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fix: deny git --output and global options on the unattended lane

[._.]/ Adam Eivy624867ad017b
diff --git a/server/lib/commandSecurity.js b/server/lib/commandSecurity.js
index 2a4dd80bf6..6942875c66 100644
--- a/server/lib/commandSecurity.js
+++ b/server/lib/commandSecurity.js
@@ -186,6 +186,13 @@ const GIT_TAG_MUTATING_FLAGS = new Set(['-d', '--delete', '-a', '--annotate', '-
const GIT_LIST_MODE_FLAGS = new Set(['-l', '--list', '--contains', '--no-contains', '--points-at', '--merged', '--no-merged']);
const GIT_REMOTE_READ_VERBS = new Set(['show', 'get-url']);
+// `--output[=<file>]` on log/show/diff (and any verb sharing diff-options)
+// writes the command's output to an arbitrary path — the same file-write
+// primitive `find -fprint*` is denied for below (#12020). Checked for every
+// verb rather than per verb so a newly allowlisted verb cannot inherit it.
+// `--output-indicator-*` only changes diff markers and is not matched.
+const GIT_OUTPUT_FLAG = '--output';
+
// `find` action flags: `-delete` removes files and `-exec`/`-ok` family runs
// arbitrary binaries, which would defeat the allowlist entirely. `-f*print*`
// writes attacker-chosen files. Everything else (`-name`, `-type`, `-maxdepth`,
@@ -218,10 +225,20 @@ function isGitRefListing(sub, rest) {
function validateUnattendedGit(args) {
const sub = args[0];
if (!sub) return deny("'git' needs a read-only subcommand on the unattended lane.");
+ // Global options (`-c key=val`, `--git-dir`, `--work-tree`, `--exec-path`,
+ // `--config-env`, `-C`) precede the verb and reconfigure what it runs
+ // against; the verb must be the first argument.
+ if (sub.startsWith('-')) {
+ return deny(`'git ${sub}' is not allowed on the unattended lane — global options before the subcommand are rejected; the first argument must be a read-only verb.`);
+ }
if (!UNATTENDED_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS.has(sub)) {
return deny(`'git ${sub}' is not allowed on the unattended lane — only read-only inspection subcommands are: ${[...UNATTENDED_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS].sort().join(', ')}.`);
}
const rest = args.slice(1);
+ const outputFlag = rest.find(a => a === GIT_OUTPUT_FLAG || a.startsWith(`${GIT_OUTPUT_FLAG}=`));
+ if (outputFlag) {
+ return deny(`'git ${sub} ${outputFlag}' is not allowed on the unattended lane — '--output' writes command output to a file.`);
+ }
if (sub === 'config' && !rest.some(a => GIT_CONFIG_READ_FLAGS.has(a))) {
return deny("'git config' is only allowed in its read form on the unattended lane (e.g. 'git config --get <key>').");
}
diff --git a/server/lib/commandSecurity.test.js b/server/lib/commandSecurity.test.js
index 1a2a671a35..b1f3ee63d5 100644
--- a/server/lib/commandSecurity.test.js
+++ b/server/lib/commandSecurity.test.js
@@ -448,6 +448,34 @@ describe('commandSecurity', () => {
expect(validateUnattendedCommand(cmd).valid).toBe(false)
})
+ // `--output[=<file>]` is a file-write primitive on a lane documented as
+ // read-only — the same class `find -fprint` is denied for (#12020).
+ it.each([
+ 'git log --output=notes.txt',
+ 'git diff --output=notes.txt',
+ 'git show --output=notes.txt',
+ 'git log --oneline --output notes.txt',
+ ])('rejects git --output file write: %s', (cmd) => {
+ const result = validateUnattendedCommand(cmd)
+ expect(result.valid).toBe(false)
+ expect(result.error).toMatch(/--output/)
+ })
+
+ it('still accepts --output-indicator-* on git diff (a marker option, not a file write)', () => {
+ expect(validateUnattendedCommand('git diff --output-indicator-new=+').valid).toBe(true)
+ })
+
+ it.each([
+ ['-c injects config such as core.pager or a credential helper', 'git -c core.pager=less log'],
+ ['--git-dir retargets the repository', 'git --git-dir=../other/.git log'],
+ ['--work-tree retargets the checkout', 'git --work-tree=../other status'],
+ ['--exec-path swaps the git binaries', 'git --exec-path=/opt/evil log'],
+ ])('rejects a global option before the verb: %s', (_label, cmd) => {
+ const result = validateUnattendedCommand(cmd)
+ expect(result.valid).toBe(false)
+ expect(result.error).toMatch(/global options before the subcommand/)
+ })
+
it.each([
['-delete removes files', 'find . -delete'],
// The `{}` / `;` form is already caught by the metacharacter filter, so this