Secure, Fast, and Extensible Sandbox runtime for AI agents.
fix(env): address OCR review findings on the MITM chain verify
高然dcbae079d63c
diff --git a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.shindex abcf889f7..287b661c8 100755--- a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh+++ b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/integration-env.sh@@ -1152,7 +1152,11 @@ extendedKeyUsage = serverAuthsubjectKeyIdentifier = hashauthorityKeyIdentifier = keyid, issuerCNF- if ! openssl req -x509 -new -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 2 \+ # -days 30 (not 2): the verify actions support running against an+ # environment created earlier, so short-lived material would time-bomb+ # every TLS handshake there. up regenerates fresh material per run+ # anyway; the window only has to outlive delayed verify runs.+ if ! openssl req -x509 -new -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 30 \-keyout "$MITM_CA_DIR/tls.key" -out "$MITM_CA_DIR/tls.crt" \-config "$MITM_CA_DIR/ca.cnf" -extensions v3_ca 2>"$openssl_err"; thendie "pinned MITM CA generation failed (openssl $(openssl version 2>&1)): $(tail -3 "$openssl_err" 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ' ')"@@ -1178,7 +1182,7 @@ CNFfiif ! openssl x509 -req -in "$MITM_CA_DIR/echo.csr" \-CA "$MITM_CA_DIR/tls.crt" -CAkey "$MITM_CA_DIR/tls.key" -CAcreateserial \- -out "$MITM_CA_DIR/echo.crt" -days 2 \+ -out "$MITM_CA_DIR/echo.crt" -days 30 \-extfile "$MITM_CA_DIR/ca.cnf" -extensions v3_echo 2>>"$openssl_err"; thendie "echo certificate signing failed: $(tail -3 "$openssl_err" 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ' ')"fi@@ -2776,7 +2780,9 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {local created sandbox_uid ack echo_secretlog "verify (mitm-ca): fingerprint pinning (pinned Secret == egress /healthz, plus the manifest lineage on the S3 publication path)"local healthz_fp lineage_fp manifest_ref- healthz_fp="$(egress_mitm_ca_fingerprint)"+ # Guarded so a failed probe lands on the crafted mismatch message (and+ # its diagnostics) instead of an ERR-trap abort.+ healthz_fp="$(egress_mitm_ca_fingerprint)" || true[[ "$healthz_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \|| fail "mitm-ca verify: egress /healthz fingerprint is '${healthz_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"# The manifest lineage leg is only readable on the S3 publication path:@@ -2784,7 +2790,7 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {# reach. There the pool-side pinning plus the behavioral chain below# (the guest accepts the MITM certificate only because it chains to the# template-baked CA) carry the assertion.- manifest_ref="$(osb_api template get "$template_id" -o json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.status.manifest_ref // empty')"+ manifest_ref="$(osb_api template get "$template_id" -o json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.status.manifest_ref // empty')" || trueif [[ "$manifest_ref" == s3://* ]]; thenlineage_fp="$(template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint "$template_id")"[[ "$lineage_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \@@ -2823,7 +2829,10 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {osb_command_succeeds curl -fsS -m 20 \--resolve "$MITM_ECHO_DOMAIN:$MITM_ECHO_PORT:$MITM_ECHO_IP" \"https://$MITM_ECHO_DOMAIN:$MITM_ECHO_PORT/echo"- if mitm_ca_guest_echo | grep -qi 'x-api-key'; then+ local pre_vault_out+ pre_vault_out="$(mitm_ca_guest_echo)" \+ || fail "mitm-ca verify: pre-vault guest HTTPS request failed (cannot assert header absence)"+ if printf '%s' "$pre_vault_out" | grep -qi 'x-api-key'; thenfail "mitm-ca verify: x-api-key present before any vault binding existed"fipass "pre-vault: guest HTTPS passthrough works, no credential injected"@@ -3353,7 +3362,11 @@ env_summary() {printf ' %-22s %s\n' "fast-sandbox" "pinned $(git -C "$FSB_DIR" rev-parse --short HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo "$FSB_COMMIT") ($FSB_DIR)"printf ' %-22s %s\n' "RustFS endpoint" "$RUSTFS_ENDPOINT"printf ' %-22s %s\n' "pool" "$POOL_NAME (runtime=firecracker, poolMin=$POOL_MIN, egress=$IMG_EGRESS)"- printf ' %-22s %s\n' "MITM CA" "$MITM_CA_SECRET (fingerprint ${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…, echo=https://$MITM_ECHO_DOMAIN via $MITM_ECHO_IP:$MITM_ECHO_PORT)"+ # The echo endpoint line is conditional: the standalone pool action+ # loads the fingerprint pin but never re-derives the echo container IP.+ local mitm_echo_at=""+ [[ -n "$MITM_ECHO_IP" ]] && mitm_echo_at=", echo=https://$MITM_ECHO_DOMAIN via $MITM_ECHO_IP:$MITM_ECHO_PORT"+ printf ' %-22s %s\n' "MITM CA" "$MITM_CA_SECRET (fingerprint ${MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT:0:16}…${mitm_echo_at})"printf ' %-22s %s\n' "P2P" "DART daemons=$(printf '%s' "$(runtime_pods)" | wc -w | tr -d ' ') (on-demand pulls: cache -> peer -> origin)"printf ' %-22s %s\n' "template" "${TEMPLATE_ID:-n/a} ($(if [[ -n "$TEMPLATE_ID" ]]; then _template_phase || echo unknown; else echo "not built"; fi))"printf ' %-22s %s\n' "StateRoot fs" "$(findmnt -no FSTYPE "$XFS_MOUNT_POINT" 2>/dev/null || echo 'plain directory (full copy per sandbox)')"diff --git a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/verify/vault.sh b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/verify/vault.shindex 0a2d574bd..a7276918b 100755--- a/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/verify/vault.sh+++ b/scripts/fast-sandbox-env/verify/vault.sh@@ -62,9 +62,10 @@# 4. Pause/resume: the request keeps passing after checkpoint/restore —# trust (baked CA in the rootfs) and vault travel with the snapshot.#-# The CA/echo material (fingerprint file, echo container) is provisioned by-# `up` (mitm_ca_up / mitm_echo_up) and re-derived here, so both stages run-# against a live stack from a prior `up`.+# The CA/echo material is provisioned by `up` (mitm_ca_up / mitm_echo_up):+# this file reads the pinned fingerprint from $WORK/mitm-ca/fingerprint and+# re-derives the echo endpoint's kind-network IP from the live container, so+# both stages run against a live stack from a prior `up`.## NOTE: integration-env.sh (the monolith CI drives today) carries working# copies of these stages; keep the two in sync until the env.sh split is@@ -81,7 +82,6 @@ source "$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)/lib.sh"# MITM chain material config (mirrors integration-env.sh; lib.sh does not# carry env-side MITM state).-MITM_CA_SECRET="${MITM_CA_SECRET:-opensandbox-mitm-ca-v1}"MITM_CA_DIR="$WORK/mitm-ca"MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT_FILE="$MITM_CA_DIR/fingerprint"MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT=""@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ MITM_ECHO_CONTAINER="${MITM_ECHO_CONTAINER:-fast-sandbox-env-mitm-echo}"MITM_ECHO_DOMAIN="${MITM_ECHO_DOMAIN:-echo.test}"MITM_ECHO_PORT=443MITM_ECHO_IP=""-MITM_ECHO_NET=""# --- stage: vault lifecycle (OSEP-0022: egress-held vault over the relay) --------@@ -220,13 +219,6 @@ first_pool_pod() {-o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}' 2>/dev/null}-# mitm_ca_fingerprint <cert.pem> -> lowercase hex SHA-256 over the DER — the-# exact fingerprint form the egress /healthz and the artifact manifest-# platform.egressMitmCA expose.-mitm_ca_fingerprint() {- openssl x509 -in "$1" -noout -fingerprint -sha256 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^.*=//' | tr -d ':' | tr 'A-Z' 'a-z'-}-# Cross-invocation state (up and the verify actions are separate processes;# same pattern as require_template_id): the fingerprint pin lives in a file,# the echo endpoint is re-derived from the live container.@@ -239,7 +231,6 @@ load_mitm_ca_fingerprint() {}load_mitm_echo_endpoint() {- MITM_ECHO_NET="$(kind_network 2>/dev/null || true)"MITM_ECHO_IP="$(docker inspect -f \'{{range $k,$v := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$v.IPAddress}}{{end}}' \"$MITM_ECHO_CONTAINER" 2>/dev/null || true)"@@ -315,7 +306,9 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {local created sandbox_uid ack echo_secretlog "verify (mitm-ca): fingerprint pinning (pinned Secret == egress /healthz, plus the manifest lineage on the S3 publication path)"local healthz_fp lineage_fp manifest_ref- healthz_fp="$(egress_mitm_ca_fingerprint)"+ # Guarded so a failed probe lands on the crafted mismatch message (and+ # its diagnostics) instead of an ERR-trap abort.+ healthz_fp="$(egress_mitm_ca_fingerprint)" || true[[ "$healthz_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \|| fail "mitm-ca verify: egress /healthz fingerprint is '${healthz_fp:-empty}', want pinned $MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT"# The manifest lineage leg is only readable on the S3 publication path:@@ -323,7 +316,7 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {# reach. There the pool-side pinning plus the behavioral chain below# (the guest accepts the MITM certificate only because it chains to the# template-baked CA) carry the assertion.- manifest_ref="$(osb_api template get "$template_id" -o json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.status.manifest_ref // empty')"+ manifest_ref="$(osb_api template get "$template_id" -o json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.status.manifest_ref // empty')" || trueif [[ "$manifest_ref" == s3://* ]]; thenlineage_fp="$(template_mitm_lineage_fingerprint "$template_id")"[[ "$lineage_fp" == "$MITM_CA_FINGERPRINT" ]] \@@ -362,7 +355,10 @@ mitm_ca_chain_verify() {osb_command_succeeds curl -fsS -m 20 \--resolve "$MITM_ECHO_DOMAIN:$MITM_ECHO_PORT:$MITM_ECHO_IP" \"https://$MITM_ECHO_DOMAIN:$MITM_ECHO_PORT/echo"- if mitm_ca_guest_echo | grep -qi 'x-api-key'; then+ local pre_vault_out+ pre_vault_out="$(mitm_ca_guest_echo)" \+ || fail "mitm-ca verify: pre-vault guest HTTPS request failed (cannot assert header absence)"+ if printf '%s' "$pre_vault_out" | grep -qi 'x-api-key'; thenfail "mitm-ca verify: x-api-key present before any vault binding existed"fipass "pre-vault: guest HTTPS passthrough works, no credential injected"