Real-time monitoring dashboard for Proxmox VE, PBS, Docker, Kubernetes, TrueNAS and vSphere. Self-hosted, with alerts for failed backups, full disks, unhealthy containers and offline nodes.
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Reject malformed audit export and summary time filters
pulse-triage[bot]582113ccd04b
diff --git a/docs/AUDIT_LOGGING.md b/docs/AUDIT_LOGGING.mdindex ecd4087c15..932122e630 100644--- a/docs/AUDIT_LOGGING.md+++ b/docs/AUDIT_LOGGING.md@@ -142,9 +142,15 @@ The new owner-only response file is created in the helper's private directory.It does not reuse filters selected in the UI. Export accepts `event`, `user`,`success`, `startTime` and `endTime`, but **not list pagination**: adding `limit`or `offset` does not bound an export. With no filters it requests the full-available history. Unlike the list, export ignores malformed time filters;-check the dates and returned event times locally rather than assuming HTTP 200-proves that the intended window was applied.+available history. List, export and summary reject malformed or empty supplied+`startTime`/`endTime` values and ranges whose end is not after their start with+HTTP 400, before reading events. List and export also reject a supplied `success`+other than exactly `true` or `false`, including an empty value. Omit a filter to+leave it unset; HTTP 200 alone does not establish complete archival coverage.++Summary accepts `event`, `user`, `startTime` and `endTime`, not `success` or list+pagination. These unsupported parameters do not narrow a summary; omit them+rather than relying on them to bound the read.Keep the export outside shared repositories and issue attachments. A failed orincomplete download is not a valid archive. Do not widen or repeat a faileddiff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.mdindex 64328bd8fe..d646f53507 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md@@ -3354,6 +3354,16 @@ token rotation, or removal state, and it records nothing about agents. Nodeconnection tests target Proxmox, PBS, and PMG endpoints directly and nevertraverse an agent.+### Audit reads during agent investigation++The shared `internal/api/` audit read boundary rejects malformed or empty+supplied RFC3339 start/end filters and non-increasing windows before reading+agent-related events. List/export reject non-literal success booleans. It+preserves absent filters, tenant selection, method/access/licence gates and+existing export/summary non-pagination semantics. This changes only audit+request validation, not agent identity, enrolment, collection or recovery.+Fake-logger handler controls live in `internal/api/audit_filter_validation_test.go`.+## Forbidden Paths1. New install or update continuity behavior hidden only inside broad monitoring ownership.diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.mdindex edece2e7b7..c7f1f85e10 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md@@ -3952,6 +3952,20 @@ deliberately not instrumented, because instrumenting both endpoints woulddouble-count a single operator action and corrupt the failure share thecounters exist to measure.+### Audit investigation filter rejection++The existing GET `/api/audit`, `/api/audit/export` and `/api/audit/summary`+validate every supplied `startTime` and `endTime` as RFC3339 and reject empty,+malformed, equal or reversed bounds with HTTP 400 before querying events.+List and export likewise reject supplied `success` values other than literal+`true` or `false`. Absence remains unfiltered; event/user filters, tenant,+licence, role and method boundaries, formats and signature verification remain.+Export/summary do not inherit list pagination, and summary has no success+filter. No export quota or new endpoint is introduced. Actual handlers and+exporter are pinned by `internal/api/audit_filter_validation_test.go` with+fake persistent loggers, including query non-execution and tenant isolation;+`internal/api/audit_handlers_test.go` pins valid export/summary filter payloads.+## Forbidden Paths1. Handler-local payload shape drift without a contract testdiff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.mdindex 3d0df492d1..bce7932ebe 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/storage-recovery.md@@ -2580,6 +2580,17 @@ is outside backup, restore, and recovery, and a missing or corrupt tally must bediscarded and rebuilt rather than surfaced as a recovery failure. Nothing maytake a correctness dependency on its contents.+### Bounded audit investigation scope++Audit list/export/summary consumers must not mistake a malformed time bound+for an unfiltered storage read. `internal/api/activity_audit_handlers.go`+rejects supplied empty/invalid RFC3339 bounds and equal/reversed windows with+HTTP 400 before querying; list/export also validate literal success booleans.+Absent filters and existing export/summary non-pagination remain supported.+This boundary adds no database/schema, retention, signing, quota or recovery+change. Fake persistent-logger controls in+`internal/api/audit_filter_validation_test.go` prove rejection without a store.+## Forbidden Paths1. Reintroducing storage or recovery product logic as ad hoc dashboard-only summaries without a canonical page-surface ownerdiff --git a/frontend-modern/public/docs/AUDIT_LOGGING.md b/frontend-modern/public/docs/AUDIT_LOGGING.mdindex ecd4087c15..932122e630 100644--- a/frontend-modern/public/docs/AUDIT_LOGGING.md+++ b/frontend-modern/public/docs/AUDIT_LOGGING.md@@ -142,9 +142,15 @@ The new owner-only response file is created in the helper's private directory.It does not reuse filters selected in the UI. Export accepts `event`, `user`,`success`, `startTime` and `endTime`, but **not list pagination**: adding `limit`or `offset` does not bound an export. With no filters it requests the full-available history. Unlike the list, export ignores malformed time filters;-check the dates and returned event times locally rather than assuming HTTP 200-proves that the intended window was applied.+available history. List, export and summary reject malformed or empty supplied+`startTime`/`endTime` values and ranges whose end is not after their start with+HTTP 400, before reading events. List and export also reject a supplied `success`+other than exactly `true` or `false`, including an empty value. Omit a filter to+leave it unset; HTTP 200 alone does not establish complete archival coverage.++Summary accepts `event`, `user`, `startTime` and `endTime`, not `success` or list+pagination. These unsupported parameters do not narrow a summary; omit them+rather than relying on them to bound the read.Keep the export outside shared repositories and issue attachments. A failed orincomplete download is not a valid archive. Do not widen or repeat a faileddiff --git a/internal/api/activity_audit_handlers.go b/internal/api/activity_audit_handlers.goindex eb100f7b61..fc914454b1 100644--- a/internal/api/activity_audit_handlers.go+++ b/internal/api/activity_audit_handlers.go@@ -126,10 +126,23 @@ func auditEventListFilterFromRequest(r *http.Request) (audit.QueryFilter, *audit}filter.Offset = offset}+ if err := auditTimeFilterFromQuery(query, &filter); err != nil {+ return audit.QueryFilter{}, err+ }+ if err := auditSuccessFilterFromQuery(query, &filter); err != nil {+ return audit.QueryFilter{}, err+ }++ return filter, nil+}++// A supplied malformed or empty bound must not become an unfiltered read.+// Keep list, export and summary on the same time-window validation boundary.+func auditTimeFilterFromQuery(query url.Values, filter *audit.QueryFilter) *auditQueryValidationError {if query.Has("startTime") {start, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, query.Get("startTime"))if err != nil {- return audit.QueryFilter{}, &auditQueryValidationError{+ return &auditQueryValidationError{code: "invalid_start_time",message: "Invalid startTime; expected an RFC3339 timestamp",}@@ -139,7 +152,7 @@ func auditEventListFilterFromRequest(r *http.Request) (audit.QueryFilter, *auditif query.Has("endTime") {end, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, query.Get("endTime"))if err != nil {- return audit.QueryFilter{}, &auditQueryValidationError{+ return &auditQueryValidationError{code: "invalid_end_time",message: "Invalid endTime; expected an RFC3339 timestamp",}@@ -147,15 +160,19 @@ func auditEventListFilterFromRequest(r *http.Request) (audit.QueryFilter, *auditfilter.EndTime = &end}if filter.StartTime != nil && filter.EndTime != nil && !filter.StartTime.Before(*filter.EndTime) {- return audit.QueryFilter{}, &auditQueryValidationError{+ return &auditQueryValidationError{code: "invalid_time_range",message: "startTime must be before endTime",}}+ return nil+}++func auditSuccessFilterFromQuery(query url.Values, filter *audit.QueryFilter) *auditQueryValidationError {if query.Has("success") {rawSuccess := query.Get("success")if rawSuccess != "true" && rawSuccess != "false" {- return audit.QueryFilter{}, &auditQueryValidationError{+ return &auditQueryValidationError{code: "invalid_success",message: "Invalid success; expected a boolean",}@@ -163,8 +180,7 @@ func auditEventListFilterFromRequest(r *http.Request) (audit.QueryFilter, *auditsuccess := rawSuccess == "true"filter.Success = &success}-- return filter, nil+ return nil}// HandleVerifyAuditEvent handles GET /api/audit/{id}/verify@@ -441,24 +457,13 @@ func (h *AuditHandlers) HandleExportAuditEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.RUser: query.Get("user"),}- // Parse startTime- if startStr := query.Get("startTime"); startStr != "" {- if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, startStr); err == nil {- filter.StartTime = &t- }- }-- // Parse endTime- if endStr := query.Get("endTime"); endStr != "" {- if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, endStr); err == nil {- filter.EndTime = &t- }+ if validationErr := auditTimeFilterFromQuery(query, &filter); validationErr != nil {+ writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusBadRequest, validationErr.code, validationErr.message, nil)+ return}-- // Parse success- if successStr := query.Get("success"); successStr != "" {- success := successStr == "true"- filter.Success = &success+ if validationErr := auditSuccessFilterFromQuery(query, &filter); validationErr != nil {+ writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusBadRequest, validationErr.code, validationErr.message, nil)+ return}// Parse verification flag@@ -512,18 +517,9 @@ func (h *AuditHandlers) HandleAuditSummary(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.RequesUser: query.Get("user"),}- // Parse startTime- if startStr := query.Get("startTime"); startStr != "" {- if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, startStr); err == nil {- filter.StartTime = &t- }- }-- // Parse endTime- if endStr := query.Get("endTime"); endStr != "" {- if t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, endStr); err == nil {- filter.EndTime = &t- }+ if validationErr := auditTimeFilterFromQuery(query, &filter); validationErr != nil {+ writeErrorResponse(w, http.StatusBadRequest, validationErr.code, validationErr.message, nil)+ return}// Parse verification flagdiff --git a/internal/api/audit_filter_validation_test.go b/internal/api/audit_filter_validation_test.gonew file mode 100644index 0000000000..5a4202a0f9--- /dev/null+++ b/internal/api/audit_filter_validation_test.go@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@+package api++import (+ "context"+ "encoding/json"+ "fmt"+ "net/http"+ "net/http/httptest"+ "net/url"+ "path/filepath"+ "strings"+ "testing"+ "time"++ "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/pkg/audit"+)++// Actual handlers/exporter, but no database, IdP, provider or production events.+type auditScopeLogger struct {+ testAuditLogger+ queries, counts, verifications int+}++func (l *auditScopeLogger) Query(f audit.QueryFilter) ([]audit.Event, error) {+ l.queries+++ return l.testAuditLogger.Query(f)+}+func (l *auditScopeLogger) Count(f audit.QueryFilter) (int, error) {+ l.counts+++ return l.testAuditLogger.Count(f)+}+func (l *auditScopeLogger) VerifySignature(e audit.Event) bool {+ l.verifications+++ return l.testAuditLogger.VerifySignature(e)+}++func auditScopeEndpoints() []struct {+ name string+ handle http.HandlerFunc+} {+ h := NewAuditHandlers()+ return []struct {+ name string+ handle http.HandlerFunc+ }{+ {"list", h.HandleListAuditEvents},+ {"export", h.HandleExportAuditEvents},+ {"summary", h.HandleAuditSummary},+ }+}++func TestAuditScopeRejectsMalformedTimes(t *testing.T) {+ cases := []struct{ name, query, code string }{+ {"invalid_start", "startTime=not-a-time", "invalid_start_time"},+ {"empty_start", "startTime=", "invalid_start_time"},+ {"invalid_end", "endTime=not-a-time", "invalid_end_time"},+ {"empty_end", "endTime=", "invalid_end_time"},+ {"missing_timezone", "startTime=2026-01-01T00:00:00", "invalid_start_time"},+ {"invalid_calendar", "endTime=2026-02-30T00:00:00Z", "invalid_end_time"},+ {"equal_bounds", "startTime=2026-01-01T00:00:00Z&endTime=2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "invalid_time_range"},+ {"reversed_bounds", "startTime=2026-01-02T00:00:00Z&endTime=2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "invalid_time_range"},+ {"equal_instants", "startTime=2026-01-01T01:00:00%2B01:00&endTime=2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", "invalid_time_range"},+ }+ for _, endpoint := range auditScopeEndpoints() {+ for _, tc := range cases {+ t.Run(endpoint.name+"/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {+ logger := &auditScopeLogger{testAuditLogger: testAuditLogger{events: []audit.Event{{ID: "private-synthetic-event", Signature: "signature"}}}}+ setAuditLogger(t, logger)+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()+ endpoint.handle(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/audit?"+tc.query+"&verify=true", nil))+ var payload APIError+ if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+ if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || payload.Code != tc.code {+ t.Errorf("status/code = %d/%q, want 400/%q", rec.Code, payload.Code, tc.code)+ }+ if logger.queries != 0 || logger.counts != 0 || logger.verifications != 0 {+ t.Errorf("rejected scope read events: query/count/verify = %d/%d/%d", logger.queries, logger.counts, logger.verifications)+ }+ if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "private-synthetic-event") || rec.Header().Get("Content-Disposition") != "" || rec.Header().Get("X-Event-Count") != "" {+ t.Error("invalid scope produced export/event content")+ }+ })+ }+ }+}++func TestAuditScopeRejectsMalformedSuccess(t *testing.T) {+ for _, endpoint := range auditScopeEndpoints()[:2] { // Summary has no success filter.+ for _, value := range []string{"", "maybe", "TRUE", "0"} {+ name := value+ if name == "" {+ name = "empty"+ }+ t.Run(endpoint.name+"/"+name, func(t *testing.T) {+ logger := &auditScopeLogger{}+ setAuditLogger(t, logger)+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()+ endpoint.handle(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/audit?success="+value, nil))+ var payload APIError+ if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+ if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || payload.Code != "invalid_success" || logger.queries != 0 || logger.counts != 0 {+ t.Fatalf("status/code/query/count = %d/%q/%d/%d", rec.Code, payload.Code, logger.queries, logger.counts)+ }+ })+ }+ }+}++func TestAuditScopePreservesFilters(t *testing.T) {+ start := time.Date(2026, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 125000000, time.UTC)+ end := start.Add(time.Hour)+ for _, endpoint := range auditScopeEndpoints() {+ for _, bounds := range []string{"none", "start_only", "end_only", "both"} {+ t.Run(endpoint.name+"/"+bounds, func(t *testing.T) {+ logger := &auditScopeLogger{testAuditLogger: testAuditLogger{events: []audit.Event{{ID: "event", Signature: "signed", Timestamp: start}}, verifyResult: true}}+ setAuditLogger(t, logger)+ q := url.Values{}+ if bounds != "none" {+ q.Set("event", "login")+ q.Set("user", "[email protected]")+ if bounds != "end_only" {+ q.Set("startTime", start.In(time.FixedZone("test", 3600)).Format(time.RFC3339Nano))+ }+ if bounds != "start_only" {+ q.Set("endTime", end.Format(time.RFC3339Nano))+ }+ }+ q.Set("verify", "true")+ q.Set("limit", "1")+ q.Set("offset", "7")+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()+ endpoint.handle(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/audit?"+q.Encode(), nil))+ if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || logger.queries != 1 {+ t.Fatalf("status/query = %d/%d", rec.Code, logger.queries)+ }+ f := logger.lastQuery+ if f.EventType != q.Get("event") || f.User != q.Get("user") || f.Success != nil {+ t.Fatalf("scope = %+v", f)+ }+ if bounds == "none" || bounds == "end_only" {+ if f.StartTime != nil {+ t.Fatal("invented start bound")+ }+ } else if f.StartTime == nil || !f.StartTime.Equal(start) {+ t.Fatalf("start = %v", f.StartTime)+ }+ if bounds == "none" || bounds == "start_only" {+ if f.EndTime != nil {+ t.Fatal("invented end bound")+ }+ } else if f.EndTime == nil || !f.EndTime.Equal(end) {+ t.Fatalf("end = %v", f.EndTime)+ }+ if endpoint.name == "list" {+ if f.Limit != 1 || f.Offset != 7 || logger.counts != 1 {+ t.Fatalf("list paging = %+v, counts=%d", f, logger.counts)+ }+ } else if f.Limit != 0 || f.Offset != 0 || logger.verifications != 1 {+ t.Fatalf("export/summary = %+v, verifies=%d", f, logger.verifications)+ }+ })+ }+ }+}++func TestAuditScopePreservesSuccessAndFormats(t *testing.T) {+ for _, endpoint := range auditScopeEndpoints()[:2] {+ for _, value := range []string{"true", "false"} {+ for _, format := range []string{"json", "csv"} {+ t.Run(endpoint.name+"/"+value+"/"+format, func(t *testing.T) {+ logger := &auditScopeLogger{}+ setAuditLogger(t, logger)+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()+ endpoint.handle(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/audit?success="+value+"&format="+format, nil))+ if rec.Code != 200 || logger.lastQuery.Success == nil || *logger.lastQuery.Success != (value == "true") {+ t.Fatalf("status/filter = %d/%+v", rec.Code, logger.lastQuery)+ }+ if endpoint.name == "export" {+ want := "application/json; charset=utf-8"+ if format == "csv" {+ want = "text/csv; charset=utf-8"+ }+ if rec.Header().Get("Content-Type") != want || rec.Header().Get("X-Event-Count") != "0" {+ t.Fatalf("export headers = %v", rec.Header())+ }+ }+ })+ }+ }+ }+}++// The tenant manager uses its ordinary factory boundary, never a SQLite store.+type auditScopeFactory map[string]*auditScopeLogger++func (f auditScopeFactory) CreateLogger(path string) (audit.Logger, error) {+ org := filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(path))+ if logger := f[org]; logger != nil {+ return logger, nil+ }+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected synthetic org")+}++func TestAuditScopeTenantIsolation(t *testing.T) {+ for _, endpoint := range auditScopeEndpoints()[1:] {+ t.Run(endpoint.name, func(t *testing.T) {+ previous := GetTenantAuditManager()+ factory := auditScopeFactory{}+ for _, org := range []string{"org-a", "org-b"} {+ factory[org] = &auditScopeLogger{testAuditLogger: testAuditLogger{events: []audit.Event{{ID: org, User: org, Timestamp: time.Now()}}}}+ }+ manager := audit.NewTenantLoggerManager(t.TempDir(), factory)+ SetTenantAuditManager(manager)+ t.Cleanup(func() { manager.Close(); SetTenantAuditManager(previous) })+ for _, org := range []string{"org-a", "org-b"} {+ req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/audit?event=login&startTime=2026-01-01T00:00:00Z", nil)+ req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), OrgIDContextKey, org))+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()+ endpoint.handle(rec, req)+ if rec.Code != 200 || factory[org].queries != 1 || factory[org].lastQuery.StartTime == nil || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), org) {+ t.Fatalf("tenant %s status/query/body = %d/%d/%s", org, rec.Code, factory[org].queries, rec.Body.String())+ }+ other := "org-a"+ if org == other {+ other = "org-b"+ }+ if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), other) {+ t.Fatal("read another tenant's events")+ }+ }+ })+ }+}++func TestAuditScopeMethodAndAvailabilityGates(t *testing.T) {+ for _, endpoint := range auditScopeEndpoints() {+ t.Run(endpoint.name, func(t *testing.T) {+ logger := &auditScopeLogger{}+ setAuditLogger(t, logger)+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()+ endpoint.handle(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/audit?startTime=bad", nil))+ if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed || logger.queries != 0 {+ t.Fatalf("method gate = %d/%d", rec.Code, logger.queries)+ }+ setAuditLogger(t, audit.NewConsoleLogger())+ rec = httptest.NewRecorder()+ endpoint.handle(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/audit?startTime=bad", nil))+ want := http.StatusNotImplemented+ if endpoint.name == "list" {+ want = http.StatusServiceUnavailable+ }+ if rec.Code != want {+ t.Fatalf("availability gate = %d, want %d", rec.Code, want)+ }+ })+ }+}diff --git a/internal/api/audit_handlers_test.go b/internal/api/audit_handlers_test.goindex 117f882d03..fda159306f 100644--- a/internal/api/audit_handlers_test.go+++ b/internal/api/audit_handlers_test.go@@ -809,6 +809,16 @@ func TestHandleExportAuditEvents(t *testing.T) {h.HandleExportAuditEvents(w, req)assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)+ assert.Equal(t, "test", logger.lastQuery.EventType)+ assert.Equal(t, "admin", logger.lastQuery.User)+ assert.NotNil(t, logger.lastQuery.StartTime)+ assert.NotNil(t, logger.lastQuery.EndTime)+ assert.Equal(t, 0, logger.lastQuery.Limit)+ assert.Equal(t, 0, logger.lastQuery.Offset)+ assert.NotNil(t, logger.lastQuery.Success)+ if logger.lastQuery.Success != nil {+ assert.True(t, *logger.lastQuery.Success)+ }})t.Run("Method not allowed", func(t *testing.T) {@@ -865,6 +875,12 @@ func TestHandleAuditSummary(t *testing.T) {h.HandleAuditSummary(w, req)assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)+ assert.Equal(t, "login", logger.lastQuery.EventType)+ assert.Equal(t, "admin", logger.lastQuery.User)+ assert.NotNil(t, logger.lastQuery.StartTime)+ assert.NotNil(t, logger.lastQuery.EndTime)+ assert.Equal(t, 0, logger.lastQuery.Limit)+ assert.Equal(t, 0, logger.lastQuery.Offset)})t.Run("Method not allowed", func(t *testing.T) {diff --git a/scripts/tests/test_admin_docs.py b/scripts/tests/test_admin_docs.pyindex aebc1cb988..530fb1780d 100644--- a/scripts/tests/test_admin_docs.py+++ b/scripts/tests/test_admin_docs.py@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ class AdminDocsTest(unittest.TestCase):audit = (DOCS / "AUDIT_LOGGING.md").read_text()for boundary in ("audit:read", "audit_logging", "private directory", "redacted excerpt", "does not reuse filters","in the same Bash session", "not an installed Pulse command", "not list pagination",- "ignores malformed time filters", "partial file", "does not follow redirects or retry"):+ "reject malformed or empty supplied", "before reading events", "not `success` or list", "partial file", "does not follow redirects or retry"):self.assertIn(boundary, audit)org = (DOCS / "MULTI_TENANT.md").read_text()for boundary in ("session-based user authentication", "403 session_required", "CSRF", "settings:read", "organization binding", "pending invitation", "accept the share", "accessRole"):