Free, Open Source, Self-Hosted WhatsApp API Gateway
TypeScript apibotgatewayself-hostedwhatsappwhatsapp-apiwhatsapp-automationwhatsapp-botwhatsapp-gatewaywhatsapp-gateway-apiwhatsapp-webwhatsapp-web-api
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { ProxyAwareThrottlerGuard } from '../../common/security/proxy-aware-throttler.guard';
import { resolveNonNegativeIntEnv } from '../../config/configuration';
/**
* The ingress route's pre-authentication rate bound, keyed on the client IP.
*
* The route is `@Public`, so this is the only bound on traffic that has not proven anything yet:
* unknown instances, failed challenges, oversized bodies and bad signatures. The per-instance bound
* that keeps one noisy tenant from starving the others on a provider's shared egress IP is charged
* by IngressService only once a delivery's signature verifies (see admitIngressInstance).
*
* It deliberately does NOT use `@Throttle()` to size its limit: `@Throttle` metadata is reflected on
* the route/handler and is read by EVERY `ThrottlerGuard` instance that walks a tier of that name,
* including the global per-IP guard, which shares the `short`/`medium`/`long` tier list from the one
* process-wide `ThrottlerModule.forRootAsync` config. Overriding one of those tiers here would silently
* retarget the global guard's tolerance for this route too. Instead, `onModuleInit` below replaces
* `this.throttlers` with its own tier that only this guard instance evaluates.
*/
@Injectable()
export class InstanceThrottlerGuard extends ProxyAwareThrottlerGuard {
async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
await super.onModuleInit();
// Blank-as-unset: a blank compose `${KEY:-}` forward must not become a limit of 0, which rejects
// the very first hit. An explicit 0 is still rejected at boot by env.validation.
this.throttlers = [
{
// Sized 10x the per-instance default. It counts every request, including those the
// per-instance bucket later sheds, so one tenant pushing a shared egress IP past it sheds
// its neighbours too. Raise it with `INGRESS_IP_LIMIT` when one IP legitimately drives more
// than that. The tier keeps the inherited proxy-aware client-IP tracker.
name: 'ingress-ip',
limit: resolveNonNegativeIntEnv(process.env.INGRESS_IP_LIMIT, 1200),
ttl: resolveNonNegativeIntEnv(process.env.INGRESS_INSTANCE_TTL, 60000),
},
];
}
/**
* This guard does NOT honour a bare `@SkipThrottle()`. The ingress controller carries one so the
* GLOBAL per-IP guard skips the route: its medium tier (default 100/min) sits BELOW the
* per-instance default (120/min), so a provider delivering every tenant's webhooks from one shared
* egress IP was 429'd at the IP tier before the instance bound ever fired. This guard carries the
* route's own limit instead, and its tier stays unconditional: skipping it would leave a `@Public`
* route with no rate bound at all.
*/
protected shouldSkip(): Promise<boolean> {
return Promise.resolve(false);
}
}