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fix: unsandbox the PDF preview iframe so the built-in viewer renders (#16702)

Hiep Le4c3bb824002b
diff --git a/src/components/features/files-tab/file-content-viewer.tsx b/src/components/features/files-tab/file-content-viewer.tsx
index b2ebf8f076..2d4efa729d 100644
--- a/src/components/features/files-tab/file-content-viewer.tsx
+++ b/src/components/features/files-tab/file-content-viewer.tsx
@@ -138,19 +138,19 @@ export function FileContentViewer({ path, viewMode }: FileContentViewerProps) {
}
if (kind === "pdf") {
- // PDFs can carry embedded JavaScript (AcroForm, OpenAction…). Even
- // though `staticUrl` lives on the agent server origin, the PDF
- // viewer's scripting capability isn't worth the risk for a file
- // preview, so we sandbox the iframe. `allow-same-origin` lets the
- // browser's built-in PDF viewer load the underlying bytes without
- // tripping cross-origin restrictions; we omit `allow-scripts`
- // because no PDF preview we care about needs to run JS in the
- // parent's origin.
+ // Deliberately NOT sandboxed: Chromium refuses to instantiate its
+ // built-in PDF viewer inside any sandboxed frame (the `sandbox`
+ // attribute disables plugins unconditionally — no token re-enables
+ // them), rendering "This page has been blocked by Chrome" instead of
+ // the document. Unsandboxed is safe here: the fileserver declares
+ // `Content-Type: application/pdf`, which browsers never sniff into
+ // HTML, so the frame can only host the PDF viewer — and PDF-embedded
+ // JS (AcroForm, OpenAction…) runs in the viewer's own sandboxed
+ // engine with no access to this page's DOM.
return (
<iframe
title={path}
src={bustedStaticUrl}
- sandbox="allow-same-origin"
data-testid="file-content-viewer-iframe"
className="h-full w-full bg-white"
/>