Secure, Fast, and Extensible Sandbox runtime for AI agents.
fix(egress): address T2a review — wire shape, field-value validation, taxonomy
高然d35228dfc86f
diff --git a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client.go b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client.goindex 3c2844fee..dee4a7b6b 100644--- a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client.go+++ b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client.go@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ import ("strings""time"+ "golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"+"github.com/alibaba/opensandbox/egress/pkg/constants")@@ -343,6 +345,12 @@ func normalizeResolverOriginString(origin string) (string, error) {if err != nil {return "", err}+ // D5 key format is exactly scheme://host:port — an operator writing a+ // path/query-qualified origin would silently broaden the token's scope+ // after normalization, so reject rather than accept.+ if parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/" || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" || parsed.User != nil {+ return "", errors.New("origin must be scheme://host:port")+ }return normalizeResolverOrigin(parsed)}@@ -461,6 +469,10 @@ func (c *resolverClient) Resolve(ctx context.Context, input ResolveInput) (*Resodata, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(response.Body, maxResolverResponseBytes+1))if err != nil {+ // A trickling body past the deadline is a timeout, not unavailability.+ if callCtx.Err() != nil {+ return nil, &ResolverError{Kind: ResolverTimeout, err: callCtx.Err()}+ }return nil, &ResolverError{Kind: ResolverUnavailable, err: err}}if len(data) > maxResolverResponseBytes {@@ -494,6 +506,13 @@ func marshalResolveInput(input ResolveInput) ([]byte, error) {return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverInvalidRequest, "request_headers_must_be_non_empty_strings")}}+ requestHeaders := input.Request.Headers+ if requestHeaders == nil {+ // D15 wire shape: the frozen contract requires request.headers to be+ // a JSON object; a nil Go map would serialize as null and be+ // rejected by a contract-compliant resolver.+ requestHeaders = map[string]string{}+ }document := resolveRequestDocument{Subject: input.Subject,Credential: input.Credential,@@ -507,7 +526,7 @@ func marshalResolveInput(input ResolveInput) ([]byte, error) {Method: input.Request.Method,Host: input.Request.Host,Path: input.Request.Path,- Headers: input.Request.Headers,+ Headers: requestHeaders,},}encoded, err := json.Marshal(document)@@ -592,7 +611,15 @@ func decodeHeaderMap(raw json.RawMessage) (map[string]string, error) {return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, "too_many_headers")}headers := make(map[string]string, len(fields))+ seenNames := make(map[string]struct{}, len(fields))for name, valueRaw := range fields {+ // HTTP header names are case-insensitive: byte-different JSON keys+ // naming one header are a contract violation, not two headers.+ lowerName := strings.ToLower(name)+ if _, duplicate := seenNames[lowerName]; duplicate {+ return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverInvalidResponse, "duplicate_header_name")+ }+ seenNames[lowerName] = struct{}{}if len(name) > maxResolverValueBytes {return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, "header_name_too_long")}@@ -603,6 +630,12 @@ func decodeHeaderMap(raw json.RawMessage) (map[string]string, error) {if err != nil {return nil, err}+ // D14 boundary: the envelope is untrusted input and these values are+ // injected into outbound HTTP frames; reject anything that is not a+ // legal HTTP field-value (control bytes incl. CR/LF/NUL/DEL).+ if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(value) {+ return nil, resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, "denied_header_value")+ }headers[name] = value}return headers, nil@@ -646,7 +679,9 @@ func decodeNonEmptyString(raw json.RawMessage, tooLongReason string) (string, erreturn "", resolverErrorf(ResolverInvalidResponse, "value_not_string")}if value == "" {- return "", resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, "empty_value")+ // A schema violation (the contract requires non-empty strings), not+ // a limit exceedance.+ return "", resolverErrorf(ResolverInvalidResponse, "empty_value")}if len(value) > maxResolverValueBytes {return "", resolverErrorf(ResolverDenied, tooLongReason)diff --git a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client_test.go b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client_test.goindex 35c27d13c..4bb1b579e 100644--- a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client_test.go+++ b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_client_test.go@@ -135,6 +135,12 @@ func TestParseResolverAuthEnv(t *testing.T) {"=alpha","notaentry","https://resolver.internal:8443=alpha,https://resolver.internal:8443=beta",+ // Path/query-qualified origins would silently broaden the token+ // scope after normalization — rejected, not accepted.+ "https://resolver.internal/base=alpha",+ "https://resolver.internal?zone=1=alpha",+ "https://resolver.internal:8443/#frag=alpha",+ "https://[email protected]:8443=alpha",} {_, err = ParseResolverAuthEnv(bad)require.Error(t, err, "auth table %q must be rejected", bad)@@ -205,7 +211,8 @@ func TestDecodeResolveResponseStrictness(t *testing.T) {{"header_value_too_long", `{"headers":{"x-a":"` + strings.Repeat("v", 9000) + `"}}`},{"denied_header_name", `{"headers":{"host":"evil"}}`},{"denied_header_name", `{"headers":{"bad name":"v"}}`},- {"empty_value", `{"headers":{"x-a":""}}`},+ {"denied_header_value", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v\nX-Injected: 1"}}`},+ {"denied_header_value", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v\u0000"}}`},{"too_many_redactions", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":[` + manyStrings(65) + `]}}`},{"redaction_value_too_long", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":["` + strings.Repeat("v", 9000) + `"]}}`},}@@ -225,6 +232,7 @@ func TestDecodeResolveResponseStrictness(t *testing.T) {`{"headers":[]}`,`{"headers":{"x-a":null}}`,`{"headers":{"x-a":1}}`,+ `{"headers":{"x-a":""}}`,`{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":[]}`,`{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":[]}}`,`{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":null}}`,@@ -235,11 +243,14 @@ func TestDecodeResolveResponseStrictness(t *testing.T) {requireKind(t, err, ResolverInvalidResponse)}- // Duplicate object keys are rejected, not last-wins.+ // Duplicate object keys are rejected, not last-wins — including+ // case-insensitive header names, which HTTP treats as one header._, err := decodeResolveResponse([]byte(`{"headers":{"x-a":"1"},"headers":{"x-a":"2"}}`))requireKind(t, err, ResolverInvalidResponse)_, err = decodeResolveResponse([]byte(`{"headers":{"x-a":"1","x-a":"2"}}`))requireKind(t, err, ResolverInvalidResponse)+ _, err = decodeResolveResponse([]byte(`{"headers":{"X-A":"1","x-a":"2"}}`))+ requireKind(t, err, ResolverInvalidResponse)document, err := decodeResolveResponse([]byte(`{"headers":{"X-A":"1","x-b":"2"},"redactions":{"X-A":["1"]}}`))require.NoError(t, err)@@ -362,6 +373,25 @@ func TestHTTPSFrameAndHappyPath(t *testing.T) {require.Contains(t, decision.Redactions, "abc")}+func TestResolveHeaderlessFrameWireShape(t *testing.T) {+ // A nil Go header map must serialize as an empty JSON object: the frozen+ // contract requires request.headers to be an object, and null would be+ // rejected by a contract-compliant resolver as malformed_request.+ var captured capturedRequest+ endpoint, tlsConfig := startEnvelopeServer(t, http.StatusOK, `{"headers":{}}`, &captured)+ client, err := NewResolverClient(ResolverClientOptions{Endpoint: endpoint, Timeout: time.Second, MaxConcurrency: 1, TLSClientConfig: tlsConfig})+ require.NoError(t, err)+ input := resolverTestInput()+ input.Request.Headers = nil+ _, err = client.Resolve(context.Background(), input)+ require.NoError(t, err)+ frame := captured.snapshot()+ require.NotNil(t, frame.body)+ requestFrame, ok := frame.body["request"].(map[string]any)+ require.True(t, ok)+ require.Equal(t, map[string]any{}, requestFrame["headers"])+}+func TestUDSFrameAndNoAuthorization(t *testing.T) {dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "osbr")require.NoError(t, err)@@ -436,7 +466,7 @@ func TestResolverDeniedLimits(t *testing.T) {{"reservedHeaderName", `{"headers":{"proxy-authorization":"v"}}`, "denied_header_name"},{"reservedHeaderNameHost", `{"headers":{"Host":"evil"}}`, "denied_header_name"},{"invalidHeaderNameChars", `{"headers":{"bad name":"v"}}`, "denied_header_name"},- {"emptyHeaderValue", `{"headers":{"x-a":""}}`, "empty_value"},+ {"headerValueControlBytes", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v\nX-Injected: 1"}}`, "denied_header_value"},{"tooManyRedactions", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":[` + manyStrings(maxResolverRedactionCount+1) + `]}}`, "too_many_redactions"},{"redactionValueTooLong", `{"headers":{"x-a":"v"},"redactions":{"x-a":["` + strings.Repeat("v", maxResolverValueBytes+1) + `"]}}`, "redaction_value_too_long"},}diff --git a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_stub_integration_test.go b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_stub_integration_test.goindex 045581b2a..fa9d00bc0 100644--- a/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_stub_integration_test.go+++ b/components/egress/pkg/credentialvault/resolver_stub_integration_test.go@@ -179,6 +179,21 @@ func TestStubIntegrationUDSHappyPath(t *testing.T) {requireStubHappyDecision(t, decision)}+func TestStubIntegrationUDSHeaderlessFrame(t *testing.T) {+ // The wire shape for a header-less request frame: nil must serialize as+ // an empty JSON object (the stub answers null with 400 malformed_request).+ socketPath := filepath.Join(shortTempDir(t), "r.sock")+ stub := startStubResolver(t, nil, "--uds", socketPath)++ client, err := NewResolverClient(ResolverClientOptions{Endpoint: stub.endpoint, Timeout: 5 * time.Second, MaxConcurrency: 4})+ require.NoError(t, err)+ input := resolverTestInput()+ input.Request.Headers = nil+ decision, err := client.Resolve(context.Background(), input)+ require.NoError(t, err)+ requireStubHappyDecision(t, decision)+}+func TestStubIntegrationUDSIncompleteRedactions(t *testing.T) {// The stub reports redactions for only one header; derivation stays// authoritative (R9) and still covers every header value.