Free, Open Source, Self-Hosted WhatsApp API Gateway
TypeScript apibotgatewayself-hostedwhatsappwhatsapp-apiwhatsapp-automationwhatsapp-botwhatsapp-gatewaywhatsapp-gateway-apiwhatsapp-webwhatsapp-web-api
fix(http): send CORS and request-id headers on body rejections
Yudhi Armyndharis472b2044fb39
diff --git a/src/configure-app.ts b/src/configure-app.tsindex 17dfd93bc..de7d36b84 100644--- a/src/configure-app.ts+++ b/src/configure-app.ts@@ -40,15 +40,19 @@ export interface AppliedBodyCaps {}/**- * Everything the production HTTP surface installs on the Express app: the in-flight body budget,- * the body parsers, request context, the CSP nonce, helmet, the SPA document handler and CORS.+ * Everything the production HTTP surface installs on the Express app: request context, the CSP+ * nonce, helmet, the SPA document handler, CORS, the in-flight body budget, the body parsers and the+ * trailing-slash DELETE refusal.** It lives here rather than inside bootstrap() so the e2e lane can run the SAME stack. main.ts* boots on import, so a suite cannot import it; the whole stack was therefore executed by nothing,* and the one suite that needed the document handler carried its own copy of it.** ORDER IS LOAD-BEARING. The budget must precede the parsers (a refused connection must not buffer- * a byte), and the nonce must precede helmet (the CSP directive reads res.locals.cspNonce).+ * a byte), and the nonce must precede helmet (the CSP directive reads res.locals.cspNonce). Request+ * context, helmet and CORS must precede both: the budget answers its 503/415 itself and a parser+ * error skips every later non-error middleware, so a rejection registered ahead of them reaches a+ * cross-origin browser as an opaque network error, without the request id.*/export function configureApp(app: INestApplication, options: ConfigureAppOptions = {}): AppliedBodyCaps {const dashboard: DashboardSource = options.dashboard ?? {@@ -56,71 +60,6 @@ export function configureApp(app: INestApplication, options: ConfigureAppOptionsenabled: dashboardServingEnabled && dashboardBuildPresent,};- // Aggregate in-flight body budget (DoS hardening): once too many body bytes are being buffered- // across ALL connections, new requests get 503 + Retry-After without their body being read.- // This is a deliberate PRE-GUARD: the throttler/auth guards run at the Nest routing layer —- // AFTER middleware and body buffering — so they can never stop slow-body memory pinning, and- // this must run BEFORE the body parser so a rejected connection never buffers a byte. The- // per-request BODY_SIZE_LIMIT below is a separate, unchanged cap on each admitted request.- const inflightBudgetBytes = resolveInflightBodyBudgetBytes(- process.env.INFLIGHT_BODY_BUDGET_BYTES,- process.env.BODY_SIZE_LIMIT,- );- // Cap request body size (DoS hardening). Media sends carry base64 in the JSON body,- // so the default is generous; tune with BODY_SIZE_LIMIT.- const bodyLimit = resolveBodyLimit(process.env.BODY_SIZE_LIMIT);- // Requests without a recognised API key share a pool of a quarter of the budget, never less than- // two BODY_SIZE_LIMIT bodies (half the default budget). With no AuthModule in the app (some test- // modules) every request is unrecognised, which is the stricter side.- // Looked up through ModuleRef: a failed app.get() aborts the process instead of throwing.- let keyIndex: ActiveKeyIndex | undefined;- try {- keyIndex = app.get(ModuleRef).get(ActiveKeyIndex, { strict: false });- } catch {- keyIndex = undefined;- }- app.use(- createInflightBodyBudget(inflightBudgetBytes, {- trustedProxies: (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES || '')- .split(',')- .map(p => p.trim())- .filter(Boolean),- classify: (req, clientIp) => keyIndex?.recognise(req.headers, clientIp),- bodyLimitBytes: parseBodyLimitBytes(bodyLimit),- requestTimeoutMs: resolveRequestTimeoutMs(process.env.REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),- }).middleware,- );- // The `verify` callback stashes the EXACT bytes json() received on req.rawBody, byte-identical to- // what a provider signed, so the @Public ingress controller can HMAC-verify over the raw body- // (JSON.stringify(req.body) is NOT byte-identical). Cheap for every route; non-ingress routes ignore it.- // `inflate: false` is a backstop, not the guard: the budget middleware above already refuses a- // compressed body with 415 before a byte is read. It sits here so a future reordering of these- // parsers relative to that middleware cannot silently reopen the gap — an inflated body is- // charged to the budget at its compressed size and bounded by nothing. Every other parser in the- // process must carry the same flag for that argument to hold; the MCP route-level fallback- // (src/modules/mcp/mcp.server.ts) does.- app.use(- json({- limit: bodyLimit,- inflate: false,- verify: (req: Request & { rawBody?: Buffer }, _res, buf) => {- req.rawBody = buf;- },- }),- );- app.use(- urlencoded({- extended: true,- limit: bodyLimit,- inflate: false,- // Form-encoded webhook providers also sign the exact wire bytes. Use the same capture contract- // as json(); other content types remain unsupported rather than installing a global catch-all.- verify: (req: Request & { rawBody?: Buffer }, _res, buf) => {- req.rawBody = buf;- },- }),- );-// Assign a request id to every inbound request (X-Request-ID), echo it on the response, and run// the whole downstream chain inside its scope so every log line + audit row carries it.app.use(requestContextMiddleware);@@ -258,6 +197,71 @@ export function configureApp(app: INestApplication, options: ConfigureAppOptionsmaxAge: 86400, // 24 hours});+ // Aggregate in-flight body budget (DoS hardening): once too many body bytes are being buffered+ // across ALL connections, new requests get 503 + Retry-After without their body being read.+ // This is a deliberate PRE-GUARD: the throttler/auth guards run at the Nest routing layer —+ // AFTER middleware and body buffering — so they can never stop slow-body memory pinning, and+ // this must run BEFORE the body parser so a rejected connection never buffers a byte. The+ // per-request BODY_SIZE_LIMIT below is a separate, unchanged cap on each admitted request.+ const inflightBudgetBytes = resolveInflightBodyBudgetBytes(+ process.env.INFLIGHT_BODY_BUDGET_BYTES,+ process.env.BODY_SIZE_LIMIT,+ );+ // Cap request body size (DoS hardening). Media sends carry base64 in the JSON body,+ // so the default is generous; tune with BODY_SIZE_LIMIT.+ const bodyLimit = resolveBodyLimit(process.env.BODY_SIZE_LIMIT);+ // Requests without a recognised API key share a pool of a quarter of the budget, never less than+ // two BODY_SIZE_LIMIT bodies (half the default budget). With no AuthModule in the app (some test+ // modules) every request is unrecognised, which is the stricter side.+ // Looked up through ModuleRef: a failed app.get() aborts the process instead of throwing.+ let keyIndex: ActiveKeyIndex | undefined;+ try {+ keyIndex = app.get(ModuleRef).get(ActiveKeyIndex, { strict: false });+ } catch {+ keyIndex = undefined;+ }+ app.use(+ createInflightBodyBudget(inflightBudgetBytes, {+ trustedProxies: (process.env.TRUSTED_PROXIES || '')+ .split(',')+ .map(p => p.trim())+ .filter(Boolean),+ classify: (req, clientIp) => keyIndex?.recognise(req.headers, clientIp),+ bodyLimitBytes: parseBodyLimitBytes(bodyLimit),+ requestTimeoutMs: resolveRequestTimeoutMs(process.env.REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),+ }).middleware,+ );+ // The `verify` callback stashes the EXACT bytes json() received on req.rawBody, byte-identical to+ // what a provider signed, so the @Public ingress controller can HMAC-verify over the raw body+ // (JSON.stringify(req.body) is NOT byte-identical). Cheap for every route; non-ingress routes ignore it.+ // `inflate: false` is a backstop, not the guard: the budget middleware above already refuses a+ // compressed body with 415 before a byte is read. It sits here so a future reordering of these+ // parsers relative to that middleware cannot silently reopen the gap — an inflated body is+ // charged to the budget at its compressed size and bounded by nothing. Every other parser in the+ // process must carry the same flag for that argument to hold; the MCP route-level fallback+ // (src/modules/mcp/mcp.server.ts) does.+ app.use(+ json({+ limit: bodyLimit,+ inflate: false,+ verify: (req: Request & { rawBody?: Buffer }, _res, buf) => {+ req.rawBody = buf;+ },+ }),+ );+ app.use(+ urlencoded({+ extended: true,+ limit: bodyLimit,+ inflate: false,+ // Form-encoded webhook providers also sign the exact wire bytes. Use the same capture contract+ // as json(); other content types remain unsupported rather than installing a global catch-all.+ verify: (req: Request & { rawBody?: Buffer }, _res, buf) => {+ req.rawBody = buf;+ },+ }),+ );+// A DELETE path ending in '/' names no resource. Non-strict routing would still match it to the// route without the slash, so a client that normalises `<parent>/<child>/..` down to `<parent>/`// would delete the parent. Only DELETE under /api/ is refused: a trailing slash on other methodsdiff --git a/test/configure-app.e2e-spec.ts b/test/configure-app.e2e-spec.tsindex e1dfab144..d9da8074a 100644--- a/test/configure-app.e2e-spec.ts+++ b/test/configure-app.e2e-spec.ts@@ -267,6 +267,31 @@ describe('production HTTP surface (configureApp)', () => {expect(res.status).toBe(415);});++ it('answers every body rejection with the CORS, helmet and request-id headers', async () => {+ const post = () =>+ request(app.getHttpServer())+ .post('/api/echo')+ .set('Content-Type', 'application/json')+ .set('Origin', 'https://allowed.example');+ const rejections = [+ await post().send('{bad'),+ await post().send({ blob: 'x'.repeat(1100 * 1024) }),+ await post()+ .set('Content-Length', String(8 * 1024 * 1024))+ .timeout({ deadline: 5000, response: 5000 })+ .send('{}'),+ await post().set('Content-Encoding', 'gzip').send('{}'),+ ];++ expect(rejections.map(res => res.status)).toEqual([400, 413, 503, 415]);+ for (const res of rejections) {+ // Without the CORS header a cross-origin browser sees an opaque network error, not the status.+ expect(res.headers['access-control-allow-origin']).toBe('https://allowed.example');+ expect(res.headers['x-request-id']).toBeDefined();+ expect(res.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');+ }+ });});describe('in-flight body budget tiers (configureApp)', () => {