π OpenHands: AI-Driven Development
refactor(acp): stop forwarding acp_env; route ACP creds via Secrets panel (#1050)
simonrosenberg5eb519c014b7
diff --git a/__tests__/api/agent-server-adapter.test.ts b/__tests__/api/agent-server-adapter.test.tsindex f628d539d1..e14c7bbd1e 100644--- a/__tests__/api/agent-server-adapter.test.ts+++ b/__tests__/api/agent-server-adapter.test.ts@@ -480,7 +480,9 @@ describe("buildStartConversationRequest", () => {// @spec LLD-001 β Frontend always sends its chosen default modeldescribe("llm.model fallback β frontend always sends its chosen default", () => {type ModelPayload = {- agent_settings: Record<string, unknown> & { llm: Record<string, unknown> };+ agent_settings: Record<string, unknown> & {+ llm: Record<string, unknown>;+ };};function getModelFrom(@@ -510,10 +512,19 @@ describe("buildStartConversationRequest", () => {// SettingsValue includes scalars so inline literals are type-safe here.it.each([["undefined", { ...DEFAULT_SETTINGS.agent_settings, llm: {} }],- ["an empty string", { ...DEFAULT_SETTINGS.agent_settings, llm: { model: "" } }],- ["whitespace only", { ...DEFAULT_SETTINGS.agent_settings, llm: { model: " " } }],+ [+ "an empty string",+ { ...DEFAULT_SETTINGS.agent_settings, llm: { model: "" } },+ ],+ [+ "whitespace only",+ { ...DEFAULT_SETTINGS.agent_settings, llm: { model: " " } },+ ],// No llm key at all β SettingsValue accepts plain scalars.- ["absent (no llm block)", { schema_version: 1, agent_kind: "openhands", agent: "CodeActAgent" }],+ [+ "absent (no llm block)",+ { schema_version: 1, agent_kind: "openhands", agent: "CodeActAgent" },+ ],// Mirrors a fresh user who skipped onboarding: server returns {}.["entirely empty", {}],])(@@ -795,7 +806,9 @@ describe("buildRuntimeServicesSystemSuffix", () => {expect(suffix).toContain("http://localhost:18000");expect(suffix).toContain("http://localhost:18001");expect(suffix).toContain("http://localhost:18001/api/automation/docs");- expect(suffix).toContain("X-Session-API-Key: $OPENHANDS_AUTOMATION_API_KEY");+ expect(suffix).toContain(+ "X-Session-API-Key: $OPENHANDS_AUTOMATION_API_KEY",+ );expect(suffix).not.toContain("X-API-Key: $OPENHANDS_AUTOMATION_API_KEY");expect(suffix).toContain("</RUNTIME_SERVICES>");// The "don't guess" line should reference the actual agent-server URL@@ -1170,6 +1183,9 @@ describe("buildStartConversationRequest β ACP discriminator", () => {agent_kind: "acp",acp_server: "claude-code",acp_command: [],+ // Legacy persisted value: provider creds no longer ride acp_env β+ // they flow through the Secrets panel (request.secrets). A stale+ // acp_env left on saved settings must be dropped, not forwarded.acp_env: { ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "user-set-via-api" },acp_model: "claude-opus-4-5",agent: "CodeActAgent",@@ -1218,9 +1234,9 @@ describe("buildStartConversationRequest β ACP discriminator", () => {"@agentclientprotocol/claude-agent-acp",]);expect(acpPayload.agent_settings.acp_model).toBe("claude-opus-4-5");- expect(acpPayload.agent_settings.acp_env).toEqual({- ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: "user-set-via-api",- });+ // acp_env is no longer a forwarded ACP setting β a stale value on saved+ // settings is dropped rather than leaked into the conversation request.+ expect(acpPayload.agent_settings.acp_env).toBeUndefined();expect(acpPayload.agent_settings.llm).toBeUndefined();expect(acpPayload.agent_settings.condenser).toBeUndefined();});diff --git a/__tests__/utils/acp-command.test.ts b/__tests__/utils/acp-command.test.tsindex a151fc0836..bf269a2724 100644--- a/__tests__/utils/acp-command.test.ts+++ b/__tests__/utils/acp-command.test.ts@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ describe("parseCommand", () => {// the persisted ``acp_command`` β that would leak a host env var// into settings on every save. The tokenizer reads ``$NAME`` as// a literal substring of the token, so the user's typed text- // survives verbatim. Users who actually want env vars in the- // subprocess should set ``acp_env`` instead of inlining them.+ // survives verbatim. Provider credentials belong in the Secrets+ // panel (request.secrets), never inlined into the command.const result = parseCommand("npx $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY");expect(result).toEqual(["npx", "$ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"]);// Pin the no-leak contract: no ``sk-β¦`` token sneaks throughdiff --git a/src/api/agent-server-adapter.ts b/src/api/agent-server-adapter.tsindex d8ee2e36fc..8a4728fa3a 100644--- a/src/api/agent-server-adapter.ts+++ b/src/api/agent-server-adapter.ts@@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ type ConversationSettingsPayload = SettingsRecord & {const ACP_SETTINGS_KEYS = ["acp_command","acp_args",- "acp_env","acp_model","acp_session_mode","acp_prompt_timeout",@@ -622,6 +621,10 @@ function buildConfiguredOpenHandsAgentSettings(for (const key of ACP_SETTINGS_KEYS) {delete agentSettings[key];}+ // ``acp_env`` is no longer a forwarded ACP setting (provider creds ride the+ // Secrets panel), but a legacy value may linger on persisted settings β+ // scrub it so it never leaks onto the OpenHands payload.+ delete agentSettings.acp_env;return {...agentSettings,diff --git a/src/types/settings.ts b/src/types/settings.tsindex f80ce03e86..c11344a3e9 100644--- a/src/types/settings.ts+++ b/src/types/settings.ts@@ -118,7 +118,9 @@ export type SettingsScope = "personal";* - ``"acp"``: the conversation is driven by an external ACP subprocess* (Claude Code / Codex / Gemini CLI / Custom). The LLM / condenser / MCP* settings are inert; ``acp_command`` / ``acp_args`` / ``acp_model`` /- * ``acp_env`` / ``acp_server`` apply instead.+ * ``acp_server`` apply instead. Provider credentials are supplied through the+ * Secrets panel (``request.secrets`` / ``agent_context.secrets``), never+ * through a per-agent env channel.*/export type AgentKind = "openhands" | "acp";