Real-time monitoring dashboard for Proxmox VE, PBS, Docker, Kubernetes, TrueNAS and vSphere. Self-hosted, with alerts for failed backups, full disks, unhealthy containers and offline nodes.
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import { marked } from 'marked';
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
// Configure marked for safe rendering.
//
// DOMPurify runs downstream of marked.parse and is the actual XSS gate, but
// we set marked options here to keep its output predictable rather than
// relying solely on the downstream sanitizer. Raw HTML coming out of an LLM
// would otherwise pass through marked unchanged (marked allows raw HTML by
// default since v9) and rely on DOMPurify to clean it. Defence-in-depth: a
// future DOMPurify-config edit that accidentally loosens the allowlist
// shouldn't suddenly mean script tags from the LLM hit the DOM.
marked.setOptions({
breaks: true, // Convert \n to <br>
gfm: true, // GitHub Flavored Markdown
});
let domPurifyConfigured = false;
const configureDOMPurify = () => {
if (domPurifyConfigured) return;
domPurifyConfigured = true;
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
const element = node as Element | null;
if (!element || element.tagName !== 'A') return;
element.setAttribute('target', '_blank');
element.setAttribute('rel', 'noopener noreferrer');
});
};
const coerceMarkdownInput = (content: unknown): string => {
if (typeof content === 'string') return content;
if (content && typeof content === 'object') {
const record = content as Record<string, unknown>;
if (typeof record.text === 'string') return record.text;
if (typeof record.content === 'string') return record.content;
try {
return JSON.stringify(content);
} catch {
return String(content);
}
}
return content == null ? '' : String(content);
};
// Helper to render markdown safely with XSS protection
// LLM output should NEVER be trusted - always sanitize before rendering as HTML
export const renderMarkdown = (content: unknown): string => {
const normalized = coerceMarkdownInput(content);
try {
configureDOMPurify();
const rawHtml = marked.parse(normalized) as string;
// Sanitize to prevent XSS from malicious LLM output or injected content.
//
// Hardening notes:
// - ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP pins href values to http/https/mailto. Without
// this we rely on DOMPurify's internal default URI scheme filter,
// which strips javascript:/data: in current versions but is library-
// version dependent; an explicit allowlist regex makes the intent
// survive future updates.
// - 'class' was previously in ALLOWED_ATTR. The LLM has no legitimate
// reason to apply utility classes, and allowing arbitrary classes
// opens a UI-redressing surface (e.g. injecting "fixed inset-0 z-50
// bg-black" to overlay the page). Drop it.
// - 'target' and 'rel' are not in ALLOWED_ATTR because the
// afterSanitizeAttributes hook above sets them on every <a>; they
// don't need to be parsed in from the LLM-supplied HTML.
const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(rawHtml, {
// Allow common formatting tags but block scripts, iframes, etc.
ALLOWED_TAGS: [
'p',
'br',
'strong',
'em',
'b',
'i',
'u',
'code',
'pre',
'blockquote',
'ul',
'ol',
'li',
'h1',
'h2',
'h3',
'h4',
'h5',
'h6',
'a',
'hr',
'table',
'thead',
'tbody',
'tr',
'th',
'td',
'span',
'div',
],
ALLOWED_ATTR: ['href'],
ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP: /^(?:https?:|mailto:)/i,
// Force all links to open in new tab and prevent opener attacks
ADD_ATTR: ['target', 'rel'],
});
// Add application-owned scrolling only after sanitization. Model HTML
// cannot supply classes or attributes that escape the message layout.
const template = document.createElement('template');
template.innerHTML = sanitized;
for (const table of template.content.querySelectorAll('table')) {
const region = document.createElement('div');
region.className =
'max-w-full overflow-x-auto focus-visible:outline-solid focus-visible:outline-2 focus-visible:outline-blue-500';
region.tabIndex = 0;
region.setAttribute('role', 'region');
region.setAttribute('aria-label', 'Scrollable table');
table.replaceWith(region);
region.appendChild(table);
}
return template.innerHTML;
} catch {
// If parsing fails, escape HTML entities as fallback
return normalized.replace(/[&<>"']/g, (char) => {
const entities: Record<string, string> = {
'&': '&',
'<': '<',
'>': '>',
'"': '"',
"'": ''',
};
return entities[char];
});
}
};