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docs(plugins): say allowConfigHosts admits an https origin, not a host
Yudhi Armyndharisef336fa0ba92
diff --git a/docs/19-plugin-architecture.md b/docs/19-plugin-architecture.mdindex 8538fcd99..ed9e1ac73 100644--- a/docs/19-plugin-architecture.md+++ b/docs/19-plugin-architecture.md@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ row), and the SDK major by the check applied to a manifest that declares `ingres| `sessions` | — | Session ids this plugin may act on, or `['*']`. Absent = `['*']`. Static — editing config can't widen it || `sessionScoped` | — | Default `true`. A scoped plugin only sees events for the sessions it's activated for; `false` = always runs || `net.allow` | — | Outbound-HTTP host allowlist for `ctx.net.fetch` (`host`, `host:port`, or `'*'`). Absent = deny all, unless `net.allowConfigHosts` admits a host |-| `net.allowConfigHosts` | — | Config keys holding an https URL; each URL's host is admitted at fetch time on top of `net.allow`, so an adapter can reach an operator-configured host without `net.allow: ['*']`. Credentialed or non-https values are ignored, and the SSRF guard still applies |+| `net.allowConfigHosts` | — | Config keys holding an https URL; each URL's https origin (scheme, host and port) is admitted at fetch time on top of `net.allow`, so an adapter can reach an operator-configured host without `net.allow: ['*']`. Credentialed or non-https values are ignored, and the SSRF guard still applies || `sdkVersion` | — | Integration SDK `major` (or `major.minor`) the plugin was authored against. Absent = `'1'`. Only enforced for a manifest declaring `ingress`: a major other than `1` is refused at load || `minOpenWAVersion` | - | Oldest OpenWA release the plugin runs on (`MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH`). Install answers 400 and boot load fails when the running host is older; a malformed value is rejected. Absent or `null` = no floor || `ingress` | — | Inbound webhook routes this plugin claims (requires the `webhook:ingress` permission). Validated at load — route uniqueness, signature scheme, ack contract; see [25 — Integration Fabric](./25-integration-fabric.md) |@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ export interface PluginEngineReadCapability {}// ctx.net — requires 'net:fetch'. Always through the host SSRF guard, scoped to the effective host-// allowlist (manifest net.allow + the hosts of the net.allowConfigHosts config keys).+// allowlist (manifest net.allow + the https origins of the net.allowConfigHosts config keys).export interface PluginNetCapability {fetch(url: string, init?: PluginNetRequestInit): Promise<PluginNetResponse>;}@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ Two further checks apply on top of the permission:way an out-of-scope session is never reachable. The `sessionId` comes from the plugin, so this is thesecurity boundary; the manifest half is static (editing config can't widen it).- **Network allowlist.** `ctx.net.fetch` additionally requires the target host to be on the plugin's- **effective** allowlist: `manifest.net.allow` plus the host of every `net.allowConfigHosts` config key+ **effective** allowlist: `manifest.net.allow` plus the https origin of every `net.allowConfigHosts` config keythat resolves to an https URL, taken across the base config **and** every per-session override. A hostadmitted only through `allowConfigHosts` is therefore allowed while absent from `net.allow`. The requestalways passes through the SSRF guard (which blocks internal IPs even for an allowlisted host).