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Secure, Fast, and Extensible Sandbox runtime for AI agents.

fix(egress): read subjFence under s.mu in the data-plane-ready hook

高然7c9c380be3c0
diff --git a/components/egress/fastsandbox_actions.go b/components/egress/fastsandbox_actions.go
index bc062e15c..fe6098c79 100644
--- a/components/egress/fastsandbox_actions.go
+++ b/components/egress/fastsandbox_actions.go
@@ -307,16 +307,21 @@ func (s *fastSandboxPolicyServer) applyLifecycleHook(env *actionhandler.Envelope
// ever consume.
s.policyCommitMu.Lock()
defer s.policyCommitMu.Unlock()
- // In-lock fence re-validation: the pre-lock check cannot see a
- // rebind that completes while this Hook waits on policyCommitMu —
+ // Fence re-validation AND the pending peek under one s.mu hold
+ // (policyCommitMu → s.mu, the established order): fenceMatchesLocked
+ // reads subjFence, which terminal cleanup deletes under s.mu without
+ // policyCommitMu (dropSubjectState is called under the registry write
+ // lock from takeover) — an unsynchronized read here would race that
+ // delete. The pre-lock fence check above cannot see a rebind or
+ // removal that completes while this Hook waits on policyCommitMu —
// a stale Hook must never activate the successor.
- if !s.fenceMatchesLocked(subj, fence) {
+ s.mu.Lock()
+ stale := !s.fenceMatchesLocked(subj, fence)
+ pol := s.pendingPolicies[subj]
+ s.mu.Unlock()
+ if stale {
return http.StatusConflict, fmt.Errorf("stale %s (fence mismatch) for subject %s", env.Hook.Name, subj)
}
- // Peek, do not consume: a transient nft failure must leave the
- // pending policy in place so the Fastlet's retry of the same Hook
- // succeeds instead of 409-ing forever with the subject deny-first.
- pol := s.pendingPolicy(subj)
if pol == nil {
// No pending policy: SET_BINDING has not landed (protocol
// ordering violation) or the binding was removed. Fail closed —
diff --git a/components/egress/fastsandbox_server_test.go b/components/egress/fastsandbox_server_test.go
index cb1370bd9..dd9637fa9 100644
--- a/components/egress/fastsandbox_server_test.go
+++ b/components/egress/fastsandbox_server_test.go
@@ -511,6 +511,38 @@ func TestActionsHookForUnregisteredSubjectConflict(t *testing.T) {
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// TestHookRemoveConcurrentNoRace (review: subjFence map race): a
+// data-plane-ready hook (holding policyCommitMu, reading subjFence under
+// s.mu) racing terminal cleanup (which deletes subjFence under s.mu without
+// policyCommitMu) must be data-race-free and converge to a consistent
+// outcome. Run under -race in CI.
+func TestHookRemoveConcurrentNoRace(t *testing.T) {
+ srv, reg, _ := fastSandboxTestServer(t)
+ s := subject.FromSandboxUID(policyTestUID)
+
+ rec := doAction(t, srv, bindBody(t, policyTestUID, vaultTestIP, testFenceR, testFenceA, 1, strPtr(policyAllow())))
+ require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+ rec = doAction(t, srv, hookBody(t, policyTestUID, testFenceR, testFenceA, constants.HookRuntimeReady))
+ require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+
+ done := make(chan struct{})
+ go func() {
+ defer close(done)
+ r := doAction(t, srv, removeBody(t, policyTestUID, testFenceR, testFenceA))
+ assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, r.Code)
+ }()
+ rec = doAction(t, srv, hookBody(t, policyTestUID, testFenceR, testFenceA, constants.HookDataPlaneReady))
+ hookCode := rec.Code
+ <-done
+
+ // The removal always completes (we waited), so the converged terminal
+ // state is absent regardless of the hook's outcome (200 activation
+ // first → removal reverts; removal first → the hook is a 404/409).
+ assert.Contains(t, []int{http.StatusOK, http.StatusNotFound, http.StatusConflict}, hookCode)
+ _, present := reg.Get(s)
+ assert.False(t, present, "terminal cleanup wins: the subject is gone")
+}
+
// Stale-subject takeover on slot reuse (OSEP-0022)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------