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Distinguish container SSH warnings from enforced key setup restrictions
pulse-triage[bot]0ab3a7d95654
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.mdindex a260026cb2..85ece46351 100644--- a/SECURITY.md+++ b/SECURITY.md@@ -11,10 +11,20 @@ For a high-level overview of the system design and data flow, please refer to## Critical Security Notice for Container Deployments-### Container SSH Key Policy (BREAKING CHANGE)+### Container SSH Key Handling-**Effective immediately, SSH-based temperature monitoring is blocked in-containerized Pulse deployments.**+**Keep host SSH private keys out of Pulse containers. A warning is not a+block.** The setup flow blocks automatic SSH-key generation in containers+unless the development override is active. The temperature collector has a+different boundary: **an existing usable key can still be used for legacy SSH+collection**, with a security warning. It does not revoke the key or prevent+outbound SSH.++Do not enable `PULSE_DEV_ALLOW_CONTAINER_SSH` or mount a host key to recover a+missing reading. That development-only setting is not needed for the legacy+collector to attempt SSH; it does not make container-held keys safe. A missing+warning is not proof that a container has no key. Use the+[private deployment review](#auditing-your-deployment) below.#### Why This Change?@@ -33,15 +43,22 @@ risk in production environments:#### Affected Deployments-✅ **Not affected** – Pulse installed directly on a VM or bare-metal host (no-containers), or homelab environments where you explicitly accept the risk.+Docker and LXC installations can be affected when a configured key is available+inside the container, including through a persistent mount. Container detection+uses `PULSE_DOCKER=true` or the runtime's container checks; it is not an audit of+every file or mount. Homelab use does not remove the risk.-❌ **Blocked** – Pulse running in Docker containers, LXC containers, or any-environment where `PULSE_DOCKER=true`/`/.dockerenv` is detected.+VM and bare-metal installations are outside the container key-generation+restriction, not outside the need to protect and restrict their SSH keys.#### Migration Path (Production)-Preferred option (no SSH keys, no proxy wiring):+Prefer an existing host-local agent for temperatures, without SSH keys or proxy+wiring. API-only monitoring without temperature data is also a valid choice;+do not widen access merely to fill a reading. Check the affected host's agent+version, last report and existing sensor data before changing its setup.++For a planned migration, not as a prerequisite for diagnosing an outage:1. Install or upgrade the unified agent (`pulse-agent`) on each Proxmox host with Proxmox integration enabled.- Use **Settings → Infrastructure → Install on a host**. Keep the separately@@ -74,7 +91,9 @@ whole SSH directory. Deleting a container file does not erase an old imagelayer or backup. Revoking the public key on every target host is the essentialstep; replace affected images and protect or retire old backups separately.-#### Security Boundary+#### Preferred Collection Layout++This is a deployment choice, not a guarantee enforced by container detection:```text┌─────────────────────────────────────┐@@ -89,16 +108,17 @@ step; replace affected images and protect or retire old backups separately.│ │ ││ ┌─────────▼─────────────────────┐ ││ │ Pulse (Docker/LXC container) │ │-│ │ · No SSH keys │ │-│ │ · No host root privileges │ │+│ │ · No host SSH keys │ │+│ │ · API + agent reports │ ││ └───────────────────────────────┘ │└─────────────────────────────────────┘```#### Homelab Exception-If you fully understand the risk and are **not** containerized (VM/bare-metal-install), the legacy SSH flow still works. Use a dedicated monitoring user,+For an existing **non-containerized** VM or bare-metal installation, the legacy+SSH flow still works. This is not an exception that makes container-held keys+safe. Use a dedicated monitoring user,restrict the key to the Pulse sensor wrapper with`command="/usr/local/sbin/pulse-sensors"` and `from="<pulse-ip>"`, androtate keys regularly.diff --git a/frontend-modern/public/docs/SECURITY.md b/frontend-modern/public/docs/SECURITY.mdindex a260026cb2..85ece46351 100644--- a/frontend-modern/public/docs/SECURITY.md+++ b/frontend-modern/public/docs/SECURITY.md@@ -11,10 +11,20 @@ For a high-level overview of the system design and data flow, please refer to## Critical Security Notice for Container Deployments-### Container SSH Key Policy (BREAKING CHANGE)+### Container SSH Key Handling-**Effective immediately, SSH-based temperature monitoring is blocked in-containerized Pulse deployments.**+**Keep host SSH private keys out of Pulse containers. A warning is not a+block.** The setup flow blocks automatic SSH-key generation in containers+unless the development override is active. The temperature collector has a+different boundary: **an existing usable key can still be used for legacy SSH+collection**, with a security warning. It does not revoke the key or prevent+outbound SSH.++Do not enable `PULSE_DEV_ALLOW_CONTAINER_SSH` or mount a host key to recover a+missing reading. That development-only setting is not needed for the legacy+collector to attempt SSH; it does not make container-held keys safe. A missing+warning is not proof that a container has no key. Use the+[private deployment review](#auditing-your-deployment) below.#### Why This Change?@@ -33,15 +43,22 @@ risk in production environments:#### Affected Deployments-✅ **Not affected** – Pulse installed directly on a VM or bare-metal host (no-containers), or homelab environments where you explicitly accept the risk.+Docker and LXC installations can be affected when a configured key is available+inside the container, including through a persistent mount. Container detection+uses `PULSE_DOCKER=true` or the runtime's container checks; it is not an audit of+every file or mount. Homelab use does not remove the risk.-❌ **Blocked** – Pulse running in Docker containers, LXC containers, or any-environment where `PULSE_DOCKER=true`/`/.dockerenv` is detected.+VM and bare-metal installations are outside the container key-generation+restriction, not outside the need to protect and restrict their SSH keys.#### Migration Path (Production)-Preferred option (no SSH keys, no proxy wiring):+Prefer an existing host-local agent for temperatures, without SSH keys or proxy+wiring. API-only monitoring without temperature data is also a valid choice;+do not widen access merely to fill a reading. Check the affected host's agent+version, last report and existing sensor data before changing its setup.++For a planned migration, not as a prerequisite for diagnosing an outage:1. Install or upgrade the unified agent (`pulse-agent`) on each Proxmox host with Proxmox integration enabled.- Use **Settings → Infrastructure → Install on a host**. Keep the separately@@ -74,7 +91,9 @@ whole SSH directory. Deleting a container file does not erase an old imagelayer or backup. Revoking the public key on every target host is the essentialstep; replace affected images and protect or retire old backups separately.-#### Security Boundary+#### Preferred Collection Layout++This is a deployment choice, not a guarantee enforced by container detection:```text┌─────────────────────────────────────┐@@ -89,16 +108,17 @@ step; replace affected images and protect or retire old backups separately.│ │ ││ ┌─────────▼─────────────────────┐ ││ │ Pulse (Docker/LXC container) │ │-│ │ · No SSH keys │ │-│ │ · No host root privileges │ │+│ │ · No host SSH keys │ │+│ │ · API + agent reports │ ││ └───────────────────────────────┘ │└─────────────────────────────────────┘```#### Homelab Exception-If you fully understand the risk and are **not** containerized (VM/bare-metal-install), the legacy SSH flow still works. Use a dedicated monitoring user,+For an existing **non-containerized** VM or bare-metal installation, the legacy+SSH flow still works. This is not an exception that makes container-held keys+safe. Use a dedicated monitoring user,restrict the key to the Pulse sensor wrapper with`command="/usr/local/sbin/pulse-sensors"` and `from="<pulse-ip>"`, androtate keys regularly.diff --git a/frontend-modern/src/features/docs/__tests__/containerSshSecurityGuide.test.ts b/frontend-modern/src/features/docs/__tests__/containerSshSecurityGuide.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..9a3356696d--- /dev/null+++ b/frontend-modern/src/features/docs/__tests__/containerSshSecurityGuide.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';+import path from 'node:path';+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';+import { renderDocMarkdown, stripLeadingTitle } from '../docMarkdown';++const read = (name: string) => readFileSync(path.resolve(process.cwd(), '..', name), 'utf8');+const source = read('SECURITY.md');+const notice = source+ .split('## Critical Security Notice for Container Deployments\n')[1]+ .split('\n---\n')[0];+const article = () => {+ const element = document.createElement('article');+ element.innerHTML = renderDocMarkdown(stripLeadingTitle(notice), 'SECURITY');+ return element;+};+const text = () => article().textContent!.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();++describe('container SSH security guidance', () => {+ it('ships the canonical notice and distinguishes setup restriction from legacy collection', () => {+ expect(read('frontend-modern/public/docs/SECURITY.md')).toBe(source);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/setup flow blocks automatic SSH-key generation in containers/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/existing usable key can still be used for legacy SSH collection/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(+ /with a security warning.*does not revoke the key or prevent outbound SSH/,+ );+ expect(text()).not.toMatch(+ /SSH-based temperature monitoring is blocked|❌ Blocked|✅ Not affected/,+ );+ });++ it('never offers a development override, wider key access or missing warnings as protection', () => {+ expect(text()).toMatch(/Do not enable PULSE_DEV_ALLOW_CONTAINER_SSH or mount a host key/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/not needed for the legacy collector to attempt SSH/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/missing warning is not proof.*container has no key/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/Homelab use does not remove the risk/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/deployment choice, not a guarantee enforced by container detection/);+ expect(article().querySelector('#auditing-your-deployment')).not.toBeNull();+ expect(article().querySelector('a[href="#auditing-your-deployment"]')).not.toBeNull();+ expect(article().querySelector('pre code')?.textContent).not.toContain(+ 'PULSE_DEV_ALLOW_CONTAINER_SSH',+ );+ });++ it('preserves readings and independent access before any planned key retirement', () => {+ expect(text()).toMatch(/API-only monitoring without temperature data is also a valid choice/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/not as a prerequisite for diagnosing an outage/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/First verify.*collection works.*independent administrative login/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/remove only that key's entry/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/Deleting a container file does not erase an old image layer or backup/);+ expect(text()).toMatch(/Revoking the public key on every target host is the essential step/);+ const rendered = article();+ expect(+ rendered.querySelector(+ 'a[href="/docs/TEMPERATURE_MONITORING#check-existing-linux-readings-safely"]',+ ),+ ).not.toBeNull();+ expect(+ rendered.querySelector('a[href="/docs/VM_DISK_MONITORING#backup-safety"]'),+ ).not.toBeNull();+ });+});