Free, Open Source, Self-Hosted WhatsApp API Gateway
TypeScript apibotgatewayself-hostedwhatsappwhatsapp-apiwhatsapp-automationwhatsapp-botwhatsapp-gatewaywhatsapp-gateway-apiwhatsapp-webwhatsapp-web-api
import * as path from 'path';
/**
* Returns true if `target` resolves to a location inside (or equal to) `root`.
*
* Guards against path traversal: untrusted input such as tar archive entry
* names or user-supplied file paths can contain ".." or absolute paths that
* escape the intended directory. Both arguments are resolved to absolute paths
* before comparison, and the trailing separator check prevents a sibling
* directory that merely shares the root's prefix (e.g. "/data-evil" vs "/data")
* from being treated as inside the root.
*/
export function isPathWithin(root: string, target: string): boolean {
const resolvedRoot = path.resolve(root);
const resolvedTarget = path.resolve(resolvedRoot, target);
return resolvedTarget === resolvedRoot || resolvedTarget.startsWith(resolvedRoot + path.sep);
}
/**
* Returns true if `key` is a safe, contained relative storage key: a non-empty relative path with no
* `..` traversal segment. Used to validate untrusted archive entry names / object keys at the
* backend-agnostic `putFile`/`getFile` boundary so an S3 key (which has no host filesystem root to
* check against `isPathWithin`) still can't escape the configured S3 key root (`S3_KEY_PREFIX`,
* default `media/`). Ordinary keys — including plugin/JID-style ones with `:`, `@`, `.`, `-` — are preserved.
*/
export function isSafeStorageKey(key: string): boolean {
if (typeof key !== 'string' || key.length === 0) return false;
// Reject NUL / control chars: harmless on the local FS but a NUL would reach the raw S3 object Key.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
if (/[\u0000-\u001f]/.test(key)) return false;
if (path.isAbsolute(key)) return false;
return !key.split(/[/\\]/).includes('..');
}
/**
* Returns true if `value` is a safe engine auth-directory key: the same conservative charset the
* CreateSessionDto enforces on a session name (letters, digits, hyphen). The key reaching the sink is
* a `Session.id`, and the boot migration also weighs a stored name against it; either becomes a path
* (`path.join(authDir, key)` / `session-${key}`), so a '.', '/', or '\\' could traverse outside it
* (arbitrary write, and `rm -rf` on teardown). This is the sink-side guard for every path that reaches
* the auth dir: normal creation validates via the DTO, but data import / seed can carry a raw value.
*/
export function isSafeSessionName(value: unknown): value is string {
return typeof value === 'string' && /^[a-zA-Z0-9-]+$/.test(value);
}