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fix: block host Unix sockets and extra writable roots in autofixer repairs (#12487)
[._.]/ Adam Eivy475d13832ae9
diff --git a/autofixer/sandbox.js b/autofixer/sandbox.jsindex 8495980b7c..a7fdce99f4 100644--- a/autofixer/sandbox.js+++ b/autofixer/sandbox.js@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ import {} from '../server/lib/codeAnimationContainment.js';import {autofixVerifyBubblewrapArgs, autofixVerifyEnv, autofixVerifyProtectedPaths, autofixVerifySeatbeltProfile,+ autofixVerifySeccompFilter,} from '../server/lib/autofixVerifyContainment.js';// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------@@ -472,6 +473,9 @@ export async function probeVerifyContainment() {return codeAnimationContainmentMechanism('darwin', await canExecute(CODE_ANIMATION_SEATBELT));}if (process.platform !== 'linux') return codeAnimationContainmentMechanism(process.platform, false);+ if (!['x64', 'arm64'].includes(process.arch)) {+ return codeAnimationContainmentMechanism('linux', false, { reason: 'the verify seccomp filter requires x64 or arm64' });+ }if (!(await canExecute(CODE_ANIMATION_BUBBLEWRAP))) {return codeAnimationContainmentMechanism('linux', false, { reason: 'install bubblewrap (/usr/bin/bwrap) to verify autofixes' });}@@ -487,13 +491,15 @@ export async function probeVerifyContainment() {// Run a contained command as its own process group so a timeout reaches every// process the test runner started, not just the sandbox launcher.-function runGroup(file, args, { cwd, env, timeoutMs }) {+function runGroup(file, args, { cwd, env, timeoutMs, seccomp = null }) {return new Promise((resolve) => {let output = '';let settled = false;let child;try {- child = spawn(file, args, { cwd, env, detached: true, windowsHide: true, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });+ child = spawn(file, args, {+ cwd, env, detached: true, windowsHide: true, stdio: seccomp ? ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] : ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],+ });} catch (err) {resolve({ ok: false, code: -1, output: `[verify] ${err.message}` });return;@@ -506,6 +512,12 @@ function runGroup(file, args, { cwd, env, timeoutMs }) {killGroup();done({ ok: false, code: -1, output: `${output}\n[verify] timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms` });}, timeoutMs);+ if (seccomp) {+ // bwrap reads the filter from fd 3; a refused setup can close it early,+ // which surfaces as bwrap's nonzero exit.+ child.stdio[3].on('error', () => {});+ child.stdio[3].end(seccomp);+ }child.stdout?.on('data', (d) => { output += d.toString(); });child.stderr?.on('data', (d) => { output += d.toString(); });child.on('error', (err) => done({ ok: false, code: -1, output: `${output}\n[verify] ${err.message}` }));@@ -519,7 +531,7 @@ function runGroup(file, args, { cwd, env, timeoutMs }) {* command string is trusted config, but the files it executes (tests, npm* lifecycle scripts) were just written by an agent driven by untrusted logs,* so it runs only under OS containment (`autofixVerifyContainment.js`): no- * network, writes confined to the worktree and a private scratch dir, no reads+ * network or host Unix sockets, writes confined to the worktree and a private scratch dir, no reads* of the PortOS data directory or host credential stores, and an environment* built from nothing — no provider key or PortOS token. Without an enforced* mechanism the verify is refused, which blocks promotion.@@ -550,9 +562,11 @@ export async function runVerifyCommand(command, cwd, { dataDir = null, timeoutMsconst env = autofixVerifyEnv({ scratch, path: process.env.PATH });const shell = ['/bin/sh', '-c', command];let launch;+ let seccomp = null;if (mechanism.id === 'macos-seatbelt') {launch = [CODE_ANIMATION_SEATBELT, ['-p', autofixVerifySeatbeltProfile({ worktree, scratch, protectedPaths }), ...shell]];} else {+ seccomp = autofixVerifySeccompFilter(process.arch);const present = await Promise.all(protectedPaths.map(async (path) => [path, await stat(path).catch(() => null)]));const bwrapArgs = autofixVerifyBubblewrapArgs({worktree, scratch, env,@@ -561,7 +575,7 @@ export async function runVerifyCommand(command, cwd, { dataDir = null, timeoutMs});launch = [CODE_ANIMATION_BUBBLEWRAP, [...bwrapArgs, ...shell]];}- const result = await runGroup(launch[0], launch[1], { cwd: worktree, env, timeoutMs });+ const result = await runGroup(launch[0], launch[1], { cwd: worktree, env, timeoutMs, seccomp });return { ...result, contained: true, mechanism: mechanism.id };} finally {await rm(scratchDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});diff --git a/autofixer/sandbox.test.js b/autofixer/sandbox.test.jsindex 61620a68f6..e3994ebd87 100644--- a/autofixer/sandbox.test.js+++ b/autofixer/sandbox.test.js@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ describe('buildFixPrompt — untrusted log fencing', () => {});describe('pickRepairProvider — only an enforced restricted mode runs a repair', () => {- const claude = { id: 'claude-code', type: 'cli', command: 'claude', args: ['--print', '--dangerously-skip-permissions', '--allowedTools', 'Bash'] };- const codex = { id: 'codex', type: 'cli', command: 'codex', args: ['--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox', '--sandbox', 'danger-full-access'] };+ const claude = { id: 'claude-code', type: 'cli', command: 'claude', args: ['--print', '--dangerously-skip-permissions', '--allowedTools', 'Bash', '--add-dir', '/example/live'] };+ const codex = { id: 'codex', type: 'cli', command: 'codex', args: ['--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox', '--sandbox', 'danger-full-access', '--add-dir', '/example/live', '-C', '/example/live'] };const gemini = { id: 'gemini-cli', type: 'cli', command: 'gemini', args: ['--yolo'] };const agy = { id: 'antigravity-cli', type: 'cli', command: 'agy', args: ['--print', '--dangerously-skip-permissions'] };// The argv the runner actually spawns: buildCliArgs over the restricted clone.@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ describe('pickRepairProvider — only an enforced restricted mode runs a repair'const argv = spawnedArgv(picked);expect(argv).not.toContain('--dangerously-skip-permissions');expect(argv).not.toContain('--allowedTools');+ expect(argv).not.toContain('/example/live');expect(argv.join(' ')).toContain('--permission-mode acceptEdits');expect(argv.join(' ')).toContain('--setting-sources user');expect(argv.join(' ')).toContain('--disallowedTools Bash WebFetch WebSearch');@@ -206,7 +207,8 @@ describe('pickRepairProvider — only an enforced restricted mode runs a repair'expect(argv[0]).toBe('exec');expect(argv).not.toContain('--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox');expect(argv).not.toContain('danger-full-access');- expect(argv.join(' ')).toContain('--sandbox workspace-write -c sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=false');+ expect(argv).not.toContain('/example/live');+ expect(argv.join(' ')).toContain('--sandbox workspace-write -c sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=false -c sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots=[]');expect(argv.at(-1)).toBe('-');});});diff --git a/autofixer/sandbox.verify.test.js b/autofixer/sandbox.verify.test.jsindex 7332c0855d..db59891043 100644--- a/autofixer/sandbox.verify.test.js+++ b/autofixer/sandbox.verify.test.js@@ -15,9 +15,13 @@ describe.skipIf(!mechanism.supported)(`runVerifyCommand under ${mechanism.id ||let outside;let server;let port;+ let unixServer;+ let socketPath;beforeAll(async () => {- root = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'autofix-verify-real-'));+ // Linux hides /tmp and /run behind tmpfs; /var/tmp keeps the socket below+ // reachable through the read-only root, so the seccomp filter is what's tested.+ root = await mkdtemp(join(process.platform === 'linux' ? '/var/tmp' : tmpdir(), 'autofix-verify-real-'));dataDir = join(root, 'data');worktree = join(dataDir, 'autofixer', 'worktrees', 'example');outside = join(root, 'outside');@@ -27,11 +31,16 @@ describe.skipIf(!mechanism.supported)(`runVerifyCommand under ${mechanism.id ||server = createServer((socket) => socket.end('reached'));await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));port = server.address().port;+ // A host pathname socket (Docker, a database) outside every writable root.+ socketPath = join(outside, 's.sock');+ unixServer = createServer((socket) => socket.end('reached'));+ await new Promise((resolve) => unixServer.listen(socketPath, resolve));});afterAll(async () => {vi.unstubAllEnvs();await new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));+ await new Promise((resolve) => unixServer.close(resolve));await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true });});@@ -53,6 +62,8 @@ describe.skipIf(!mechanism.supported)(`runVerifyCommand under ${mechanism.id ||expect(result.output).not.toMatch(new RegExp(`^HOME=${process.env.HOME}$`, 'm'));});+ const connectProbe = (target) => `${JSON.stringify(process.execPath)} -e "require('net').connect(${target}).on('data', (d) => { console.log(String(d)); process.exit(0); }).on('error', () => process.exit(3))"`;+it('cannot write outside the worktree, read the PortOS data directory, or reach loopback', async () => {const write = await verify(`echo x > ${JSON.stringify(join(outside, 'escaped'))}`);expect(write.ok).toBe(false);@@ -62,8 +73,14 @@ describe.skipIf(!mechanism.supported)(`runVerifyCommand under ${mechanism.id ||expect(read.ok).toBe(false);expect(read.output).not.toContain('example-provider-key');- const net = await verify(`${JSON.stringify(process.execPath)} -e "require('net').connect(${port}, '127.0.0.1').on('data', (d) => { console.log(String(d)); process.exit(0); }).on('error', () => process.exit(3))"`);+ const net = await verify(connectProbe(`${port}, '127.0.0.1'`));expect(net.ok).toBe(false);expect(net.output).not.toContain('reached');});++ it('cannot connect to a host pathname Unix socket', async () => {+ const unix = await verify(connectProbe(`'${socketPath}'`));+ expect(unix.ok).toBe(false);+ expect(unix.output).not.toContain('reached');+ });});diff --git a/server/lib/autofixVerifyContainment.js b/server/lib/autofixVerifyContainment.jsindex f58ae3df68..ac0f581d44 100644--- a/server/lib/autofixVerifyContainment.js+++ b/server/lib/autofixVerifyContainment.js@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@* (`codeAnimationContainment.js`) cannot host it; this profile keeps the same* mechanisms (macOS Seatbelt, Linux bubblewrap, refusal elsewhere) with these* bounds instead:- * - no network, including loopback and Unix sockets (PortOS's API);+ * - no network, including loopback and pathname Unix sockets (PortOS's API,+ * a Docker or database socket): Seatbelt denies them, and on Linux a+ * network namespace plus a seccomp filter refusing AF_UNIX sockets;* - writes only to the worktree and a private scratch home/tmp;* - no reads of the PortOS data directory (providers, settings, keys) or the* host user's credential stores; the rest of the host stays readable so@@ -19,7 +21,7 @@* Pure: no filesystem, process or settings access. Paths must be realpaths.*/import { join, posix } from 'node:path';-import { seatbeltPathLiteral } from './codeAnimationContainment.js';+import { encodeSeccompProgram, seatbeltPathLiteral } from './codeAnimationContainment.js';/** Host-user credential stores, relative to the real home directory. */export const AUTOFIX_VERIFY_PROTECTED_HOME_PATHS = Object.freeze([@@ -72,14 +74,40 @@ ${denied ? `(deny file-read* ${denied})\n` : ''}(allow file-read* (subpath ${lit}/**- * bubblewrap argv up to the command. `protectedDirs` / `protectedFiles` must+ * Linux seccomp program for the verify command: `socket(AF_UNIX, …)` fails+ * with EPERM, so a host pathname socket visible through the read-only root+ * cannot be connected to. `socketpair` (child-process stdio) stays allowed.+ * Unknown ABIs (including x32) are killed rather than bypassing the check.+ */+export function autofixVerifySeccompFilter(arch) {+ const abi = { x64: { audit: 0xc000003e, socket: 41 }, arm64: { audit: 0xc00000b7, socket: 198 } }[arch];+ if (!abi) throw new Error('Autofix verify seccomp supports only x64 and arm64.');+ const ALLOW = 0x7fff0000, KILL = 0x80000000, EPERM = 0x00050001, AF_UNIX = 1;+ return encodeSeccompProgram([+ [0x20, 0, 0, 4], // seccomp_data.arch+ [0x15, 1, 0, abi.audit],+ [0x06, 0, 0, KILL],+ [0x20, 0, 0, 0], // seccomp_data.nr+ [0x35, 0, 1, 0x40000000], // x32/invalid syscall range+ [0x06, 0, 0, KILL],+ [0x15, 0, 3, abi.socket],+ [0x20, 0, 0, 16], // socket domain, args[0] low word+ [0x15, 0, 1, AF_UNIX],+ [0x06, 0, 0, EPERM],+ [0x06, 0, 0, ALLOW],+ ]);+}++/**+ * bubblewrap argv up to the command; the caller writes+ * `autofixVerifySeccompFilter` to fd 3. `protectedDirs` / `protectedFiles` must* exist (bwrap mounts over them): directories become empty tmpfs, files* become /dev/null. The worktree and scratch are bound writable last.*/export function autofixVerifyBubblewrapArgs({ worktree, scratch, env, protectedDirs = [], protectedFiles = [] }) {const args = [- '--unshare-all', '--die-with-parent', '--new-session', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', '--clearenv',- '--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '--proc', '/proc', '--tmpfs', '/tmp',+ '--unshare-all', '--die-with-parent', '--new-session', '--cap-drop', 'ALL', '--clearenv', '--seccomp', '3',+ '--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '--proc', '/proc', '--tmpfs', '/tmp', '--tmpfs', '/run',];for (const dir of protectedDirs) args.push('--tmpfs', dir);for (const file of protectedFiles) args.push('--ro-bind', '/dev/null', file);diff --git a/server/lib/codeAnimationContainment.js b/server/lib/codeAnimationContainment.jsindex ede98a4b52..92d1c20d3e 100644--- a/server/lib/codeAnimationContainment.js+++ b/server/lib/codeAnimationContainment.js@@ -185,6 +185,11 @@ export function codeAnimationSeccompFilter(arch) {[0x06, 0, 0, EPERM],[0x06, 0, 0, ALLOW],];+ return encodeSeccompProgram(instructions);+}++/** Encode classic BPF `[code, jt, jf, k]` instructions as a `struct sock_filter` array. */+export function encodeSeccompProgram(instructions) {const bytes = Buffer.alloc(instructions.length * 8);instructions.forEach(([code, jt, jf, k], index) => {bytes.writeUInt16LE(code, index * 8);diff --git a/server/lib/providerModels.js b/server/lib/providerModels.jsindex cc4da40712..cbdd492c2f 100644--- a/server/lib/providerModels.js+++ b/server/lib/providerModels.js@@ -727,9 +727,10 @@ export function buildEffortArgs(effort, provider, existingArgs = [], model = nul// edit rather than a four-builder grep.export const CODEX_UPDATE_CHECK_KEY = 'check_for_update_on_startup';export const CODEX_AGENT_THREADS_KEY = 'agents.max_concurrent_threads_per_session';-// Forced off for autofixer repairs (#12487) so a user config cannot open the-// workspace-write sandbox to the network.+// Forced off/empty for autofixer repairs (#12487) so a user config cannot open+// the workspace-write sandbox to the network or to writes outside the cwd.export const CODEX_WORKSPACE_NETWORK_KEY = 'sandbox_workspace_write.network_access';+export const CODEX_WORKSPACE_WRITABLE_ROOTS_KEY = 'sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots';/*** Give a Codex swarm enough session threads for its root orchestrator plus@@ -810,6 +811,7 @@ export const PORTOS_CLI_CONFIG_KEYS = Object.freeze([CODEX_EFFORT_KEY,CODEX_UPDATE_CHECK_KEY,CODEX_WORKSPACE_NETWORK_KEY,+ CODEX_WORKSPACE_WRITABLE_ROOTS_KEY,]);/**diff --git a/server/lib/providerModels.test.js b/server/lib/providerModels.test.jsindex 278dd7d1fc..c477fabe1d 100644--- a/server/lib/providerModels.test.js+++ b/server/lib/providerModels.test.js@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ import {PORTOS_CLI_CONFIG_KEYS,CODEX_AGENT_THREADS_KEY,CODEX_WORKSPACE_NETWORK_KEY,+ CODEX_WORKSPACE_WRITABLE_ROOTS_KEY,isPortosSuppliedConfigKey,hasCodexUpdateCheckConfig,buildCodexStartupArgs,@@ -750,6 +751,7 @@ describe('providerModels', () => {CODEX_EFFORT_KEY,CODEX_UPDATE_CHECK_KEY,CODEX_WORKSPACE_NETWORK_KEY,+ CODEX_WORKSPACE_WRITABLE_ROOTS_KEY,].sort());// Guard against a third emitter appearing without a row: both builders// that produce `-c` are asserted to use a listed key.diff --git a/server/lib/providerVendors.js b/server/lib/providerVendors.jsindex 4e3e411784..773d06835c 100644--- a/server/lib/providerVendors.js+++ b/server/lib/providerVendors.js@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ import {OPENCODE_BUILD_AGENT,applyLeanClaudeArgs,CODEX_WORKSPACE_NETWORK_KEY,+ CODEX_WORKSPACE_WRITABLE_ROOTS_KEY,} from './providerModels.js';import {isCodexCommand,@@ -1152,9 +1153,12 @@ const CLAUDE_REPAIR_ARGS = ['--setting-sources', 'user','--disallowedTools', 'Bash', 'WebFetch', 'WebSearch',];-// Codex's OS sandbox: writes confined to the working directory, network off-// even when the user's config.toml enables it for workspace-write.-const CODEX_REPAIR_ARGS = ['--sandbox', 'workspace-write', '-c', `${CODEX_WORKSPACE_NETWORK_KEY}=false`];+// Codex's OS sandbox: writes confined to the working directory, with network+// and extra writable roots forced off even when the user's config.toml sets them.+const CODEX_REPAIR_ARGS = [+ '--sandbox', 'workspace-write',+ '-c', `${CODEX_WORKSPACE_NETWORK_KEY}=false`, '-c', `${CODEX_WORKSPACE_WRITABLE_ROOTS_KEY}=[]`,+];/*** Saved provider argv for a file-editing repair driven by untrusted input@@ -1172,13 +1176,14 @@ export function restrictedRepairArgs(provider) {const saved = stripApprovalBypassArgs(Array.isArray(provider.args) ? provider.args : []).args;if (isClaudeCommand(command)) {const cleared = dropOptions(- dropOptions(saved, ['--allowedTools', '--allowed-tools', '--disallowedTools', '--disallowed-tools', '--mcp-config'], { variadic: true }),+ dropOptions(saved, ['--allowedTools', '--allowed-tools', '--disallowedTools', '--disallowed-tools', '--mcp-config', '--add-dir'], { variadic: true }),['--permission-mode', '--setting-sources'],).filter((arg) => arg !== '--strict-mcp-config');return { mode: 'claude-disallowed-tools', args: [...cleared, ...CLAUDE_REPAIR_ARGS] };}if (isCodexCommand(command)) {- const cleared = dropOptions(saved, ['--sandbox', '-s']);+ // --add-dir widens the writable roots; --cd moves the workspace root itself.+ const cleared = dropOptions(saved, ['--sandbox', '-s', '--add-dir', '--cd', '-C']);// Options must follow the subcommand; the builder appends `exec` only when absent.const withExec = cleared.includes('exec') ? cleared : ['exec', ...cleared];return { mode: 'codex-workspace-write', args: [...withExec, ...CODEX_REPAIR_ARGS] };