Free, Open Source, Self-Hosted WhatsApp API Gateway
TypeScript apibotgatewayself-hostedwhatsappwhatsapp-apiwhatsapp-automationwhatsapp-botwhatsapp-gatewaywhatsapp-gateway-apiwhatsapp-webwhatsapp-web-api
fix(container): forward signals after privilege drop
Yudhi Armyndharis2a4b92236847
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex 9f9db9eb5..710203a94 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0### Fixed+- Forward container shutdown signals after dropping process privileges in Compose and Helm.- Preserve webhook outbox payloads until delivery or durable failure storage succeeds.- Enforce webhook replay retention and keep later eligible failures moving through batches.- Keep one terminal webhook failure per receiver idempotency key.diff --git a/charts/openwa/values.yaml b/charts/openwa/values.yamlindex fe23dc8ca..41bd573fe 100644--- a/charts/openwa/values.yaml+++ b/charts/openwa/values.yaml@@ -107,14 +107,14 @@ terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 45# fsGroup is what makes a fresh volume writable by it. OnRootMismatch makes the# kubelet re-own the volume only when its root has the wrong group or mode,# instead of touching every file on every mount. `add: null` removes the-# default list below; Helm merges maps, so leaving it out keeps all five.+# default list below; Helm merges maps, so leaving it out keeps all six.# The RuntimeDefault seccomp profile is opt-in (it can also be set alone,# under either context) until a whatsapp-web.js session start under it has# been confirmed on arm64, where the image uses Debian's Chromium.podSecurityContext: {}-# Parity with docker-compose hardening. The five added capabilities are used-# only by the root entrypoint (chown, then the gosu drop); see+# Parity with docker-compose hardening. The added capabilities support+# the root entrypoint and init signal forwarding after the gosu drop; see# podSecurityContext above for the non-root alternative.containerSecurityContext:readOnlyRootFilesystem: true@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ containerSecurityContext:- CHOWN- DAC_OVERRIDE- FOWNER+ - KILL- SETGID- SETUIDdiff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.ymlindex 858527745..c0a6e4b11 100644--- a/docker-compose.yml+++ b/docker-compose.yml@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ services:- internal-docker# Container hardening: Chromium runs with --no-sandbox, so the# container itself is the confinement boundary. cap_drop ALL + a minimal re-add- # ONLY for the root entrypoint's chown + gosu privilege-drop; once gosu setuids to+ # for root entrypoint ownership, the gosu drop and init signal forwarding. Once gosu setuids to# the openwa user the node/Chromium process keeps NO effective capabilities.# read_only rootfs (Chromium's profile lives on the writable /app/data volume;# HOME=/tmp + tmpfs absorb stray writes). no-new-privileges blocks setuid escalation.@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ services:- CHOWN # entrypoint: chown openwa /app/data on the named volume- DAC_OVERRIDE # entrypoint: chown across pre-existing files- FOWNER+ - KILL # dumb-init: forward signals to the openwa process after gosu drops uid- SETGID # gosu: drop to the openwa group- SETUID # gosu: drop to the openwa userread_only: truediff --git a/docs/12-troubleshooting-faq.md b/docs/12-troubleshooting-faq.mdindex 81a69c3b7..fe4579c2e 100644--- a/docs/12-troubleshooting-faq.md+++ b/docs/12-troubleshooting-faq.md@@ -1167,8 +1167,9 @@ npm run migration:run:main:prod # inside the released imageBy default the entrypoint starts as root, re-owns `/app/data` to the `openwa` user (uid/gid 997) onevery start, and then drops privileges with `gosu`. Keep that path intact:-- Keep the `CHOWN`, `DAC_OVERRIDE`, `FOWNER`, `SETGID` and `SETUID` entries under `cap_add` in- `docker-compose.yml`; the `chown` and the `gosu` drop need them.+- Keep the `CHOWN`, `DAC_OVERRIDE`, `FOWNER`, `KILL`, `SETGID` and `SETUID` entries under `cap_add` in+ `docker-compose.yml`; the entrypoint needs ownership and privilege-drop permissions, and+ `dumb-init` needs `KILL` to forward shutdown signals to the process after its UID changes.- Setting `user:` on `openwa-api` (or `--user` on `docker run`) starts the entrypoint as that uidinstead. It then skips the `chown` and the drop, so `/app/data` must already be writable by thatuid: `user: "997:997"` works on a volume a root start has already re-owned, and the `cap_add` listdiff --git a/scripts/check-chart-behaviour.mjs b/scripts/check-chart-behaviour.mjsindex 94c99cdc3..f3a475445 100644--- a/scripts/check-chart-behaviour.mjs+++ b/scripts/check-chart-behaviour.mjs@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ const check = (id, ok, detail) => results.push({ id, ok, detail });const problems = [podContext(byDefault) && 'the default render sets a pod securityContext',!addsCaps(byDefault) && 'the default render lost the capabilities the root entrypoint needs',+ !/^ {14}- KILL$/m.test(byKind(byDefault, 'StatefulSet')[0] ?? '') &&+ 'the root init cannot forward shutdown signals after the privilege drop',!/runAsNonRoot: true/.test(pod) && 'podSecurityContext.runAsNonRoot does not reach the pod spec',!/fsGroup: 997/.test(pod) && 'podSecurityContext.fsGroup does not reach the pod spec',// Without it the kubelet re-owns every file on the volume on every mount before the pod starts.diff --git a/scripts/smoke-test-non-root.sh b/scripts/smoke-test-non-root.shindex 79e04524f..d637321e2 100755--- a/scripts/smoke-test-non-root.sh+++ b/scripts/smoke-test-non-root.sh@@ -22,9 +22,13 @@ elsefiVOL=""+SIGNAL_CONTAINER=""# Only remove an image this script created — never one the caller handed us.cleanup() {+ if [ -n "$SIGNAL_CONTAINER" ]; then+ docker rm -f "$SIGNAL_CONTAINER" > /dev/null 2>&1 || true+ fiif [ -n "$VOL" ]; thendocker volume rm -f "$VOL" > /dev/null 2>&1 || truefi@@ -65,6 +69,37 @@ elseexit 1fi+echo ""+echo "==> Checking signal forwarding with Compose capabilities..."+CAPS=$(docker run --rm -i --entrypoint node "$IMAGE_TAG" -e \+ 'const fs=require("fs"),yaml=require("js-yaml");console.log(yaml.load(fs.readFileSync(0,"utf8")).services["openwa-api"].cap_add.join(" "))' < docker-compose.yml)+set --+for cap in $CAPS; do+ set -- "$@" --cap-add "$cap"+done+SIGNAL_CONTAINER=$(docker run -d --read-only --tmpfs /tmp --cap-drop ALL "$@" \+ --security-opt no-new-privileges "$IMAGE_TAG" node -e \+ 'const fs=require("fs");if(process.getuid()!==997||!/^CapEff:\s+0+$/m.test(fs.readFileSync("/proc/self/status","utf8")))process.exit(1);process.on("SIGTERM",()=>process.exit(0));console.log("signal-ready");setInterval(()=>{},1000)')+for attempt in 1 2 3 4 5; do+ if docker logs "$SIGNAL_CONTAINER" | grep -q '^signal-ready$'; then+ break+ fi+ if [ "$attempt" -eq 5 ]; then+ echo "FAIL: the non-root signal test did not become ready" >&2+ exit 1+ fi+ sleep 1+done+docker stop --time 5 "$SIGNAL_CONTAINER" > /dev/null+SIGNAL_EXIT=$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.ExitCode}}' "$SIGNAL_CONTAINER")+if [ "$SIGNAL_EXIT" != 0 ]; then+ echo "FAIL: the unprivileged process did not receive SIGTERM (exit $SIGNAL_EXIT)" >&2+ exit 1+fi+echo "PASS: init forwards SIGTERM and the non-root process has no effective capabilities"+docker rm "$SIGNAL_CONTAINER" > /dev/null+SIGNAL_CONTAINER=""+echo ""echo "==> Checking /app/data ownership on start..."VOL="openwa-smoke-data-$$"