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fix(events): refund an authenticated IPv6 handshake on its /64

Yudhi Armyndharisebffe2b0ac3c
diff --git a/src/modules/events/events.gateway.spec.ts b/src/modules/events/events.gateway.spec.ts
index beffd409a..da6b2a414 100644
--- a/src/modules/events/events.gateway.spec.ts
+++ b/src/modules/events/events.gateway.spec.ts
@@ -973,6 +973,24 @@ describe('EventsGateway rate limiting', () => {
const ipOf = ([, ctx]: [AuditAction, WarnContext?]): unknown =>
(ctx as { ipAddress?: string } | undefined)?.ipAddress;
+ it('refunds an authenticated handshake to the /64 bucket it was charged to', async () => {
+ // The charge lands on the /64; a refund keyed on the full address finds no bucket, so every
+ // authenticated connect from one IPv6 network would spend the shared window after all.
+ process.env.WS_RATE_LIMIT_HANDSHAKE_MAX = '2';
+ process.env.WS_RATE_LIMIT_HANDSHAKE_WINDOW_MS = '60000';
+ process.env.WS_MAX_SOCKETS_PER_KEY = '99';
+ authService.validateApiKey.mockResolvedValue({ id: 'k1', name: 'k', allowedSessions: null });
+ const gw = buildGateway();
+
+ const addresses = ['2001:db8:1:2::a', '2001:db8:1:2::a', '2001:db8:1:2::b', '2001:db8:1:2::c', '2001:db8:1:2::a'];
+ for (const [i, address] of addresses.entries()) {
+ const sock = makeSock(`ok${i}`, { apiKey: 'good' }, address);
+ await gw.handleConnection(asSocket(sock));
+ expect(sock.disconnect).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ }
+ expect(authService.validateApiKey).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(addresses.length);
+ });
+
it('shares the handshake window and the violation sample across a /64, keeping the real address', async () => {
process.env.WS_RATE_LIMIT_HANDSHAKE_MAX = '1';
authService.validateApiKey.mockRejectedValue(new Error('bad key'));
diff --git a/src/modules/events/events.gateway.ts b/src/modules/events/events.gateway.ts
index 5e6f6e0b7..b145b9882 100644
--- a/src/modules/events/events.gateway.ts
+++ b/src/modules/events/events.gateway.ts
@@ -308,11 +308,14 @@ export class EventsGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGate
// Resolve the client IP once here so the handshake throttle, the validation, and the
// audit trail all use the same trusted-proxy-aware value (parity with the REST guard / MCP mount).
const clientIp = this.resolveClientIp(client);
+ // The handshake bucket key: an IPv6 client is charged on its /64. The refund below must name the
+ // same bucket, or an authenticated IPv6 handshake is never given back.
+ const handshakeKey = limiterKeyForIp(clientIp);
// Pre-auth, per-IP handshake throttle. This must run BEFORE any credential handling: an
// unauthenticated handshake flood otherwise reaches the DB validateApiKey below on every
// attempt (same gap the MCP pre-auth IP throttle covers for the /mcp mount).
- if (!this.handshakeLimiter.allow(limiterKeyForIp(clientIp))) {
+ if (!this.handshakeLimiter.allow(handshakeKey)) {
this.logger.warn(`Client ${client.id} rejected: handshake rate limit exceeded (ip: ${clientIp})`);
this.noteRateLimitViolation('handshake', { ipAddress: clientIp });
client.emit('message', this.createError('RATE_LIMITED', 'Too many connection attempts, retry later'));
@@ -387,7 +390,7 @@ export class EventsGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGate
// handshakes, and authenticated connections stay bounded by maxSocketsPerKey above. Without
// this, every client behind one NAT/proxy IP shares a 10/min budget and normal dashboard
// re-mounts lock each other out.
- this.handshakeLimiter.refund(clientIp);
+ this.handshakeLimiter.refund(handshakeKey);
// The transport can close while validateApiKey is in flight, and Nest runs the disconnect
// handler before this one returns. That untrack found no key on client.data yet and did
// nothing, so the socket just tracked would stay in the per-key set for the life of the