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refactor(common): parse TRUSTED_PROXIES in one place

Yudhi Armyndharis043697419f35
diff --git a/src/common/security/proxy-aware-throttler.guard.ts b/src/common/security/proxy-aware-throttler.guard.ts
index df15b1a75..2274ba7c3 100644
--- a/src/common/security/proxy-aware-throttler.guard.ts
+++ b/src/common/security/proxy-aware-throttler.guard.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { ExecutionContext, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import { normalizeIp, ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerLimitDetail } from '@nestjs/throttler';
-import { resolveClientIp, RequestLike } from '../utils/ip';
+import { parseTrustedProxies, resolveClientIp, RequestLike } from '../utils/ip';
import { createLogger } from '../services/logger.service';
const logger = createLogger('ProxyAwareThrottlerGuard');
@@ -42,10 +42,7 @@ export class ProxyAwareThrottlerGuard extends ThrottlerGuard {
private warnedSharedProxyBucket = false;
protected getTracker(req: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<string> {
- const trustedProxies = (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES || '')
- .split(',')
- .map(proxy => proxy.trim())
- .filter(Boolean);
+ const trustedProxies = parseTrustedProxies(process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES);
// An X-Forwarded-For header with an empty TRUSTED_PROXIES is the silent self-DoS this guard
// exists to prevent: every client collapses onto the proxy's socket address, so all traffic
// shares ONE bucket per tier and one abuser rate-limits everyone. The header itself must stay
diff --git a/src/common/utils/ip.spec.ts b/src/common/utils/ip.spec.ts
index 899dbeab4..cdb1c7ef6 100644
--- a/src/common/utils/ip.spec.ts
+++ b/src/common/utils/ip.spec.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,12 @@
-import { normalizeIp, ipMatches, limiterKeyForIp, resolveClientIp, isIpOrCidrEntry, invalidTrustedProxies } from './ip';
+import {
+ normalizeIp,
+ ipMatches,
+ limiterKeyForIp,
+ resolveClientIp,
+ isIpOrCidrEntry,
+ invalidTrustedProxies,
+ parseTrustedProxies,
+} from './ip';
describe('normalizeIp', () => {
it('strips an IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix', () => {
@@ -141,3 +149,17 @@ describe('resolveClientIp', () => {
);
});
});
+
+describe('parseTrustedProxies', () => {
+ it('splits on commas, trims each entry and drops blanks', () => {
+ expect(parseTrustedProxies(' 10.0.0.1, 172.18.0.0/16 ,, fd00::/8 ')).toEqual([
+ '10.0.0.1',
+ '172.18.0.0/16',
+ 'fd00::/8',
+ ]);
+ });
+
+ it.each([undefined, '', ' ', ' , , '])('reads %p as no proxies', raw => {
+ expect(parseTrustedProxies(raw)).toEqual([]);
+ });
+});
diff --git a/src/common/utils/ip.ts b/src/common/utils/ip.ts
index 75f1cf827..6fe2b3d60 100644
--- a/src/common/utils/ip.ts
+++ b/src/common/utils/ip.ts
@@ -117,10 +117,15 @@ export function isIpOrCidrEntry(entry: string): boolean {
* never matches a peer, so the proxy it was meant to name is treated as a direct client.
*/
export function invalidTrustedProxies(raw: string | undefined): string[] {
+ return parseTrustedProxies(raw).filter(entry => !isIpOrCidrEntry(entry));
+}
+
+/** The comma-separated TRUSTED_PROXIES value as a list of entries; blanks are dropped. */
+export function parseTrustedProxies(raw: string | undefined): string[] {
return (raw || '')
.split(',')
.map(entry => entry.trim())
- .filter(entry => entry && !isIpOrCidrEntry(entry));
+ .filter(Boolean);
}
/**
diff --git a/src/config/configuration.ts b/src/config/configuration.ts
index 82bd979e4..f04fd6749 100644
--- a/src/config/configuration.ts
+++ b/src/config/configuration.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { resolveInflightBodyBudgetBytes } from './inflight-body-budget';
import { resolveRequestTimeoutMs } from './http-timeouts';
import { readWsRateLimitConfig } from '../modules/events/ws-rate-limit';
import { DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_SHUTDOWN_DRAIN_MS, MAX_TIMER_MS } from '../common/services/shutdown-budget';
+import { parseTrustedProxies } from '../common/utils/ip';
import { positiveIntFromEnv } from '../common/utils/env-int';
/**
@@ -338,10 +339,7 @@ export default () => ({
// may be trusted for client-IP resolution. Empty by default: X-Forwarded-For
// is ignored and the direct socket address is used, preventing spoofing of
// the API-key allowedIps whitelist.
- trustedProxies: (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES || '')
- .split(',')
- .map(proxy => proxy.trim())
- .filter(Boolean),
+ trustedProxies: parseTrustedProxies(process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES),
},
// Plugin platform configuration
diff --git a/src/configure-app.ts b/src/configure-app.ts
index 9363a64b5..a417d466e 100644
--- a/src/configure-app.ts
+++ b/src/configure-app.ts
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { ShutdownService } from './common/services/shutdown.service';
import { injectDashboardCspNonce } from './config/dashboard-csp';
import { resolveCorsPolicy, isUpgradeInsecureRequestsEnabled, resolveBodyLimit } from './config/bootstrap-security';
import { resolveRequestTimeoutMs } from './config/http-timeouts';
+import { parseTrustedProxies } from './common/utils/ip';
/** Where the bundled dashboard documents come from, and whether to serve them at all. */
export interface DashboardSource {
@@ -259,10 +260,7 @@ export function configureApp(app: INestApplication, options: ConfigureAppOptions
const keyIndex = optional(ActiveKeyIndex);
app.use(
createInflightBodyBudget(inflightBudgetBytes, {
- trustedProxies: (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES || '')
- .split(',')
- .map(p => p.trim())
- .filter(Boolean),
+ trustedProxies: parseTrustedProxies(process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES),
classify: (req, clientIp) => keyIndex?.recognise(req.headers, clientIp),
bodyLimitBytes: parseBodyLimitBytes(bodyLimit),
requestTimeoutMs: resolveRequestTimeoutMs(process.env.REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),
diff --git a/src/modules/events/events.gateway.ts b/src/modules/events/events.gateway.ts
index ffb8c3122..c482ebb30 100644
--- a/src/modules/events/events.gateway.ts
+++ b/src/modules/events/events.gateway.ts
@@ -18,7 +18,12 @@ import { isWsRedisEnabled } from './redis-io.adapter';
import { AuditService } from '../audit/audit.service';
import { AuditAction } from '../audit/entities/audit-log.entity';
import { resolveCorsPolicy } from '../../config/bootstrap-security';
-import { limiterKeyForIp, resolveClientIp as resolveRequestClientIp, type RequestLike } from '../../common/utils/ip';
+import {
+ limiterKeyForIp,
+ parseTrustedProxies,
+ resolveClientIp as resolveRequestClientIp,
+ type RequestLike,
+} from '../../common/utils/ip';
import { DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_MEDIA_INLINE_MAX_BYTES, shedInlineMedia } from '../../common/utils/inline-media';
import { isSafeSessionName } from '../../common/utils/path-safety';
import { ApiKeyRole, type ApiKey } from '../auth/entities/api-key.entity';
@@ -45,10 +50,7 @@ function resolveWsCorsOrigin(): boolean | string[] {
* client IP with the same trusted-proxy-aware logic as the REST guard and the MCP mount.
*/
function readTrustedProxies(): string[] {
- return (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES ?? '')
- .split(',')
- .map(s => s.trim())
- .filter(Boolean);
+ return parseTrustedProxies(process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES);
}
import type {
WSClientMessage,
diff --git a/src/modules/mcp/mcp.server.ts b/src/modules/mcp/mcp.server.ts
index 713ee225d..128090300 100644
--- a/src/modules/mcp/mcp.server.ts
+++ b/src/modules/mcp/mcp.server.ts
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import type { AuditService } from '../audit/audit.service';
import { AuditAction } from '../audit/entities/audit-log.entity';
import { handleToolError, jsonToolResult, smartToolResult } from './tool-result';
import type { KeyRateLimiter } from './mcp-rate-limit';
-import { limiterKeyForIp, resolveClientIp } from '../../common/utils/ip';
+import { limiterKeyForIp, parseTrustedProxies, resolveClientIp } from '../../common/utils/ip';
import { resolveBodyLimit } from '../../config/bootstrap-security';
import { presentedApiKey } from '../../common/security/bearer-token';
@@ -72,10 +72,7 @@ export function auditMcpAuthFailure(
/** Read TRUSTED_PROXIES once as a list (shared by the pre-auth throttle and the audit IP resolver). */
function readTrustedProxies(): string[] {
- return (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES ?? '')
- .split(',')
- .map(s => s.trim())
- .filter(Boolean);
+ return parseTrustedProxies(process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES);
}
/** Resolve the trusted-proxy-aware client IP + HTTP method/path for an audit record. */