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/**
* Network-isolation contract for generated preview browsers (#11157).
*
* A fresh srcdoc realm gets its own constructors, so a page CSP and a
* constructor freeze in the original document do not stop WebRTC, DNS, or a
* nested navigation. The preview browser therefore runs under an OS mechanism
* that denies IP networking, with Chrome flags only as defense in depth.
* Firefox, WebKit, and hosts without Seatbelt or bubblewrap are unsupported:
* callers fail closed instead of executing generated HTML in the user's browser.
*
* Pure: no filesystem, process, or settings access.
*/
export const PREVIEW_SEATBELT = '/usr/bin/sandbox-exec';
export const PREVIEW_BUBBLEWRAP = '/usr/bin/bwrap';
// Header policy for a generated page whose scripts and media are same-origin
// files or data/blob URLs. connect-src and frame-src stay closed; the OS jail
// is what actually stops UDP and a fresh realm that ignores this policy.
export const PREVIEW_PAGE_CSP = [
'sandbox allow-scripts',
"default-src 'none'",
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
"img-src 'self' data: blob:",
"font-src 'self' data:",
"media-src 'self' data: blob:",
"connect-src 'none'",
"frame-src 'none'",
"worker-src 'none'",
"object-src 'none'",
"base-uri 'none'",
"form-action 'none'",
].join('; ');
/**
* Chrome arguments for one private preview profile.
* `denyNetwork` adds the flags that block proxied UDP and DNS. They are not
* the boundary: a test proves the OS jail with those flags absent on the
* negative control, and present only on the jailed launch. `dropSandbox` adds
* `--no-sandbox` because Chrome's own `sandbox_init` returns EPERM inside
* Seatbelt or bubblewrap and the renderer then crashes. The outer jail is the
* egress boundary.
*/
export function _previewChromeArgs(profileDir, { denyNetwork = true, dropSandbox = false } = {}) {
return [
'--headless=new',
...(dropSandbox ? ['--no-sandbox'] : []),
'--remote-debugging-pipe',
...(denyNetwork ? [
'--force-webrtc-ip-handling-policy=disable_non_proxied_udp',
'--host-resolver-rules=MAP * ~NOTFOUND',
'--proxy-server=http://127.0.0.1:9',
] : []),
'--disable-background-networking',
'--disable-background-timer-throttling',
'--disable-backgrounding-occluded-windows',
'--disable-renderer-backgrounding',
'--disable-component-update',
'--disable-sync',
'--disable-breakpad',
'--no-first-run',
'--no-default-browser-check',
'--mute-audio',
`--user-data-dir=${profileDir}`,
'about:blank',
];
}
/**
* Seatbelt profile: allow Chrome's normal process and file needs, then deny
* IP networking. Last matching rule wins. Unix sockets are allowed again after
* `(deny network*)` so the browser can bind its own helper sockets. The system
* resolver socket stays denied: `getaddrinfo` would otherwise ask mDNSResponder,
* outside the jail, to send the DNS query.
*/
export function _previewSeatbeltProfile() {
return `(version 1)
(allow default)
(deny network*)
(deny system-socket (socket-domain AF_INET))
(deny system-socket (socket-domain AF_INET6))
(allow system-socket (socket-domain AF_UNIX))
(allow system-socket (socket-domain AF_SYSTEM))
(allow network-bind (local unix-socket))
(allow network-inbound (local unix-socket))
(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket))
(deny network-outbound
(literal "/private/var/run/mDNSResponder")
(literal "/var/run/mDNSResponder")
(remote unix-socket (path-literal "/private/var/run/mDNSResponder"))
(remote unix-socket (path-literal "/var/run/mDNSResponder")))
(deny mach-lookup
(global-name "com.apple.mDNSResponder"
"com.apple.mDNSResponder.helper"
"com.apple.dnssd.service"))
`;
}
/** Host resolver sockets an empty network namespace does not hide. */
export const PREVIEW_HOST_RESOLVER_SOCKETS = [
'/run/systemd/resolve/io.systemd.Resolve',
'/run/systemd/resolve/io.systemd.Resolve.Monitor',
'/run/nscd/socket',
'/var/run/nscd/socket',
'/run/avahi-daemon/socket',
'/var/run/avahi-daemon/socket',
];
/**
* bubblewrap argv after the bwrap binary. The network namespace is empty.
* `hostResolverSockets` are paths that exist on this host; each is covered
* with `/dev/null` so glibc cannot ask the host resolver to send DNS.
*/
export function _previewBubblewrapArgs(executable, chromeArgs, hostResolverSockets = []) {
const covers = [];
for (const path of hostResolverSockets) {
covers.push('--ro-bind-try', '/dev/null', path);
}
return [
'--unshare-net',
'--die-with-parent',
'--bind', '/', '/',
'--dev-bind', '/dev', '/dev',
'--proc', '/proc',
...covers,
'--',
executable,
...chromeArgs,
];
}
/**
* How to spawn the preview browser, or a refusal. `isolation: 'off'` is the
* negative control used by the egress test (no OS jail and no network flags).
* Production previews pass `'required'`. `'os'` is the collector proof: the same
* jail, without Chrome's network flags, so silence is attributable to the OS.
*/
export function previewIsolationPlan({
platform,
seatbeltAvailable,
bubblewrapAvailable,
executable,
profileDir,
dropSandbox = false,
isolation = 'required',
hostResolverSockets = [],
}) {
const denyNetwork = isolation !== 'off' && isolation !== 'os';
const chromeArgs = _previewChromeArgs(profileDir, { denyNetwork, dropSandbox });
if (isolation === 'off') {
return { supported: true, mechanism: 'none', command: executable, args: chromeArgs, reason: null };
}
if (platform === 'darwin' && seatbeltAvailable) {
return {
supported: true,
mechanism: 'macos-seatbelt',
command: PREVIEW_SEATBELT,
args: ['-p', _previewSeatbeltProfile(), executable, ...chromeArgs],
reason: null,
};
}
if (platform === 'linux' && bubblewrapAvailable) {
return {
supported: true,
mechanism: 'linux-bubblewrap',
command: PREVIEW_BUBBLEWRAP,
args: _previewBubblewrapArgs(executable, chromeArgs, hostResolverSockets),
reason: null,
};
}
const reason = platform === 'darwin'
? 'macOS Seatbelt (/usr/bin/sandbox-exec) is unavailable, so generated previews cannot run.'
: platform === 'linux'
? 'Linux bubblewrap (/usr/bin/bwrap) is unavailable, so generated previews cannot run.'
: `Generated previews have no enforced network isolation on ${platform}. Firefox and WebKit are not used.`;
return { supported: false, mechanism: null, command: null, args: [], reason };
}