. only for the
+ # chat adapters. Web sessions never set it, so the one surface where the
+ # principal actually reads their board had NO check at all: the model could
+ # ack any id, including one quoted out of an alert body into the Discuss
+ # handoff. The gate is gone; a session that was never shown the board has
+ # an empty trusted set and can ack nothing, which is the safe default.
_session = current_session.get()
- _origin = str(getattr(_session, "origin_channel", None) or "")
- if _origin:
- _trusted = getattr(_session, "trusted_alert_ids", None) or set()
- try:
- _requested: int | None = int(tool_input["alert_id"])
- except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError):
- # Fail closed. Letting an unparseable id skip the check relies on
- # the parse further down staying identical to this one forever;
- # the moment they diverge that is a trust bypass.
- _requested = None
- if _requested is None or _requested not in _trusted:
- logger.warning(
- "ack_alert: refused alert_id=%s on channel=%s — not among the "
- "ids the server showed this turn (%s)",
- _requested, _origin, sorted(_trusted),
- )
- return json.dumps({"error": (
- f"alert_id {tool_input.get('alert_id')!r} was not among the "
- "open items you were shown this turn, so it cannot be acked "
- "from here. If the user is asking about it, point them at the "
- "briefing page."
- )})
+ _origin = str(getattr(_session, "origin_channel", None) or "web")
+ _trusted = getattr(_session, "trusted_alert_ids", None) or set()
+ try:
+ _requested: int | None = int(tool_input["alert_id"])
+ except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError):
+ # Fail closed. Letting an unparseable id skip the check relies on
+ # the parse further down staying identical to this one forever;
+ # the moment they diverge that is a trust bypass.
+ _requested = None
+ if _requested is None or _requested not in _trusted:
+ logger.warning(
+ "ack_alert: refused alert_id=%s on channel=%s — not among the "
+ "ids the server showed this turn (%s)",
+ _requested, _origin, sorted(_trusted),
+ )
+ return json.dumps({"error": (
+ f"alert_id {tool_input.get('alert_id')!r} was not among the "
+ "open items you were shown this turn, so it cannot be acked "
+ "from here. If the user is asking about it, point them at the "
+ "briefing page."
+ )})
from openexecutive.alerts import store as alert_store
diff --git a/packages/core/tests/unit/test_ack_alert_trust.py b/packages/core/tests/unit/test_ack_alert_trust.py
index 0e63a5f5..0c6342d1 100644
--- a/packages/core/tests/unit/test_ack_alert_trust.py
+++ b/packages/core/tests/unit/test_ack_alert_trust.py
@@ -109,12 +109,46 @@ def test_chat_turn_with_no_trusted_ids_can_ack_nothing() -> None:
set_status.assert_not_called()
-def test_web_session_is_unaffected() -> None:
- """The briefing page acks over HTTP before the chat handoff, so the
- discussed alert is no longer unread and would not be in a briefing block.
- Enforcing there would break the Discuss flow."""
+def test_web_session_is_enforced_too() -> None:
+ """The web session is the one that most needs the check, not the exception.
+
+ The guard used to run only when `origin_channel` was set, i.e. only for the
+ chat adapters. The browser never sets it, so the single surface where the
+ principal actually reads their board had no check at all and the model
+ could ack any id — including one an inbound email wrote into an alert body
+ that the Discuss handoff then quoted into the turn.
+
+ The old test asserted the opposite on the premise that the briefing page
+ acks over HTTP first, leaving the alert absent from the digest. That path
+ is unaffected: the HTTP route (`api/routes/alerts.py`) calls `set_status`
+ directly and never reaches this handler, and its Discuss seed tells the
+ model the alert is already acked and not to call this tool.
+ """
current_session.set(Session(session_id="web-1", caller_person_id=7))
+ with (
+ patch("openexecutive.alerts.store.get_alert", return_value=_alert(99)),
+ patch("openexecutive.alerts.store.set_status", return_value=True),
+ patch("openexecutive.alerts.lifecycle.record_ack_feedback"),
+ patch("openexecutive.audit.log_event"),
+ ):
+ out = _call(99)
+
+ assert "error" in out
+ assert "not among the open items" in out["error"]
+
+
+def test_web_session_can_ack_an_id_the_digest_named() -> None:
+ """The flip side: a web turn that WAS shown the board can still clear it.
+
+ This is what `briefing.context.render_and_trust` records, and without it
+ the change above would simply break acking on the web instead of securing
+ it.
+ """
+ session = Session(session_id="web-2", caller_person_id=7)
+ session.trusted_alert_ids = {99}
+ current_session.set(session)
+
with (
patch("openexecutive.alerts.store.get_alert", return_value=_alert(99)),
patch("openexecutive.alerts.store.set_status", return_value=True),
@@ -127,8 +161,15 @@ def test_web_session_is_unaffected() -> None:
assert "error" not in out
-def test_no_session_at_all_is_unaffected() -> None:
- """CLI / scheduler callers have no session; the guard must not fire."""
+def test_no_session_at_all_is_refused() -> None:
+ """No session means nothing was shown, so nothing may be acked.
+
+ The old test allowed this for "CLI / scheduler callers". No such caller
+ exists: `handle_ack_alert` is reachable only through
+ `SCHEDULE_TOOL_HANDLERS` from the orchestrator's tool loop, which always
+ binds a session. Fail closed rather than keep an unreachable exemption
+ that a future session-less caller would silently inherit.
+ """
with (
patch("openexecutive.alerts.store.get_alert", return_value=_alert(5)),
patch("openexecutive.alerts.store.set_status", return_value=True),
@@ -137,4 +178,4 @@ def test_no_session_at_all_is_unaffected() -> None:
):
out = _call(5)
- assert out["alert_id"] == 5
+ assert "error" in out
diff --git a/packages/core/tests/unit/test_briefing_context.py b/packages/core/tests/unit/test_briefing_context.py
index 8e8f4861..244fbf21 100644
--- a/packages/core/tests/unit/test_briefing_context.py
+++ b/packages/core/tests/unit/test_briefing_context.py
@@ -80,9 +80,71 @@ def test_excludes_acked_and_dismissed(db: Path) -> None:
set_status(dismissed, "dismissed", db_path=db)
out = format_open_alerts_for_prompt(db_path=db)
- assert f"[{keep}]" in out
- assert "Already handled" not in out
- assert "Not interested" not in out
+ open_block, _, handled_block = out.partition("Already handled —")
+
+ # Closed rows are never in the OPEN list — that is the original contract
+ # and it still holds.
+ assert f"[{keep}]" in open_block
+ assert "Already handled" not in open_block
+ assert "Not interested" not in open_block
+
+ # They now appear in a separate, explicitly-labelled tail so the Executive
+ # can recognise work the principal already settled instead of sending them
+ # back to the page to dismiss a card that is already gone.
+ assert handled_block
+ assert "Already handled" in handled_block
+ assert "Not interested" in handled_block
+
+
+def test_handled_ids_are_not_trusted_for_acking(db: Path) -> None:
+ """The handled tail names ids but must not widen the ack surface.
+
+ `ack_alert` accepts only what `rendered_ids` collected; a closed row has
+ nothing to ack, so letting the tail feed the trusted set would hand the
+ model reach it was never meant to have.
+ """
+ from openexecutive.alerts.store import set_status as _set_status
+
+ open_id = insert_alert(
+ source="email", external_id="open-1", severity="medium",
+ headline="Still open", body="b", db_path=db,
+ )
+ closed_id = insert_alert(
+ source="email", external_id="closed-1", severity="medium",
+ headline="Since settled", body="b", db_path=db,
+ )
+ assert closed_id is not None
+ _set_status(closed_id, "ack", db_path=db)
+
+ rendered: list[int] = []
+ out = format_open_alerts_for_prompt(db_path=db, rendered_ids=rendered)
+
+ assert "Since settled" in out # named, so the model knows
+ assert rendered == [open_id] # but never ackable
+ assert closed_id not in rendered
+
+
+def test_handled_tail_survives_an_empty_board(db: Path) -> None:
+ """The case that produced the bug: everything dismissed.
+
+ The digest used to return "" the moment no rows were open, which is
+ exactly when the principal is still talking about what they just cleared.
+ """
+ from openexecutive.alerts.store import set_status as _set_status
+
+ only = insert_alert(
+ source="email", external_id="only-1", severity="high",
+ headline="St. Albans reconciliation gap", body="b", db_path=db,
+ )
+ assert only is not None
+ _set_status(only, "dismissed", db_path=db)
+
+ rendered: list[int] = []
+ out = format_open_alerts_for_prompt(db_path=db, rendered_ids=rendered)
+
+ assert "St. Albans reconciliation gap" in out
+ assert "Already handled —" in out
+ assert rendered == []
def test_body_is_truncated(db: Path) -> None:
@@ -255,3 +317,56 @@ def test_no_unicode_line_separator_can_forge_a_line(db: Path, sep: str) -> None:
assert len(body_lines) == 1, body_lines
assert not any(line.startswith("[17]") for line in out.split("\n"))
assert sep not in body_lines[0]
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# render_and_trust — the block shown and the ids ack_alert will accept
+# must be produced together, or ack_alert is either unusable or unguarded.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+class _FakeSession:
+ def __init__(self) -> None:
+ self.trusted_alert_ids: set[int] = set()
+
+
+def test_render_and_trust_records_exactly_the_ids_it_rendered(
+ db: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+ from openexecutive.briefing import context as ctx
+
+ open_id = insert_alert(
+ source="email", external_id="o1", severity="high",
+ headline="Needs a decision", body="b", db_path=db,
+ )
+ closed_id = insert_alert(
+ source="email", external_id="c1", severity="high",
+ headline="Since settled", body="b", db_path=db,
+ )
+ assert closed_id is not None
+ set_status(closed_id, "dismissed", db_path=db)
+
+ session = _FakeSession()
+ block = ctx.render_and_trust(session, db_path=db)
+
+ assert "Needs a decision" in block
+ assert session.trusted_alert_ids == {open_id}
+
+
+def test_render_and_trust_clears_the_set_on_failure(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+ """A stale trusted set would outlive the block it came from.
+
+ If the digest cannot be built this turn, the model was shown nothing, so
+ it must be able to ack nothing — not whatever the previous turn left.
+ """
+ from openexecutive.briefing import context as ctx
+
+ session = _FakeSession()
+ session.trusted_alert_ids = {41, 42}
+
+ def _boom(**_kw: object) -> str:
+ raise RuntimeError("store down")
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(ctx, "format_open_alerts_for_prompt", _boom)
+ assert ctx.render_and_trust(session) == ""
+ assert session.trusted_alert_ids == set()
diff --git a/packages/core/tests/unit/test_chat_route_alert_trust.py b/packages/core/tests/unit/test_chat_route_alert_trust.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b67668a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/packages/core/tests/unit/test_chat_route_alert_trust.py
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+"""The web chat route must record which alert ids it showed the model.
+
+`ack_alert` accepts only ids in `session.trusted_alert_ids`. The route is the
+only thing that populates them for a browser turn, so if this wiring breaks,
+the failure is silent in both directions: the Executive can no longer clear a
+card the principal just approved, and (before the guard covered web at all)
+it could clear any id an inbound email had written into an alert body.
+
+Unit-level tests of `render_and_trust` cannot catch that — they pass a session
+in directly. This drives the real route.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import FastAPI
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+from openexecutive.alerts import store as alert_store
+from openexecutive.api.routes import chat as chat_route
+from openexecutive.memory import episodic, session_store
+from openexecutive.memory.company_profile import CompanyProfile
+from openexecutive.people import store as people_store
+
+
[email protected](autouse=True)
+def _reset_route_state() -> None:
+ chat_route._sessions.clear()
+ chat_route._last_turn_events.clear()
+ chat_route._last_turn_meta.clear()
+
+
+def env(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> Path:
+ monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+ db_path = Path("./episodic_memory.db").resolve()
+ monkeypatch.setattr(episodic, "DB_PATH", db_path)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(session_store, "DB_PATH", db_path)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(people_store, "DB_PATH", tmp_path / "people.db")
+ monkeypatch.setattr(alert_store, "DB_PATH", tmp_path / "alerts.db")
+ episodic.initialize_db(db_path)
+ people_store.initialize_db()
+ alert_store.initialize_db(tmp_path / "alerts.db")
+
+ monkeypatch.setenv("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "test-key")
+ from openexecutive.onboarding import profile_builder
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(profile_builder, "load_or_create_profile", lambda: CompanyProfile())
+
+ from openexecutive.knowledge import retriever as retriever_mod
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(retriever_mod, "retrieve", lambda **_: "")
+
+ from openexecutive.orchestrator import executive as exec_mod
+
+ class _StubExecutive:
+ _THINKING = exec_mod.Executive._THINKING
+
+ def __init__(self, **_kwargs: Any) -> None:
+ pass
+
+ async def stream_chat(self, **_kwargs: Any) -> AsyncIterator[str]:
+ yield "ok"
+
+ async def stream_chat_with_committee(self, **_kwargs: Any) -> AsyncIterator[str]:
+ yield "ok"
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(exec_mod, "Executive", _StubExecutive)
+ return tmp_path
+
+
+def _post(message: str = "what's on my plate?") -> None:
+ app = FastAPI()
+ app.include_router(chat_route.router)
+ client = TestClient(app)
+ resp = client.post("/chat", json={"message": message})
+ assert resp.status_code == 200
+ _ = resp.text # drain the SSE stream so the turn completes
+
+
+def _only_session() -> Any:
+ assert len(chat_route._sessions) == 1
+ return next(iter(chat_route._sessions.values()))
+
+
+def test_web_turn_trusts_the_live_alert_it_was_shown(env: Path) -> None:
+ people_store.upsert_person(full_name="Alex", is_principal=True)
+ live = alert_store.insert_alert(
+ source="email", external_id="live-1", severity="high",
+ headline="Approve the Q3 budget", body="Needs a decision.",
+ db_path=env / "alerts.db",
+ )
+ assert live is not None
+
+ _post()
+
+ assert _only_session().trusted_alert_ids == {live}
+
+
+def test_web_turn_does_not_trust_a_closed_alert(env: Path) -> None:
+ """A dismissed alert is named in the digest's handled tail so the Executive
+ knows it is settled — but it must not become ackable."""
+ people_store.upsert_person(full_name="Alex", is_principal=True)
+ closed = alert_store.insert_alert(
+ source="email", external_id="closed-1", severity="high",
+ headline="St. Albans reconciliation gap", body="b",
+ db_path=env / "alerts.db",
+ )
+ assert closed is not None
+ alert_store.set_status(closed, "dismissed", db_path=env / "alerts.db")
+
+ _post()
+
+ assert _only_session().trusted_alert_ids == set()
+
+
+def test_web_turn_with_no_alerts_trusts_nothing(env: Path) -> None:
+ people_store.upsert_person(full_name="Alex", is_principal=True)
+
+ _post()
+
+ assert _only_session().trusted_alert_ids == set()