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Secure, Fast, and Extensible Sandbox runtime for AI agents.

test(env): exercise the real vault lifecycle in the integration environment

高然2380f0c5e3be
diff --git a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
index 90cf0df2b..41d6662f0 100755
--- a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
+++ b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
@@ -1676,6 +1676,126 @@ pause_resume_verify() {
wait_for "pause/resume sandbox deleted" 120 verify_sandbox_gone
}
+# --- stage: vault lifecycle (OSEP-0022: egress-held vault over the relay) --------
+
+# Status-code-returning variant of server_api for negative-path assertions
+# (curl -f hides the status).
+server_api_status() { # method path [json-body]
+ local method="$1" path="$2" body="${3:-}" out
+ if [[ -n "$body" ]]; then
+ out="$(curl -sS -m 60 -X "$method" -H "OPEN-SANDBOX-API-KEY: $SERVER_API_KEY" \
+ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$body" -w '\n%{http_code}' "$SERVER_URL$path" 2>/dev/null)"
+ else
+ out="$(curl -sS -m 60 -X "$method" -H "OPEN-SANDBOX-API-KEY: $SERVER_API_KEY" \
+ -w '\n%{http_code}' "$SERVER_URL$path" 2>/dev/null)"
+ fi
+ printf '%s' "${out##*$'\n'}"
+}
+
+# The vault stage's sandbox must ride the subject-scoped egress log markers
+# (export/import/registration), so every log assertion goes through this.
+vault_log_contains() { # <fixed-substring>
+ kubectl -n "$RESOURCE_NS" logs -l app=sandbox-fastlet -c egress --tail=800 2>/dev/null \
+ | grep -qF "$1"
+}
+
+vault_revision_is() { # <expected-revision>
+ local out
+ out="$(server_api GET "/sandboxes/$VERIFY_ID/credential-vault" 2>/dev/null)" || return 1
+ [[ "$(printf '%s' "$out" | jq -r '.revision // empty')" == "$1" ]]
+}
+
+vault_lifecycle_verify() {
+ local created vault_body ack rev sandbox_uid
+ log "verify (vault): creating a sandbox via the opensandbox CLI (templateId=$TEMPLATE_ID)"
+ # The policy rides the create (the vault validates its bindings against
+ # it, and a create WITHOUT a policy produces no egress binding at all —
+ # the subject would never register).
+ jq -n '{defaultAction: "deny", egress: [{action: "allow", target: "ext.test"}]}' \
+ > "$GEN_DIR/vault-policy.json"
+ created="$(osb_api sandbox create --template "$TEMPLATE_ID" --timeout 1h \
+ --metadata origin=fast-sandbox-env-vault \
+ --network-policy-file "$GEN_DIR/vault-policy.json" \
+ --skip-health-check -o json 2>/dev/null)" \
+ || fail "vault verify: sandbox create failed"
+ VERIFY_ID="$(printf '%s' "$created" | jq -r '.id')"
+ wait_for "vault sandbox Running" 150 sandbox_running
+ sandbox_uid="$(kubectl -n "$RESOURCE_NS" get sandbox "$VERIFY_ID" -o jsonpath='{.metadata.uid}' 2>/dev/null)"
+ [[ -n "$sandbox_uid" ]] || fail "vault verify: sandbox CR carried no uid"
+ # The subject must be registered (deny-first -> active) before the vault
+ # POST; otherwise the relay 404s (create -> ready -> set vault).
+ wait_for "vault subject registered on egress" 120 \
+ vault_log_contains "subject s-$sandbox_uid: SET_BINDING applied (state=active)"
+
+ # 1) create-only: 201 ack carries the egress-validated revision; a
+ # duplicate POST is 409 (atomic across server replicas).
+ vault_body="$(jq -n '{credentials: [{name: "tok", source: {type: "inline", value: "sekrit-vault-e2e"}}], bindings: [{name: "ext", match: {hosts: ["ext.test"]}, auth: {type: "apiKey", name: "X-Api-Key", credential: "tok"}}]}')"
+ ack="$(server_api POST "/sandboxes/$VERIFY_ID/credential-vault" "$vault_body")" \
+ || fail "vault verify: POST credential-vault failed"
+ rev="$(printf '%s' "$ack" | jq -r '.revision // empty')"
+ [[ "$rev" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || fail "vault verify: create ack carried no revision: $(printf '%s' "$ack" | head -c 200)"
+ pass "vault created over the relay (ack revision $rev)"
+ if server_api POST "/sandboxes/$VERIFY_ID/credential-vault" "$vault_body" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+ fail "vault verify: duplicate POST succeeded (create-only must 409)"
+ fi
+ [[ "$(server_api_status POST "/sandboxes/$VERIFY_ID/credential-vault" "$vault_body")" == "409" ]] \
+ || fail "vault verify: duplicate POST was not 409"
+ pass "duplicate POST rejected (create-only 409)"
+
+ # 2) pause/resume carries the REAL vault: the egress copies the vault
+ # file into the checkpoint bundle (export) and re-imports it on
+ # restore; the relay GET still reports the same revision.
+ osb_api sandbox pause "$VERIFY_ID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "vault verify: pause failed"
+ wait_for "vault sandbox Paused (checkpoint durable)" 240 sandbox_paused
+ wait_for "vault exported into the checkpoint bundle" 120 \
+ vault_log_contains "subject s-$sandbox_uid: vault exported to snapshot bundle"
+ pass "pause exported the vault bundle (subject sealed)"
+ osb_api sandbox resume "$VERIFY_ID" --skip-health-check >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "vault verify: resume failed"
+ wait_for "vault sandbox Running (restored)" 240 sandbox_running
+ wait_for "vault re-imported from the bundle" 120 \
+ vault_log_contains "subject s-$sandbox_uid: vault imported from snapshot bundle"
+ wait_for "vault revision preserved across pause/resume" 120 vault_revision_is "$rev"
+ pass "vault survived pause/resume (revision $rev preserved)"
+
+ # 3) egress-restart recovery: crash the worker (the supervisor restarts
+ # it with a fresh instanceId); the fastlet replays SET_BINDING and the
+ # vault file reloads by incarnation. The GET succeeding with the same
+ # revision proves the whole chain (relay up, replay done, file loaded).
+ local pod restarted=0
+ for pod in $(pool_pods); do
+ if kubectl -n "$RESOURCE_NS" exec "$pod" -c egress -- sh -c 'command -v pkill >/dev/null' 2>/dev/null; then
+ kubectl -n "$RESOURCE_NS" exec "$pod" -c egress -- pkill -f '/opt/opensandbox-egress/egress' >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+ restarted=1
+ else
+ log "verify (vault): egress restart skipped on ${pod##*/} (pkill unavailable)"
+ fi
+ done
+ if [[ "$restarted" == 1 ]]; then
+ wait_for "pool egress containers back up" 180 egress_containers_ready
+ wait_for "vault reloaded after egress restart" 240 vault_revision_is "$rev"
+ pass "vault reloaded after egress restart (revision $rev preserved)"
+ fi
+
+ # 4) delete + re-create: DELETE is terminal, GET 404s, a fresh POST is a
+ # new vault at revision 1.
+ server_api DELETE "/sandboxes/$VERIFY_ID/credential-vault" >/dev/null \
+ || fail "vault verify: DELETE failed"
+ [[ "$(server_api_status GET "/sandboxes/$VERIFY_ID/credential-vault")" == "404" ]] \
+ || fail "vault verify: GET after DELETE was not 404"
+ pass "vault deleted (GET 404)"
+ ack="$(server_api POST "/sandboxes/$VERIFY_ID/credential-vault" "$vault_body")" \
+ || fail "vault verify: re-create after DELETE failed"
+ rev="$(printf '%s' "$ack" | jq -r '.revision // empty')"
+ [[ "$rev" == "1" ]] || fail "vault verify: fresh vault revision is $rev, expected 1"
+ pass "vault re-created (fresh revision $rev)"
+
+ osb_api sandbox kill "$VERIFY_ID" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+ || log "verify cleanup: kill failed; remove $VERIFY_ID manually"
+ wait_for "vault sandbox deleted" 120 verify_sandbox_gone
+}
+
+
+
# --- stage: idle-pause / wake-on-access verify (OSEP-0024 profile) --------------
# Poll the gateway until /ping returns 200 (marked 503s tolerated; the
@@ -2235,6 +2355,7 @@ case "$ACTION" in
run_stage "SandboxPool $POOL_NAME (egress + P2P)" pool_up
run_stage "end-to-end verify (CLI create -> gateway -> execd /ping)" opensandbox_verify
run_stage "pause/resume verify (CLI -> FastPath checkpoint)" pause_resume_verify
+ run_stage "vault lifecycle verify (CLI -> relay -> egress-held vault)" vault_lifecycle_verify
run_stage "idle-pause / wake-on-access verify (OSEP-0024 profile)" idle_pause_verify
run_stage "snapshot verify (CLI -> SandboxSnapshot -> restore)" snapshot_verify
trap - ERR