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Secure, Fast, and Extensible Sandbox runtime for AI agents.

fix(env): assert the MITM manifest lineage only on the S3 publication path

高然2146c27d2252
diff --git a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
index 37aa5a9c5..abcf889f7 100755
--- a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
+++ b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
@@ -2774,15 +2774,25 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {
|| die "no pinned MITM CA fingerprint at $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT_FILE (run up first; mitm_ca_up stores it there)"
load_mitm_echo_endpoint
local created sandbox_uid ack echo_secret
- log "verify (mitm-ca): three-way fingerprint pinning (manifest platform.egressMitmCA == egress /healthz == pinned Secret)"
- local healthz_fp lineage_fp
+ log "verify (mitm-ca): fingerprint pinning (pinned Secret == egress /healthz, plus the manifest lineage on the S3 publication path)"
+ local healthz_fp lineage_fp manifest_ref
healthz_fp="$(egress_mitm_ca_fingerprint)"
[[ "$healthz_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
|| fail "mitm-ca verify: egress /healthz fingerprint is '${healthz_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
- lineage_fp="$(template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint "$template_id")"
- [[ "$lineage_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
- || fail "mitm-ca verify: template manifest platform.egressMitmCA fingerprint is '${lineage_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
- pass "template↔pool CA pinning: manifest platform.egressMitmCA == egress /healthz == pinned (${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…)"
+ # The manifest lineage leg is only readable on the S3 publication path:
+ # an oci:// manifestRef lives in the in-cluster registry, out of rc's
+ # reach. There the pool-side pinning plus the behavioral chain below
+ # (the guest accepts the MITM certificate only because it chains to the
+ # template-baked CA) carry the assertion.
+ manifest_ref="$(osb_api template get "$template_id" -o json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.status.manifest_ref // empty')"
+ if [[ "$manifest_ref" == s3://* ]]; then
+ lineage_fp="$(template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint "$template_id")"
+ [[ "$lineage_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
+ || fail "mitm-ca verify: template manifest platform.egressMitmCA fingerprint is '${lineage_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
+ pass "template↔pool CA pinning: manifest platform.egressMitmCA == egress /healthz == pinned (${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…)"
+ else
+ pass "template↔pool CA pinning: egress /healthz == pinned (${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…); ${manifest_ref:-no manifest_ref} — guest-side chain proven behaviorally below"
+ fi
# Sandbox policy: the domain allow covers the vault binding (binding
# validation requires the host be policy-allowed), the IP allow covers
diff --git a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/verify/vault.sh b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/verify/vault.sh
index 83d3cadbb..0a2d574bd 100755
--- a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/verify/vault.sh
+++ b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/verify/vault.sh
@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@
# Stage 2: MITM CA chain verify (OSEP-0022 trust anchor) — proves the chain
# `up` provisions: pinned CA Secret -> template bake -> egress mitmdump:
#
-# 1. Three-way fingerprint pinning: the published artifact manifest's
-# platform.egressMitmCA.certSha256 == the egress /healthz
-# mitmCaFingerprint == the pinned Secret fingerprint (content, not
-# name).
+# 1. Three-way fingerprint pinning on the S3 publication path: the
+# published artifact manifest's platform.egressMitmCA.certSha256 ==
+# the egress /healthz mitmCaFingerprint == the pinned Secret
+# fingerprint (content, not name). An oci:// manifestRef lives in the
+# in-cluster registry, out of rc's reach — there the assertion is the
+# /healthz leg plus the behavioral chain below (a guest accepts the
+# MITM certificate only because it chains to the template-baked CA).
# 2. Negative control before the vault exists: a guest HTTPS request to
# the CA-signed TLS echo endpoint passes through the shared mitmdump
# opaquely, TLS verified against the template-baked CA (no -k), and
@@ -310,15 +313,25 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {
load_mitm_ca_fingerprint
load_mitm_echo_endpoint
local created sandbox_uid ack echo_secret
- log "verify (mitm-ca): three-way fingerprint pinning (manifest platform.egressMitmCA == egress /healthz == pinned Secret)"
- local healthz_fp lineage_fp
+ log "verify (mitm-ca): fingerprint pinning (pinned Secret == egress /healthz, plus the manifest lineage on the S3 publication path)"
+ local healthz_fp lineage_fp manifest_ref
healthz_fp="$(egress_mitm_ca_fingerprint)"
[[ "$healthz_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
|| fail "mitm-ca verify: egress /healthz fingerprint is '${healthz_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
- lineage_fp="$(template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint "$template_id")"
- [[ "$lineage_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
- || fail "mitm-ca verify: template manifest platform.egressMitmCA fingerprint is '${lineage_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
- pass "template↔pool CA pinning: manifest platform.egressMitmCA == egress /healthz == pinned (${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…)"
+ # The manifest lineage leg is only readable on the S3 publication path:
+ # an oci:// manifestRef lives in the in-cluster registry, out of rc's
+ # reach. There the pool-side pinning plus the behavioral chain below
+ # (the guest accepts the MITM certificate only because it chains to the
+ # template-baked CA) carry the assertion.
+ manifest_ref="$(osb_api template get "$template_id" -o json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.status.manifest_ref // empty')"
+ if [[ "$manifest_ref" == s3://* ]]; then
+ lineage_fp="$(template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint "$template_id")"
+ [[ "$lineage_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
+ || fail "mitm-ca verify: template manifest platform.egressMitmCA fingerprint is '${lineage_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
+ pass "template↔pool CA pinning: manifest platform.egressMitmCA == egress /healthz == pinned (${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…)"
+ else
+ pass "template↔pool CA pinning: egress /healthz == pinned (${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…); ${manifest_ref:-no manifest_ref} — guest-side chain proven behaviorally below"
+ fi
# Sandbox policy: the domain allow covers the vault binding (binding
# validation requires the host be policy-allowed), the IP allow covers