Self-hosted, Self-Improving, Federated Everything App — dev management, agent orchestration, persistent mind, digital twin, second brain, and creative pipeline from a single dashboard over Tailscale to port the user into the OS
Security Audit Skill Template
Routing
Use when: The task requests a security audit or investigation of a vulnerability, injection, authentication, authorization, permissions, secrets or exposure. Don't use when: The task is ordinary code quality, performance work or a feature unrelated to security.
Task-Specific Guidelines
1. Establish the actual threat model
- Read the target repository's
AGENTS.md, security model and relevant decisions first; for PortOS, also readETHOS.md. Their accepted risks and deployment assumptions govern this audit. A managed app can have a different model from PortOS itself. - Identify the attacker, credential or capability they possess, reachable entry point, required configuration and harmful sink. Distinguish source tracing, synthetic reproduction and a demonstrated exploit; never present a mocked provider dispatch as proven command execution.
- Separate unauthorized callers from agents operating within an existing grant. For PortOS, verified owner sessions include delegated
PORTOS_API_TOKENagent sessions; genuine local connections qualify when authentication is disabled. Scoped federation credentials and remote password-free callers do not grant host authority. Legacy Basic holders already know the instance password and can sign in for a session; direct Basic refusal is credential-use policy, not isolation from that password holder. - Do not file a missing control solely because a generic checklist recommends it. PortOS's documented CORS, rate-limit and multi-tenant exceptions are not findings by themselves. Existing browser-relay, authentication and host-control checks still matter when a concrete path bypasses them.
2. Trace the boundary and preserve the workflow
- Inspect input validation, path/symlink containment, query and shell construction, secret handling, socket events and effective provider transport where relevant to the chosen slice.
- Follow fallback, resume/retry, queue and background paths through actual dispatch. A selected inference API may fall back to a tool-capable agent. A working directory, prompt fence or later render sandbox does not contain an earlier host agent.
- Prefer the smallest fix that refuses unauthorized effects while preserving granted capabilities and configured provider choices. Do not globally disable agent tools, require human approval or add per-action passwords to repair a missing network authorization check.
- In PortOS Music Video, configured authenticated agents may create, review art/storyboards/proofs, resolve feedback, render and prepare final drafts without human intervention. Creative review requires exact revisions, genuine inspection evidence and audit identity. The human-only media action is public Suno publication or social-media posting; private draft preparation and final-file rendering are not publication.
- Preserve provider permissions, quotas and budgets. A workflow grant does not authorize unrequested purchases or spending beyond configured limits.
- Name any collateral restriction explicitly. Gating a deterministic or provably inference-only branch can be a deliberate policy choice; it is not evidence that the branch executes host tools. If a branch remains open, prove that fallback and deferred work cannot escape that boundary.
3. Report actionable findings
For each finding, include:
- Evidence: Entry and sink file/line references, current revision and relevant existing issues or fixes.
- Threat and prerequisites: Caller authority, configuration, required state and plausible harm. Qualify severity accordingly.
- Validation and limits: What ran, what was mocked, and what remains source-traced. Use synthetic data; never expose real credentials, private records or machine identity.
- Chosen fix: A concrete, bounded implementation with explicit allowed workflows and any compatibility or policy tradeoff.
- Regression checks: Unauthorized refusal before effects and successful authorized operation, including authenticated agents, plus materially different fallback/deferred paths. Preserve separate revision, evidence, budget and publication checks.
4. Respect the requested delivery scope
- A read-only audit does not authorize code changes, issue edits, credentials, live-data mutations or external posts. Follow the active task's instructions.
- During authorized remediation, fix bounded defects and capture deferred work through the owning repository's issue conventions. Severity does not independently expand authorization.
- Review the final diff for workflow regressions and sensitive content, run appropriate checks, and report the remaining limitations. Use the repository's commit and PR conventions.
Example: Host authority without a supervision gate
A password-free remote caller can trigger an enabled coding agent through a media-authoring route. A synthetic mounted test proves dispatch is reachable; actual destructive model behavior is not executed. Add the existing host-authority gate before record/queue/provider effects and test refusal for unauthorized callers. Verify that a delegated agent session, an ordinary owner session and genuine local password-free access retain generation with the same provider choices. Creative review keeps its revision and evidence checks; final public Suno publication and social posts stay human-only.