Self-evolving Context Database for AI Agents. Unify Agent Memory, Knowledge RAG and Skills.
Python agent-contextagent-memoryagent-pluginsagentic-ragcontext-databasedsh-pluginknowledge-basememorymemory-managementself-evolvingvector-database
# Copyright (c) 2026 Beijing Volcano Engine Technology Co., Ltd.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0
"""Tests for CodeRepositoryParser._extract_zip Zip Slip protection."""
import io
import os
import stat
import zipfile
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from openviking.parse.parsers.code.code import CodeRepositoryParser
def _make_zip(entries: dict[str, str], target_path: str) -> None:
"""Create a zip file with the given filename->content mapping."""
buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w") as zf:
for name, content in entries.items():
zf.writestr(name, content)
Path(target_path).write_bytes(buf.getvalue())
def _make_zip_with_symlink(target_path: str) -> None:
"""Create a zip containing a symlink entry via raw external_attr."""
buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w") as zf:
info = zipfile.ZipInfo("evil_link")
info.external_attr = (stat.S_IFLNK | 0o777) << 16
zf.writestr(info, "/etc/passwd")
Path(target_path).write_bytes(buf.getvalue())
def _assert_no_escape(tmp_path: Path, target_dir: str) -> None:
"""Assert no files were written outside target_dir within tmp_path."""
target = Path(target_dir).resolve()
for f in tmp_path.rglob("*"):
resolved = f.resolve()
if resolved == target or resolved.is_relative_to(target):
continue
if f.suffix == ".zip":
continue
raise AssertionError(f"File escaped target_dir: {resolved}")
@pytest.fixture
def parser():
return CodeRepositoryParser()
@pytest.fixture
def workspace(tmp_path):
"""Provide a temp workspace with zip_path, target_dir, and tmp_path."""
zip_path = str(tmp_path / "test.zip")
target_dir = str(tmp_path / "extracted")
os.makedirs(target_dir)
return tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir
class TestExtractZipNormal:
"""Verify normal zip extraction still works."""
async def test_extracts_files_correctly(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
_make_zip(
{"src/main.py": "print('hello')", "README.md": "# Test"},
zip_path,
)
name = await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
assert name == "test"
assert (Path(target_dir) / "src" / "main.py").read_text() == "print('hello')"
assert (Path(target_dir) / "README.md").read_text() == "# Test"
async def test_returns_stem_as_name(self, parser, tmp_path):
zip_path = str(tmp_path / "my-repo.zip")
target_dir = str(tmp_path / "out")
os.makedirs(target_dir)
_make_zip({"a.txt": "content"}, zip_path)
name = await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
assert name == "my-repo"
class TestExtractZipPathTraversal:
"""Verify Zip Slip path traversal raises ValueError."""
async def test_rejects_dot_dot_traversal(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
_make_zip({"../../evil.txt": "pwned"}, zip_path)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Zip Slip detected"):
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
_assert_no_escape(tmp_path, target_dir)
async def test_rejects_absolute_path(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
_make_zip({"/etc/passwd": "root:x:0:0"}, zip_path)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Zip Slip detected"):
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
_assert_no_escape(tmp_path, target_dir)
async def test_rejects_nested_traversal(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
_make_zip({"foo/../../evil.txt": "pwned"}, zip_path)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Zip Slip detected"):
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
_assert_no_escape(tmp_path, target_dir)
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.name != "nt", reason="Windows-specific test")
async def test_rejects_windows_drive_path(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
_make_zip({"C:\\evil.txt": "pwned"}, zip_path)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Zip Slip detected"):
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
_assert_no_escape(tmp_path, target_dir)
async def test_rejects_backslash_traversal(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
_make_zip({"..\\..\\evil.txt": "pwned"}, zip_path)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Zip Slip detected"):
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
_assert_no_escape(tmp_path, target_dir)
async def test_rejects_unc_path(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
_make_zip({"\\\\server\\share\\evil.txt": "pwned"}, zip_path)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Zip Slip detected"):
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
_assert_no_escape(tmp_path, target_dir)
class TestExtractZipSymlink:
"""Verify symlink entries are skipped."""
async def test_skips_symlink_entry(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
_make_zip_with_symlink(zip_path)
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
extracted_files = list(Path(target_dir).rglob("*"))
assert len(extracted_files) == 0
class TestExtractZipEmptyNormalization:
"""Verify entries containing '..' are rejected even if they normalize safely."""
async def test_rejects_dot_dot_entry(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w") as zf:
# "./.." contains ".." and must be rejected
info = zipfile.ZipInfo("./..")
info.external_attr = 0
zf.writestr(info, "should be rejected")
zf.writestr("src/main.py", "print('ok')")
Path(zip_path).write_bytes(buf.getvalue())
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Zip Slip detected"):
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
class TestExtractZipDirectoryEntry:
"""Verify explicit directory entries are skipped without error."""
async def test_skips_directory_entries(self, parser, workspace):
tmp_path, zip_path, target_dir = workspace
buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w") as zf:
zf.writestr("mydir/", "")
zf.writestr("mydir/file.txt", "content")
Path(zip_path).write_bytes(buf.getvalue())
await parser._extract_zip(zip_path, target_dir)
assert (Path(target_dir) / "mydir" / "file.txt").read_text() == "content"