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Secure, Fast, and Extensible Sandbox runtime for AI agents.

fix(egress): address T2a review — wire shape, field-value validation, taxonomy

高然d35228dfc86f
diff --git a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client.go b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client.go
index 3c2844fee..dee4a7b6b 100644
--- a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client.go
+++ b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client.go
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
+ "golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
+
"github.com/alibaba/opensandbox/egress/pkg/constants"
)
@@ -343,6 +345,12 @@ func normalizeResolverOriginString(origin string) (string, error) {
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
+ // D5 key format is exactly scheme://host:port — an operator writing a
+ // path/query-qualified origin would silently broaden the token's scope
+ // after normalization, so reject rather than accept.
+ if parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/" || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.User != nil {
+ return "", errors.New("origin must be scheme://host:port")
+ }
return normalizeResolverOrigin(parsed)
}
@@ -461,6 +469,10 @@ func (c *resolverClient) Resolve(ctx context.Context, input ResolveInput) (*Reso
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, maxResolverResponseBytes+1))
if err != nil {
+ // A trickling body past the deadline is a timeout, not unavailability.
+ if callCtx.Err() != nil {
+ return nil, &ResolverError{Kind: ResolverTimeout, err: callCtx.Err()}
+ }
return nil, &ResolverError{Kind: ResolverUnavailable, err: err}
}
if len(data) > maxResolverResponseBytes {
@@ -494,6 +506,13 @@ func marshalResolveInput(input ResolveInput) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverInvalidRequest, "request_headers_must_be_non_empty_strings")
}
}
+ requestHeaders := input.Request.Headers
+ if requestHeaders == nil {
+ // D15 wire shape: the frozen contract requires request.headers to be
+ // a JSON object; a nil Go map would serialize as null and be
+ // rejected by a contract-compliant resolver.
+ requestHeaders = map[string]string{}
+ }
document := resolveRequestDocument{
Subject: input.Subject,
Credential: input.Credential,
@@ -507,7 +526,7 @@ func marshalResolveInput(input ResolveInput) ([]byte, error) {
Method: input.Request.Method,
Host: input.Request.Host,
Path: input.Request.Path,
- Headers: input.Request.Headers,
+ Headers: requestHeaders,
},
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(document)
@@ -592,7 +611,15 @@ func decodeHeaderMap(raw json.RawMessage) (map[string]string, error) {
return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, "too_many_headers")
}
headers := make(map[string]string, len(fields))
+ seenNames := make(map[string]struct{}, len(fields))
for name, valueRaw := range fields {
+ // HTTP header names are case-insensitive: byte-different JSON keys
+ // naming one header are a contract violation, not two headers.
+ lowerName := strings.ToLower(name)
+ if _, duplicate := seenNames[lowerName]; duplicate {
+ return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverInvalidResponse, "duplicate_header_name")
+ }
+ seenNames[lowerName] = struct{}{}
if len(name) > maxResolverValueBytes {
return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, "header_name_too_long")
}
@@ -603,6 +630,12 @@ func decodeHeaderMap(raw json.RawMessage) (map[string]string, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+ // D14 boundary: the envelope is untrusted input and these values are
+ // injected into outbound HTTP frames; reject anything that is not a
+ // legal HTTP field-value (control bytes incl. CR/LF/NUL/DEL).
+ if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(value) {
+ return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, "denied_header_value")
+ }
headers[name] = value
}
return headers, nil
@@ -646,7 +679,9 @@ func decodeNonEmptyString(raw json.RawMessage, tooLongReason string) (string, er
return "", resolverErrorf(ResolverInvalidResponse, "value_not_string")
}
if value == "" {
- return "", resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, "empty_value")
+ // A schema violation (the contract requires non-empty strings), not
+ // a limit exceedance.
+ return "", resolverErrorf(ResolverInvalidResponse, "empty_value")
}
if len(value) > maxResolverValueBytes {
return "", resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, tooLongReason)
diff --git a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client_test.go b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client_test.go
index 35c27d13c..4bb1b579e 100644
--- a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client_test.go
+++ b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client_test.go
@@ -135,6 +135,12 @@ func TestParseResolverAuthEnv(t *testing.T) {
"=alpha",
"notaentry",
"https://resolver.internal:8443=alpha,https://resolver.internal:8443=beta",
+ // Path/query-qualified origins would silently broaden the token
+ // scope after normalization — rejected, not accepted.
+ "https://resolver.internal/base=alpha",
+ "https://resolver.internal?zone=1=alpha",
+ "https://resolver.internal:8443/#frag=alpha",
+ "https://[email protected]:8443=alpha",
} {
_, err = ParseResolverAuthEnv(bad)
require.Error(t, err, "auth table %q must be rejected", bad)
@@ -205,7 +211,8 @@ func TestDecodeResolveResponseStrictness(t *testing.T) {
{"header_value_too_long", `{"headers":{"x-a":"` + strings.Repeat("v", 9000) + `"}}`},
{"denied_header_name", `{"headers":{"host":"evil"}}`},
{"denied_header_name", `{"headers":{"bad name":"v"}}`},
- {"empty_value", `{"headers":{"x-a":""}}`},
+ {"denied_header_value", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v\nX-Injected: 1"}}`},
+ {"denied_header_value", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v\u0000"}}`},
{"too_many_redactions", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":[` + manyStrings(65) + `]}}`},
{"redaction_value_too_long", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":["` + strings.Repeat("v", 9000) + `"]}}`},
}
@@ -225,6 +232,7 @@ func TestDecodeResolveResponseStrictness(t *testing.T) {
`{"headers":[]}`,
`{"headers":{"x-a":null}}`,
`{"headers":{"x-a":1}}`,
+ `{"headers":{"x-a":""}}`,
`{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":[]}`,
`{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":[]}}`,
`{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":null}}`,
@@ -235,11 +243,14 @@ func TestDecodeResolveResponseStrictness(t *testing.T) {
requireKind(t, err, ResolverInvalidResponse)
}
- // Duplicate object keys are rejected, not last-wins.
+ // Duplicate object keys are rejected, not last-wins — including
+ // case-insensitive header names, which HTTP treats as one header.
_, err := decodeResolveResponse([]byte(`{"headers":{"x-a":"1"},"headers":{"x-a":"2"}}`))
requireKind(t, err, ResolverInvalidResponse)
_, err = decodeResolveResponse([]byte(`{"headers":{"x-a":"1","x-a":"2"}}`))
requireKind(t, err, ResolverInvalidResponse)
+ _, err = decodeResolveResponse([]byte(`{"headers":{"X-A":"1","x-a":"2"}}`))
+ requireKind(t, err, ResolverInvalidResponse)
document, err := decodeResolveResponse([]byte(`{"headers":{"X-A":"1","x-b":"2"},"redactions":{"X-A":["1"]}}`))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -362,6 +373,25 @@ func TestHTTPSFrameAndHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
require.Contains(t, decision.Redactions, "abc")
}
+func TestResolveHeaderlessFrameWireShape(t *testing.T) {
+ // A nil Go header map must serialize as an empty JSON object: the frozen
+ // contract requires request.headers to be an object, and null would be
+ // rejected by a contract-compliant resolver as malformed_request.
+ var captured capturedRequest
+ endpoint, tlsConfig := startEnvelopeServer(t, http.StatusOK, `{"headers":{}}`, &captured)
+ client, err := NewResolverClient(ResolverClientOptions{Endpoint: endpoint, Timeout: time.Second, MaxConcurrency: 1, TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig})
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ input := resolverTestInput()
+ input.Request.Headers = nil
+ _, err = client.Resolve(context.Background(), input)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ frame := captured.snapshot()
+ require.NotNil(t, frame.body)
+ requestFrame, ok := frame.body["request"].(map[string]any)
+ require.True(t, ok)
+ require.Equal(t, map[string]any{}, requestFrame["headers"])
+}
+
func TestUDSFrameAndNoAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "osbr")
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -436,7 +466,7 @@ func TestResolverDeniedLimits(t *testing.T) {
{"reservedHeaderName", `{"headers":{"proxy-authorization":"v"}}`, "denied_header_name"},
{"reservedHeaderNameHost", `{"headers":{"Host":"evil"}}`, "denied_header_name"},
{"invalidHeaderNameChars", `{"headers":{"bad name":"v"}}`, "denied_header_name"},
- {"emptyHeaderValue", `{"headers":{"x-a":""}}`, "empty_value"},
+ {"headerValueControlBytes", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v\nX-Injected: 1"}}`, "denied_header_value"},
{"tooManyRedactions", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":[` + manyStrings(maxResolverRedactionCount+1) + `]}}`, "too_many_redactions"},
{"redactionValueTooLong", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":["` + strings.Repeat("v", maxResolverValueBytes+1) + `"]}}`, "redaction_value_too_long"},
}
diff --git a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_stub_integration_test.go b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_stub_integration_test.go
index 045581b2a..fa9d00bc0 100644
--- a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_stub_integration_test.go
+++ b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_stub_integration_test.go
@@ -179,6 +179,21 @@ func TestStubIntegrationUDSHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
requireStubHappyDecision(t, decision)
}
+func TestStubIntegrationUDSHeaderlessFrame(t *testing.T) {
+ // The wire shape for a header-less request frame: nil must serialize as
+ // an empty JSON object (the stub answers null with 400 malformed_request).
+ socketPath := filepath.Join(shortTempDir(t), "r.sock")
+ stub := startStubResolver(t, nil, "--uds", socketPath)
+
+ client, err := NewResolverClient(ResolverClientOptions{Endpoint: stub.endpoint, Timeout: 5 * time.Second, MaxConcurrency: 4})
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ input := resolverTestInput()
+ input.Request.Headers = nil
+ decision, err := client.Resolve(context.Background(), input)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ requireStubHappyDecision(t, decision)
+}
+
func TestStubIntegrationUDSIncompleteRedactions(t *testing.T) {
// The stub reports redactions for only one header; derivation stays
// authoritative (R9) and still covers every header value.