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fix(clip-cache): prevent path traversal in ingest, try_link, and eviction (#711)
Hugecf9f03c09f02
diff --git a/tests/tools/test_clip_cache.py b/tests/tools/test_clip_cache.pyindex feb155d9..cb1907e5 100644--- a/tests/tools/test_clip_cache.py+++ b/tests/tools/test_clip_cache.py@@ -435,3 +435,115 @@ def test_get_default_cache_returns_same_instance(monkeypatch, tmp_path):b = get_default_cache()assert a is breset_default_cache()+++# ----------------------------------------------------------------------+# Path traversal defenses+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------+++def test_ingest_rejects_path_traversal_clip_id(tmp_path):+ cache = ClipCache(cache_dir=tmp_path / "cache")+ src = _fake_clip(tmp_path / "source.mp4", 4000)++ # A sensitive file outside cache_dir that must never be touched+ outside_canary = tmp_path / "canary.mp4"+ outside_canary.write_text("protected content")++ # Attempting to ingest with a traversal clip_id aiming at the canary+ traversal_id = "../canary"+ ok = cache.ingest(traversal_id, src, _default_metadata(traversal_id))+ assert ok is False+ assert outside_canary.read_text() == "protected content"++ # Various malformed or traversal identifiers+ bad_clip_ids = [+ "../escape",+ "../../escape",+ "/absolute/escape",+ "dir/subclip",+ "dir\\subclip",+ "..\\windows_escape",+ "clip:stream",+ "clip\x00null",+ "",+ ".",+ "..",+ ]+ for bad_id in bad_clip_ids:+ assert cache.ingest(bad_id, src, _default_metadata()) is False++ # Confirm cache manifest and cache dir have no escaped files+ entries = cache._read_manifest()+ assert len(entries) == 0+++def test_try_link_rejects_path_traversal_clip_id(tmp_path):+ cache = ClipCache(cache_dir=tmp_path / "cache")+ dest = tmp_path / "project" / "leaked.mp4"++ # An outside file exists+ _fake_clip(tmp_path / "outside.mp4", 3000)++ # Attempting to link using path traversal in clip_id+ assert cache.try_link("../outside", dest) is False+ assert cache.try_link("../../outside", dest) is False+ assert cache.try_link("/outside", dest) is False+ assert not dest.exists()+ assert cache.misses >= 3+++def test_manifest_prunes_traversal_entries(tmp_path):+ cache_dir = tmp_path / "cache"+ cache = ClipCache(cache_dir=cache_dir)++ outside_victim = _fake_clip(tmp_path / "victim.mp4", 2000)++ # Inject corrupt or malicious entries directly into the manifest+ evil_traversal = CacheEntry(+ clip_id="evil_traversal",+ file_name="../victim.mp4",+ size_bytes=2000,+ added_at=100.0,+ last_access_at=100.0,+ )+ evil_id = CacheEntry(+ clip_id="../bad_id",+ file_name="bad.mp4",+ size_bytes=2000,+ added_at=100.0,+ last_access_at=100.0,+ )+ valid_entry = CacheEntry(+ clip_id="valid_clip",+ file_name="valid_clip.mp4",+ size_bytes=2000,+ added_at=200.0,+ last_access_at=200.0,+ )+ _fake_clip(cache_dir / "valid_clip.mp4", 2000)++ manifest_path = cache_dir / ClipCache.MANIFEST_NAME+ with open(manifest_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:+ f.write(json.dumps(evil_traversal.to_dict()) + "\n")+ f.write(json.dumps(evil_id.to_dict()) + "\n")+ f.write(json.dumps(valid_entry.to_dict()) + "\n")++ # _read_manifest should silently filter out traversal entries+ entries = cache._read_manifest()+ assert "evil_traversal" not in entries+ assert "../bad_id" not in entries+ assert "valid_clip" in entries+ assert len(entries) == 1++ # try_link must refuse to link any traversal file even if present in entries+ dest = tmp_path / "project" / "dest.mp4"+ assert cache.try_link("evil_traversal", dest) is False+ assert not dest.exists()++ # Eviction must never unlink outside files+ cache.max_total_bytes = 1000 # force eviction on next ingest+ src = _fake_clip(tmp_path / "new.mp4", 2000)+ cache.ingest("new_clip", src, _default_metadata("new_clip"))+ assert outside_victim.exists(), "outside victim file must not be unlinked during eviction"+diff --git a/tools/video/clip_cache.py b/tools/video/clip_cache.pyindex c0ff7def..29cbe250 100644--- a/tools/video/clip_cache.py+++ b/tools/video/clip_cache.py@@ -169,6 +169,44 @@ class CacheEntry:)+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------+# Path confinement and safety helpers+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------+++def _is_safe_clip_id(clip_id: str) -> bool:+ """Validate that clip_id is safe and cannot escape the cache directory."""+ if not clip_id or not isinstance(clip_id, str):+ return False+ if "\x00" in clip_id:+ return False+ if any(sep in clip_id for sep in ("/", "\\", ":")) or ".." in clip_id:+ return False+ if clip_id.strip() in {".", ".."}:+ return False+ return True+++def _safe_blob_path(cache_dir: Path, name: str) -> Optional[Path]:+ """Resolve a blob path and ensure it stays strictly within cache_dir."""+ if not name or not isinstance(name, str):+ return None+ if "\x00" in name:+ return None+ if any(sep in name for sep in ("/", "\\", ":")) or ".." in name:+ return None+ if name.strip() in {".", ".."}:+ return None+ try:+ resolved_dir = cache_dir.resolve()+ candidate = (cache_dir / name).resolve()+ if candidate.is_relative_to(resolved_dir) and candidate != resolved_dir:+ return candidate+ except (ValueError, RuntimeError, OSError):+ return None+ return None++# ----------------------------------------------------------------------# The cache itself# ----------------------------------------------------------------------@@ -277,6 +315,10 @@ class ClipCache:try:d = json.loads(line)entry = CacheEntry.from_dict(d)+ if not _is_safe_clip_id(entry.clip_id):+ continue+ if _safe_blob_path(self.cache_dir, entry.file_name) is None:+ continueentries[entry.clip_id] = entryexcept (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):continue@@ -326,6 +368,10 @@ class ClipCache:gone), the stale entry is pruned and the call reports a miss,so the caller falls back to downloading fresh."""+ if not _is_safe_clip_id(clip_id):+ self.misses += 1+ return False+dest = Path(dest)with self._locked():entries = self._read_manifest()@@ -334,9 +380,9 @@ class ClipCache:self.misses += 1return False- blob_path = self.cache_dir / entry.file_name- if not blob_path.exists():- # Drift — prune and miss.+ blob_path = _safe_blob_path(self.cache_dir, entry.file_name)+ if blob_path is None or not blob_path.exists():+ # Drift or unsafe — prune and miss.del entries[clip_id]self._write_manifest(entries)self.misses += 1@@ -382,6 +428,9 @@ class ClipCache:and had its access time bumped), ``False`` if ingest failed(missing source, empty file, lock timeout, or link/copy fail)."""+ if not _is_safe_clip_id(clip_id):+ return False+source_path = Path(source_path)if not source_path.exists():return False@@ -398,12 +447,14 @@ class ClipCache:entries = self._read_manifest()# Already cached → just bump last_access and return.- if clip_id in entries and (- self.cache_dir / entries[clip_id].file_name- ).exists():- entries[clip_id].last_access_at = time.time()- self._write_manifest(entries)- return True+ if clip_id in entries:+ existing_blob = _safe_blob_path(+ self.cache_dir, entries[clip_id].file_name+ )+ if existing_blob and existing_blob.exists():+ entries[clip_id].last_access_at = time.time()+ self._write_manifest(entries)+ return True# Make room.self._evict_to_fit_locked(entries, size_bytes)@@ -412,7 +463,9 @@ class ClipCache:# as long as clip_ids are unique (they are — {source}_{source_id}).ext = source_path.suffix or ""blob_name = f"{clip_id}{ext}"- blob_path = self.cache_dir / blob_name+ blob_path = _safe_blob_path(self.cache_dir, blob_name)+ if blob_path is None:+ return False# Clean any stale blob at the same path (drift or interrupted# ingest from a previous run).@@ -497,7 +550,10 @@ class ClipCache:for victim in sorted_victims:if current_bytes + needed_bytes <= self.max_total_bytes:break- blob_path = self.cache_dir / victim.file_name+ blob_path = _safe_blob_path(self.cache_dir, victim.file_name)+ if blob_path is None:+ del entries[victim.clip_id]+ continueunlinked = Falsetry:if blob_path.exists():