Self-evolving Context Database for AI Agents. Unify Agent Memory, Knowledge RAG and Skills.
Python agent-contextagent-memoryagent-pluginsagentic-ragcontext-databasedsh-pluginknowledge-basememorymemory-managementself-evolvingvector-database
# Copyright (c) 2026 Beijing Volcano Engine Technology Co., Ltd.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0
"""Shared helpers for safe user-supplied path handling."""
import re
from urllib.parse import unquote
from openviking_cli.utils.uri import VikingURI
_UNSAFE_REL_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"(^|[\\/])\.\.($|[\\/])")
_WINDOWS_DRIVE_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z]:")
def _reject_encoded_path_escape(path: str) -> None:
# Raw backslashes are accepted as Windows separators and normalized by
# ``sanitize_relative_viking_path``. Decode only after splitting on both
# raw separator forms so encoded separators cannot create a new segment.
for segment in path.replace("\\", "/").split("/"):
decoded = unquote(segment)
if decoded != segment and (
decoded in {".", ".."} or "/" in decoded or "\\" in decoded
):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe relative path rejected: {path}")
def sanitize_relative_viking_path(rel_path: str) -> str:
"""Normalize a relative path for use inside Viking URI paths.
The returned path always uses forward slashes. Absolute paths, Windows
drive-prefixed paths, and parent-directory traversal are rejected with
OS-independent checks.
"""
if not rel_path:
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe relative path rejected: {rel_path!r}")
if rel_path.startswith("/") or rel_path.startswith("\\"):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe relative path rejected: {rel_path}")
if _WINDOWS_DRIVE_RE.match(rel_path):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe relative path rejected: {rel_path}")
if _UNSAFE_REL_PATH_RE.search(rel_path):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe relative path rejected: {rel_path}")
_reject_encoded_path_escape(rel_path)
return rel_path.replace("\\", "/")
def _normalize_storage_segments(path: str) -> str:
return "/".join(
VikingURI.sanitize_segment(segment)
if any(character.isspace() for character in segment)
else segment
for segment in path.split("/")
)
def validate_safe_viking_uri_path(uri: str) -> str:
"""Validate a literal storage path, where ``#`` is part of the filename."""
normalized = VikingURI(uri.strip()).uri.rstrip("/")
if "?" in normalized:
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe Viking URI path rejected: {uri}")
path = normalized[len(f"{VikingURI.SCHEME}://") :]
if not path:
return normalized
safe_path = sanitize_relative_viking_path(path)
if safe_path != path:
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe Viking URI path rejected: {uri}")
return normalized
def normalize_storage_target_uri(uri: str) -> str:
"""Return a safe Viking URI with whitespace-bearing path segments sanitized."""
normalized = validate_safe_viking_uri_path(uri)
prefix = f"{VikingURI.SCHEME}://"
path = normalized[len(prefix) :]
return f"{prefix}{_normalize_storage_segments(path)}"
def safe_join_viking_uri(base_uri: str, rel_path: str) -> str:
"""Join a Viking URI base with a sanitized relative child path."""
safe_rel_path = sanitize_relative_viking_path(rel_path)
return VikingURI(base_uri).join(safe_rel_path).uri