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πŸ™Œ OpenHands: AI-Driven Development

fix(desktop): parse window-open URLs instead of prefix-matching localhost (#16961)

ι™ˆεΏ—θ°¦7ec4ed03afc1
diff --git a/electron/lib/window-url-policy.mjs b/electron/lib/window-url-policy.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..27e7d26f18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/electron/lib/window-url-policy.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * URL classification for window.open() and popup navigation in the Electron
+ * shell.
+ *
+ * The renderer renders untrusted links (chat / agent markdown) with
+ * `target="_blank"`, which routes through `setWindowOpenHandler` in
+ * main.mjs. Classifying those URLs by string prefix
+ * (`url.startsWith("http://localhost")`) lets attacker-controlled hosts
+ * through as "app URLs" β€” `http://localhost.evil.com` satisfies the prefix,
+ * and so does `http://[email protected]` (userinfo). Either one would open
+ * remote content in a chromeless native window that visually belongs to the
+ * app. Schemes outside a small allowlist must also never be handed to
+ * `shell.openExternal`, which forwards them to OS protocol handlers.
+ * Both classifications therefore go through URL parsing, not prefixes.
+ */
+
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "[::1]"]);
+
+// Schemes `shell.openExternal` may be given. Kept in sync with the `href`
+// protocols the renderer's markdown sanitizer accepts
+// (`MARKDOWN_SANITIZE_SCHEMA` in
+// src/components/features/markdown/markdown-renderer.tsx) β€” a link the
+// renderer is willing to render but this policy denies becomes a click that
+// silently does nothing. `mailto:` and `tel:` reach the mail/dialer handler;
+// `file:`, `smb:` and custom scheme handlers stay denied.
+const EXTERNAL_PROTOCOLS = new Set(["http:", "https:", "mailto:", "tel:"]);
+
+/**
+ * True for http(s) URLs whose host is the loopback app server β€” the only
+ * URLs that may open inside an Electron window.
+ */
+export function isLoopbackAppUrl(rawUrl) {
+ try {
+ const url = new URL(rawUrl);
+ return (
+ (url.protocol === "http:" || url.protocol === "https:") &&
+ LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(url.hostname)
+ );
+ } catch {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * True for URLs that may be handed to the OS via `shell.openExternal` β€” the
+ * allowlisted schemes above. Everything else (file:, smb:, custom scheme
+ * handlers, unparsable strings) must be denied, not delegated to the OS.
+ */
+export function isExternalBrowsableUrl(rawUrl) {
+ try {
+ return EXTERNAL_PROTOCOLS.has(new URL(rawUrl).protocol);
+ } catch {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/electron/lib/window-url-policy.test.mjs b/electron/lib/window-url-policy.test.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e25974784
--- /dev/null
+++ b/electron/lib/window-url-policy.test.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+import {
+ isExternalBrowsableUrl,
+ isLoopbackAppUrl,
+} from "./window-url-policy.mjs";
+
+describe("isLoopbackAppUrl", () => {
+ it.each([
+ "http://localhost:8000/",
+ "http://localhost:8000/some/app/path?query=1",
+ "http://127.0.0.1:8000/",
+ "http://[::1]:8000/",
+ "https://localhost:8000/",
+ ])("allows the loopback app server: %s", (url) => {
+ expect(isLoopbackAppUrl(url)).toBe(true);
+ });
+
+ it.each([
+ // Prefix look-alikes an attacker controls.
+ "http://localhost.evil.com/",
+ "http://127.0.0.1.evil.com/",
+ "http://[email protected]/",
+ "http://[email protected]/",
+ // Remote hosts and non-http schemes.
+ "https://openhands.dev/",
+ "http://192.168.1.10:8000/",
+ "file:///etc/passwd",
+ "javascript:alert(1)",
+ "about:blank",
+ "smb://nas/share",
+ "not a url",
+ "",
+ ])("rejects everything else: %s", (url) => {
+ expect(isLoopbackAppUrl(url)).toBe(false);
+ });
+});
+
+describe("isExternalBrowsableUrl", () => {
+ it.each([
+ "https://github.com/openhands",
+ "http://example.com/docs",
+ // Allowed `href` protocols in the renderer's markdown sanitizer; denying
+ // them here would make such links click into nothing.
+ "mailto:[email protected]",
+ "tel:+15551234",
+ ])("allows browsable schemes: %s", (url) => {
+ expect(isExternalBrowsableUrl(url)).toBe(true);
+ });
+
+ it.each([
+ "file:///etc/passwd",
+ "file://\\\\nas\\share",
+ "smb://nas/share",
+ "javascript:alert(1)",
+ "about:blank",
+ "not a url",
+ "",
+ ])("denies everything the OS must not handle: %s", (url) => {
+ expect(isExternalBrowsableUrl(url)).toBe(false);
+ });
+});
diff --git a/electron/main.mjs b/electron/main.mjs
index 6806479836..3445cae1f6 100644
--- a/electron/main.mjs
+++ b/electron/main.mjs
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { isExternalBrowsableUrl, isLoopbackAppUrl } from "./lib/window-url-policy.mjs";
+
const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
const __dirname = dirname(__filename);
@@ -391,15 +393,20 @@ function createMainWindow() {
overrideBrowserWindowOptions: { width: 800, height: 700 },
};
}
- // All other external URLs open directly in the system browser.
- if (
- !url.startsWith("http://localhost") &&
- !url.startsWith("http://127.0.0.1")
- ) {
+ // All other URLs open directly in the system browser. The loopback test
+ // goes through URL parsing: prefix matching would also accept
+ // attacker-controlled hosts like http://localhost.evil.com (or
+ // http://[email protected]) and render them in a chromeless native
+ // window. Schemes outside the openExternal allowlist are denied
+ // outright β€” shell.openExternal would forward them to OS protocol
+ // handlers.
+ if (isLoopbackAppUrl(url)) {
+ return { action: "allow" };
+ }
+ if (isExternalBrowsableUrl(url)) {
shell.openExternal(url);
- return { action: "deny" };
}
- return { action: "allow" };
+ return { action: "deny" };
});
// When the renderer opens a popup (the about:blank above), watch for its
@@ -408,13 +415,11 @@ function createMainWindow() {
// now-unneeded Electron popup.
mainWin.webContents.on("did-create-window", (popupWin) => {
popupWin.webContents.on("will-navigate", (_event, url) => {
- if (
- url !== "about:blank" &&
- !url.startsWith("http://localhost") &&
- !url.startsWith("http://127.0.0.1")
- ) {
+ if (url !== "about:blank" && !isLoopbackAppUrl(url)) {
_event.preventDefault();
- shell.openExternal(url);
+ if (isExternalBrowsableUrl(url)) {
+ shell.openExternal(url);
+ }
popupWin.close();
}
});