Skip to content

Force Proxy to any Windows/MacOS/Linux Application TCP and UDP traffic

docs(linux): remove the audit notes from the repository

anof-cyber801de959d267
diff --git a/Linux/SECURITY_AUDIT.md b/Linux/SECURITY_AUDIT.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 930b847..0000000
--- a/Linux/SECURITY_AUDIT.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
-# ProxyBridge for Linux — pre-release security assessment (2026-10-20)
-
-Scope: everything under `Linux/` as of commit 5f307c2 on `dev`: the eBPF program and its loader, the userspace relay
-(SOCKS5/HTTP/UDP), the DNS tap, the rule engine, `/proc` scanning, the `.pbprofile` parser, the CLI, the GTK GUI, the
-"start at boot" systemd unit, `setup.sh`, `build.sh` and the GitHub workflows. Four independent code reviews, one per area,
-plus a 4-minute mutation fuzz of the profile parser (3.1 million inputs under ASan/UBSan, no crash) and `readelf`
-checks of the shipped binaries.
-
-Threat model: the engine runs as root on a desktop or shared host. Untrusted inputs are the proxy server's bytes, DNS
-answers, the contents of `/proc` for other users' processes, other local users' processes (which may try to bypass their
-own rules, hijack another process's flow, or exhaust the daemon), imported profile files, the update feed, and the
-command line / environment.
-
-**Result:** no memory-safety bug was found in any parser (SOCKS5, HTTP CONNECT, DNS decompression, UDP SOCKS header,
-JSON). All findings concern trust between local processes, what the root daemon accepts from remote text, and the
-boot service. Everything below marked *fixed* was fixed in the commit that follows this document; three design
-limitations are documented in the README instead.
-
-## Findings and fixes
-
-### 1. Boot service could run a user-writable binary as root — medium, fixed
-`gui/gui_boot.c`. The unit's `ExecStart` pointed at the `ProxyBridge` binary next to the running GUI. The README
-encourages `sudo ./ProxyBridgeGUI` from the extracted tarball, so ticking "Start at Boot" from `~/Downloads/pb/`
-produced a root service that executes `~/Downloads/pb/ProxyBridge` (and loads `libproxybridge.so` from the same
-directory via `$ORIGIN`) at every boot. Anything that later gains write access to that user account owns root at boot.
-**Fix:** the GUI accepts the binary only when it and every directory above it belong to root and are writable by root
-only (`boot_path_trusted`), otherwise it refuses with "install ProxyBridge with setup.sh". Unit test added.
-
-### 2. Boot service loaded the profile by *name* — medium, fixed
-`gui/gui_boot.c`, `profile/pb_profile.c` (`pbp_resolve`). The unit contained `--profile "<name>"`. A name containing
-`/` (typed, or carried in an imported file's `"Name"`) is a relative path, resolved against the service's working
-directory `/`, so a profile named `tmp/.w.pbprofile` made the root CLI load `/tmp/.w.pbprofile` at boot — a file any
-local user can create, redirecting all matching traffic to their proxy. **Fix:** the unit now carries the absolute path
-of the stored profile file; `boot_unit_text` refuses relative paths.
-
-### 3. `--profile name.pbprofile` shadowed by a file in the current directory — low, fixed
-`pbp_resolve` tried a bare name ending in `.pbprofile` as a relative path first. `sudo ProxyBridge --profile Work.pbprofile`
-run from `/tmp` loaded an attacker's `/tmp/Work.pbprofile` instead of the GUI profile. **Fix:** anything without `/` is a
-profile name; a file in the current directory needs `./`.
-
-### 4. Systemd unit ran unconfined — low, fixed
-The unit had only `Type=simple`/`Restart=on-failure`. **Fix:** `NoNewPrivileges`, `ProtectSystem=strict`,
-`ProtectHome=read-only`, `PrivateTmp`, `ProtectKernelModules`, `ProtectKernelLogs`, `ProtectClock`, `RestrictSUIDSGID`,
-`LockPersonality`, `RestrictRealtime`. (Root and the eBPF capabilities are still needed; a capability bounding set was
-not added without a real boot test.)
-
-### 5. Uninstall left an enabled root service behind — low, fixed
-The README's uninstall steps did not remove `/etc/systemd/system/proxybridge.service`. **Fix:** `setup.sh --uninstall
-[--purge]` and README steps that disable and remove the unit.
-
-### 6. Any local process could send UDP through another process's flow — medium, fixed
-`src/pb_relay.c` (`udp_dgram`), `src/bpf/proxybridge.bpf.c` (`udp_flow_addr`). Redirected UDP is addressed to a
-loopback "flow address" (127.x.y.z) that the relay maps back to the real destination. The relay never checked who sent
-the datagram, and the address is a deterministic hash that is also visible in `/proc/net/udp`. A process whose own
-traffic is BLOCKed could send to a flow address used by an allowed process and have its payload relayed through the
-proxy with the configured credentials, logged as the victim. **Fix:** every flow address is now per process (pid in the
-hash), and for each new client port the relay verifies through `/proc/net/udp{,6}` and `/proc/<pid>/fd` that the sender
-holds a UDP socket on that port and is still the same executable (`pb_core_udp_sender_ok`); other senders are dropped.
-Relay unit test added (impostor gets nothing, owner keeps working).
-
-### 7. UDP session table exhaustion by one process — medium, fixed
-1024 sessions total; one process sending from 1024 source ports filled the table, starving everyone else's UDP.
-**Fix:** one process may hold at most a quarter of the table (together with fix 6, a process can only use its own flows).
-
-### 8. Flow-address probe exhaustion borrowed another flow's address — low, fixed
-In the eBPF program, when all 8 probed slots were occupied by other live flows, the loop fell through and returned the
-last computed address — another flow's — so the datagram would have been delivered to another process's destination.
-**Fix:** the send is refused (EPERM) instead.
-
-### 9. Userspace decisions trusted a possibly reused PID — high (plausible), fixed
-`src/ProxyBridge.c` (`pb_core_decide`). Flows the kernel cannot decide itself (long host lists, domain rules) are
-decided by the relay later. It identified the program by reading `/proc/<pid>/exe` *first* and only fell back to the
-executable identity the kernel had captured at `connect()`. If the process exited and its PID was reused before the
-relay ran, the rule was evaluated against the new program. **Fix:** the kernel-captured identity (device + inode) is
-preferred; `/proc` is the fallback.
-
-### 10. DNS tap learned from unrelated answer records — medium, fixed
-`src/pb_dns.c`. Every A record and every CNAME in a response was attached to every address in it, regardless of the
-question. A response `q.example A 1.1.1.1; allowed.corp A 6.6.6.6; victim.bank CNAME …` taught the engine that all
-three names belong to both addresses, which steers domain rules and, with "send domain to proxy", the host name the
-proxy is asked to connect to. **Fix:** only the question name, CNAME targets chained from it, and A records owned by
-those names are used. Unit test added.
-
-### 11. SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE relay address pointed at this host — low, fixed
-A remote proxy could answer `BND.ADDR = 127.0.0.1:<port>`, making the root relay send application payloads to local
-services. **Fix:** a loopback relay address is accepted only when the proxy itself is on loopback.
-
-### 12. Exponential glob in log filters — high, fixed
-`profile/pb_profile.c` (`ci_glob`). The filter matcher backtracked exponentially on patterns with many `*`. A filter
-`*a*a*a*…*b` from an imported profile took 8 s *per connection event* while holding the engine's callback lock — one
-crafted profile froze logging and the GUI. **Fix:** linear single-backtrack glob (the engine's own algorithm); timing
-test added.
-
-### 13. Control characters from profiles and the update feed reached the terminal — medium, fixed
-The JSON parser accepted raw bytes 0x01–0x1F and `\u001b`, `\n`, `\u0007` etc. in any string. A proxy `Host` or `Name`
-with `ESC]0;…BEL` set the operator's terminal title; a newline forged extra log lines; the update feed's `version`
-field was printed raw (a MITM could inject escape sequences into the root operator's terminal). **Fix:** profiles with
-control characters in any field are rejected; the feed `version` must be a plain version string (≤ 32 chars of
-`[0-9A-Za-z.+-]`); the engine replaces control characters in anything it hands to the log and connection callbacks
-(executable names, DNS names).
-
-### 14. JSON parser leniency that diverges from Windows/.NET — low, fixed
-`"Port": 1080e1` was read as 1080 (Windows reads 10800); `8.9` as 8; duplicate keys took the first value (Windows
-takes the last), so a file could look different to a reviewer on Windows than what Linux applied. **Fix:** non-integral
-numbers and duplicate keys (case-insensitive) are rejected.
-
-### 15. Proxy Id wrap — low, fixed
-`"Id": 4294967295` made the next auto-assigned id 0, which means "default proxy" everywhere. **Fix:** ids ≥ 2^31 are
-rejected.
-
-### 16. Double `close()` in profile writing — low, fixed
-On a failed `rename`, the descriptor was closed twice; in the multithreaded GUI that can close an unrelated,
-freshly reused descriptor. Fixed.
-
-### 17. curl argument handling — low, fixed
-The feed URL (overridable through `PROXYBRIDGE_UPDATE_FEED` in the CLI, test hook in the GUI) was passed to curl
-without `--`, and any protocol was allowed. **Fix:** `--proto =https,file -- <url>`; the environment override is
-ignored when running set-uid (`AT_SECURE`); `PROXYBRIDGE_CONFIG_DIR` uses `secure_getenv`.
-
-### 18. GUI update check — low, fixed
-The GUI parsed the feed with `strstr` and could hand any https URL to the browser, which runs as root. **Fix:** the GUI
-uses the same strict parser and version comparison as the CLI, and only opens pages under `github.com/InterceptSuite/`
-or `interceptsuite.com`.
-
-### 19. Exported profiles unreadable by the user who exported them — low, fixed
-Exports are written as root with mode 0600, so under `sudo` the invoking user cannot open their own export. **Fix:**
-when started through `sudo`/`pkexec` and the destination directory belongs to the invoking user, the file is handed to
-that user.
-
-### 20. Release integrity — low, fixed
-Release tarballs had no checksum, and the version from the manual `tag` input was interpolated into a shell script
-(template-injection pattern; mitigated by the actor check). **Fix:** a `.sha256` file is published with each tarball and
-the version is passed through `env`.
-
-### 21. Smaller relay items — fixed
-- Credentials copied onto worker stacks (`ab[]`, `cred[]`, `enc[]`, request buffer) are wiped with `explicit_bzero`.
-- The "no original destination for client" log (triggered by anyone connecting to the relay port) is rate-limited.
-- `teardown()` now takes the data-thread mutex while freeing connection lists that `pb_relay_flows()` may be walking.
-- `setup.sh` installs with `install -o root -g root -m 0755` (a pre-existing file's owner is never kept) and creates
- `/etc/proxybridge` 0700.
-
-## Documented design limitations (README → Security model)
-
-- **Fail-open on exit.** The kernel removes the eBPF programs when ProxyBridge stops or crashes; from then on
- `BLOCK` rules no longer block and nothing is proxied. ProxyBridge is a routing tool, not a firewall.
-- **Local-proxy exemption by listening port.** A process that listens on the configured proxy address and port is
- treated as the proxy and its connections go direct. While that port is free (proxy not running), any local process
- that binds it is exempted. Point rules at running proxies, or at a proxy on another host, on shared machines.
-- **DNS tap mappings are per address, not per process.** A process's own DNS answers (now bailiwick-checked) still
- teach the engine name→address pairs that domain rules of other processes match by address.
-- Running out of `exe2class` map space (16384 distinct executables) degrades unknown programs to the slower userspace
- decision path; decisions stay correct.
-
-## Verified as solid
-SOCKS5 greeting/auth/reply and HTTP CONNECT parsers (bounded, status checked before address), DNS name decompression
-(hop limit, pointer bounds), UDP SOCKS header parsing, TCP-DNS framing, fd lifecycle in every relay error path,
-handshake deadlines and worker-pool shedding, relay sockets bound to loopback only (UDP additionally to `lo` with an
-`IP_PKTINFO` 127/8 filter), fail-closed on handshake failure, missing proxy and BLOCK; cgroup v2 root attach with
-`ALLOW_MULTI`, v4-mapped v6 handling, implicit-direct consistency between kernel and userspace, first-match rule
-ordering (covered by the 4800-case differential test); JSON nesting depth and node limits, surrogate handling,
-file/proxy/rule/filter limits enforced before allocation, atomic 0600 writes via `mkstemp`+`rename`, percent-encoded
-profile file names (no traversal); GTK markup only through `g_markup_printf_escaped`, `%s` everywhere a dialog shows
-data, systemd quoting with control-character rejection, `systemctl`/`curl` spawned with fixed argv; all three binaries
-PIE, full RELRO, BIND_NOW, NX, stack protector, FORTIFY_SOURCE=3, CET; actions SHA-pinned; libbpf source fetch
-checksum-verified.
-
-## Tests added
-`profile_test`: control characters, non-integral numbers, duplicate keys, Id range, glob timing bound, strict
-`pbp_resolve`, feed version validation. `dns_test`: out-of-bailiwick records. `relay_test`: impostor UDP sender.
-`boot_test`: absolute profile path, hardening directives, `boot_path_trusted`. `ui_test`: escape sequences in the feed,
-foreign download host refused. `e2e_cli`: unchanged surface, still 48/48.