Skip to content

Free, Open Source, Self-Hosted WhatsApp API Gateway

docs(plugins): say allowConfigHosts admits an https origin, not a host

Yudhi Armyndharisef336fa0ba92
diff --git a/docs/19-plugin-architecture.md b/docs/19-plugin-architecture.md
index 8538fcd99..ed9e1ac73 100644
--- a/docs/19-plugin-architecture.md
+++ b/docs/19-plugin-architecture.md
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ row), and the SDK major by the check applied to a manifest that declares `ingres
| `sessions` | — | Session ids this plugin may act on, or `['*']`. Absent = `['*']`. Static — editing config can't widen it |
| `sessionScoped` | — | Default `true`. A scoped plugin only sees events for the sessions it's activated for; `false` = always runs |
| `net.allow` | — | Outbound-HTTP host allowlist for `ctx.net.fetch` (`host`, `host:port`, or `'*'`). Absent = deny all, unless `net.allowConfigHosts` admits a host |
-| `net.allowConfigHosts` | — | Config keys holding an https URL; each URL's host is admitted at fetch time on top of `net.allow`, so an adapter can reach an operator-configured host without `net.allow: ['*']`. Credentialed or non-https values are ignored, and the SSRF guard still applies |
+| `net.allowConfigHosts` | — | Config keys holding an https URL; each URL's https origin (scheme, host and port) is admitted at fetch time on top of `net.allow`, so an adapter can reach an operator-configured host without `net.allow: ['*']`. Credentialed or non-https values are ignored, and the SSRF guard still applies |
| `sdkVersion` | — | Integration SDK `major` (or `major.minor`) the plugin was authored against. Absent = `'1'`. Only enforced for a manifest declaring `ingress`: a major other than `1` is refused at load |
| `minOpenWAVersion` | - | Oldest OpenWA release the plugin runs on (`MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH`). Install answers 400 and boot load fails when the running host is older; a malformed value is rejected. Absent or `null` = no floor |
| `ingress` | — | Inbound webhook routes this plugin claims (requires the `webhook:ingress` permission). Validated at load — route uniqueness, signature scheme, ack contract; see [25 — Integration Fabric](./25-integration-fabric.md) |
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ export interface PluginEngineReadCapability {
}
// ctx.net — requires 'net:fetch'. Always through the host SSRF guard, scoped to the effective host
-// allowlist (manifest net.allow + the hosts of the net.allowConfigHosts config keys).
+// allowlist (manifest net.allow + the https origins of the net.allowConfigHosts config keys).
export interface PluginNetCapability {
fetch(url: string, init?: PluginNetRequestInit): Promise<PluginNetResponse>;
}
@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ Two further checks apply on top of the permission:
way an out-of-scope session is never reachable. The `sessionId` comes from the plugin, so this is the
security boundary; the manifest half is static (editing config can't widen it).
- **Network allowlist.** `ctx.net.fetch` additionally requires the target host to be on the plugin's
- **effective** allowlist: `manifest.net.allow` plus the host of every `net.allowConfigHosts` config key
+ **effective** allowlist: `manifest.net.allow` plus the https origin of every `net.allowConfigHosts` config key
that resolves to an https URL, taken across the base config **and** every per-session override. A host
admitted only through `allowConfigHosts` is therefore allowed while absent from `net.allow`. The request
always passes through the SSRF guard (which blocks internal IPs even for an allowlisted host).