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Secure, Fast, and Extensible Sandbox runtime for AI agents.

fix(env): read the MITM CA lineage from platform.egressMitmCA

高然649f9e6c64af
diff --git a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/README.md b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/README.md
index 5b1b1e29a..13857a8ab 100644
--- a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/README.md
+++ b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/README.md
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ The `verify-native` / `verify-overlaybd` actions drive the server through the op
The environment exercises the full MITM trust-anchor chain against the real components — no simulation:
1. **CA material** — a self-signed CA (fresh per run) is provisioned as the versioned Secret `opensandbox-mitm-ca-v1` in the dataplane namespace, per the ops-runbook shape collapsed into one namespace: keypair entries (`tls.crt` + `tls.key`) for the egress seed mount, certificate-only entry (`ca.crt`) for the template bake. The stored certificate is fingerprint-checked against the generated one (content, not name).
-2. **Template bake** — the rendered server `config.toml` sets `kubernetes.template_mitm_ca_secret`, so the server fills `spec.egressMitmCertificate` on the template create and the builder installs the certificate into the guest trust store, stamping `lineage.egressMitmCA.certSha256` into the published artifact manifest. The template stage asserts the CR field and the lineage fingerprint.
+2. **Template bake** — the rendered server `config.toml` sets `kubernetes.template_mitm_ca_secret`, so the server fills `spec.egressMitmCertificate` on the template create and the builder installs the certificate into the guest trust store, stamping `platform.egressMitmCA.certSha256` into the published artifact manifest. The template stage asserts the CR field and the lineage fingerprint.
3. **Pool pinning** — the pool's egress container mounts the Secret read-only as its CA seed; the MITM addon starts with the pinned CA (fail-closed, never generates) and exposes its fingerprint on `/healthz`. The pool stage asserts the fingerprint equals the pinned one.
4. **Injection e2e** — a dedicated verify stage creates a sandbox with a policy allowing the CA-signed TLS echo endpoint (a container on the kind network reflecting request headers), first proves the credential-free passthrough (no `X-Api-Key`), then binds a vault credential to the SNI (`X-Api-Key` via the relay) and asserts the guest's own `curl --resolve … https://echo.test` response reflects the injected header — TLS verified against the template-baked CA on every leg, no `-k` anywhere. A pause/resume round trip then repeats the request: trust and vault travel with the snapshot.
-5. **Pinning assertion** — template manifest lineage fingerprint == egress `/healthz` fingerprint == the pinned Secret's fingerprint, asserted three-way.
+5. **Pinning assertion** — template manifest `platform.egressMitmCA` fingerprint == egress `/healthz` fingerprint == the pinned Secret's fingerprint, asserted three-way.
Requires a bare-metal Linux host with KVM (`/dev/kvm`), Docker, Go ≥ 1.25, cgroup v2, and `sudo` for the XFS StateRoot loop mount and sysctl bump. The CLI install requires `uv` (it manages its own ≥ 3.10 interpreter), or set `OSB_BIN` to a preinstalled `osb` binary. Full operational notes (topology, latency characteristics, production caveats): `fast-sandbox/docs/guides/firecracker-integration-env.md`.
diff --git a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
index c71592497..8deb83a0c 100755
--- a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
+++ b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh
@@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ template_up() {
|| fail "template CR egressMitmCertificate.key is '$cert_key', want ca.crt (certificate entry only)"
lineage_fp="$(template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint)"
[[ "$lineage_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
- || fail "template manifest lineage egressMitmCA.certSha256 is '${lineage_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
+ || fail "template manifest platform.egressMitmCA.certSha256 is '${lineage_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
log "template baked CA: secret/$cert_ref (ca.crt), lineage fingerprint ${lineage_fp:0:16}…"
pass "SandboxTemplate Succeeded + artifacts published (via opensandbox CLI)"
return 0
@@ -1815,16 +1815,16 @@ bake_registry_ca_into_images() {
verify_image_ca_bake "$IMG_RUNTIME"
}
-# template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint [template-id] -> the egressMitmCA.certSha256
-# the builder stamped into the published artifact-set manifest (empty when the
-# manifest or the lineage entry is missing).
+# template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint [template-id] -> the certSha256 the
+# builder stamped under platform.egressMitmCA in the published artifact-set
+# manifest (empty when the manifest or the entry is missing).
template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint() {
local tid manifest_ref manifest_json
tid="${1:-$TEMPLATE_ID}"
manifest_ref="$(osb_api template get "$tid" -o json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.status.manifest_ref // empty')"
[[ -n "$manifest_ref" ]] || return 0
manifest_json="$(rc cat "chain/$RUSTFS_BUCKET/$(dirname "${manifest_ref#s3://$RUSTFS_BUCKET/}")/manifest.json" 2>/dev/null)" || return 0
- printf '%s' "$manifest_json" | jq -r '.lineage.egressMitmCA.certificates[0].certSha256 // empty' 2>/dev/null
+ printf '%s' "$manifest_json" | jq -r '.platform.egressMitmCA.certificates[0].certSha256 // empty' 2>/dev/null
}
# --- stage: SandboxPool (egress attached, P2P spread) --------------------------------------------
@@ -2748,15 +2748,15 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {
# Optional template override (the overlaybd second pass); default native.
local template_id="${1:-$TEMPLATE_ID}"
local created sandbox_uid ack echo_secret
- log "verify (mitm-ca): three-way fingerprint pinning (template lineage == egress /healthz == pinned Secret)"
+ log "verify (mitm-ca): three-way fingerprint pinning (manifest platform.egressMitmCA == egress /healthz == pinned Secret)"
local healthz_fp lineage_fp
healthz_fp="$(egress_mitm_ca_fingerprint)"
[[ "$healthz_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
|| fail "mitm-ca verify: egress /healthz fingerprint is '${healthz_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
lineage_fp="$(template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint "$template_id")"
[[ "$lineage_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \
- || fail "mitm-ca verify: template manifest lineage fingerprint is '${lineage_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
- pass "template↔pool CA pinning: manifest lineage == egress /healthz == pinned (${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…)"
+ || fail "mitm-ca verify: template manifest platform.egressMitmCA fingerprint is '${lineage_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"
+ pass "template↔pool CA pinning: manifest platform.egressMitmCA == egress /healthz == pinned (${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…)"
# Sandbox policy: the domain allow covers the vault binding (binding
# validation requires the host be policy-allowed), the IP allow covers