Real-time monitoring dashboard for Proxmox VE, PBS, Docker, Kubernetes, TrueNAS and vSphere. Self-hosted, with alerts for failed backups, full disks, unhealthy containers and offline nodes.
Go aialertsdashboarddockerdocker-monitoringgohomelabinfrastructure-monitoringkubernetesmonitoringmspproxmoxproxmox-backup-serverproxmox-mail-gatewayproxmox-veself-hostedtruenastypescriptvspherewebhooks
Remove the Assistant mutation handlers nothing calls
rcourtman5d53fa7a3d57
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/status.json b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/status.jsonindex 65a2054db1..8adf177f20 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/status.json+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/status.json@@ -4047,7 +4047,7 @@"./internal/ai/tools","./internal/api","-run",- "TestParseProviderToolInputRejectsInternalApprovalMetadata|TestValidateDeclaredToolArgumentsRejectsUnknownProviderProperties|TestExecuteCommand_RoundTripViaWebSocket|TestExecuteCommand_InvalidApprovalAuthorizationNeverMintsOrDispatches|TestService_ExecuteStream_AutonomousRawCommandRequiresApproval|TestService_Execute_RepeatedDeniedToolCallTerminatesBounded|TestServiceToolLoop_|TestPulseToolExecutor_ExecuteRunCommand|TestHandleChat_CannotElevateAutonomousModePerRequest|TestVerifyAndConsumeCommandAuthorization",+ "TestParseProviderToolInputRejectsInternalApprovalMetadata|TestValidateDeclaredToolArgumentsRejectsUnknownProviderProperties|TestExecuteCommand_RoundTripViaWebSocket|TestExecuteCommand_InvalidApprovalAuthorizationNeverMintsOrDispatches|TestService_ExecuteStream_AutonomousRawCommandRequiresApproval|TestService_Execute_RepeatedDeniedToolCallTerminatesBounded|TestServiceToolLoop_|TestRetiredMutationProfileMatrixDeniesBeforeHandlers|TestHandleChat_CannotElevateAutonomousModePerRequest|TestVerifyAndConsumeCommandAuthorization","-count=1"]},@@ -4189,11 +4189,6 @@"kind": "file","evidence_tier": "test-proof"},- {- "repo": "pulse",- "path": "internal/ai/tools/control_run_command_test.go",- "kind": "file"- },{"repo": "pulse","path": "internal/ai/tools/execution_profile.go",diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/ai-runtime.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/ai-runtime.mdindex c239e39fde..9965b2132b 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/ai-runtime.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/ai-runtime.md@@ -2150,13 +2150,13 @@ and search matches through `addCanonicalGuestSearchMatches` /disk summaries flow through `appendGuestDiskSummaries` in`internal/ai/tools/tools_storage.go`. A new guest family extends thosehelpers (their view-constraint interfaces name the read-state methods they-need) rather than re-rolling a parallel loop. The same shape applies to-mutating tool pipelines: file append/write share `executeFileMutation`-driven by `fileMutationSpec` (`internal/ai/tools/tools_file.go`), and-namespaced kubectl actions share `executeKubernetesResourceAction` driven by-`kubernetesResourceAction` (`internal/ai/tools/tools_kubernetes.go`) — new-file or kubectl actions add a spec, keeping approval-command text stable,-instead of duplicating the approval/audit pipeline. OpenAI-compatible message+need) rather than re-rolling a parallel loop. The Assistant tool layer holds+no mutating tool pipeline to extend: `pulse_control` only plans typed resource+actions into Pulse Actions through `executeControlResource`+(`internal/ai/tools/tools_control.go`), and the shell, guest, Docker,+Kubernetes and file-mutation handlers that once carried their own approval and+audit steps were removed because nothing in production called them.+OpenAI-compatible messageconversion for both non-streaming and streaming turns is shared through`convertMessagesToOpenAI` (`internal/ai/providers/openai.go`), Anthropic messageconversion for both non-streaming and streaming turns is shared by the API-key@@ -4412,9 +4412,9 @@ resolve canonical/source IDs and unique aliases before collection, rejectpresenting stale read-only summaries. Frontend approval cards must surface backendapproval risk/description without hiding a pending approval when skip ordeny fails. Action-producing tools must also persist the unified- `ActionPlan.Preflight` dry-run boundary through- `internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go` rather than leaving dry-run availability- as chat-only text.+ `ActionPlan.Preflight` dry-run boundary through the canonical planner+ (`internal/actionplanner/planner.go`) rather than leaving dry-run+ availability as chat-only text.The `pulse_discovery` tool response must carry each discovered fact'sprovenance — the `source` that produced it and its `confidence` — alongsidethe fact's category/key/value, so the model can attribute and weight what it@@ -4574,65 +4574,20 @@ resolve canonical/source IDs and unique aliases before collection, rejectand to leave `impact` empty rather than fabricate one when theconsequence is genuinely unknown; the runtime must not synthesize adefault in that case.- The action broker enforces a plan-hash drift check at the execute- boundary: when an approval ID resolves to a stored plan with a- PlanHash, the freshly-recomputed approval-equivalent hash from the- actual payload (using `approvalPlanHash`, the same function used at- approval-creation time) must match. Mismatch returns- `ErrActionPlanDrift` and refuses dispatch; the contract is "the- operator approved exactly this (command, target, reason)- combination" and a different one cannot run under the stale- approval. When `approvedHash` is empty (older approval records, or- contract paths that did not author one), validation is skipped to- preserve existing behavior. The check is currently wired in- `executeCommandWithAudit` for shell-command actions; the native-- action path uses a different hash function (`actionPlanHashForParams`)- so a coherent canonical-hash refactor must precede adding the same- check there.- The broker runs a class-derived read-after-write verification check- immediately after a successful dispatch. `VerificationCommandForCommand`- in `internal/ai/tools/tools_control.go` returns the executable check- keyed on the same command class as the preflight authoring (e.g.- `systemctl is-active <unit>` after a service-restart). The check- runs through the same agent path as the dispatch and the outcome is- persisted on `ExecutionResult.Verification` so the audit history- shows not only what the action did but whether the read-back- confirmed the intended state. Container-class verification is- deferred to pulse_docker's existing tool-level runtime inspect- check (`docker inspect` or `podman inspect`, according to the- resolved container runtime); classes without a derivable verification command leave- `Verification` nil rather than fabricating a verified=true entry.- The approval preflight presented to operators authors per-command-class- safety and verification context on top of the default broker-level- posture. `classifyApprovalCommand` and- `approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions` in- `internal/ai/tools/tools_control.go` bucket common Pulse remediation- actions (service-restart, service-stop, service-start, service-reload,- container-restart, container-stop, k8s-rollout-restart, plus the- Proxmox VM lifecycle classes proxmox-vm-reboot, proxmox-vm-stop,- proxmox-vm-start, proxmox-vm-shutdown and the matching pct-driven- proxmox-ct-\* container lifecycle classes) and return hand-authored- operational copy: what the command actually touches, how Pulse will- read back success. The additions append onto the default- safety/verification arrays rather than replacing them, so the- broker's structural posture (org scope, hash match, single-use- approval) remains visible alongside the class-specific copy.- Unknown command classes must return empty additions rather than- fabricated padding — operators see only the default content, not- invented assertions about what an unrecognized command will do.- The Proxmox classes intentionally do not derive a broker-level- `VerificationCommandForCommand` check because pulse_control's- `verifyGuestAction` already runs `qm status` / `pct status` at the- tool layer; adding a parallel broker dispatch would double-run the- same read-after-write check.- Drift refusal must also persist a Failed audit record with the- Request, Plan, and Approvals snapshots intact and a Result whose- ErrorMessage is prefixed `plan_drift:` so the audit trail shows- every drift attempt that was caught. Operators reviewing the action- audit history must be able to see drift refusals as first-class- audit rows, not only in WARN-level logs; the `plan_drift:` prefix- is a stable token for audit-UI filters and alert rules to- distinguish drift from generic execution failures.+ The Assistant tool layer carries no action broker. Its former+ shell-command, guest, Docker, Kubernetes and file-mutation handlers,+ the `executeCommandWithAudit` and `executeNativeActionWithAudit`+ execution lanes, and the approval-record, preflight and plan-hash helpers+ behind them (`createApprovalRecord`, `approvalPreflight`,+ `classifyApprovalCommand`, `VerificationCommandForCommand`,+ `approvalPlanHash`) were removed because nothing in production called+ them: `pulse_control` only plans a typed resource action through+ `executeControlResource`, and plan freshness+ (`unifiedresources.ErrActionPlanDrift`) and the operator remediation lock+ are enforced by `internal/actionlifecycle`. Class-derived read-after-write+ verification, per-class preflight copy and the `plan_drift:` audit prefix+ therefore have no tool-layer implementation; a change that needs one+ belongs in the lifecycle, not back in `internal/ai/tools`.`FindingsStore.GetTrustSummary` returns a snapshot of how currentlytracked findings have resolved (tracked, currently-active, resolved,auto-resolved, fix-verified, fix-failed, dismissed-as-noise,@@ -5799,19 +5754,15 @@ approvals (the common shape on the approval hot path) still carrya canonical resource id agents can match against the rest ofPulse.-`PulseToolExecutor` exposes `SetOnActionCompleted(cb)` as the-parallel seam for action-audit terminal states. The action-audit-hot path in `internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go` routes every-terminal-state record (Completed, runtime-Failed, plan-drift-refusal, operator-lock refusal, recovery-branch fail) through a-single helper `publishActionCompleted(record)` which guards on-nil callback, defensively filters non-terminal states, and fires-the callback on its own goroutine after the audit record has-been persisted. Refused-before-dispatch failures preserve the-canonical `plan_drift:` and `resource_remediation_locked:`-error-token prefixes on `record.Result.ErrorMessage` so the agent-SSE stream's `action.completed` payload carries them verbatim —-agents branch on the prefix rather than parsing human text.+`PulseToolExecutor` still exposes `SetOnActionCompleted(cb)` as the+parallel seam for action-audit terminal states, and the API layer installs+the agent SSE bridge on it, but no production path dispatches the callback:+its only dispatcher, `publishActionCompleted` in+`internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go`, was reachable solely from the retired+`executeCommandWithAudit` and `executeNativeActionWithAudit` lanes and was+removed with them. The `action.completed` agent event is therefore published+only by API-owned execution (`ResourceHandlers` through+`PublishActionCompletedRecord`), not by the Assistant executor.The investigation runtime now hands the orchestrator a Findingpre-enriched with operator-set state and operational memory.@@ -5891,28 +5842,15 @@ both are evaluated by the canonical operator-state model. Descendant-scopeinheritance is alert-intent behavior and does not weaken exact-resourceaction-remediation locks or invent inherited action authority.-The action broker consults the same `resource_operator_state` table-on every dispatch — both the agent-command path-(`executeCommandWithAudit`) and the native provider path-(`executeNativeActionWithAudit`) in-`internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go` run the shared-`checkRemediationLockForDispatch` gate — and refuses with-`unifiedresources.ErrResourceRemediationLocked` when the operator-has set `NeverAutoRemediate=true` on the target resource. Refusal-persists a Failed audit record whose `ErrorMessage` is prefixed-`resource_remediation_locked:` so the audit timeline shows every-refused dispatch, paralleling the `plan_drift:` shape from the drift-guard. Operator state outranks per-action approval — the broker-refuses even when the approval ID resolves and the plan hash matches.-When the lock state cannot be determined (no audit store wired, or-the operator-state lookup errors), dispatches that do not carry an-approved human decision fail CLOSED with-`ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown` and a Failed audit record prefixed-`remediation_lock_state_unknown:` — the broker must not assume an-unreadable lock is unset while Patrol or Assistant run autonomously.-Dispatches backed by an approved human decision keep the historical-fail-open posture on unknown lock state (the operator explicitly-signed off on the exact plan), with the degraded lookup logged. The `IntentionallyOffline` branch is the indefinite+Operator state outranks per-action approval on the Pulse Actions path:+`validateExecutionPolicy` in `internal/actionlifecycle/service.go` reads the+same `resource_operator_state` table at the dispatch decision point, refuses+with `unifiedresources.ErrResourceRemediationLocked` when the operator has set+`NeverAutoRemediate=true` on the target resource, and fails closed when the+audit store is unavailable. The Assistant tool layer no longer consults the+table itself: the tool-layer broker that did so (`checkRemediationLockForDispatch`+inside the retired execution lanes) and its `ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown`+were removed with the unreachable handlers. The `IntentionallyOffline` branch is the indefinitecounterpart — same auto-dismiss but with`operator_state_cause: intentionally_offline` and no`maintenance_end_at` field because the suppression has no scheduled@@ -6255,8 +6193,8 @@ then highest operational risk, then oldest request time, with approval ID asthe final tie-break so map iteration cannot decide which governed action looksmost urgent.That same approval boundary also owns approved command execution. When-`internal/api/ai_handlers.go`, `internal/ai/service.go`, or-`internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go` consume a governed approval record, the+`internal/api/ai_handlers.go` or `internal/ai/service.go` consume a governed+approval record, theruntime must carry that approval identifier into the final`agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload` so the host agent can re-check the sharedcommand policy locally and fail closed on blocked or still-unapproved commandsdiff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.mdindex 7494b1203c..e8e030d736 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md@@ -5921,24 +5921,18 @@ TargetName)` via the same rule the store uses internally — agentsmatch the result against canonical resource ids elsewhere in Pulsewithout depending on a `Plan` being populated.-`PulseToolExecutor` exposes `SetOnActionCompleted(cb)` as the-parallel seam for action-audit terminal states. Every dispatch-that reaches `ActionStateCompleted` or `ActionStateFailed` —-including refused-before-dispatch refusals routed through the-plan-drift and operator-lock guards in `executeCommandWithAudit`,-the per-execution result lane shared by `executeCommandWithAudit`-and `executeNativeActionWithAudit`, and the recovery branch when-state-machine normalization fails — calls-`publishActionCompleted(record)`, which dispatches the callback on-its own goroutine after the audit record has already been-persisted. The callback is installed once per chat-service per-org through `wireAIChatDependenciesForService` against-`chatService.GetExecutor()`, so multi-tenant chat-service rebuilds-re-wire the bridge without coupling the tools package to the api-package. API-owned execution installs `ResourceHandlers` on the-same `PublishActionCompletedRecord` projector so direct+`PulseToolExecutor` still exposes `SetOnActionCompleted(cb)` as an+executor-side seam for action-audit terminal states, and the callback is+installed once per chat-service per org through+`wireAIChatDependenciesForService` against `chatService.GetExecutor()`, but+nothing in the tools package dispatches it: `publishActionCompleted` and the+`executeCommandWithAudit` / `executeNativeActionWithAudit` lanes that called+it were removed with the unreachable Assistant mutation handlers+(`pulse_control` only plans typed actions into Pulse Actions).+API-owned execution installs `ResourceHandlers` on the+`PublishActionCompletedRecord` projector so direct`/api/actions/{id}/execute` completions and stale-plan refusals-emit the identical payload shape. `action.completed` payloads preserve the canonical+emit the `action.completed` payload. `action.completed` payloads preserve the canonicalrefusal-token prefixes (`plan_drift:`, `action_plan_expired:`,`action_dry_run_only:`, `resource_remediation_locked:`) on`errorMessage` verbatim so agents branch on the stable codediff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/unified-resources.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/unified-resources.mdindex 592d95431a..d9830f0586 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/unified-resources.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/unified-resources.md@@ -2861,10 +2861,9 @@ application resource-provider or WebSocket lifecycle.21. Keep post-execution verification outcome on the canonical executionresult. `ExecutionResult.Verification` carries`ActionVerificationResult` with `Ran`, `Command`, `Output`,- `Success`, `RanAt`, and `Note`. The broker runs the- class-derived read-after-write check after a successful dispatch- and persists the outcome through the existing `result_json`- column; no schema migration is required. Verification is+ `Success`, `RanAt`, and `Note`. When a read-after-write check runs+ after a successful dispatch, its outcome persists through the+ existing `result_json` column; no schema migration is required. Verification isbest-effort: classes without a derivable check leave`Verification` nil rather than fabricating a verified=true entry,matching the no-fabrication rule used elsewhere in the trust@@ -2881,13 +2880,11 @@ application resource-provider or WebSocket lifecycle.approved a different action vs approval window passed) and auditreview and operator UI surfaces should treat them differently. Thedrift contract is "the operator approved exactly this (command,- target, reason) combination"; the freshly-recomputed- approval-equivalent hash and the recorded `planHash` are how we- enforce that. New broker call sites that introduce additional- governed-action paths must either reuse the existing approval-- equivalent hash or extend the canonical hash set in- `internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go` rather than adding ad-hoc- comparison logic.+ target, reason) combination"; the freshly recomputed plan hash and+ the recorded `planHash` are how we enforce that. New broker call+ sites that introduce additional governed-action paths must reuse+ the canonical plan hash from `internal/actionplanner/planner.go`+ rather than adding ad-hoc comparison logic.23. Keep the `ActionVerificationResult` frontend mirror canonical andpin the operator-facing render location.`frontend-modern/src/types/actionAudit.ts` defines the TS@@ -3560,13 +3557,13 @@ DELETE) in `internal/api/resources_operator_state.go` is theoperator-facing consumer of this contract; the URL canonical_id always wins over thebody, server-side `setAt` / `setBy` populate from request time andauthenticated identity, and validation rejections surface a stable-`operator_state_invalid` error code. The action broker-(`executeCommandWithAudit`) consults the same store on every dispatch-and refuses with `ErrResourceRemediationLocked` when the operator has-set `NeverAutoRemediate=true`; the refusal is persisted as a Failed-audit record with `resource_remediation_locked:` prefix on the-`ErrorMessage` so audit-UI filters and alert rules can branch on the-stable token. Finding-suppression integrations consume the same+`operator_state_invalid` error code. The Pulse Actions lifecycle+(`validateExecutionPolicy` in `internal/actionlifecycle/service.go`)+consults the same store at the dispatch decision point and refuses with+`ErrResourceRemediationLocked` when the operator has set+`NeverAutoRemediate=true`; the API reports it as+`resource_remediation_locked` so audit-UI filters and alert rules can+branch on the stable token. Finding-suppression integrations consume the same`ResourceOperatorState` shape via the`ResourceOperatorStateProvider` interface in `internal/ai`.diff --git a/internal/ai/chat/service.go b/internal/ai/chat/service.goindex 330d80fe6d..ee904278c6 100644--- a/internal/ai/chat/service.go+++ b/internal/ai/chat/service.go@@ -888,7 +888,6 @@ func (s *Service) ExecuteStream(ctx context.Context, req ExecuteRequest, callbacif baseExecutor != nil {effectiveExecutor = baseExecutor.Clone()effectiveExecutor.SetControlLevel(effectiveControlLevel)- effectiveExecutor.SetAutonomousMode(autonomousMode)effectiveExecutor.ApplyExecutionProfile(tools.ProfileInteractiveAssistant)effectiveExecutor.SetExecuteAuthority(req.HasExecuteAuthority)effectiveExecutor.SetResolvedContext(resolvedCtx)@@ -3106,7 +3105,6 @@ func (s *Service) ListAvailableTools(ctx context.Context, prompt string) []strinautonomousMode := s.isAutonomousModeEnabled()effectiveExecutor := executor.Clone()effectiveExecutor.SetControlLevel(effectiveControlLevel)- effectiveExecutor.SetAutonomousMode(autonomousMode)effectiveExecutor.ApplyExecutionProfile(tools.ProfileInteractiveAssistant)effectiveExecutor.SetExecuteAuthority(executeAuthorityFromContext(ctx))availableTools := s.toolsForExecutor(effectiveExecutor, autonomousMode)@@ -3702,9 +3700,6 @@ func (s *Service) SetAutonomousMode(enabled bool) {s.mu.Lock()defer s.mu.Unlock()s.autonomousMode = enabled- if s.executor != nil {- s.executor.SetContext("", "", enabled)- }if s.agenticLoop != nil {s.agenticLoop.SetAutonomousMode(enabled)}diff --git a/internal/ai/chat/service_execute_additional_test.go b/internal/ai/chat/service_execute_additional_test.goindex dc2ad38695..e12768ce31 100644--- a/internal/ai/chat/service_execute_additional_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/chat/service_execute_additional_test.go@@ -1800,7 +1800,7 @@ func TestService_ExecuteStream_RequestAutonomousOverrideClampsToolExecutor(t *teAgentServer: agentServer,ControlLevel: tools.ControlLevelAutonomous,})- executor.SetContext("agent", "agent-1", true)+ executor.SetContext("agent", "agent-1")providerCallCount := 0provider := &stubServiceProvider{diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go b/internal/ai/tools/action_audit.goindex 06b5920a8a..9c0c25422c 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/action_audit.go@@ -1,18 +1,10 @@package toolsimport (- "context"- "crypto/sha256"- "encoding/hex"- "encoding/json"- "errors"- "fmt""strings""time"- "github.com/google/uuid""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentcapabilities"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval"unifiedresources "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/unifiedresources""github.com/rs/zerolog/log"@@ -20,498 +12,6 @@ import (const approvalAuditActor = approval.RequesterPulseAssistant-// ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown is returned when the broker cannot-// determine whether the operator has set NeverAutoRemediate on the-// target resource — no audit store is wired, or the operator-state-// lookup failed. Autonomous (non-human-approved) dispatches must fail-// CLOSED on this error: a broker that cannot read the operator's-// "never touch this" flag must not assume it is unset. Human-approved-// dispatches may proceed, since the operator has explicitly signed-// off on the specific plan.-var ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown = errors.New("remediation lock state unknown; operator approval required")--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeCommandWithAudit(- ctx context.Context,- capabilityName string,- resourceID string,- approvalID string,- requiresApproval bool,- agentID string,- payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload,- requestedBy string,- reason string,-) (*agentexec.CommandResultPayload, error) {- if e.agentServer == nil {- return nil, fmt.Errorf("no agent server available")- }-- actionID := uuid.NewString()- requestCorrelationID := strings.TrimSpace(approvalID)- if requestCorrelationID == "" {- requestCorrelationID = actionID- }-- now := time.Now().UTC()- approvalReq := approvalRequestForID(approvalID)- planFromApproval := approvalReq != nil && approvalReq.Plan != nil- if planFromApproval {- if approvedActionID := strings.TrimSpace(approvalReq.Plan.ActionID); approvedActionID != "" {- actionID = approvedActionID- }- if approvedRequestID := strings.TrimSpace(approvalReq.Plan.RequestID); approvedRequestID != "" {- requestCorrelationID = approvedRequestID- }- }- plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: actionID,- RequestID: requestCorrelationID,- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: requiresApproval,- ApprovalPolicy: func() unifiedresources.ActionApprovalLevel {- if requiresApproval {- return unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin- }- return unifiedresources.ApprovalNone- }(),- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- ResourceVersion: "",- PolicyVersion: "",- PlanHash: actionPlanHash(actionID, requestCorrelationID, capabilityName, resourceID, payload, reason),- Message: reason,- Preflight: actionAuditPreflight(resourceID, reason, now),- }- if planFromApproval {- plan = mergeApprovedActionPlan(*approvalReq.Plan, plan)- }- approvalRecords := approvalRecordsForID(approvalID, &plan)-- record := unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord{- ID: actionID,- CreatedAt: now,- UpdatedAt: now,- State: actionPreExecutionState(planFromApproval, approvalRecords),- Request: unifiedresources.ActionRequest{- RequestID: requestCorrelationID,- ResourceID: strings.TrimSpace(resourceID),- CapabilityName: capabilityName,- Params: map[string]any{- "command": payload.Command,- "targetType": payload.TargetType,- "targetId": payload.TargetID,- "agentId": agentID,- "approvalId": approvalID,- "requestedBy": requestedBy,- },- Reason: reason,- RequestedBy: requestedBy,- },- Plan: plan,- }- record.Approvals = approvalRecords-- // Plan-drift check: the operator approved a specific command + target +- // reason combination, and the broker must refuse to run a different one- // even when the approval ID resolves. Compares the approved hash against- // a freshly-recomputed approval-equivalent hash from the actual payload.- // Persists a refused audit record so operators can see drift caught in- // the audit history rather than only in WARN logs.- if planFromApproval {- if driftErr := validateApprovedCommandPlanHash(- plan.PlanHash,- plan.ActionID,- plan.RequestID,- capabilityName,- resourceID,- payload.Command,- payload.TargetType,- payload.TargetID,- reason,- ); driftErr != nil {- log.Warn().- Str("action_id", plan.ActionID).- Str("approval_id", approvalID).- Str("capability", capabilityName).- Err(driftErr).- Msg("Refusing action execution: payload does not match approved plan hash")- now := time.Now().UTC()- record.State = unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed- record.UpdatedAt = now- record.Result = &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{- Success: false,- ErrorMessage: fmt.Sprintf("plan_drift: %s", driftErr.Error()),- }- if err := persistFailedActionAudit(e.actionAuditStore, record, requestedBy, "plan drift refused"); err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Str("action_id", record.ID).Msg("failed to persist plan-drift refusal")- }- e.publishActionCompleted(record)- return nil, driftErr- }- }-- // Operator-set NeverAutoRemediate refusal: when the operator has- // flagged the target resource as never-auto-remediate, the broker- // must refuse the dispatch even with a valid approval and matching- // plan hash. The operator's per-resource intent outranks the- // per-action approval — this is the safety mechanism for "do not- // touch this resource even if you think you should." When the lock- // state cannot be determined (no store, or lookup error), only a- // dispatch backed by an approved human decision may proceed;- // autonomous dispatches fail closed. Persists a Failed audit record- // with `resource_remediation_locked:` or- // `remediation_lock_state_unknown:` prefix so the audit history- // shows every refused dispatch.- if refusal := e.checkRemediationLockForDispatch(plan.ActionID, resourceID, capabilityName, hasApprovedActionApproval(approvalRecords)); refusal != nil {- e.refuseDispatchForRemediationLock(record, requestedBy, refusal)- return nil, refusal- }-- record, err := e.recordActionExecutionStart(record, approvalID, requestedBy, fmt.Sprintf("dispatching command to agent %s", agentID), planFromApproval)- if err != nil {- return nil, err- }-- payload.ApprovalID = strings.TrimSpace(approvalID)- if approvalReq != nil && approvalReq.Plan != nil {- payload.BindCommandAuthorization(e.orgID, approvalReq.Plan.ActionID)- }- result, err := e.agentServer.ExecuteCommand(ctx, agentID, payload)- finalMessage := "command completed"- executionResult := &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{Success: true}-- if err != nil {- finalMessage = err.Error()- executionResult.Success = false- executionResult.ErrorMessage = err.Error()- } else {- output := result.Stdout- if strings.TrimSpace(result.Stderr) != "" {- if output != "" {- output += "\n"- }- output += result.Stderr- }- executionResult.Output = output- if result.ExitCode != 0 {- finalMessage = fmt.Sprintf("exit code %d", result.ExitCode)- executionResult.Success = false- executionResult.ErrorMessage = finalMessage- }- }-- // Read-after-write verification: if execution succeeded AND the command- // class has a derivable verification check, run it via the same agent- // path and record the outcome on the audit record. Verification is- // best-effort: if no check is derivable, or the check fails to run, we- // record that fact rather than fabricating a verified=true.- if executionResult.Success {- if vCmd, ok := VerificationCommandForCommand(payload.TargetType, payload.Command); ok {- vRanAt := time.Now().UTC()- vResult, vErr := e.agentServer.ExecuteCommand(ctx, agentID, agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: vCmd,- TargetType: payload.TargetType,- TargetID: payload.TargetID,- })- verification := &unifiedresources.ActionVerificationResult{- Ran: true,- Command: vCmd,- RanAt: vRanAt,- }- if vErr != nil {- verification.Success = false- verification.Note = fmt.Sprintf("verification check failed to dispatch: %s", vErr.Error())- } else {- output := strings.TrimSpace(vResult.Stdout)- if vResult.Stderr != "" {- if output != "" {- output += "\n"- }- output += strings.TrimSpace(vResult.Stderr)- }- verification.Output = output- verification.Success = vResult.ExitCode == 0- if !verification.Success {- verification.Note = fmt.Sprintf("verification check exit code %d", vResult.ExitCode)- }- }- executionResult.Verification = verification- }- }-- e.recordActionExecutionResult(record, executionResult, requestedBy, finalMessage)-- return result, err-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeNativeActionWithAudit(- ctx context.Context,- capabilityName string,- resourceID string,- approvalID string,- requiresApproval bool,- params map[string]any,- requestedBy string,- reason string,- execute func(context.Context) (*unifiedresources.ExecutionResult, error),-) (*unifiedresources.ExecutionResult, error) {- actionID := uuid.NewString()- requestCorrelationID := strings.TrimSpace(approvalID)- if requestCorrelationID == "" {- requestCorrelationID = actionID- }-- now := time.Now().UTC()- approvalReq := approvalRequestForID(approvalID)- planFromApproval := approvalReq != nil && approvalReq.Plan != nil- if planFromApproval {- if approvedActionID := strings.TrimSpace(approvalReq.Plan.ActionID); approvedActionID != "" {- actionID = approvedActionID- }- if approvedRequestID := strings.TrimSpace(approvalReq.Plan.RequestID); approvedRequestID != "" {- requestCorrelationID = approvedRequestID- }- }- plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: actionID,- RequestID: requestCorrelationID,- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: requiresApproval,- ApprovalPolicy: func() unifiedresources.ActionApprovalLevel {- if requiresApproval {- return unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin- }- return unifiedresources.ApprovalNone- }(),- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- ResourceVersion: "",- PolicyVersion: "",- PlanHash: actionPlanHashForParams(actionID, requestCorrelationID, capabilityName, resourceID, params, reason),- Message: reason,- Preflight: actionAuditPreflight(resourceID, reason, now),- }- if planFromApproval {- plan = mergeApprovedActionPlan(*approvalReq.Plan, plan)- }- approvalRecords := approvalRecordsForID(approvalID, &plan)-- record := unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord{- ID: actionID,- CreatedAt: now,- UpdatedAt: now,- State: actionPreExecutionState(planFromApproval, approvalRecords),- Request: unifiedresources.ActionRequest{- RequestID: requestCorrelationID,- ResourceID: strings.TrimSpace(resourceID),- CapabilityName: capabilityName,- Params: cloneActionParams(params),- Reason: reason,- RequestedBy: requestedBy,- },- Plan: plan,- }- record.Approvals = approvalRecords-- // Same operator-lock gate as the agent-command dispatch path: native- // provider dispatches (e.g. TrueNAS app start/stop/restart) are write- // actions on the resource, and the operator's NeverAutoRemediate flag- // must gate them identically — including failing closed for- // autonomous dispatches when the lock state cannot be determined.- if refusal := e.checkRemediationLockForDispatch(plan.ActionID, resourceID, capabilityName, hasApprovedActionApproval(approvalRecords)); refusal != nil {- return e.refuseDispatchForRemediationLock(record, requestedBy, refusal), refusal- }-- record, err := e.recordActionExecutionStart(record, approvalID, requestedBy, "dispatching native resource action", planFromApproval)- if err != nil {- return &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{Success: false, ErrorMessage: err.Error()}, err- }-- result, err := execute(ctx)- finalMessage := "native resource action completed"- executionResult := &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{Success: true}-- if err != nil {- finalMessage = err.Error()- executionResult.Success = false- executionResult.ErrorMessage = err.Error()- } else if result != nil {- executionResult = result- if !result.Success {- finalMessage = strings.TrimSpace(result.ErrorMessage)- if finalMessage == "" {- finalMessage = "native resource action failed"- }- }- }-- e.recordActionExecutionResult(record, executionResult, requestedBy, finalMessage)-- return executionResult, err-}--func actionPreExecutionState(planFromApproval bool, approvals []unifiedresources.ActionApprovalRecord) unifiedresources.ActionState {- if planFromApproval || hasApprovedActionApproval(approvals) {- return unifiedresources.ActionStateApproved- }- return unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned-}--func hasApprovedActionApproval(approvals []unifiedresources.ActionApprovalRecord) bool {- for _, approval := range approvals {- if approval.Outcome == unifiedresources.OutcomeApproved {- return true- }- }- return false-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) recordActionExecutionStart(record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, approvalID, actor, message string, planFromApproval bool) (unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, error) {- now := time.Now().UTC()- if strings.TrimSpace(actor) == "" {- actor = approvalAuditActor- }- if planFromApproval {- if record.Plan.ApprovalPolicy == unifiedresources.ApprovalDryRun {- refusalRecord := record- if e != nil && e.actionAuditStore != nil {- if current, found, err := e.actionAuditStore.GetActionAudit(record.ID); err == nil && found {- refusalRecord = current- }- }- return e.recordActionExecutionRefusal(refusalRecord, unifiedresources.ErrActionDryRunOnly, actor, now)- }- var err error- approvalRecord := record- record, err = e.ensureApprovalDecisionBeforeExecution(record, approvalID, actor, now)- if err != nil {- if unifiedresources.IsPermanentActionExecutionRefusal(err) {- return e.recordActionExecutionRefusal(actionExecutionRefusalRecord(record, approvalRecord), err, actor, now)- }- return record, err- }- } else if e != nil && e.actionAuditStore != nil {- plannedEvent := unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{- ActionID: record.ID, Timestamp: now, State: unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned,- Actor: actor, Message: strings.TrimSpace(record.Request.Reason),- }- current, _, err := e.actionAuditStore.CreateActionAudit(record, []unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{plannedEvent})- if err != nil {- log.Warn().- Err(err).- Str("action_id", record.ID).- Str("resource_id", record.Request.ResourceID).- Msg("failed to persist planned action audit")- return record, err- }- record = current- }-- started, event, err := unifiedresources.BeginActionExecution(record, actor, now)- if err != nil {- log.Warn().- Err(err).- Str("action_id", record.ID).- Str("state", string(record.State)).- Msg("failed to normalize action execution start")- if unifiedresources.IsPermanentActionExecutionRefusal(err) {- return e.recordActionExecutionRefusal(record, err, actor, now)- }- return record, err- }- if strings.TrimSpace(message) != "" {- event.Message = strings.TrimSpace(message)- }- if e == nil || e.actionAuditStore == nil {- return started, nil- }- if err := e.actionAuditStore.RecordActionExecutionStart(started, event); err != nil {- log.Warn().- Err(err).- Str("action_id", started.ID).- Str("state", string(started.State)).- Msg("failed to persist action execution start")- return record, err- }- return started, nil-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) recordActionExecutionRefusal(record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, reason error, actor string, now time.Time) (unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, error) {- failed, event, err := unifiedresources.RefuseActionExecution(record, reason, actor, now)- if err != nil {- return record, err- }- if e == nil || e.actionAuditStore == nil {- e.publishActionCompleted(failed)- return failed, reason- }- _, found, queryErr := e.actionAuditStore.GetActionAudit(failed.ID)- if queryErr != nil {- return record, queryErr- }- var persistErr error- if found {- persistErr = e.actionAuditStore.RecordActionExecutionRefusal(failed, event)- } else {- _, _, persistErr = e.actionAuditStore.CreateActionAudit(failed, []unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{event})- }- if persistErr != nil {- log.Warn().- Err(persistErr).- Str("action_id", failed.ID).- Str("state", string(failed.State)).- Msg("failed to persist action execution refusal")- return record, persistErr- }- e.publishActionCompleted(failed)- return failed, reason-}--func actionExecutionRefusalRecord(record, fallback unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord) unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord {- if len(record.Approvals) == 0 && len(fallback.Approvals) > 0 {- record.Approvals = append([]unifiedresources.ActionApprovalRecord(nil), fallback.Approvals...)- }- if record.Request.Params == nil && len(fallback.Request.Params) > 0 {- record.Request.Params = cloneActionParams(fallback.Request.Params)- }- return record-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) ensureApprovalDecisionBeforeExecution(record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, approvalID, actor string, now time.Time) (unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, error) {- if e == nil || e.actionAuditStore == nil {- return record, nil- }-- current, ok, err := e.actionAuditStore.GetActionAudit(record.ID)- if err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Str("action_id", record.ID).Msg("failed to query action audit before execution")- return record, err- }- if !ok {- decisionEvent := unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{ActionID: record.ID, Timestamp: now, State: record.State, Actor: actor, Message: "Action approval was recorded before execution."}- current, _, err := e.actionAuditStore.CreateActionAudit(record, []unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{decisionEvent})- if err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Str("action_id", record.ID).Msg("failed to persist approved action audit before execution")- return record, err- }- return current, nil- }- if current.State != unifiedresources.ActionStatePending {- return current, nil- }-- approvalRecord := actionApprovalRecordForExecution(current, approvalID, actor, now, unifiedresources.OutcomeApproved)- updated, event, err := unifiedresources.ApplyActionDecision(current, approvalRecord, approvalRecord.Timestamp)- if err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Str("action_id", record.ID).Msg("failed to normalize approval decision before execution")- return current, err- }- if err := e.actionAuditStore.RecordActionDecision(updated, event); err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Str("action_id", record.ID).Msg("failed to persist approval decision before execution")- return current, err- }- return updated, nil-}-func actionApprovalRecordForExecution(action unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, approvalID, actor string, now time.Time, fallbackOutcome unifiedresources.ApprovalOutcome) unifiedresources.ActionApprovalRecord {if fallbackOutcome == "" {fallbackOutcome = unifiedresources.OutcomeApproved@@ -542,70 +42,6 @@ func actionApprovalRecordForExecution(action unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord,}}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) recordActionExecutionResult(record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, result *unifiedresources.ExecutionResult, actor, message string) unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord {- now := time.Now().UTC()- if strings.TrimSpace(actor) == "" {- actor = approvalAuditActor- }- completed, event, err := unifiedresources.CompleteActionExecution(record, result, actor, now)- if err != nil {- log.Warn().- Err(err).- Str("action_id", record.ID).- Str("state", string(record.State)).- Msg("failed to normalize action execution result")- record.UpdatedAt = now- record.Result = result- if result != nil && result.Success {- record.State = unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted- } else {- record.State = unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed- }- log.Warn().Str("action_id", record.ID).Msg("refusing to persist a synthetic terminal action result after transition normalization failed")- return record- }- if strings.TrimSpace(message) != "" {- event.Message = strings.TrimSpace(message)- }- if e == nil || e.actionAuditStore == nil {- e.publishActionCompleted(completed)- return completed- }- if err := e.actionAuditStore.RecordActionExecutionResult(completed, event); err != nil {- log.Warn().- Err(err).- Str("action_id", completed.ID).- Str("state", string(completed.State)).- Msg("failed to persist action execution result")- }- e.publishActionCompleted(completed)- return completed-}--// publishActionCompleted dispatches the executor's post-completion-// callback, if installed. Fire-and-forget on its own goroutine: the-// callback runs after the audit record has already been persisted,-// so a panic or stall on the consumer side must not back up the-// dispatch hot path. Snapshots the record by value so the consumer-// reads a stable view independent of any subsequent record-// mutations on the originating goroutine.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) publishActionCompleted(record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord) {- if e == nil {- return- }- cb := e.onActionCompleted- if cb == nil {- return- }- if record.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted && record.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- // Defensive — only Completed/Failed are terminal states the- // agent SSE stream surfaces. Any other state would confuse- // agents that branch on "this action is done."- return- }- go cb(record)-}-// RecordApprovalDecision updates the unified action audit for an approval that// reached a terminal or pre-execution decision state.func (e *PulseToolExecutor) RecordApprovalDecision(approvalID string, state unifiedresources.ActionState, actor, message string) {@@ -640,13 +76,6 @@ func RecordApprovalDecision(store unifiedresources.ResourceStore, approvalID str}}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) recordApprovalDecisionAtomically(approvalID string, record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, actor string) bool {- if e == nil {- return false- }- return recordApprovalDecisionAtomically(e.actionAuditStore, approvalID, record, actor)-}-func recordApprovalDecisionAtomically(store unifiedresources.ResourceStore, approvalID string, record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, actor string) bool {if store == nil {return false@@ -692,130 +121,6 @@ func recordApprovalDecisionAtomically(store unifiedresources.ResourceStore, apprreturn true}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) recordPendingApprovalAction(req *approval.ApprovalRequest) {- if e == nil {- return- }- RecordPendingApprovalAction(e.actionAuditStore, req)-}--// AttachApprovalActionPlan normalizes an approval request onto the shared-// action-governance model before it is persisted by the approval store.-func AttachApprovalActionPlan(req *approval.ApprovalRequest, now time.Time) {- if req == nil {- return- }- if now.IsZero() {- now = time.Now().UTC()- } else {- now = now.UTC()- }- req.ID = strings.TrimSpace(req.ID)- if req.ID == "" {- req.ID = uuid.NewString()- }- capabilityName := approvalCapabilityForTargetType(req.TargetType)- resourceID := approvalAuditResourceID(req.TargetType, req.TargetID, req.TargetName)- if req.Plan == nil {- actionID := uuid.NewString()- req.Plan = &unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: actionID,- RequestID: req.ID,- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- PredictedBlastRadius: approvalBlastRadius(req.TargetType, req.Command),- RollbackAvailable: approvalRollbackAvailable(req.TargetType, req.Command),- Message: strings.TrimSpace(req.Context),- PlannedAt: now,- PlanHash: approvalPlanHash(actionID, req.ID, capabilityName, resourceID, req.Command, req.TargetType, req.TargetID, req.Context),- }- }- if strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.ActionID) == "" {- req.Plan.ActionID = uuid.NewString()- }- if strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.RequestID) == "" {- req.Plan.RequestID = req.ID- }- if req.Plan.PlannedAt.IsZero() {- req.Plan.PlannedAt = now- }- if strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.Message) == "" {- req.Plan.Message = strings.TrimSpace(req.Context)- }- req.Plan.Allowed = true- req.Plan.RequiresApproval = true- if req.Plan.ApprovalPolicy == "" {- req.Plan.ApprovalPolicy = unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin- }- if strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.PlanHash) == "" {- req.Plan.PlanHash = approvalPlanHash(req.Plan.ActionID, req.Plan.RequestID, capabilityName, resourceID, req.Command, req.TargetType, req.TargetID, req.Context)- }- req.ContextConfidence = approvalContextConfidence(req)- req.Preflight = approvalPreflight(req)- req.Plan.Preflight = req.Preflight-}--// RecordPendingApprovalAction persists the planned and pending audit state for-// a newly-created governed approval request.-func RecordPendingApprovalAction(store unifiedresources.ResourceStore, req *approval.ApprovalRequest) {- if store == nil || req == nil || req.Plan == nil {- return- }- actor := approval.RequesterForRequest(req)- record := actionAuditRecordFromApproval(req, unifiedresources.ActionStatePending, actor)- events := []unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{- {ActionID: req.Plan.ActionID, State: unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned, Timestamp: record.CreatedAt, Actor: actor, Message: strings.TrimSpace(req.Context)},- {ActionID: req.Plan.ActionID, State: unifiedresources.ActionStatePending, Timestamp: record.CreatedAt, Actor: actor, Message: "waiting for approval"},- }- if _, _, err := store.CreateActionAudit(record, events); err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Str("action_id", record.ID).Msg("failed to persist pending approval action")- }-}--func recordApprovalLifecycle(store unifiedresources.ResourceStore, actionID string, state unifiedresources.ActionState, actor, message string) {- event := unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{- ActionID: strings.TrimSpace(actionID),- State: state,- Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),- Actor: strings.TrimSpace(actor),- Message: strings.TrimSpace(message),- }- if event.Actor == "" {- event.Actor = approvalAuditActor- }- if err := store.RecordActionLifecycleEvent(event); err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Str("action_id", actionID).Str("state", string(state)).Msg("failed to persist pending approval lifecycle event")- }-}--func mergeApprovedActionPlan(approved unifiedresources.ActionPlan, fallback unifiedresources.ActionPlan) unifiedresources.ActionPlan {- if strings.TrimSpace(approved.ActionID) == "" {- approved.ActionID = fallback.ActionID- }- if strings.TrimSpace(approved.RequestID) == "" {- approved.RequestID = fallback.RequestID- }- if approved.PlannedAt.IsZero() {- approved.PlannedAt = fallback.PlannedAt- }- if approved.ExpiresAt.IsZero() {- approved.ExpiresAt = fallback.ExpiresAt- }- if strings.TrimSpace(approved.PlanHash) == "" {- approved.PlanHash = fallback.PlanHash- }- if strings.TrimSpace(approved.Message) == "" {- approved.Message = fallback.Message- }- approved.Allowed = true- approved.RequiresApproval = approved.RequiresApproval || fallback.RequiresApproval- if approved.ApprovalPolicy == "" {- approved.ApprovalPolicy = fallback.ApprovalPolicy- }- return approved-}-func actionAuditRecordFromApproval(req *approval.ApprovalRequest, state unifiedresources.ActionState, _ string) unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord {now := time.Now().UTC()plan := *req.Plan@@ -924,98 +229,6 @@ func approvalAuditResourceID(targetType, targetID, targetName string) string {return targetType + ":" + targetID}-// validateApprovedCommandPlanHash recomputes the approval-equivalent plan-// hash from the actual payload presented at execute time and compares it to-// the hash recorded at approval time. If approvedHash is empty (older-// approval records, or contract paths that did not author one), validation-// is skipped and existing behavior is preserved. If the hashes differ, the-// broker must refuse execution: the operator approved a specific command +-// target + reason combination, and a different one is now being requested.-//-// The hash function used here matches `approvalPlanHash` (the function-// invoked at approval-creation time) so direct comparison is meaningful.-// `actionPlanHash` shape differs slightly (no field-level whitespace-// trimming) and would produce false-positive drift on legitimate payloads.-func validateApprovedCommandPlanHash(- approvedHash string,- actionID, requestID, capabilityName, resourceID string,- command, targetType, targetID, reason string,-) error {- approvedHash = strings.TrimSpace(approvedHash)- if approvedHash == "" {- return nil- }- fresh := approvalPlanHash(actionID, requestID, capabilityName, resourceID, command, targetType, targetID, reason)- if fresh == approvedHash {- return nil- }- return fmt.Errorf("%w (approved %s, payload %s)", unifiedresources.ErrActionPlanDrift, approvedHash, fresh)-}--func actionPlanHash(actionID, requestID, capabilityName, resourceID string, payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload, reason string) string {- sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.Join([]string{- actionID,- requestID,- capabilityName,- strings.TrimSpace(resourceID),- payload.Command,- payload.TargetType,- payload.TargetID,- reason,- }, "|")))- return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])-}--func actionPlanHashForParams(actionID, requestID, capabilityName, resourceID string, params map[string]any, reason string) string {- encoded, _ := json.Marshal(cloneActionParams(params))- sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.Join([]string{- actionID,- requestID,- capabilityName,- strings.TrimSpace(resourceID),- string(encoded),- reason,- }, "|")))- return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])-}--func approvalPlanHash(actionID, requestID, capabilityName, resourceID, command, targetType, targetID, context string) string {- sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.Join([]string{- actionID,- requestID,- capabilityName,- strings.TrimSpace(resourceID),- command,- strings.TrimSpace(targetType),- strings.TrimSpace(targetID),- strings.TrimSpace(context),- }, "|")))- return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])-}--func cloneActionParams(params map[string]any) map[string]any {- if len(params) == 0 {- return nil- }- cloned := make(map[string]any, len(params))- for key, value := range params {- cloned[key] = value- }- return cloned-}--func actionAuditPreflight(resourceID, reason string, generatedAt time.Time) *unifiedresources.ActionPreflight {- return unifiedresources.NormalizeActionPreflight(&unifiedresources.ActionPreflight{- Target: strings.TrimSpace(resourceID),- IntendedChange: strings.TrimSpace(reason),- DryRunAvailable: false,- DryRunSummary: "No provider-supported dry run is available for this action.",- SafetyChecks: []string{"Approval and execution are scoped to the resolved resource."},- VerificationSteps: []string{"Read back the target state after execution."},- GeneratedAt: generatedAt,- }, unifiedresources.ActionRequest{ResourceID: resourceID, Reason: reason}, unifiedresources.ActionPlan{PlannedAt: generatedAt, Message: reason})-}-func approvalRecordsForID(approvalID string, plan *unifiedresources.ActionPlan) []unifiedresources.ActionApprovalRecord {approvalID = strings.TrimSpace(approvalID)if approvalID == "" {@@ -1079,131 +292,3 @@ func approvalTimestamp(req *approval.ApprovalRequest) time.Time {}return req.DecidedAt.UTC()}--// isResourceRemediationLocked returns whether the operator has set-// NeverAutoRemediate=true on the resource the dispatch targets.-// Returns (false, nil) when the resource has no operator state, or-// when only IntentionallyOffline (without NeverAutoRemediate) is set.-// When the lock state cannot be determined — no audit store is wired,-// or the store lookup fails — it returns an error wrapping-// ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown so the caller can-// distinguish "not locked" from "unknown". Caller policy lives in-// checkRemediationLockForDispatch: autonomous (non-human-approved)-// dispatches fail closed on unknown state; human-approved dispatches-// keep the historical fail-open posture.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) isResourceRemediationLocked(resourceID string) (bool, error) {- canonical := strings.TrimSpace(resourceID)- if canonical == "" {- return false, nil- }- if e == nil || e.actionAuditStore == nil {- return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: no action audit store is wired", ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown)- }- state, found, err := e.actionAuditStore.GetResourceOperatorState(canonical)- if err != nil {- return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: operator-state lookup failed: %s", ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown, err.Error())- }- if !found {- return false, nil- }- return state.BlocksRemediation(), nil-}--// checkRemediationLockForDispatch applies the operator NeverAutoRemediate-// policy at the dispatch decision point. Returns nil when the dispatch may-// proceed, ErrResourceRemediationLocked when the operator has locked the-// resource, or an ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown-wrapped error when the-// lock state cannot be determined and the dispatch carries no approved-// human decision. Autonomous dispatches fail CLOSED on unknown lock state:-// a broker that cannot read the operator's "never touch this" flag must-// not assume it is unset. Human-approved dispatches keep the historical-// fail-open posture — the operator explicitly signed off on this exact-// plan, so a degraded operator-state lookup does not override their-// decision — but the degraded lookup is still logged.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) checkRemediationLockForDispatch(actionID, resourceID, capabilityName string, humanApproved bool) error {- locked, lockErr := e.isResourceRemediationLocked(resourceID)- if lockErr != nil {- if humanApproved {- log.Warn().- Str("action_id", actionID).- Str("resource_id", resourceID).- Str("capability", capabilityName).- Err(lockErr).- Msg("Remediation lock state unknown; allowing human-approved dispatch (fail-open) but logging")- return nil- }- log.Warn().- Str("action_id", actionID).- Str("resource_id", resourceID).- Str("capability", capabilityName).- Err(lockErr).- Msg("Refusing autonomous action execution: remediation lock state unknown (fail-closed); operator approval required")- return lockErr- }- if locked {- log.Warn().- Str("action_id", actionID).- Str("resource_id", resourceID).- Str("capability", capabilityName).- Msg("Refusing action execution: resource is operator-locked against automated remediation")- return unifiedresources.ErrResourceRemediationLocked- }- return nil-}--// refuseDispatchForRemediationLock persists a Failed audit record for a-// dispatch refused by the remediation-lock gate and returns the-// ExecutionResult describing the refusal. The ErrorMessage carries a-// stable prefix (`resource_remediation_locked:` or-// `remediation_lock_state_unknown:`) so audit-UI filters and alert rules-// can branch on the token.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) refuseDispatchForRemediationLock(record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, requestedBy string, refusal error) *unifiedresources.ExecutionResult {- now := time.Now().UTC()- record.State = unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed- record.UpdatedAt = now- result := &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{- Success: false,- ErrorMessage: remediationLockRefusalMessage(refusal),- }- record.Result = result- if err := persistFailedActionAudit(e.actionAuditStore, record, requestedBy, remediationLockLifecycleMessage(refusal)); err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Str("action_id", record.ID).Msg("failed to persist remediation-lock refusal")- }- e.publishActionCompleted(record)- return result-}--func persistFailedActionAudit(store unifiedresources.ResourceStore, record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, actor, message string) error {- if store == nil {- return nil- }- event := unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{ActionID: record.ID, Timestamp: record.UpdatedAt, State: unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed, Actor: actor, Message: message}- current, found, err := store.GetActionAudit(record.ID)- if err != nil {- return err- }- if found {- current.State = unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed- current.UpdatedAt = record.UpdatedAt- current.Result = record.Result- current.Verification = record.Verification- current.VerificationOutcome = record.VerificationOutcome- return store.RecordActionExecutionRefusal(current, event)- }- _, _, err = store.CreateActionAudit(record, []unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{event})- return err-}--func remediationLockRefusalMessage(refusal error) string {- if errors.Is(refusal, ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown) {- return fmt.Sprintf("remediation_lock_state_unknown: %s", refusal.Error())- }- return fmt.Sprintf("resource_remediation_locked: %s", refusal.Error())-}--func remediationLockLifecycleMessage(refusal error) string {- if errors.Is(refusal, ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown) {- return "remediation lock state unknown refused"- }- return "resource remediation lock refused"-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/action_audit_execution_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/action_audit_execution_test.goindex 854e04cb66..e6c6870ee9 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/action_audit_execution_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/action_audit_execution_test.go@@ -1,174 +1,15 @@package toolsimport (- "context"- "errors""strings""testing""time"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval"unifiedresources "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/unifiedresources"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/mock")-const (- testAuditVerificationCommandRedacted = "[redacted-verification-command]"- testAuditVerificationOutputRedacted = "[redacted-verification-output]"- testAuditVerificationNoteRedacted = "[redacted-verification-note]"-)--func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditUsesExecutionStateMachine(t *testing.T) {- store := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return payload.Command == "uptime" && payload.TargetType == "agent" && payload.TargetID == "agent-1"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Success: true,- Stdout: "ok",- ExitCode: 0,- }, nil).Once()-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: store,- })- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "node-1",- "",- false,- "agent-1",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "uptime",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- },- "pulse_control",- "run uptime",- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit: %v", err)- }- if result == nil || result.Stdout != "ok" {- t.Fatalf("command result = %#v", result)- }-- audits, err := store.GetActionAudits("node-1", time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudits: %v", err)- }- if len(audits) != 1 {- t.Fatalf("audits len = %d, want 1", len(audits))- }- audit := audits[0]- if audit.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted || audit.Result == nil || audit.Result.Output != "ok" {- t.Fatalf("audit = %#v", audit)- }-- events, err := store.GetActionLifecycleEvents(audit.ID, time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionLifecycleEvents: %v", err)- }- seen := map[unifiedresources.ActionState]string{}- for _, event := range events {- seen[event.State] = event.Message- }- for _, state := range []unifiedresources.ActionState{- unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned,- unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting,- unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted,- } {- if _, ok := seen[state]; !ok {- t.Fatalf("missing lifecycle state %q in %#v", state, events)- }- }- if seen[unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting] != "dispatching command to agent agent-1" {- t.Fatalf("executing event message = %q", seen[unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting])- }- agentServer.AssertExpectations(t)-}--func TestAttachApprovalActionPlanRecordsPendingActionAudit(t *testing.T) {- store := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- now := time.Date(2026, 5, 7, 9, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC)- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: " approval-patrol-queued ",- OrgID: "tenant-1",- ToolID: "investigation_fix",- Command: "systemctl restart nginx",- TargetType: "investigation",- TargetID: "finding-123",- TargetName: "web-1",- Context: "Restart nginx after Patrol investigation",- RiskLevel: approval.RiskHigh,- }-- AttachApprovalActionPlan(req, now)-- if req.ID != "approval-patrol-queued" {- t.Fatalf("approval id = %q", req.ID)- }- if req.Plan == nil {- t.Fatal("expected governed action plan")- }- if req.Plan.ActionID == "" {- t.Fatalf("expected action id: %#v", req.Plan)- }- if req.Plan.RequestID != req.ID {- t.Fatalf("plan request id = %q, want %q", req.Plan.RequestID, req.ID)- }- if !req.Plan.Allowed || !req.Plan.RequiresApproval || req.Plan.ApprovalPolicy != unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin {- t.Fatalf("approval plan posture = %#v", req.Plan)- }- if !req.Plan.PlannedAt.Equal(now) {- t.Fatalf("planned at = %s, want %s", req.Plan.PlannedAt, now)- }- if req.Preflight == nil || req.ContextConfidence == nil || req.Plan.Preflight != req.Preflight {- t.Fatalf("expected preflight and context confidence on approval: %#v", req)- }-- RecordPendingApprovalAction(store, req)-- audit, ok, err := store.GetActionAudit(req.Plan.ActionID)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudit: %v", err)- }- if !ok {- t.Fatal("expected pending approval action audit")- }- if audit.State != unifiedresources.ActionStatePending {- t.Fatalf("audit state = %q, want pending", audit.State)- }- if audit.Request.RequestID != req.ID {- t.Fatalf("audit request id = %q, want %q", audit.Request.RequestID, req.ID)- }- if audit.Request.ResourceID != "investigation:finding-123" {- t.Fatalf("audit resource id = %q", audit.Request.ResourceID)- }- if audit.Request.RequestedBy != approval.RequesterPulsePatrol {- t.Fatalf("audit requested by = %q", audit.Request.RequestedBy)- }-- events, err := store.GetActionLifecycleEvents(req.Plan.ActionID, time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionLifecycleEvents: %v", err)- }- states := map[unifiedresources.ActionState]bool{}- for _, event := range events {- states[event.State] = true- if event.Actor != approval.RequesterPulsePatrol {- t.Fatalf("lifecycle actor = %q, want %q", event.Actor, approval.RequesterPulsePatrol)- }- }- if !states[unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned] || !states[unifiedresources.ActionStatePending] {- t.Fatalf("expected planned and pending lifecycle states, got %#v", events)- }-}--func TestExecuteNativeActionWithApprovedAuditRecordsDecisionBeforeExecution(t *testing.T) {+func TestRecordApprovalDecisionDoesNotRegressExecutingAudit(t *testing.T) {actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()approvalStore, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{DataDir: t.TempDir(),@@ -183,8 +24,8 @@ func TestExecuteNativeActionWithApprovedAuditRecordsDecisionBeforeExecution(t *tnow := time.Now().UTC()plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: "act-approved-native",- RequestID: "approval-native",+ ActionID: "act-decision-no-regress",+ RequestID: "approval-decision-no-regress",Allowed: true,RequiresApproval: true,ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,@@ -195,73 +36,50 @@ func TestExecuteNativeActionWithApprovedAuditRecordsDecisionBeforeExecution(t *tPlanHash: "sha256:test",}req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-native",- Command: "restart app",- TargetType: "docker",- TargetID: "docker-host:app",- TargetName: "app",- Context: "restart app during maintenance",+ ID: "approval-decision-no-regress",+ Command: "restart service",+ TargetType: "agent",+ TargetID: "agent-1",+ TargetName: "agent-1",+ Context: "restart service during maintenance",Plan: &plan,}if err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)}-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{ActionAuditStore: actionStore})- executor.recordPendingApprovalAction(req)- if _, err := approvalStore.Approve("approval-native", "[email protected]"); err != nil {+ if _, err := approvalStore.Approve("approval-decision-no-regress", "[email protected]"); err != nil {t.Fatalf("Approve: %v", err)}-- result, err := executor.executeNativeActionWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_docker",- "docker-host:app",- "approval-native",- true,- map[string]any{"action": "restart"},- "pulse_control",- "restart app during maintenance",- func(context.Context) (*unifiedresources.ExecutionResult, error) {- return &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{Success: false, ErrorMessage: "provider rejected restart"}, nil- },- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeNativeActionWithAudit: %v", err)- }- if result == nil || result.Success || result.ErrorMessage != "provider rejected restart" {- t.Fatalf("execution result = %#v", result)+ executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{ActionAuditStore: actionStore})+ record := actionAuditRecordFromApproval(req, unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting, "pulse_control")+ record.Approvals = approvalRecordsForID(req.ID, req.Plan)+ if err := actionStore.RecordActionAudit(record); err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("RecordActionAudit: %v", err)}- audit, ok, err := actionStore.GetActionAudit("act-approved-native")+ executor.RecordApprovalDecision("approval-decision-no-regress", unifiedresources.ActionStateApproved, "[email protected]", "approval granted")++ audit, ok, err := actionStore.GetActionAudit("act-decision-no-regress")if err != nil {t.Fatalf("GetActionAudit: %v", err)}- if !ok || audit.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed || len(audit.Approvals) != 1 || audit.Result == nil {+ if !ok || audit.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting || audit.Result != nil {t.Fatalf("audit = %#v, ok=%v", audit, ok)}- if audit.Approvals[0].Actor != "[email protected]" || audit.Approvals[0].Outcome != unifiedresources.OutcomeApproved {- t.Fatalf("approval audit = %#v", audit.Approvals[0])- }+}- events, err := actionStore.GetActionLifecycleEvents("act-approved-native", time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionLifecycleEvents: %v", err)- }- seen := map[unifiedresources.ActionState]bool{}- for _, event := range events {- seen[event.State] = true+// seedPendingApprovalAudit persists the planned and pending audit state a+// governed approval request carries before an operator decides it.+func seedPendingApprovalAudit(t *testing.T, store unifiedresources.ResourceStore, req *approval.ApprovalRequest) {+ t.Helper()+ actor := approval.RequesterForRequest(req)+ record := actionAuditRecordFromApproval(req, unifiedresources.ActionStatePending, actor)+ events := []unifiedresources.ActionLifecycleEvent{+ {ActionID: req.Plan.ActionID, State: unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned, Timestamp: record.CreatedAt, Actor: actor, Message: strings.TrimSpace(req.Context)},+ {ActionID: req.Plan.ActionID, State: unifiedresources.ActionStatePending, Timestamp: record.CreatedAt, Actor: actor, Message: "waiting for approval"},}- for _, state := range []unifiedresources.ActionState{- unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned,- unifiedresources.ActionStatePending,- unifiedresources.ActionStateApproved,- unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting,- unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed,- } {- if !seen[state] {- t.Fatalf("missing lifecycle state %q in %#v", state, events)- }+ if _, _, err := store.CreateActionAudit(record, events); err != nil {+ t.Fatalf("CreateActionAudit: %v", err)}}@@ -304,7 +122,7 @@ func TestRecordApprovalDecisionUsesActionDecisionStoreContract(t *testing.T) {t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)}executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{ActionAuditStore: actionStore})- executor.recordPendingApprovalAction(req)+ seedPendingApprovalAudit(t, actionStore, req)if _, err := approvalStore.Approve("approval-decision", "[email protected]"); err != nil {t.Fatalf("Approve: %v", err)}@@ -378,8 +196,7 @@ func TestRecordApprovalDecisionUsesRejectedActionDecisionStoreContract(t *testinif err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)}- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{ActionAuditStore: actionStore})- executor.recordPendingApprovalAction(req)+ seedPendingApprovalAudit(t, actionStore, req)if _, err := approvalStore.Deny("approval-rejected-decision", "[email protected]", "outside maintenance"); err != nil {t.Fatalf("Deny: %v", err)}@@ -417,1144 +234,3 @@ func TestRecordApprovalDecisionUsesRejectedActionDecisionStoreContract(t *testin}}}--func TestRecordApprovalDecisionDoesNotRegressExecutingAudit(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- approvalStore, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)- }- previousApprovalStore := approval.GetStore()- approval.SetStore(approvalStore)- t.Cleanup(func() { approval.SetStore(previousApprovalStore) })-- now := time.Now().UTC()- plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: "act-decision-no-regress",- RequestID: "approval-decision-no-regress",- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- ResourceVersion: "resource:sha256:test",- PolicyVersion: "policy:sha256:test",- PlanHash: "sha256:test",- }- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-decision-no-regress",- Command: "restart service",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- TargetName: "agent-1",- Context: "restart service during maintenance",- Plan: &plan,- }- if err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)- }- if _, err := approvalStore.Approve("approval-decision-no-regress", "[email protected]"); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Approve: %v", err)- }- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{ActionAuditStore: actionStore})- record := actionAuditRecordFromApproval(req, unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting, "pulse_control")- record.Approvals = approvalRecordsForID(req.ID, req.Plan)- if err := actionStore.RecordActionAudit(record); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("RecordActionAudit: %v", err)- }-- executor.RecordApprovalDecision("approval-decision-no-regress", unifiedresources.ActionStateApproved, "[email protected]", "approval granted")-- audit, ok, err := actionStore.GetActionAudit("act-decision-no-regress")- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudit: %v", err)- }- if !ok || audit.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting || audit.Result != nil {- t.Fatalf("audit = %#v, ok=%v", audit, ok)- }-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditRefusesPayloadDriftAgainstApprovedPlan covers the-// safety guarantee that the operator approved exactly one (command, target,-// reason) combination. If the payload presented at execute time hashes to-// anything different than the approved plan, the broker must refuse rather-// than dispatch a drifted command under a stale approval.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditRefusesPayloadDriftAgainstApprovedPlan(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- approvalStore, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)- }- previousApprovalStore := approval.GetStore()- approval.SetStore(approvalStore)- t.Cleanup(func() { approval.SetStore(previousApprovalStore) })-- now := time.Now().UTC()- approvedHash := approvalPlanHash(- "act-drift",- "approval-drift",- "pulse_control",- "agent-1",- "systemctl restart workload",- "agent",- "agent-1",- "restart workload service",- )- plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: "act-drift",- RequestID: "approval-drift",- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- PlanHash: approvedHash,- }- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-drift",- Command: "systemctl restart workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- TargetName: "agent-1",- Context: "restart workload service",- Plan: &plan,- }- if err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)- }- if _, err := approvalStore.Approve("approval-drift", "[email protected]"); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Approve: %v", err)- }-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- executor.recordPendingApprovalAction(req)-- // Payload deliberately differs from the approved command. The hash check- // must catch this and refuse.- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-1",- "approval-drift",- true,- "agent-1",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "rm -rf /var/log/pulse",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- },- "pulse_control",- "restart workload service",- )- if !errors.Is(err, unifiedresources.ErrActionPlanDrift) {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit error = %v, want ErrActionPlanDrift", err)- }- if result != nil {- t.Fatalf("expected nil result on drift refusal, got %#v", result)- }- agentServer.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)-- // Drift refusal must be observable in the audit history, not just in- // WARN logs. Operators reviewing the action audit trail need to see- // "Pulse caught this drift attempt" recorded as a Failed action with- // a plan_drift error message.- audits, err := actionStore.GetActionAudits("agent:agent-1", time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudits: %v", err)- }- if len(audits) != 1 {- t.Fatalf("expected 1 drift-refused audit record, got %d", len(audits))- }- driftAudit := audits[0]- if driftAudit.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- t.Fatalf("drift audit state = %q, want %q", driftAudit.State, unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed)- }- if driftAudit.Result == nil || driftAudit.Result.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected drift audit Result.Success=false, got %#v", driftAudit.Result)- }- if driftAudit.Result == nil || !strings.Contains(driftAudit.Result.ErrorMessage, "plan_drift") {- t.Fatalf("expected drift audit ErrorMessage to include plan_drift, got %q", driftAudit.Result.ErrorMessage)- }-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditRunsClassDerivedVerificationAfterDispatch-// covers the read-after-write loop: when a successful dispatch matches a-// known command class, the broker derives the verification command and-// runs it via the same agent path. The result is persisted on the audit-// record's ExecutionResult.Verification so the audit history shows not-// only what the action did but whether the read-back confirmed it.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditRunsClassDerivedVerificationAfterDispatch(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- // Dispatch: systemctl restart nginx — succeeds.- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return payload.Command == "systemctl restart nginx"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Success: true,- Stdout: "",- ExitCode: 0,- }, nil).Once()- // Verification: systemctl is-active nginx — succeeds with "active".- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return payload.Command == "systemctl is-active 'nginx'"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Success: true,- Stdout: "active",- ExitCode: 0,- }, nil).Once()-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- _, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "node-1",- "",- false,- "agent-1",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl restart nginx",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- },- "pulse_control",- "restart nginx after Patrol detected stale config",- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit: %v", err)- }-- audits, err := actionStore.GetActionAudits("node-1", time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudits: %v", err)- }- if len(audits) != 1 {- t.Fatalf("audits len = %d, want 1", len(audits))- }- verification := audits[0].Result.Verification- if verification == nil {- t.Fatalf("expected ExecutionResult.Verification to be populated, got nil")- }- if !verification.Ran {- t.Fatalf("expected Verification.Ran=true")- }- if verification.Command != testAuditVerificationCommandRedacted {- t.Fatalf("Verification.Command = %q, want stored audit redaction marker", verification.Command)- }- if !verification.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected Verification.Success=true after exit code 0")- }- if verification.Output != testAuditVerificationOutputRedacted {- t.Fatalf("Verification.Output = %q, want stored audit redaction marker", verification.Output)- }- agentServer.AssertExpectations(t)-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditMarksVerificationFailedWhenReadbackDoesNotConfirm-// covers the negative case: dispatch succeeded, but the read-after-write-// check returned a non-zero exit code (e.g. service is "failed" not-// "active"). Verification.Success must reflect the read-back outcome-// rather than the dispatch outcome so the audit row honestly shows that-// Pulse ran the action but couldn't confirm it took.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditMarksVerificationFailedWhenReadbackDoesNotConfirm(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return payload.Command == "systemctl restart workload"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Success: true,- ExitCode: 0,- }, nil).Once()- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return payload.Command == "systemctl is-active 'workload'"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Success: false,- Stdout: "failed",- ExitCode: 3,- }, nil).Once()-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- _, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "node-1",- "",- false,- "agent-1",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl restart workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- },- "pulse_control",- "restart workload after backup window",- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit: %v", err)- }-- audits, _ := actionStore.GetActionAudits("node-1", time.Time{}, 10)- verification := audits[0].Result.Verification- if verification == nil || !verification.Ran {- t.Fatalf("expected verification ran, got %#v", verification)- }- if verification.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected Verification.Success=false after exit code 3")- }- if verification.Output != testAuditVerificationOutputRedacted {- t.Fatalf("Verification.Output = %q, want stored audit redaction marker", verification.Output)- }- if verification.Note != testAuditVerificationNoteRedacted {- t.Fatalf("Verification.Note = %q, want stored audit redaction marker", verification.Note)- }-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditSkipsVerificationForUnclassifiedCommands-// covers the no-fabrication boundary: when no verification command is-// derivable for the action class, the broker leaves Verification nil-// rather than recording a fake "verified" entry.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditSkipsVerificationForUnclassifiedCommands(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return payload.Command == "echo hello"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Success: true,- Stdout: "hello",- ExitCode: 0,- }, nil).Once()-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- _, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "node-1",- "",- false,- "agent-1",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "echo hello",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- },- "pulse_control",- "echo greeting",- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit: %v", err)- }-- audits, _ := actionStore.GetActionAudits("node-1", time.Time{}, 10)- if audits[0].Result.Verification != nil {- t.Fatalf("expected nil Verification for unclassified command, got %#v", audits[0].Result.Verification)- }- // Exactly one ExecuteCommand call expected (no verification dispatch).- agentServer.AssertExpectations(t)-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditAllowsMatchingPlanHash covers the positive case:-// when the payload at execute time hashes identically to the approved plan,-// dispatch proceeds normally.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditAllowsMatchingPlanHash(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- approvalStore, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)- }- previousApprovalStore := approval.GetStore()- approval.SetStore(approvalStore)- t.Cleanup(func() { approval.SetStore(previousApprovalStore) })-- now := time.Now().UTC()- approvedHash := approvalPlanHash(- "act-match",- "approval-match",- "pulse_control",- "agent-1",- "uptime",- "agent",- "agent-1",- "check uptime",- )- plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: "act-match",- RequestID: "approval-match",- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- PlanHash: approvedHash,- }- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-match",- Command: "uptime",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- TargetName: "agent-1",- Context: "check uptime",- Plan: &plan,- }- if err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)- }- if _, err := approvalStore.Approve("approval-match", "[email protected]"); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Approve: %v", err)- }-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.Anything).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Success: true,- Stdout: "up 4 days",- ExitCode: 0,- }, nil).Once()-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- executor.recordPendingApprovalAction(req)-- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-1",- "approval-match",- true,- "agent-1",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "uptime",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- },- "pulse_control",- "check uptime",- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit: %v", err)- }- if result == nil || result.Stdout != "up 4 days" {- t.Fatalf("command result = %#v", result)- }- agentServer.AssertExpectations(t)-}--func TestExecuteCommandWithDeniedApprovalDoesNotDispatch(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- approvalStore, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)- }- previousApprovalStore := approval.GetStore()- approval.SetStore(approvalStore)- t.Cleanup(func() { approval.SetStore(previousApprovalStore) })-- now := time.Now().UTC()- // PlanHash is the approval-equivalent hash of the (command, target,- // reason) the operator approved. This test covers the denial path, so- // the hash must match the executing payload to isolate denial as the- // reason for refusal — otherwise the broker's drift check fires first.- deniedHash := approvalPlanHash(- "act-denied-command",- "approval-denied-command",- "pulse_control",- "agent-1",- "rm -rf /tmp/pulse-test",- "agent",- "agent-1",- "unsafe cleanup command",- )- plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: "act-denied-command",- RequestID: "approval-denied-command",- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- ResourceVersion: "resource:sha256:test",- PolicyVersion: "policy:sha256:test",- PlanHash: deniedHash,- }- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-denied-command",- Command: "rm -rf /tmp/pulse-test",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- TargetName: "agent-1",- Context: "unsafe cleanup command",- Plan: &plan,- }- if err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)- }- if _, err := approvalStore.Deny("approval-denied-command", "[email protected]", "unsafe command"); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Deny: %v", err)- }-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- executor.recordPendingApprovalAction(req)-- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-1",- "approval-denied-command",- true,- "agent-1",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "rm -rf /tmp/pulse-test",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- },- "pulse_control",- "unsafe cleanup command",- )- if !errors.Is(err, unifiedresources.ErrActionNotApproved) {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit error = %v, want %v", err, unifiedresources.ErrActionNotApproved)- }- if result != nil {- t.Fatalf("command result = %#v, want nil", result)- }- agentServer.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)-- audit, ok, err := actionStore.GetActionAudit("act-denied-command")- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudit: %v", err)- }- if !ok || audit.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateRejected || len(audit.Approvals) != 1 || audit.Approvals[0].Outcome != unifiedresources.OutcomeRejected {- t.Fatalf("audit = %#v, ok=%v", audit, ok)- }- events, err := actionStore.GetActionLifecycleEvents("act-denied-command", time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionLifecycleEvents: %v", err)- }- for _, event := range events {- if event.State == unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting || event.State == unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted {- t.Fatalf("denied approval must not create execution lifecycle event: %#v", event)- }- }-}--func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditRefusesApprovedDryRunOnlyAndExpiredPlans(t *testing.T) {- for _, tc := range []struct {- name string- suffix string- configure func(*approval.ApprovalRequest)- wantErr error- wantPrefix string- }{- {- name: "dry run only",- suffix: "dryrun",- configure: func(req *approval.ApprovalRequest) {- req.Plan.ApprovalPolicy = unifiedresources.ApprovalDryRun- },- wantErr: unifiedresources.ErrActionDryRunOnly,- wantPrefix: "action_dry_run_only:",- },- {- name: "expired",- suffix: "expired",- configure: func(req *approval.ApprovalRequest) {- req.Plan.ExpiresAt = time.Now().UTC().Add(-time.Minute)- },- wantErr: unifiedresources.ErrActionPlanExpired,- wantPrefix: "action_plan_expired:",- },- } {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- approvalStore, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)- }- previousApprovalStore := approval.GetStore()- approval.SetStore(approvalStore)- t.Cleanup(func() { approval.SetStore(previousApprovalStore) })-- now := time.Now().UTC()- actionID := "act-" + tc.suffix + "-command"- approvalID := "approval-" + tc.suffix + "-command"- targetID := "agent-" + tc.suffix- command := "systemctl restart workload"- reason := "restart workload service"- approvedHash := approvalPlanHash(- actionID,- approvalID,- "pulse_control",- targetID,- command,- "agent",- targetID,- reason,- )- plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: actionID,- RequestID: approvalID,- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- ResourceVersion: "resource:sha256:test",- PolicyVersion: "policy:sha256:test",- PlanHash: approvedHash,- }- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: approvalID,- Command: command,- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: targetID,- TargetName: targetID,- Context: reason,- Plan: &plan,- }- if err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)- }- approved, err := approvalStore.Approve(approvalID, "[email protected]")- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Approve: %v", err)- }- tc.configure(approved)-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- executor.recordPendingApprovalAction(approved)-- completed := make(chan unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, 1)- executor.SetOnActionCompleted(func(record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord) {- completed <- record- })-- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- targetID,- approvalID,- true,- targetID,- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: command,- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: targetID,- },- "pulse_control",- reason,- )- if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit error = %v, want %v", err, tc.wantErr)- }- if result != nil {- t.Fatalf("expected nil command result on refusal, got %#v", result)- }- agentServer.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)-- audit, ok, err := actionStore.GetActionAudit(actionID)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudit: %v", err)- }- if !ok {- t.Fatalf("expected refused action audit %q", actionID)- }- if audit.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- t.Fatalf("audit state = %q, want %q", audit.State, unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed)- }- if audit.Result == nil || audit.Result.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected Result.Success=false, got %#v", audit.Result)- }- if !strings.HasPrefix(audit.Result.ErrorMessage, tc.wantPrefix) {- t.Fatalf("ErrorMessage = %q, want prefix %q", audit.Result.ErrorMessage, tc.wantPrefix)- }- if errors.Is(tc.wantErr, unifiedresources.ErrActionDryRunOnly) {- if len(audit.Approvals) != 0 {- t.Fatalf("dry-run-only refusal minted executable approval authority: %#v", audit.Approvals)- }- } else if len(audit.Approvals) != 1 || audit.Approvals[0].Outcome != unifiedresources.OutcomeApproved {- t.Fatalf("expected approved audit record to be preserved, got %#v", audit.Approvals)- }-- events, err := actionStore.GetActionLifecycleEvents(actionID, time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionLifecycleEvents: %v", err)- }- seenFailed := false- for _, event := range events {- if event.State == unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting || event.State == unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted {- t.Fatalf("refusal must not create dispatch lifecycle event: %#v", event)- }- if event.State == unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- seenFailed = true- if !strings.HasPrefix(event.Message, tc.wantPrefix) {- t.Fatalf("failed lifecycle message = %q, want prefix %q", event.Message, tc.wantPrefix)- }- }- }- if !seenFailed {- t.Fatalf("missing failed refusal lifecycle event in %#v", events)- }-- select {- case received := <-completed:- if received.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- t.Fatalf("callback state = %q, want %q", received.State, unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed)- }- if received.Result == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(received.Result.ErrorMessage, tc.wantPrefix) {- t.Fatalf("callback result = %#v, want prefix %q", received.Result, tc.wantPrefix)- }- case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):- t.Fatal("terminal refusal callback did not fire within 2s")- }- })- }-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditRefusesWhenResourceIsRemediationLocked covers-// the operator-set NeverAutoRemediate safety. When the operator has flagged-// the target resource as never-auto-remediate (via the-// /api/resources/{id}/operator-state surface), the broker must refuse the-// dispatch even with a valid approval and matching plan hash. The-// per-resource intent outranks the per-action approval — this is the-// safety mechanism for "do not touch this resource even if you think you-// should." The refusal must be visible on the audit timeline as a Failed-// record with a `resource_remediation_locked:` ErrorMessage prefix.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditRefusesWhenResourceIsRemediationLocked(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()-- // Operator has marked the target resource as never-auto-remediate.- if err := actionStore.SetResourceOperatorState(unifiedresources.ResourceOperatorState{- CanonicalID: "agent-locked",- NeverAutoRemediate: true,- Note: "manual-only — Pulse must not touch this host",- SetAt: time.Now().UTC(),- SetBy: "operator:richard",- }); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("SetResourceOperatorState: %v", err)- }-- approvalStore, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)- }- previousApprovalStore := approval.GetStore()- approval.SetStore(approvalStore)- t.Cleanup(func() { approval.SetStore(previousApprovalStore) })-- now := time.Now().UTC()- approvedHash := approvalPlanHash(- "act-locked",- "approval-locked",- "pulse_control",- "agent-locked",- "systemctl restart workload",- "agent",- "agent-locked",- "restart workload service",- )- plan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: "act-locked",- RequestID: "approval-locked",- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- PlanHash: approvedHash,- }- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-locked",- Command: "systemctl restart workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-locked",- TargetName: "agent-locked",- Context: "restart workload service",- Plan: &plan,- }- if err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)- }- if _, err := approvalStore.Approve("approval-locked", "[email protected]"); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Approve: %v", err)- }-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- executor.recordPendingApprovalAction(req)-- // Payload matches the approval (no drift); only the operator-set lock- // should refuse this. If the broker dispatches anyway, the operator's- // per-resource intent has been overridden by the approval, which is- // the failure we're guarding against.- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-locked",- "approval-locked",- true,- "agent-locked",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl restart workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-locked",- },- "pulse_control",- "restart workload service",- )- if !errors.Is(err, unifiedresources.ErrResourceRemediationLocked) {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit error = %v, want ErrResourceRemediationLocked", err)- }- if result != nil {- t.Fatalf("expected nil result on remediation-locked refusal, got %#v", result)- }- agentServer.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)-- // Refusal must be observable in the audit history with the canonical- // `resource_remediation_locked:` ErrorMessage prefix so audit-UI- // filters and alert rules can branch on the stable token.- audits, err := actionStore.GetActionAudits("agent:agent-locked", time.Time{}, 10)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudits: %v", err)- }- if len(audits) != 1 {- t.Fatalf("expected 1 refused audit record, got %d", len(audits))- }- refused := audits[0]- if refused.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- t.Fatalf("audit state = %q, want %q", refused.State, unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed)- }- if refused.Result == nil || refused.Result.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected Result.Success=false, got %#v", refused.Result)- }- if !strings.HasPrefix(refused.Result.ErrorMessage, "resource_remediation_locked:") {- t.Fatalf("expected ErrorMessage to start with resource_remediation_locked:, got %q", refused.Result.ErrorMessage)- }-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditAllowsDispatchWhenResourceUnlocked covers-// the negative case: a resource that has operator state recorded but-// without NeverAutoRemediate set must NOT block the dispatch. Pin this-// so the refusal branch can't drift into "always refuse when state-// exists".-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditAllowsDispatchWhenResourceUnlocked(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- // State recorded but with NeverAutoRemediate=false — should not refuse.- if err := actionStore.SetResourceOperatorState(unifiedresources.ResourceOperatorState{- CanonicalID: "agent-allowed",- IntentionallyOffline: true,- NeverAutoRemediate: false,- SetAt: time.Now().UTC(),- }); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("SetResourceOperatorState: %v", err)- }-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-allowed", mock.Anything).- Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{Stdout: "OK", ExitCode: 0}, nil)-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })-- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-allowed",- "", // no approval (not testing approval flow here)- false, // requiresApproval=false- "agent-allowed",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl status workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-allowed",- },- "pulse_control",- "check status",- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit unexpected error: %v", err)- }- if result == nil {- t.Fatal("expected dispatch to proceed; got nil result")- }- agentServer.AssertCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-allowed", mock.Anything)-}--func TestSetOnActionCompleted_FiresOnSuccessfulDispatch(t *testing.T) {- // The post-completion callback is the seam the API layer uses to- // bridge action audits into the agent SSE stream- // (action.completed events). Pin the contract: the callback- // fires once per terminal-state record, sees the persisted- // audit, and runs without blocking the dispatch caller —- // fire-and-forget on its own goroutine.- store := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-cb", mock.Anything).- Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{Success: true, Stdout: "ok", ExitCode: 0}, nil).Once()-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: store,- })-- got := make(chan unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, 1)- executor.SetOnActionCompleted(func(rec unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord) {- got <- rec- })-- if _, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-cb",- "",- false,- "agent-cb",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "uptime",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-cb",- },- "pulse_control",- "run uptime",- ); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit: %v", err)- }-- select {- case received := <-got:- if received.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted {- t.Errorf("callback record state = %q, want %q", received.State, unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted)- }- if received.ID == "" {- t.Error("callback record must carry the canonical action id")- }- if received.Request.ResourceID != "agent-cb" {- t.Errorf("callback resource id = %q, want %q", received.Request.ResourceID, "agent-cb")- }- if received.Result == nil || !received.Result.Success {- t.Errorf("callback result must surface success: %#v", received.Result)- }- case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):- t.Fatal("post-completion callback did not fire within 2s")- }-}--func TestSetOnActionCompleted_RecordCarriesVerificationResult(t *testing.T) {- // Verification is the post-execution read-after-write probe the- // broker derives for action classes with a known check command- // (systemctl-style service control). Pin the contract: the- // callback record's Verification block is populated when the- // dispatch class supports it, with the derived command and the- // success/failure outcome of running it. Agents reading the- // callback (or the SSE event downstream) close the certainty- // loop on this field.- store := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- // First call: the action itself.- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-vrf",- mock.MatchedBy(func(p agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return p.Command == "systemctl restart nginx"- })).- Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{Success: true, Stdout: "", ExitCode: 0}, nil).Once()- // Second call: the broker-derived verification probe. The- // expected command is `systemctl is-active 'nginx'`.- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-vrf",- mock.MatchedBy(func(p agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return strings.HasPrefix(p.Command, "systemctl is-active")- })).- Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{Success: true, Stdout: "active\n", ExitCode: 0}, nil).Once()-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: store,- })- got := make(chan unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, 1)- executor.SetOnActionCompleted(func(rec unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord) {- got <- rec- })-- if _, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-vrf",- "",- false,- "agent-vrf",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl restart nginx",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-vrf",- },- "pulse_control",- "restart nginx",- ); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit: %v", err)- }-- select {- case received := <-got:- if received.Result == nil {- t.Fatal("callback record must carry an ExecutionResult")- }- if received.Result.Verification == nil {- t.Fatal("callback record must carry a Verification block for service-restart actions — drift here breaks the certainty loop on action.completed")- }- if received.Verification == nil {- t.Fatal("callback record must carry the canonical top-level Verification block")- }- v := received.Result.Verification- if !v.Ran {- t.Error("Verification.Ran must be true after the broker dispatched the probe")- }- if received.Verification.Command != v.Command {- t.Errorf("canonical Verification.Command = %q, want %q", received.Verification.Command, v.Command)- }- if !v.Success {- t.Errorf("Verification.Success: probe returned exit 0, expected Success=true; got %+v", v)- }- if !strings.Contains(v.Command, "systemctl is-active") {- t.Errorf("Verification.Command must surface the derived probe command; got %q", v.Command)- }- if v.RanAt.IsZero() {- t.Error("Verification.RanAt must be populated so agents can reason about probe freshness")- }- case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):- t.Fatal("post-completion callback did not fire within 2s")- }- agentServer.AssertExpectations(t)-}--func TestSetOnActionCompleted_FiresOnPlanDriftRefusal(t *testing.T) {- // Plan-drift refusal lands in the audit store as Failed with the- // stable `plan_drift:` prefix; the callback must surface that- // terminal state so agents can branch on the refusal token- // without polling.- now := time.Date(2026, 5, 9, 9, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC)- approvedPlan := unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: "drift-action",- RequestID: "appr-drift",- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- PlannedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- PlanHash: "approved-but-drifted",- Message: "approved reason",- }- approvedReq := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "appr-drift",- Command: "approved-cmd",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-drift",- TargetName: "agent-drift",- Status: approval.StatusApproved,- Plan: &approvedPlan,- RequestedAt: now,- ExpiresAt: now.Add(5 * time.Minute),- }- approvalStoreOriginal := approval.GetStore()- defer approval.SetStore(approvalStoreOriginal)- memStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- approvalStoreLocal, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DefaultTimeout: 5 * time.Minute,- DisablePersistence: true,- })- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("approval.NewStore: %v", err)- }- if err := approvalStoreLocal.CreateApproval(approvedReq); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)- }- approval.SetStore(approvalStoreLocal)-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: &mockAgentServer{},- ActionAuditStore: memStore,- })-- got := make(chan unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord, 1)- executor.SetOnActionCompleted(func(rec unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord) {- got <- rec- })-- // Submit a payload whose hash will not match the approved plan.- if _, dispatchErr := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-drift",- "appr-drift",- true,- "agent-drift",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "different-cmd",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-drift",- },- "pulse_control",- "different reason",- ); dispatchErr == nil {- t.Fatal("expected plan-drift refusal; got nil error")- } else if !strings.Contains(dispatchErr.Error(), "plan") {- // Defensive: the validator's exact error wording can evolve;- // just confirm we got an error from the drift path rather- // than from somewhere else.- t.Logf("drift error: %v", dispatchErr)- }-- select {- case received := <-got:- if received.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- t.Errorf("refusal state = %q, want %q", received.State, unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed)- }- if received.Result == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(received.Result.ErrorMessage, "plan_drift:") {- t.Errorf("refusal must carry plan_drift: prefix on ErrorMessage; got %#v", received.Result)- }- case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):- t.Fatal("plan-drift callback did not fire within 2s")- }-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/action_audit_remediation_lock_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/action_audit_remediation_lock_test.godeleted file mode 100644index 65aaefba80..0000000000--- a/internal/ai/tools/action_audit_remediation_lock_test.go+++ /dev/null@@ -1,405 +0,0 @@-package tools--import (- "context"- "errors"- "strings"- "testing"- "time"-- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval"- unifiedresources "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/unifiedresources"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/mock"-)--// failingOperatorStateStore simulates an audit store whose operator-state-// lookup errors (e.g. sqlite I/O failure) while every other store surface-// keeps working, so refusal audit records can still be asserted.-type failingOperatorStateStore struct {- *unifiedresources.MemoryStore-}--func (s *failingOperatorStateStore) GetResourceOperatorState(string) (unifiedresources.ResourceOperatorState, bool, error) {- return unifiedresources.ResourceOperatorState{}, false, errors.New("simulated operator-state lookup failure")-}--// installApprovedApproval seeds the global approval store with an approved,-// plan-less approval and returns its ID. Plan-less keeps the plan-drift-// check out of the way: these tests exercise the remediation-lock gate's-// human-approved branch, which keys off the approved decision record.-func installApprovedApproval(t *testing.T, id, command, targetType, targetID string) {- t.Helper()- approvalStore, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("NewStore: %v", err)- }- previousApprovalStore := approval.GetStore()- approval.SetStore(approvalStore)- t.Cleanup(func() { approval.SetStore(previousApprovalStore) })-- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: id,- Command: command,- TargetType: targetType,- TargetID: targetID,- TargetName: targetID,- Context: "test approval",- }- if err := approvalStore.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("CreateApproval: %v", err)- }- if _, err := approvalStore.Approve(id, "[email protected]"); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Approve: %v", err)- }-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditFailsClosedOnLockLookupErrorWithoutApproval-// covers the autonomous posture (Patrol / assisted autonomy: no human-// approval on the dispatch) when the operator-state lookup errors. The-// broker cannot tell whether the operator set NeverAutoRemediate, so it-// must fail CLOSED — refuse the dispatch, surface "remediation lock state-// unknown", and leave a Failed audit record with the stable-// `remediation_lock_state_unknown:` prefix.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditFailsClosedOnLockLookupErrorWithoutApproval(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := &failingOperatorStateStore{MemoryStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()}- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- executor.SetAutonomousMode(true)-- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-degraded",- "", // no approval — autonomous dispatch- false,- "agent-degraded",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl restart workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-degraded",- },- "pulse_patrol",- "restart workload service",- )- if !errors.Is(err, ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown) {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit error = %v, want ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown", err)- }- if result != nil {- t.Fatalf("expected nil result on fail-closed refusal, got %#v", result)- }- agentServer.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)-- audits, auditErr := actionStore.GetActionAudits("agent-degraded", time.Time{}, 10)- if auditErr != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudits: %v", auditErr)- }- if len(audits) != 1 {- t.Fatalf("expected 1 refused audit record, got %d", len(audits))- }- refused := audits[0]- if refused.State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- t.Fatalf("audit state = %q, want %q", refused.State, unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed)- }- if refused.Result == nil || refused.Result.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected Result.Success=false, got %#v", refused.Result)- }- if !strings.HasPrefix(refused.Result.ErrorMessage, "remediation_lock_state_unknown:") {- t.Fatalf("expected ErrorMessage to start with remediation_lock_state_unknown:, got %q", refused.Result.ErrorMessage)- }-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditFailsClosedWithNilStoreWithoutApproval covers-// the degraded deployment where no audit store is wired at all (e.g. the-// sqlite store failed to initialize and the chat service continued with a-// warning). Autonomous write dispatches must fail closed rather than-// silently ignoring an operator lock the broker cannot read.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditFailsClosedWithNilStoreWithoutApproval(t *testing.T) {- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- // No ActionAuditStore.- })- executor.SetAutonomousMode(true)-- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-nostore",- "",- false,- "agent-nostore",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl restart workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-nostore",- },- "pulse_patrol",- "restart workload service",- )- if !errors.Is(err, ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown) {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit error = %v, want ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown", err)- }- if result != nil {- t.Fatalf("expected nil result on fail-closed refusal, got %#v", result)- }- agentServer.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditAllowsHumanApprovedDispatchOnLockLookupError-// pins the interactive posture: when the dispatch is backed by an approved-// human decision, an unknown lock state keeps the historical fail-open-// behavior — the operator explicitly signed off on the action, so a-// degraded operator-state lookup does not override their decision.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditAllowsHumanApprovedDispatchOnLockLookupError(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := &failingOperatorStateStore{MemoryStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()}- installApprovedApproval(t, "approval-degraded", "systemctl restart workload", "agent", "agent-degraded")-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-degraded", mock.Anything).- Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{Stdout: "OK", ExitCode: 0}, nil)-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })-- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-degraded",- "approval-degraded",- true,- "agent-degraded",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl restart workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-degraded",- },- "pulse_control",- "restart workload service",- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit unexpected error: %v", err)- }- if result == nil {- t.Fatal("expected human-approved dispatch to proceed; got nil result")- }- agentServer.AssertCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-degraded", mock.Anything)-}--// TestExecuteCommandWithAuditAllowsHumanApprovedDispatchWithNilStore covers-// the human-approved branch with no audit store wired: same fail-open-// posture as the lookup-error case.-func TestExecuteCommandWithAuditAllowsHumanApprovedDispatchWithNilStore(t *testing.T) {- installApprovedApproval(t, "approval-nostore", "systemctl restart workload", "agent", "agent-nostore")-- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-nostore", mock.Anything).- Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{Stdout: "OK", ExitCode: 0}, nil)-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- // No ActionAuditStore.- })-- result, err := executor.executeCommandWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "agent-nostore",- "approval-nostore",- true,- "agent-nostore",- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: "systemctl restart workload",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-nostore",- },- "pulse_control",- "restart workload service",- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeCommandWithAudit unexpected error: %v", err)- }- if result == nil {- t.Fatal("expected human-approved dispatch to proceed; got nil result")- }- agentServer.AssertCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-nostore", mock.Anything)-}--// TestExecuteNativeActionWithAuditRefusesWhenResourceIsRemediationLocked-// pins the lock gate on the native-provider dispatch path (e.g. TrueNAS-// app start/stop/restart), which previously skipped the remediation lock-// entirely. The operator's NeverAutoRemediate flag must gate native write-// dispatches identically to agent-command dispatches.-func TestExecuteNativeActionWithAuditRefusesWhenResourceIsRemediationLocked(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- if err := actionStore.SetResourceOperatorState(unifiedresources.ResourceOperatorState{- CanonicalID: "app-locked",- NeverAutoRemediate: true,- SetAt: time.Now().UTC(),- SetBy: "operator:richard",- }); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("SetResourceOperatorState: %v", err)- }-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })-- executed := false- result, err := executor.executeNativeActionWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "app-locked",- "",- false,- map[string]any{"action": "restart"},- "pulse_control",- "restart app-container",- func(context.Context) (*unifiedresources.ExecutionResult, error) {- executed = true- return &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{Success: true}, nil- },- )- if !errors.Is(err, unifiedresources.ErrResourceRemediationLocked) {- t.Fatalf("executeNativeActionWithAudit error = %v, want ErrResourceRemediationLocked", err)- }- if executed {- t.Fatal("native action executed despite operator remediation lock")- }- if result == nil || result.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected failed ExecutionResult, got %#v", result)- }- if !strings.HasPrefix(result.ErrorMessage, "resource_remediation_locked:") {- t.Fatalf("expected ErrorMessage to start with resource_remediation_locked:, got %q", result.ErrorMessage)- }-- audits, auditErr := actionStore.GetActionAudits("app-locked", time.Time{}, 10)- if auditErr != nil {- t.Fatalf("GetActionAudits: %v", auditErr)- }- if len(audits) != 1 {- t.Fatalf("expected 1 refused audit record, got %d", len(audits))- }- if audits[0].State != unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed {- t.Fatalf("audit state = %q, want %q", audits[0].State, unifiedresources.ActionStateFailed)- }-}--// TestExecuteNativeActionWithAuditFailsClosedOnUnknownLockStateWithoutApproval-// covers both unknown-state shapes on the native path: nil store and a-// store whose operator-state lookup errors. Autonomous native dispatches-// must fail closed in both.-func TestExecuteNativeActionWithAuditFailsClosedOnUnknownLockStateWithoutApproval(t *testing.T) {- cases := []struct {- name string- store unifiedresources.ResourceStore- }{- {name: "nil store", store: nil},- {name: "lookup error", store: &failingOperatorStateStore{MemoryStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()}},- }- for _, tc := range cases {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- ActionAuditStore: tc.store,- })- executor.SetAutonomousMode(true)-- executed := false- result, err := executor.executeNativeActionWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "app-degraded",- "",- false,- map[string]any{"action": "restart"},- "pulse_patrol",- "restart app-container",- func(context.Context) (*unifiedresources.ExecutionResult, error) {- executed = true- return &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{Success: true}, nil- },- )- if !errors.Is(err, ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown) {- t.Fatalf("executeNativeActionWithAudit error = %v, want ErrRemediationLockStateUnknown", err)- }- if executed {- t.Fatal("native action executed despite unknown remediation lock state")- }- if result == nil || result.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected failed ExecutionResult, got %#v", result)- }- if !strings.HasPrefix(result.ErrorMessage, "remediation_lock_state_unknown:") {- t.Fatalf("expected ErrorMessage to start with remediation_lock_state_unknown:, got %q", result.ErrorMessage)- }- })- }-}--// TestExecuteNativeActionWithAuditAllowsHumanApprovedDispatchOnUnknownLockState-// pins the human-approved fail-open branch on the native path.-func TestExecuteNativeActionWithAuditAllowsHumanApprovedDispatchOnUnknownLockState(t *testing.T) {- actionStore := &failingOperatorStateStore{MemoryStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()}- installApprovedApproval(t, "approval-native", "truenas app restart myapp", "app-container", "app-degraded")-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })-- executed := false- result, err := executor.executeNativeActionWithAudit(- context.Background(),- "pulse_control",- "app-degraded",- "approval-native",- true,- map[string]any{"action": "restart"},- "pulse_control",- "restart app-container",- func(context.Context) (*unifiedresources.ExecutionResult, error) {- executed = true- return &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{Success: true}, nil- },- )- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("executeNativeActionWithAudit unexpected error: %v", err)- }- if !executed {- t.Fatal("expected human-approved native dispatch to proceed")- }- if result == nil || !result.Success {- t.Fatalf("expected successful ExecutionResult, got %#v", result)- }-}--// A succession moves the operator's row to the successor ID when a rebuild-// applies it, before the registry generation listing the successor is-// published; the dispatch a model asks for in between still names the old ID.-// The lock the operator set on it must still refuse.-func TestRemediationLockGateFollowsASuccessionOffTheIDItNames(t *testing.T) {- store := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- if err := store.SetResourceOperatorState(unifiedresources.ResourceOperatorState{CanonicalID: "agent-before-key", NeverAutoRemediate: true}); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("lock the agent: %v", err)- }- if err := store.ApplyCanonicalIDSuccessions([]unifiedresources.CanonicalIDSuccession{{OldCanonicalID: "agent-before-key", NewCanonicalID: "agent-keyed"}}); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("ApplyCanonicalIDSuccessions: %v", err)- }- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{ActionAuditStore: store})-- for _, humanApproved := range []bool{false, true} {- err := executor.checkRemediationLockForDispatch("action-1", "agent-before-key", "restart", humanApproved)- if !errors.Is(err, unifiedresources.ErrResourceRemediationLocked) {- t.Fatalf("humanApproved=%v: error = %v, want ErrResourceRemediationLocked", humanApproved, err)- }- }- if err := executor.checkRemediationLockForDispatch("action-2", "agent-unrelated", "restart", false); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("an ID no succession names was refused: %v", err)- }-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/aitools_control_pure_branchcov0716_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/aitools_control_pure_branchcov0716_test.godeleted file mode 100644index d17180896f..0000000000--- a/internal/ai/tools/aitools_control_pure_branchcov0716_test.go+++ /dev/null@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@-package tools--import (- "testing"-- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"-)--// This file raises branch coverage for two pure helpers in tools_control.go:-// - resolvedResourceControlIdentity (nil resource guard, provider-uid path,-// alias-scan loop with whitespace skipping, fallback trimming)-// - formatAvailableAgentHosts (no-agents path, hostname/agentID fallback in-// collectAgentHostnames, maxItems truncation and "(+N more)" suffix)-//-// Both helpers are pure (no I/O, no executor state) and return exact strings,-// so every case asserts the concrete return value rather than "no panic".-//-// The in-package test mock `mockResource` (defined in strict_resolution_test.go)-// implements ResolvedResourceInfo and is reused here to drive the non-nil arm.--// TestBranchCovResolvedResourceControlIdentity covers every return path of-// resolvedResourceControlIdentity: the nil-resource guard, the providerUID win-// (including whitespace trimming), the alias scan that skips whitespace-only-// aliases and returns the first non-empty one, and the final fallback path-// (no providerUID and no usable alias) including fallback trimming.-func TestBranchCovResolvedResourceControlIdentity(t *testing.T) {- tests := []struct {- name string- resource ResolvedResourceInfo- fallback string- want string- }{- // --- nil resource: returns trimmed fallback. ---- {name: "nil_resource_trims_fallback", resource: nil, fallback: " nginx-01 ", want: "nginx-01"},- {name: "nil_resource_empty_fallback", resource: nil, fallback: "", want: ""},- {name: "nil_resource_whitespace_only_fallback", resource: nil, fallback: " ", want: ""},-- // --- providerUID path: non-empty (after trim) wins over aliases/fallback. ---- {- name: "providerUID_wins_over_aliases",- resource: &mockResource{providerUID: "ctr-abc", aliases: []string{"nginx", "zzz"}},- fallback: "fallback",- want: "ctr-abc",- },- {name: "providerUID_is_trimmed", resource: &mockResource{providerUID: " ctr-abc "}, fallback: "fallback", want: "ctr-abc"},- // Whitespace-only providerUID is treated as empty -> falls through to aliases.- {- name: "whitespace_only_providerUID_falls_through",- resource: &mockResource{providerUID: " ", aliases: []string{"nginx"}},- fallback: "fallback",- want: "nginx",- },-- // --- alias-scan path: returns the first non-empty (after trim) alias. ---- {name: "first_alias_returned", resource: &mockResource{aliases: []string{"nginx", "abc"}}, fallback: "fallback", want: "nginx"},- {name: "alias_is_trimmed", resource: &mockResource{aliases: []string{" nginx-02 "}}, fallback: "fallback", want: "nginx-02"},- // Leading whitespace-only alias is skipped, next usable alias is returned.- {name: "skip_whitespace_only_alias", resource: &mockResource{aliases: []string{" ", "nginx"}}, fallback: "fallback", want: "nginx"},- {name: "skip_multiple_whitespace_aliases", resource: &mockResource{aliases: []string{"", " ", "\t", "real-alias"}}, fallback: "fallback", want: "real-alias"},-- // --- fallback path: no providerUID and no usable alias. ---- {name: "empty_aliases_falls_back", resource: &mockResource{aliases: []string{}}, fallback: "host-01", want: "host-01"},- {name: "nil_aliases_falls_back", resource: &mockResource{aliases: nil}, fallback: "host-01", want: "host-01"},- {name: "all_whitespace_aliases_falls_back", resource: &mockResource{aliases: []string{" ", "\t"}}, fallback: "host-01", want: "host-01"},- {name: "fallback_is_trimmed_when_used", resource: &mockResource{}, fallback: " host-01 ", want: "host-01"},- }-- for _, tc := range tests {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- got := resolvedResourceControlIdentity(tc.resource, tc.fallback)- if got != tc.want {- t.Fatalf("resolvedResourceControlIdentity(%v, %q) = %q, want %q",- tc.resource, tc.fallback, got, tc.want)- }- })- }-}--// TestBranchCovFormatAvailableAgentHosts covers every return path of-// formatAvailableAgentHosts (and its helper collectAgentHostnames): the-// no-agents path (nil, empty, and agents that all collapse to empty names),-// the hostname-used path, the AgentID fallback when Hostname is blank, the-// dropping of agents whose Hostname and AgentID are both blank, name trimming,-// and the truncation/"(+N more)" suffix at the maxItems=6 boundary.-func TestBranchCovFormatAvailableAgentHosts(t *testing.T) {- // hostnames builds a slice of n agents with distinct, non-empty Hostnames.- hostnames := func(n int) []agentexec.ConnectedAgent {- out := make([]agentexec.ConnectedAgent, n)- for i := 0; i < n; i++ {- out[i] = agentexec.ConnectedAgent{Hostname: string(rune('a' + i))}- }- return out- }-- tests := []struct {- name string- agents []agentexec.ConnectedAgent- want string- }{- // --- no-agents path. ---- {name: "nil_agents", agents: nil, want: "No agents are currently connected."},- {name: "empty_agents", agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{}, want: "No agents are currently connected."},- // Agents exist but every one collapses to an empty name -> still "No agents".- {- name: "all_agents_blank",- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{Hostname: " ", AgentID: " "}, {}},- want: "No agents are currently connected.",- },-- // --- hostname path (single agent). ---- {name: "single_hostname", agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{Hostname: "host-1"}}, want: "Available targets: host-1"},-- // --- AgentID fallback when Hostname is blank/whitespace. ---- {- name: "agentID_used_when_hostname_blank",- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-9"}},- want: "Available targets: agent-9",- },- {- name: "agentID_used_when_hostname_whitespace",- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{Hostname: " ", AgentID: "agent-9"}},- want: "Available targets: agent-9",- },- // agentID is also trimmed.- {- name: "agentID_is_trimmed",- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: " agent-9 "}},- want: "Available targets: agent-9",- },-- // --- Hostname is preferred over AgentID. ---- {- name: "hostname_preferred_over_agentID",- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{Hostname: "host-1", AgentID: "agent-1"}},- want: "Available targets: host-1",- },-- // --- blank agent is dropped; remaining agents are listed in order. ---- {- name: "blank_agent_dropped_others_kept",- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {Hostname: "host-1"},- {Hostname: " ", AgentID: " "}, // dropped- {AgentID: "agent-3"},- },- want: "Available targets: host-1, agent-3",- },-- // --- maxItems boundary (maxItems == 6 inside the function). ---- // Exactly 6 hostnames: full list, no "(+N more)" suffix.- {- name: "exactly_max_no_truncation",- agents: hostnames(6),- want: "Available targets: a, b, c, d, e, f",- },- // 7 hostnames: list truncated to first 6, suffix "(+1 more)".- {- name: "one_over_max_truncated",- agents: hostnames(7),- want: "Available targets: a, b, c, d, e, f (+1 more)",- },- // 9 hostnames: suffix counts the overflow beyond maxItems.- {- name: "several_over_max_truncated",- agents: hostnames(9),- want: "Available targets: a, b, c, d, e, f (+3 more)",- },- }-- for _, tc := range tests {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- got := formatAvailableAgentHosts(tc.agents)- if got != tc.want {- t.Fatalf("formatAvailableAgentHosts(%v) = %q, want %q", tc.agents, got, tc.want)- }- })- }-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/approval_preflight_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/approval_preflight_test.godeleted file mode 100644index 29274f54eb..0000000000--- a/internal/ai/tools/approval_preflight_test.go+++ /dev/null@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@-package tools--import (- "strings"- "testing"-- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval"-)--func TestClassifyApprovalCommand_BucketsKnownCommandShapes(t *testing.T) {- cases := []struct {- name string- target string- command string- want string- }{- {"systemctl restart canonical", "agent", "systemctl restart nginx", "service-restart"},- {"service restart legacy", "agent", "service nginx restart", ""},- {"service restart canonical", "agent", "service restart nginx", "service-restart"},- {"systemctl stop", "agent", "systemctl stop postgres", "service-stop"},- {"systemctl start", "agent", "systemctl start redis", "service-start"},- {"systemctl reload", "agent", "systemctl reload nginx", "service-reload"},- {"docker restart", "docker", "docker restart homepage", "container-restart"},- {"podman restart", "agent", "podman restart pihole", "container-restart"},- {"docker stop", "docker", "docker stop oldcontainer", "container-stop"},- {"kubectl rollout restart", "kubernetes", "kubectl rollout restart deployment/api", "k8s-rollout-restart"},- // Proxmox VM lifecycle classes — Pulse's primary monitored platform.- // Each verb has distinct semantics so they map to distinct classes.- {"qm reboot", "agent", "qm reboot 101", "proxmox-vm-reboot"},- {"qm restart alias", "agent", "qm restart 101", "proxmox-vm-reboot"},- {"qm stop hard halt", "agent", "qm stop 101", "proxmox-vm-stop"},- {"qm start", "agent", "qm start 101", "proxmox-vm-start"},- {"qm shutdown graceful", "agent", "qm shutdown 101", "proxmox-vm-shutdown"},- // Proxmox LXC container lifecycle classes.- {"pct reboot", "agent", "pct reboot 200", "proxmox-ct-reboot"},- {"pct restart alias", "agent", "pct restart 200", "proxmox-ct-reboot"},- {"pct stop hard halt", "agent", "pct stop 200", "proxmox-ct-stop"},- {"pct start", "agent", "pct start 200", "proxmox-ct-start"},- {"pct shutdown graceful", "agent", "pct shutdown 200", "proxmox-ct-shutdown"},- // Negative cases: tool prefix without a recognized verb must NOT- // classify (defends against `qm migrate`, `pct destroy`, etc.).- {"qm migrate not a lifecycle verb", "agent", "qm migrate 101 pve-2", ""},- {"pct destroy not a lifecycle verb", "agent", "pct destroy 200", ""},- {"unknown free-form command", "agent", "echo hello world", ""},- {"empty command", "agent", "", ""},- }- for _, tc := range cases {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- got := classifyApprovalCommand(tc.target, tc.command)- if got != tc.want {- t.Fatalf("classifyApprovalCommand(%q, %q) = %q, want %q", tc.target, tc.command, got, tc.want)- }- })- }-}--func TestApprovalCommandClassPreflightAdditions_AuthorsConcreteContextForKnownClasses(t *testing.T) {- cases := []struct {- name string- command string- safetyToken string // must appear somewhere in safety checks- verifyToken string // must appear somewhere in verification steps- }{- {"service-restart names systemctl is-active", "systemctl restart nginx", "briefly unavailable", "systemctl is-active"},- {"service-stop warns dependent services", "systemctl stop postgres", "dependent services", "inactive"},- {"container-restart names docker inspect", "docker restart homepage", "briefly unavailable", "docker inspect"},- {"k8s rollout names rollout status", "kubectl rollout restart deployment/api", "PodDisruptionBudget", "rollout status"},- // Proxmox classes must concretely warn about the destructive vs- // graceful split (qm stop = hard halt, qm shutdown = graceful) and- // name the canonical `qm status` / `pct status` read-after-write- // check the operator should see post-dispatch.- {"qm reboot names qm status", "qm reboot 101", "ACPI shutdown", "qm status"},- {"qm stop warns it is hard not graceful", "qm stop 101", "hard stop", "stopped"},- {"qm shutdown names timeout fallback", "qm shutdown 101", "ACPI shutdown", "qm status"},- {"pct stop warns it is hard not graceful", "pct stop 200", "hard stop", "stopped"},- {"pct shutdown names lxc-attach", "pct shutdown 200", "lxc-attach", "pct status"},- }- for _, tc := range cases {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- safety, verify := approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions("agent", tc.command)- if len(safety) == 0 || len(verify) == 0 {- t.Fatalf("expected non-empty preflight additions for %q, got safety=%v verify=%v", tc.command, safety, verify)- }- joinedSafety := strings.Join(safety, " ")- if !strings.Contains(joinedSafety, tc.safetyToken) {- t.Fatalf("safety checks missing token %q for %q: %v", tc.safetyToken, tc.command, safety)- }- joinedVerify := strings.Join(verify, " ")- if !strings.Contains(joinedVerify, tc.verifyToken) {- t.Fatalf("verification steps missing token %q for %q: %v", tc.verifyToken, tc.command, verify)- }- })- }-}--func TestApprovalCommandClassPreflightAdditions_ReturnsEmptyForUnknownClass(t *testing.T) {- // Unknown command shapes must not be padded with fabricated safety or- // verification copy. Default preflight content stands on its own.- safety, verify := approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions("agent", "echo hello world")- if safety != nil || verify != nil {- t.Fatalf("expected nil additions for unknown command, got safety=%v verify=%v", safety, verify)- }-}--func TestVerificationCommandForCommand_DerivesPerClassReadAfterWriteCheck(t *testing.T) {- cases := []struct {- name string- target string- command string- wantCmd string- wantOk bool- }{- {"systemctl restart", "agent", "systemctl restart nginx", "systemctl is-active 'nginx'", true},- {"systemctl reload with .service suffix", "agent", "systemctl reload my.service", "systemctl is-active 'my.service'", true},- {"systemctl stop", "agent", "systemctl stop postgres", "systemctl is-active 'postgres'", true},- // Docker/podman classes are intentionally excluded from broker-level- // verification — pulse_docker runs its own docker inspect check at- // the tool layer, so adding a broker-level dispatch would double-run.- {"docker restart deferred to tool layer", "docker", "docker restart homepage", "", false},- {"podman restart deferred to tool layer", "agent", "podman restart pihole", "", false},- // Proxmox classes are intentionally excluded from broker-level- // verification — pulse_control's verifyGuestAction already runs- // `qm status` and `pct status` at the tool layer, so adding a- // parallel broker-level dispatch would double-run the same check.- // The preflight copy still names the verification narrative; only- // the broker-side derivation is suppressed.- {"qm reboot deferred to pulse_control", "agent", "qm reboot 101", "", false},- {"qm stop deferred to pulse_control", "agent", "qm stop 101", "", false},- {"qm shutdown deferred to pulse_control", "agent", "qm shutdown 101", "", false},- {"pct stop deferred to pulse_control", "agent", "pct stop 200", "", false},- {"pct shutdown deferred to pulse_control", "agent", "pct shutdown 200", "", false},- {"unknown command", "agent", "echo hello", "", false},- {"systemctl with single-quote in unit", "agent", `systemctl restart nasty'name`, "systemctl is-active 'nasty'\\''name'", true},- }- for _, tc := range cases {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- cmd, ok := VerificationCommandForCommand(tc.target, tc.command)- if ok != tc.wantOk {- t.Fatalf("VerificationCommandForCommand(%q, %q) ok = %v, want %v", tc.target, tc.command, ok, tc.wantOk)- }- if cmd != tc.wantCmd {- t.Fatalf("VerificationCommandForCommand(%q, %q) cmd = %q, want %q", tc.target, tc.command, cmd, tc.wantCmd)- }- })- }-}--func TestApprovalPreflight_MergesClassAdditionsIntoSafetyAndVerification(t *testing.T) {- // End-to-end check that approvalPreflight surfaces the per-class- // additions to the operator without losing the default safety /- // verification content.- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-systemctl-restart",- Command: "systemctl restart nginx",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- TargetName: "edge-1",- Context: "restart nginx after Patrol detected stale config",- }- preflight := approvalPreflight(req)- if preflight == nil {- t.Fatalf("expected preflight, got nil")- }-- joinedSafety := strings.Join(preflight.SafetyChecks, " | ")- if !strings.Contains(joinedSafety, "Approval is scoped to the current organization") {- t.Fatalf("default safety check missing: %v", preflight.SafetyChecks)- }- if !strings.Contains(joinedSafety, "briefly unavailable") {- t.Fatalf("class-specific safety check missing: %v", preflight.SafetyChecks)- }-- joinedVerify := strings.Join(preflight.VerificationSteps, " | ")- if !strings.Contains(joinedVerify, "Persist unified action audit lifecycle") {- t.Fatalf("default verification step missing: %v", preflight.VerificationSteps)- }- if !strings.Contains(joinedVerify, "systemctl is-active") {- t.Fatalf("class-specific verification step missing: %v", preflight.VerificationSteps)- }-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/control_docker_helpers_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/control_docker_helpers_test.godeleted file mode 100644index 46a3602a00..0000000000--- a/internal/ai/tools/control_docker_helpers_test.go+++ /dev/null@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@-package tools--import (- "testing"-- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/models"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"-)--func TestResolveDockerContainer(t *testing.T) {- t.Run("NoStateProvider", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{})- _, _, err := exec.resolveDockerContainer("web", "")- require.Error(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "read state not available")- })-- t.Run("HostMatch", func(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- DockerHosts: []models.DockerHost{- {- ID: "host1",- Hostname: "dock1",- Containers: []models.DockerContainer{- {ID: "abc123", Name: "web"},- },- },- },- }- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state}})-- container, host, err := exec.resolveDockerContainer("web", "dock1")- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Equal(t, "web", container.Name)- assert.Equal(t, "host1", host.ID)- })-- t.Run("HostNotFound", func(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- DockerHosts: []models.DockerHost{- {- ID: "host1",- Hostname: "dock1",- Containers: []models.DockerContainer{- {ID: "abc123", Name: "web"},- },- },- },- }- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state}})-- _, _, err := exec.resolveDockerContainer("web", "missing")- require.Error(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "not found on host")- })-- t.Run("MultipleHosts", func(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- DockerHosts: []models.DockerHost{- {- ID: "host1",- DisplayName: "Dock One",- Containers: []models.DockerContainer{- {ID: "abcdef", Name: "web"},- },- },- {- ID: "host2",- DisplayName: "Dock Two",- Containers: []models.DockerContainer{- {ID: "abc999", Name: "web"},- },- },- },- }- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state}})-- _, _, err := exec.resolveDockerContainer("web", "")- require.Error(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "multiple Docker hosts")- assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "Dock One")- })-- t.Run("IDPrefixMatch", func(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- DockerHosts: []models.DockerHost{- {- ID: "host1",- Hostname: "dock1",- Containers: []models.DockerContainer{- {ID: "abcdef", Name: "web"},- },- },- },- }- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state}})-- container, _, err := exec.resolveDockerContainer("abc", "")- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Equal(t, "abcdef", container.ID)- })-- t.Run("PreservesAgentID", func(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- DockerHosts: []models.DockerHost{- {- ID: "host1",- AgentID: "agent1",- Hostname: "dock1",- Containers: []models.DockerContainer{- {ID: "abc123", Name: "web"},- },- },- },- }- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent1", Hostname: "node1"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- AgentServer: agentSrv,- })-- _, host, err := exec.resolveDockerContainer("web", "dock1")- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Equal(t, "agent1", host.AgentID)- assert.Equal(t, "node1", exec.getAgentHostnameForDockerHost(host))- })-}--func TestGetAgentHostnameForDockerHost(t *testing.T) {- t.Run("NoAgentServer", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{})- host := &models.DockerHost{Hostname: "dock1"}- assert.Equal(t, "dock1", exec.getAgentHostnameForDockerHost(host))- })-- t.Run("AgentIDMatch", func(t *testing.T) {- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent1", Hostname: "node1"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{AgentServer: agentSrv})- host := &models.DockerHost{AgentID: "agent1", Hostname: "dock1"}- assert.Equal(t, "node1", exec.getAgentHostnameForDockerHost(host))- })-- t.Run("FallbackHostname", func(t *testing.T) {- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent2", Hostname: "node2"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{AgentServer: agentSrv})- host := &models.DockerHost{AgentID: "agent1", Hostname: "dock1"}- assert.Equal(t, "dock1", exec.getAgentHostnameForDockerHost(host))- })-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/control_helpers_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/control_helpers_test.godeleted file mode 100644index 5d5f2befac..0000000000--- a/internal/ai/tools/control_helpers_test.go+++ /dev/null@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@-package tools--import (- "encoding/json"- "strings"- "testing"-- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentcapabilities"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"-)--func TestCreateApprovalRecord(t *testing.T) {- approval.SetStore(nil)- assert.Empty(t, createApprovalRecord("ls", "agent", "h1", "host1", "ctx"))-- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- approval.SetStore(store)- defer approval.SetStore(nil)-- approvalID := createApprovalRecord("ls", "agent", "h1", "host1", "ctx")- require.NotEmpty(t, approvalID)-- req, ok := store.GetApproval(approvalID)- require.True(t, ok)- assert.Equal(t, "ls", req.Command)- assert.Equal(t, "agent", req.TargetType)- assert.Equal(t, "h1", req.TargetID)- assert.Equal(t, "host1", req.TargetName)- assert.Equal(t, "ctx", req.Context)- require.NotNil(t, req.Plan)- assert.Equal(t, approvalID, req.Plan.RequestID)- assert.Equal(t, "ctx", req.Plan.Message)- require.NotNil(t, req.ContextConfidence)- assert.Equal(t, approval.ContextConfidenceVerified, req.ContextConfidence.Level)- require.NotNil(t, req.Preflight)- assert.Contains(t, req.Preflight.Target, "host1")- assert.Contains(t, req.Preflight.DryRunSummary, "dry run")-}--func TestIsPreApproved(t *testing.T) {- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- approval.SetStore(store)- defer approval.SetStore(nil)-- assert.False(t, isPreApproved(map[string]interface{}{}))- assert.False(t, isPreApproved(agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(nil, "missing")))-- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "app-1",- Command: "ls",- }- require.NoError(t, store.CreateApproval(req))-- assert.False(t, isPreApproved(agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(nil, "app-1")))-- _, err = store.Approve("app-1", "tester")- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, isPreApproved(agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(nil, "app-1")))-}--func TestConsumeApprovalWithValidation_RejectsCrossOrg(t *testing.T) {- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- approval.SetStore(store)- defer approval.SetStore(nil)-- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "app-1",- OrgID: "org-a",- Command: "ls",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "h1",- }- require.NoError(t, store.CreateApproval(req))- _, err = store.Approve("app-1", "tester")- require.NoError(t, err)-- ok := consumeApprovalWithValidation(agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(nil, "app-1"), "org-b", "ls", "agent", "h1")- assert.False(t, ok)-- stored, found := store.GetApproval("app-1")- require.True(t, found)- assert.False(t, stored.Consumed)-}--func TestConsumeApprovalWithValidation_AllowsMatchingOrg(t *testing.T) {- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- approval.SetStore(store)- defer approval.SetStore(nil)-- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "app-2",- OrgID: "org-a",- Command: "ls",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "h1",- }- require.NoError(t, store.CreateApproval(req))- _, err = store.Approve("app-2", "tester")- require.NoError(t, err)-- ok := consumeApprovalWithValidation(agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(nil, "app-2"), "org-a", "ls", "agent", "h1")- assert.True(t, ok)-- stored, found := store.GetApproval("app-2")- require.True(t, found)- assert.False(t, stored.Consumed, "validation must not consume before the agentexec authorization boundary")-}--func TestFormattingHelpers(t *testing.T) {- t.Run("formatApprovalNeeded", func(t *testing.T) {- payload := decodePayload(t, formatApprovalNeeded("ls", "ok", "id-1"), "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: ")- assert.Equal(t, "approval_required", payload["type"])- assert.Equal(t, "ls", payload["command"])- assert.Equal(t, "ok", payload["reason"])- assert.Equal(t, "id-1", payload["approval_id"])- })-- t.Run("formatPolicyBlocked", func(t *testing.T) {- payload := decodePayload(t, formatPolicyBlocked("rm -rf /", "blocked"), "POLICY_BLOCKED: ")- assert.Equal(t, "policy_blocked", payload["type"])- assert.Equal(t, "rm -rf /", payload["command"])- assert.Equal(t, "blocked", payload["reason"])- })-- t.Run("formatTargetHostRequired", func(t *testing.T) {- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {Hostname: "node-1"},- {AgentID: "agent-2"},- {Hostname: "node-3"},- {Hostname: "node-4"},- {Hostname: "node-5"},- {Hostname: "node-6"},- {Hostname: "node-7"},- }- msg := formatTargetHostRequired(agents)- assert.Contains(t, msg, "Available: node-1, agent-2, node-3, node-4, node-5, node-6")- assert.Contains(t, msg, "(+1 more)")- })-- t.Run("formatControlApprovalNeeded", func(t *testing.T) {- payload := decodePayload(t, formatControlApprovalNeeded("vm1", 101, "start", "qm start 101", "id-2"), "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: ")- assert.Equal(t, "approval_required", payload["type"])- assert.Equal(t, "vm1", payload["guest_name"])- assert.Equal(t, float64(101), payload["guest_vmid"])- assert.Equal(t, "start", payload["action"])- assert.Equal(t, "qm start 101", payload["command"])- assert.Equal(t, "id-2", payload["approval_id"])- })-- t.Run("formatDockerApprovalNeeded", func(t *testing.T) {- payload := decodePayload(t, formatDockerApprovalNeeded("web", "node-1", "restart", "docker restart web", "id-3"), "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: ")- assert.Equal(t, "approval_required", payload["type"])- assert.Equal(t, "web", payload["container_name"])- assert.Equal(t, "node-1", payload["docker_host"])- assert.Equal(t, "restart", payload["action"])- assert.Equal(t, "docker restart web", payload["command"])- assert.Equal(t, "id-3", payload["approval_id"])- })-- t.Run("formatAppContainerApprovalNeeded", func(t *testing.T) {- payload := decodePayload(t, formatAppContainerApprovalNeeded("Nextcloud", "truenas-main", "restart", "truenas app restart Nextcloud on truenas-main", "id-4"), "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: ")- assert.Equal(t, "approval_required", payload["type"])- assert.Equal(t, "Nextcloud", payload["resource_name"])- assert.Equal(t, "truenas-main", payload["resource_host"])- assert.Equal(t, "app-container", payload["resource_type"])- assert.Equal(t, "restart", payload["action"])- assert.Equal(t, "truenas app restart Nextcloud on truenas-main", payload["command"])- assert.Equal(t, "id-4", payload["approval_id"])- })-}--func decodePayload(t *testing.T, value, prefix string) map[string]interface{} {- t.Helper()- require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(value, prefix))-- var payload map[string]interface{}- raw := strings.TrimPrefix(value, prefix)- err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &payload)- require.NoError(t, err)- return payload-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/control_run_command_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/control_run_command_test.godeleted file mode 100644index a6816a6407..0000000000--- a/internal/ai/tools/control_run_command_test.go+++ /dev/null@@ -1,505 +0,0 @@-package tools--import (- "context"- "encoding/json"- "strings"- "testing"- "time"-- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentcapabilities"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/models"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/unifiedresources"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/mock"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"-)--func mustParseJSONMap(t *testing.T, text string) map[string]interface{} {- t.Helper()- var out map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(text), &out))- return out-}--func mustParseApprovalPayload(t *testing.T, text string) map[string]interface{} {- t.Helper()- require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(text, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: "))- return mustParseJSONMap(t, strings.TrimPrefix(text, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: "))-}--func TestPulseToolExecutor_ExecuteRunCommand(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("MissingCommand", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{})- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{})- assert.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "command is required")- })-- t.Run("AutonomousRejectsRawCommandBeforeDispatch", func(t *testing.T) {- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower"}}}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentSrv,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- })- exec.SetAutonomousMode(true)-- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(map[string]interface{}{- "command": "touch /tmp/authority-boundary-bypass",- "target_host": "tower",- }, "fabricated"))- require.NoError(t, err)- require.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "raw command execution is unavailable in autonomous model sessions")- agentSrv.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)- })-- t.Run("NeverAutoRemediateUsesCanonicalIdentityBehindHostAlias", func(t *testing.T) {- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{DataDir: t.TempDir(), DisablePersistence: true})- require.NoError(t, err)- previous := approval.GetStore()- approval.SetStore(store)- t.Cleanup(func() { approval.SetStore(previous) })-- const canonicalID = "agent:agent-1"- const command = "systemctl restart workload"- planHash := approvalPlanHash(- "action-alias", "approval-alias", "pulse_control", canonicalID,- command, "agent", "", `run command "systemctl restart workload" on tower`,- )- approvalReq := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-alias", OrgID: "org-1", Command: command, TargetType: "agent", TargetID: "agent-1",- Plan: &unifiedresources.ActionPlan{ActionID: "action-alias", RequestID: "approval-alias", Allowed: true, RequiresApproval: true, ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin, PlanHash: planHash},- }- require.NoError(t, store.CreateApproval(approvalReq))- _, err = store.Approve("approval-alias", "[email protected]")- require.NoError(t, err)-- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- require.NoError(t, actionStore.SetResourceOperatorState(unifiedresources.ResourceOperatorState{- CanonicalID: canonicalID, NeverAutoRemediate: true,- }))- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower.example.com"}}}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{AgentServer: agentSrv, ControlLevel: ControlLevelControlled, ActionAuditStore: actionStore})- exec.SetOrgID("org-1")- exec.SetResolvedContext(&mockResolvedContext{aliases: map[string]ResolvedResourceInfo{- "tower": &mockResource{resourceID: canonicalID, resourceType: "agent", targetHost: "tower.example.com", agentID: "agent-1", kind: "agent", aliases: []string{"tower"}},- }})-- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(map[string]interface{}{- "command": command, "target_host": "tower",- }, "approval-alias"))- require.NoError(t, err)- require.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, unifiedresources.ErrResourceRemediationLocked.Error())- agentSrv.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)- })-- t.Run("PolicyBlocked", func(t *testing.T) {- policy := &mockCommandPolicy{}- policy.On("Evaluate", "rm -rf /").Return(agentexec.PolicyBlock).Once()-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{Policy: policy})- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "command": "rm -rf /",- })- assert.NoError(t, err)- assert.False(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "POLICY_BLOCKED")- policy.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("TargetHostRequired", func(t *testing.T) {- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "a1", Hostname: "node1"},- {AgentID: "a2", Hostname: "node2"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{AgentServer: agentSrv})-- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "command": "ls",- })- assert.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "Multiple agents are connected")- })-- t.Run("ControlledRequiresApproval", func(t *testing.T) {- approval.SetStore(nil)- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentSrv,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelControlled,- })- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "command": "ls",- "target_host": "tower",- })- assert.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")- })-- t.Run("ControlledApprovalUsesResolvedRoutingTarget", func(t *testing.T) {- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- approval.SetStore(store)- defer approval.SetStore(nil)- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()-- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentSrv,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelControlled,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- // Session context target must not influence command approval binding.- exec.SetContext("host", "session-target", false)-- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "command": "uptime",- "target_host": "tower",- })- require.NoError(t, err)-- payload := mustParseApprovalPayload(t, result.Content[0].Text)- approvalID, _ := payload["approval_id"].(string)- require.NotEmpty(t, approvalID)-- req, found := store.GetApproval(approvalID)- require.True(t, found)- assert.Equal(t, "agent", req.TargetType)- assert.Equal(t, "agent-1", req.TargetID)- assert.Equal(t, "tower", req.TargetName)- require.NotNil(t, req.Plan)- assert.Equal(t, approvalID, req.Plan.RequestID)- assert.True(t, req.Plan.RequiresApproval)- assert.Equal(t, unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin, req.Plan.ApprovalPolicy)- require.NotNil(t, req.ContextConfidence)- assert.Equal(t, approval.ContextConfidenceVerified, req.ContextConfidence.Level)- require.NotNil(t, req.Preflight)- assert.Contains(t, req.Preflight.Target, "tower")- assert.False(t, req.Preflight.DryRunAvailable)- preflight, ok := payload["preflight"].(map[string]interface{})- require.True(t, ok, "approval payload should include preflight")- assert.Equal(t, false, preflight["dry_run_available"])- assert.Contains(t, preflight["target"].(string), "tower")-- audits, err := actionStore.GetActionAudits("", time.Time{}, 10)- require.NoError(t, err)- require.Len(t, audits, 1)- assert.Equal(t, unifiedresources.ActionStatePending, audits[0].State)- assert.Equal(t, req.Plan.ActionID, audits[0].ID)- assert.Equal(t, "pulse_control", audits[0].Request.CapabilityName)-- events, err := actionStore.GetActionLifecycleEvents(req.Plan.ActionID, time.Time{}, 10)- require.NoError(t, err)- require.Len(t, events, 2)- assert.Equal(t, unifiedresources.ActionStatePending, events[0].State)- assert.Equal(t, unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned, events[1].State)- })-- t.Run("ControlledConsumesApprovedCommandWithResolvedRoutingTarget", func(t *testing.T) {- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- approval.SetStore(store)- defer approval.SetStore(nil)-- // PlanHash is the approval-equivalent hash of the (command, target,- // reason) the operator approved. The broker's drift check refuses- // execution when the executing payload hashes to anything different.- // For this happy-path test, compute the hash with the exact inputs- // executeCommandWithAudit will see when executeRunCommand routes the- // approved "uptime" command to the resolved tower agent.- approvedHash := approvalPlanHash(- "action-1",- "approval-1",- "pulse_control",- "tower",- "uptime",- "agent",- "",- `run command "uptime" on tower`,- )- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-1",- Command: "uptime",- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "agent-1",- Plan: &unifiedresources.ActionPlan{- ActionID: "action-1",- RequestID: "approval-1",- Allowed: true,- RequiresApproval: true,- ApprovalPolicy: unifiedresources.ApprovalAdmin,- Message: "run command",- PlanHash: approvedHash,- },- }- require.NoError(t, store.CreateApproval(req))- _, err = store.Approve("approval-1", "tester")- require.NoError(t, err)-- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower"},- }}- agentSrv.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return([]agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower"},- }).Maybe()- agentSrv.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return payload.Command == "uptime" &&- payload.ApprovalID == "approval-1" &&- payload.TargetType == "agent" &&- payload.TargetID == ""- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Stdout: "ok",- ExitCode: 0,- }, nil).Once()-- actionStore := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentSrv,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelControlled,- ActionAuditStore: actionStore,- })- exec.SetContext("host", "different-session-target", false)-- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(map[string]interface{}{- "command": "uptime",- "target_host": "tower",- }, "approval-1"))- require.NoError(t, err)-- resp := mustParseJSONMap(t, result.Content[0].Text)- assert.Equal(t, true, resp["success"])- assert.Equal(t, float64(0), resp["exit_code"])- agentSrv.AssertExpectations(t)-- consumed, found := store.GetApproval("approval-1")- require.True(t, found)- assert.False(t, consumed.Consumed, "mock agent servers do not own the final authorization-consumption boundary")-- audits, err := actionStore.GetActionAudits("", time.Time{}, 10)- require.NoError(t, err)- require.Len(t, audits, 1)- assert.Equal(t, "action-1", audits[0].ID)- assert.Equal(t, unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted, audits[0].State)- assert.Equal(t, approvedHash, audits[0].Plan.PlanHash)- })-- t.Run("ExecuteSuccess", func(t *testing.T) {- store := unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore()- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{}- agentSrv.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return([]agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent1", Hostname: "node1"},- }).Twice()- agentSrv.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent1", mock.MatchedBy(func(payload agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- // For direct agent targets, TargetID is empty - resolveTargetForCommand returns "" for agent type- return payload.Command == "uptime" && payload.TargetType == "agent" && payload.TargetID == ""- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- Stdout: "ok",- ExitCode: 0,- }, nil).Once()-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentSrv,- ActionAuditStore: store,- })- exec.SetContext("host", "host1", false)-- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "command": "uptime",- "run_on_host": true,- })- assert.NoError(t, err)- resp := mustParseJSONMap(t, result.Content[0].Text)- assert.Equal(t, true, resp["success"])- assert.Equal(t, float64(0), resp["exit_code"])- assert.Contains(t, resp["output"].(string), "ok")- if v, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {- assert.Equal(t, true, v["ok"])- }- agentSrv.AssertExpectations(t)-- audits, err := store.GetActionAudits("", time.Time{}, 10)- require.NoError(t, err)- require.Len(t, audits, 1)- assert.Equal(t, "pulse_control", audits[0].Request.CapabilityName)- assert.Contains(t, audits[0].Plan.Message, "run command \"uptime\"")- assert.Empty(t, audits[0].Plan.ResourceVersion)- assert.Empty(t, audits[0].Plan.PolicyVersion)- assert.NotEmpty(t, audits[0].Plan.PlanHash)-- planJSON, err := json.Marshal(audits[0].Plan)- require.NoError(t, err)- _ = mustParseJSONMap(t, string(planJSON))-- events, err := store.GetActionLifecycleEvents(audits[0].ID, time.Time{}, 10)- require.NoError(t, err)- require.Len(t, events, 3)- assert.Equal(t, unifiedresources.ActionStatePlanned, events[2].State)- assert.Equal(t, unifiedresources.ActionStateExecuting, events[1].State)- assert.Equal(t, unifiedresources.ActionStateCompleted, events[0].State)- })-}--func TestPulseToolExecutor_RunCommandLXCRouting(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("LXCCommandRoutedCorrectly", func(t *testing.T) {- // Test that commands targeting LXCs are routed with correct target type/ID- // The agent handles sh -c wrapping, so tool just sends raw command- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "proxmox-agent", Hostname: "pve-node"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "proxmox-agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- // Tool sends raw command, agent will wrap in sh -c- return cmd.TargetType == "container" &&- cmd.TargetID == "108" &&- cmd.Command == "grep pattern /var/log/*.log"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "matched line",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- Containers: []models.Container{- {VMID: 108, Name: "jellyfin", Node: "pve-node"},- },- }-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "command": "grep pattern /var/log/*.log",- "target_host": "jellyfin",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- resp := mustParseJSONMap(t, result.Content[0].Text)- assert.Equal(t, true, resp["success"])- assert.Equal(t, "jellyfin", resp["target_host"])- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("VMCommandRoutedCorrectly", func(t *testing.T) {- // Test that commands targeting VMs are routed with correct target type/ID- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "proxmox-agent", Hostname: "pve-node"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "proxmox-agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "vm" &&- cmd.TargetID == "100" &&- cmd.Command == "ls /tmp/*.txt"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "result",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- VMs: []models.VM{- {VMID: 100, Name: "test-vm", Node: "pve-node"},- },- }-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "command": "ls /tmp/*.txt",- "target_host": "test-vm",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- resp := mustParseJSONMap(t, result.Content[0].Text)- assert.Equal(t, true, resp["success"])- assert.Equal(t, "test-vm", resp["target_host"])- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("DirectHostRoutedCorrectly", func(t *testing.T) {- // Direct host commands are canonicalized to target type "agent"- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent", Hostname: "tower"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "agent" &&- cmd.Command == "ls /tmp/*.txt"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "files",- }, nil)-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "command": "ls /tmp/*.txt",- "target_host": "tower",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- resp := mustParseJSONMap(t, result.Content[0].Text)- assert.Equal(t, true, resp["success"])- assert.Equal(t, "tower", resp["target_host"])- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-}--func TestPulseToolExecutor_FindAgentForCommand(t *testing.T) {- t.Run("NoAgentServer", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{})- assert.Empty(t, exec.findAgentForCommand(false, ""))- })-- t.Run("NoAgents", func(t *testing.T) {- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{AgentServer: agentSrv})- assert.Empty(t, exec.findAgentForCommand(false, ""))- })-- t.Run("TargetHostMatches", func(t *testing.T) {- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "a1", Hostname: "node1"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{AgentServer: agentSrv})- assert.Equal(t, "a1", exec.findAgentForCommand(false, "a1"))- })-- t.Run("MultipleAgentsNoTarget", func(t *testing.T) {- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "a1", Hostname: "node1"},- {AgentID: "a2", Hostname: "node2"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{AgentServer: agentSrv})- assert.Empty(t, exec.findAgentForCommand(false, ""))- })-- t.Run("SingleAgentNoTarget", func(t *testing.T) {- agentSrv := &mockAgentServer{agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "a1", Hostname: "node1"},- }}- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{AgentServer: agentSrv})- assert.Equal(t, "a1", exec.findAgentForCommand(false, ""))- })-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/data_types.go b/internal/ai/tools/data_types.goindex 5897911a1d..1458782f08 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/data_types.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/data_types.go@@ -1356,18 +1356,6 @@ type DockerCheckUpdatesResponse struct {Command DockerCommandStatus `json:"command"`}-// DockerUpdateContainerResponse is returned by pulse_update_docker_container-type DockerUpdateContainerResponse struct {- Success bool `json:"success"`- TargetID string `json:"target_id"`- ContainerID string `json:"container_id"`- ContainerName string `json:"container_name"`- CommandID string `json:"command_id"`- Message string `json:"message"`- Command DockerCommandStatus `json:"command"`- Verification map[string]interface{} `json:"verification,omitempty"`-}-// ========== Kubernetes Types ==========// KubernetesClustersResponse is returned by pulse_get_kubernetes_clustersdiff --git a/internal/ai/tools/data_types_branchcov0719late_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/data_types_branchcov0719late_test.goindex bd67972b51..350ff72e2e 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/data_types_branchcov0719late_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/data_types_branchcov0719late_test.go@@ -170,32 +170,6 @@ func TestDataTypesBranchcov0719latePVEClusterStatusNormalize(t *testing.T) {})}-// TestDataTypesBranchcov0719lateErrExecutionContextUnavailableError covers-// ErrExecutionContextUnavailable.Error(). It returns Message verbatim.-func TestDataTypesBranchcov0719lateErrExecutionContextUnavailableError(t *testing.T) {- t.Run("ReturnsMessageVerbatim", func(t *testing.T) {- const msg = "write would execute on the host node instead of inside the system-container"- err := &ErrExecutionContextUnavailable{- TargetHost: "homepage-docker",- ResolvedKind: "system-container",- ResolvedNode: "pve-node",- Transport: "direct",- Message: msg,- }- assert.Equal(t, msg, err.Error())- })-- t.Run("EmptyMessageYieldsEmptyString", func(t *testing.T) {- err := &ErrExecutionContextUnavailable{}- assert.Equal(t, "", err.Error())- })-- t.Run("SatisfiesErrorInterface", func(t *testing.T) {- var err error = &ErrExecutionContextUnavailable{Message: "boom"}- assert.Equal(t, "boom", err.Error())- })-}-// TestDataTypesBranchcov0719lateValidateCurrentResourceAvailable covers// PulseToolExecutor.ValidateCurrentResourceAvailable across its nil/empty// error arms and its single-resource OK arm.diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/docker_updates_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/docker_updates_test.goindex 7b704866d3..36e3674544 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/docker_updates_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/docker_updates_test.go@@ -148,187 +148,3 @@ func TestExecuteCheckDockerUpdates_DoesNotRetryNonTransientError(t *testing.T) {assert.NotContains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "after 3 attempts")updatesProvider.AssertNumberOfCalls(t, "TriggerUpdateCheck", 1)}--func TestExecuteUpdateDockerContainer_RetriesTransientError(t *testing.T) {- origSleep := dockerUpdateQueueSleepFn- dockerUpdateQueueSleepFn = func(context.Context, time.Duration) error { return nil }- t.Cleanup(func() { dockerUpdateQueueSleepFn = origSleep })- origVerifySleep := dockerUpdateVerifySleepFn- dockerUpdateVerifySleepFn = func(context.Context, time.Duration) error { return nil }- t.Cleanup(func() { dockerUpdateVerifySleepFn = origVerifySleep })-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- DockerHosts: []models.DockerHost{- {- ID: "host1",- Hostname: "dock1",- DisplayName: "Dock One",- Containers: []models.DockerContainer{- {ID: "c1", Name: "/nginx"},- },- },- },- }-- updatesProvider := &mockUpdatesProvider{}- updatesProvider.On("IsUpdateActionsEnabled").Return(true).Once()- updatesProvider.On("UpdateContainer", "host1", "c1", "nginx").Return(DockerCommandStatus{}, errors.New("i/o timeout")).Once()- updatesProvider.On("UpdateContainer", "host1", "c1", "nginx").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update",- Type: "update",- Status: "queued",- }, nil).Once()- updatesProvider.On("GetCommandStatus", "cmd-update").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update",- Type: "update",- Status: "completed",- Message: "Container nginx updated successfully",- }, true)-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- UpdatesProvider: updatesProvider,- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- })-- result, err := exec.executeUpdateDockerContainer(context.Background(), map[string]interface{}{- "host": "dock1",- "container": "c1",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- require.False(t, result.IsError)-- var resp DockerUpdateContainerResponse- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.Equal(t, "cmd-update", resp.CommandID)- updatesProvider.AssertExpectations(t)-}--func newDockerUpdateExecutor(t *testing.T, updatesProvider *mockUpdatesProvider) *PulseToolExecutor {- t.Helper()-- origVerifySleep := dockerUpdateVerifySleepFn- dockerUpdateVerifySleepFn = func(context.Context, time.Duration) error { return nil }- t.Cleanup(func() { dockerUpdateVerifySleepFn = origVerifySleep })-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- DockerHosts: []models.DockerHost{- {- ID: "host1",- Hostname: "dock1",- DisplayName: "Dock One",- Containers: []models.DockerContainer{- {ID: "c1", Name: "/nginx"},- },- },- },- }-- return NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- UpdatesProvider: updatesProvider,- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- })-}--func TestExecuteUpdateDockerContainer_VerifiedSuccess(t *testing.T) {- updatesProvider := &mockUpdatesProvider{}- updatesProvider.On("IsUpdateActionsEnabled").Return(true).Once()- updatesProvider.On("UpdateContainer", "host1", "c1", "nginx").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update",- Type: "update_container",- Status: "queued",- }, nil).Once()- // The command is dispatched and in progress first, then completes.- updatesProvider.On("GetCommandStatus", "cmd-update").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update", Status: "dispatched",- }, true).Once()- updatesProvider.On("GetCommandStatus", "cmd-update").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update", Status: "in_progress", Message: "Pulling image nginx...",- }, true).Once()- updatesProvider.On("GetCommandStatus", "cmd-update").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update", Status: "completed", Message: "Container nginx updated successfully",- }, true).Once()-- exec := newDockerUpdateExecutor(t, updatesProvider)- result, err := exec.executeUpdateDockerContainer(context.Background(), map[string]interface{}{- "host": "dock1",- "container": "c1",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- require.False(t, result.IsError)-- var resp DockerUpdateContainerResponse- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.True(t, resp.Success)- assert.Contains(t, resp.Message, "Update verified")- require.NotNil(t, resp.Verification)- assert.Equal(t, true, resp.Verification["confirmed"])- assert.Equal(t, "verified", resp.Verification["outcome"])- assert.Equal(t, "command_status", resp.Verification["method"])- updatesProvider.AssertExpectations(t)-}--func TestExecuteUpdateDockerContainer_VerifiedFailure(t *testing.T) {- updatesProvider := &mockUpdatesProvider{}- updatesProvider.On("IsUpdateActionsEnabled").Return(true).Once()- updatesProvider.On("UpdateContainer", "host1", "c1", "nginx").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update",- Type: "update_container",- Status: "queued",- }, nil).Once()- updatesProvider.On("GetCommandStatus", "cmd-update").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update",- Status: "failed",- FailureReason: "New container crashed immediately (exit code 1)",- }, true).Once()-- exec := newDockerUpdateExecutor(t, updatesProvider)- result, err := exec.executeUpdateDockerContainer(context.Background(), map[string]interface{}{- "host": "dock1",- "container": "c1",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)-- var resp DockerUpdateContainerResponse- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.False(t, resp.Success)- assert.Contains(t, resp.Message, "failed")- assert.Contains(t, resp.Message, "crashed immediately")- require.NotNil(t, resp.Verification)- assert.Equal(t, false, resp.Verification["confirmed"])- assert.Equal(t, "failed", resp.Verification["outcome"])- updatesProvider.AssertExpectations(t)-}--func TestExecuteUpdateDockerContainer_InconclusiveAfterWindow(t *testing.T) {- updatesProvider := &mockUpdatesProvider{}- updatesProvider.On("IsUpdateActionsEnabled").Return(true).Once()- updatesProvider.On("UpdateContainer", "host1", "c1", "nginx").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update",- Type: "update_container",- Status: "queued",- }, nil).Once()- // The update never reaches a terminal state within the window.- updatesProvider.On("GetCommandStatus", "cmd-update").Return(DockerCommandStatus{- ID: "cmd-update", Status: "in_progress", Message: "Pulling image nginx...",- }, true)-- exec := newDockerUpdateExecutor(t, updatesProvider)- result, err := exec.executeUpdateDockerContainer(context.Background(), map[string]interface{}{- "host": "dock1",- "container": "c1",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- require.False(t, result.IsError)-- var resp DockerUpdateContainerResponse- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.True(t, resp.Success) // queueing succeeded; completion is explicitly unverified- assert.Contains(t, resp.Message, "NOT yet verified")- require.NotNil(t, resp.Verification)- assert.Equal(t, false, resp.Verification["confirmed"])- assert.Equal(t, "inconclusive", resp.Verification["outcome"])- updatesProvider.AssertNumberOfCalls(t, "GetCommandStatus", dockerUpdateVerifyMaxAttempts)-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/execution_profile.go b/internal/ai/tools/execution_profile.goindex d6066a13ab..e29821e153 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/execution_profile.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/execution_profile.go@@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ func patrolDetectionPulseStateAllowlist() map[string]bool {// ApplyExecutionProfile applies the profile's policy to this executor// instance (normally a request-scoped clone). Both Patrol profiles deny-// infrastructure mutations, clear any inherited autonomous mode, and mark-// the executor non-interactive; they differ only in pulse-state policy.+// infrastructure mutations and mark the executor non-interactive; they+// differ only in pulse-state policy.// Unknown profiles are rejected outright (panic on programmer error)// rather than falling through to the interactive default's permissions.func (e *PulseToolExecutor) ApplyExecutionProfile(profile ExecutionProfile) {@@ -81,11 +81,9 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) ApplyExecutionProfile(profile ExecutionProfile) {e.executionProfile = profileswitch profile {case ProfilePatrolDetection:- e.isAutonomous = falsee.denyInfrastructureMutations = truee.pulseStateAllowlist = patrolDetectionPulseStateAllowlist()case ProfilePatrolInvestigation:- e.isAutonomous = falsee.denyInfrastructureMutations = truee.pulseStateAllowlist = map[string]bool{agentcapabilities.PatrolProposeActionToolName: true}default:diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/executor.go b/internal/ai/tools/executor.goindex 0ea4785066..88fd7a9665 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/executor.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/executor.go@@ -654,10 +654,9 @@ type PulseToolExecutor struct {controlLevel ControlLevel// Current execution context- targetType string- targetID string- isAutonomous bool- orgID string+ targetType string+ targetID string+ orgID string// hasExecuteAuthority is request-local transport authority. Control// settings describe operator policy; they never grant a chat-only token// permission to execute infrastructure mutations.@@ -667,9 +666,7 @@ type PulseToolExecutor struct {// restriction for non-interactive read-only workloads (e.g. Patrol// investigations): every infrastructure-mutating invocation is// blocked by the registry before its handler runs, regardless of- // control level or autonomy. Core-owned and never serialized; it is- // deliberately separate from isAutonomous, which only suppresses- // interactive questions and grants no mutation authority.+ // control level. Core-owned and never serialized.denyInfrastructureMutations bool// pulseStateAllowlist restricts pulse-state mutations to the named// tools. Nil and an empty map both deny all.@@ -833,7 +830,6 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) Clone() *PulseToolExecutor {controlLevel: e.controlLevel,targetType: e.targetType,targetID: e.targetID,- isAutonomous: e.isAutonomous,orgID: e.orgID,hasExecuteAuthority: e.hasExecuteAuthority,executeAuthorityBound: e.executeAuthorityBound,@@ -898,16 +894,9 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) hasCanonicalReadState() bool {}// SetContext sets the current execution context-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) SetContext(targetType, targetID string, autonomous bool) {+func (e *PulseToolExecutor) SetContext(targetType, targetID string) {e.targetType = targetTypee.targetID = targetID- e.isAutonomous = autonomous-}--// SetAutonomousMode updates only the execution mode, preserving any-// session-scoped target context already attached to this executor clone.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) SetAutonomousMode(enabled bool) {- e.isAutonomous = enabled}// SetOrgID sets the org scope used when creating approval records.@@ -1053,15 +1042,13 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) SetTypedActionPlanner(planner TypedActionPlanner) {e.typedActionPlanner = planner}-// SetOnActionCompleted installs a fire-and-forget callback that runs-// after every terminal-state action audit is persisted (Completed or-// Failed, including refused-before-dispatch failures with stable-// `plan_drift:` / `resource_remediation_locked:` error prefixes).-// Pass nil to disable. Used by the API layer to bridge action-// completion into the agent SSE stream without coupling the tools-// package to the api package. The callback runs on its own-// goroutine; consumers must not assume immediate or in-order-// delivery relative to subsequent dispatches.+// SetOnActionCompleted installs the executor-side seam the API layer+// attaches the agent SSE bridge to. Nothing in the tools package+// dispatches the callback any more: the Assistant plans typed actions+// into Pulse Actions instead of executing them, and the dispatcher+// that used to fire it was removed with the retired execution lanes.+// action.completed events come from API-owned execution. Pass nil to+// disable.func (e *PulseToolExecutor) SetOnActionCompleted(cb func(unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord)) {if e == nil {returndiff --git a/internal/ai/tools/executor_clone_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/executor_clone_test.goindex dbe459c02d..79a233ae8c 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/executor_clone_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/executor_clone_test.go@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ func TestPulseToolExecutorCloneIsolatesSessionState(t *testing.T) {resolved := &mockResolvedContext{}original := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{})- original.SetContext("node", "node-1", false)+ original.SetContext("node", "node-1")original.SetOrgID("tenant-a")original.SetResolvedContext(resolved)original.SetPatrolFindingCreator(creator)@@ -30,16 +30,16 @@ func TestPulseToolExecutorCloneIsolatesSessionState(t *testing.T) {if clone.GetPatrolObserverProposer() != proposer {t.Fatal("Clone() should retain patrol observer proposer availability for the new run")}- if clone.targetType != original.targetType || clone.targetID != original.targetID || clone.isAutonomous != original.isAutonomous {- t.Fatalf("Clone() lost base execution context: got %q/%q/%v", clone.targetType, clone.targetID, clone.isAutonomous)+ if clone.targetType != original.targetType || clone.targetID != original.targetID {+ t.Fatalf("Clone() lost base execution context: got %q/%q", clone.targetType, clone.targetID)}if clone.orgID != original.orgID {t.Fatalf("Clone() orgID = %q, want %q", clone.orgID, original.orgID)}- clone.SetContext("vm", "vm-201", true)- if original.targetType != "node" || original.targetID != "node-1" || original.isAutonomous {- t.Fatalf("original context mutated after clone update: got %q/%q/%v", original.targetType, original.targetID, original.isAutonomous)+ clone.SetContext("vm", "vm-201")+ if original.targetType != "node" || original.targetID != "node-1" {+ t.Fatalf("original context mutated after clone update: got %q/%q", original.targetType, original.targetID)}}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/executor_setters_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/executor_setters_test.goindex b78ff3b46d..2e5dd8c46b 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/executor_setters_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/executor_setters_test.go@@ -36,15 +36,9 @@ func (s *stubAgentProfileManager) GetAgentScope(ctx context.Context, agentID strfunc TestPulseToolExecutor_Setters(t *testing.T) {exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{})- exec.SetContext("vm", "101", true)+ exec.SetContext("vm", "101")assert.Equal(t, "vm", exec.targetType)assert.Equal(t, "101", exec.targetID)- assert.True(t, exec.isAutonomous)-- exec.SetAutonomousMode(false)- assert.Equal(t, "vm", exec.targetType)- assert.Equal(t, "101", exec.targetID)- assert.False(t, exec.isAutonomous)exec.SetControlLevel(ControlLevelControlled)assert.Equal(t, ControlLevelControlled, exec.controlLevel)diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/file_docker_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/file_docker_test.goindex 8e99fe6398..95774757f4 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/file_docker_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/file_docker_test.go@@ -2,9 +2,6 @@ package toolsimport ("context"- "crypto/sha256"- "encoding/base64"- "encoding/hex""encoding/json""fmt""strings"@@ -18,37 +15,6 @@ import ("github.com/stretchr/testify/require")-func TestExecuteFileEditDockerContainerValidation(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("InvalidDockerContainerName", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeFileEdit(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "action": "read",- "path": "/config/test.json",- "target_host": "tower",- "container": "my container", // space is invalid- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "invalid character")- })-- t.Run("ValidDockerContainerName", func(t *testing.T) {- // This should pass validation but fail on agent lookup- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeFileEdit(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "action": "read",- "path": "/config/test.json",- "target_host": "tower",- "container": "my-container_v1.2",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- // Should fail with "no agent" not "invalid character"- assert.NotContains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "invalid character")- })-}-func TestExecuteFileReadDocker(t *testing.T) {ctx := context.Background()@@ -182,349 +148,6 @@ func TestExecuteFileReadFailureStatus(t *testing.T) {}}-func TestExecuteFileWriteDocker(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("WriteToDockerContainer", func(t *testing.T) {- content := `{"new": "config"}`- encodedContent := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(content))- expectedWriteCmd := fmt.Sprintf(- "docker exec %s sh -c %s",- shellEscape("nginx"),- shellEscape(fmt.Sprintf("echo %s | base64 -d > %s", shellEscape(encodedContent), shellEscape("/etc/nginx/nginx.conf"))),- )- expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(content))- expectedHex := hex.EncodeToString(expected[:])-- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == expectedWriteCmd- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "",- }, nil)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "docker exec") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "nginx") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "sha256sum") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "/etc/nginx/nginx.conf")- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: expectedHex + " /etc/nginx/nginx.conf\n",- }, nil)-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeFileWrite(ctx, "/etc/nginx/nginx.conf", content, "tower", "nginx", map[string]interface{}{})- require.NoError(t, err)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.True(t, resp["success"].(bool))- assert.Equal(t, "write", resp["action"])- assert.Equal(t, "nginx", resp["container"])- assert.Equal(t, float64(len(content)), resp["bytes_written"])- if v, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {- assert.True(t, v["ok"].(bool))- }- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("WriteControlledRequiresApproval", func(t *testing.T) {- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelControlled,- })- result, err := exec.executeFileWrite(ctx, "/config/test.json", "test", "tower", "mycontainer", map[string]interface{}{})- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "container: mycontainer")- })-}--func TestExecuteFileAppendDocker(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("AppendToDockerContainer", func(t *testing.T) {- content := "\nnew line"- encodedContent := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(content))- expectedAppendCmd := fmt.Sprintf(- "docker exec %s sh -c %s",- shellEscape("logcontainer"),- shellEscape(fmt.Sprintf("echo %s | base64 -d >> %s", shellEscape(encodedContent), shellEscape("/var/log/app.log"))),- )- expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(content))- expectedHex := hex.EncodeToString(expected[:])-- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "tower"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == expectedAppendCmd- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "",- }, nil)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "docker exec") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "logcontainer") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "tail -c") &&- (strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "sha256sum") || strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "shasum"))- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: expectedHex + " -\n",- }, nil)-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeFileAppend(ctx, "/var/log/app.log", content, "tower", "logcontainer", map[string]interface{}{})- require.NoError(t, err)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.True(t, resp["success"].(bool))- assert.Equal(t, "append", resp["action"])- assert.Equal(t, "logcontainer", resp["container"])- if v, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {- assert.True(t, v["ok"].(bool))- }- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-}--func TestExecuteFileWriteLXCVMTargets(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("WriteToLXCRoutedCorrectly", func(t *testing.T) {- // Test that file writes to LXC are routed with correct target type/ID- // Agent handles sh -c wrapping, so tool sends raw pipeline command- content := "test content"- encodedContent := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(content))- expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(content))- expectedHex := hex.EncodeToString(expected[:])-- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "proxmox-agent", Hostname: "pve-node"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "proxmox-agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- // Tool sends raw pipeline, agent wraps in sh -c for LXC- return cmd.TargetType == "container" &&- cmd.TargetID == "141" &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, encodedContent) &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "| base64 -d >") &&- !strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "docker exec")- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "",- }, nil)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "proxmox-agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "container" &&- cmd.TargetID == "141" &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "sha256sum") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "/opt/test/config.yaml") &&- !strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "docker exec")- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: expectedHex + " /opt/test/config.yaml\n",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- Containers: []models.Container{- {VMID: 141, Name: "homepage-docker", Node: "pve-node"},- },- }-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeFileWrite(ctx, "/opt/test/config.yaml", content, "homepage-docker", "", map[string]interface{}{})- require.NoError(t, err)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.True(t, resp["success"].(bool))- assert.Equal(t, "write", resp["action"])- assert.Nil(t, resp["container"]) // No Docker container- if v, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {- assert.True(t, v["ok"].(bool))- }- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("WriteToVMRoutedCorrectly", func(t *testing.T) {- // Test that file writes to VMs are routed with correct target type/ID- content := "vm config"- encodedContent := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(content))- expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(content))- expectedHex := hex.EncodeToString(expected[:])-- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "proxmox-agent", Hostname: "pve-node"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "proxmox-agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "vm" &&- cmd.TargetID == "100" &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, encodedContent)- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "",- }, nil)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "proxmox-agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "vm" &&- cmd.TargetID == "100" &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "sha256sum") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "/etc/test.conf") &&- !strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "docker exec")- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: expectedHex + " /etc/test.conf\n",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- VMs: []models.VM{- {VMID: 100, Name: "test-vm", Node: "pve-node"},- },- }-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeFileWrite(ctx, "/etc/test.conf", content, "test-vm", "", map[string]interface{}{})- require.NoError(t, err)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.True(t, resp["success"].(bool))- if v, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {- assert.True(t, v["ok"].(bool))- }- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("WriteToDirectHost", func(t *testing.T) {- // Direct host writes use raw pipeline command- content := "host config"- encodedContent := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(content))- expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(content))- expectedHex := hex.EncodeToString(expected[:])-- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent", Hostname: "tower"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "agent" &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, encodedContent) &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "| base64 -d >")- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "",- }, nil)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "agent" &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "sha256sum") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "/tmp/test.txt") &&- !strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "docker exec")- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: expectedHex + " /tmp/test.txt\n",- }, nil)-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeFileWrite(ctx, "/tmp/test.txt", content, "tower", "", map[string]interface{}{})- require.NoError(t, err)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.True(t, resp["success"].(bool))- if v, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {- assert.True(t, v["ok"].(bool))- }- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("AppendToLXCRoutedCorrectly", func(t *testing.T) {- // Append operations to LXC are routed with correct target type/ID- content := "\nnew line"- encodedContent := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(content))- expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(content))- expectedHex := hex.EncodeToString(expected[:])-- agents := []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "proxmox-agent", Hostname: "pve-node"}}- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{}- mockAgent.On("GetConnectedAgents").Return(agents)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "proxmox-agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "container" &&- cmd.TargetID == "141" &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, encodedContent) &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, ">>") // append uses >>- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "",- }, nil)- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "proxmox-agent", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.TargetType == "container" &&- cmd.TargetID == "141" &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "tail -c") &&- strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "/var/log/app.log") &&- (strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "sha256sum") || strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "shasum")) &&- !strings.Contains(cmd.Command, "docker exec")- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: expectedHex + " -\n",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- Containers: []models.Container{- {VMID: 141, Name: "homepage-docker", Node: "pve-node"},- },- }-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- AgentServer: mockAgent,- ControlLevel: ControlLevelAutonomous,- ActionAuditStore: unifiedresources.NewMemoryStore(),- })- result, err := exec.executeFileAppend(ctx, "/var/log/app.log", content, "homepage-docker", "", map[string]interface{}{})- require.NoError(t, err)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.True(t, resp["success"].(bool))- assert.Equal(t, "append", resp["action"])- if v, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {- assert.True(t, v["ok"].(bool))- }- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-}-func TestExecuteFileEditDockerNestedRouting(t *testing.T) {ctx := context.Background()@@ -571,13 +194,11 @@ func TestExecuteFileEditDockerNestedRouting(t *testing.T) {})}-// Missing access is a failed operation, independent of whether monitoring knows-// the target. Exercise the actual tool handlers so writes cannot report success.-func TestCommandToolsPreserveMonitoringWhenAccessUnavailable(t *testing.T) {+func TestReadToolsPreserveMonitoringWhenAccessUnavailable(t *testing.T) {t.Setenv("PULSE_STRICT_RESOLUTION", "false")for _, target := range []string{"known-vm", "unknown-target"} {for _, noServer := range []bool{false, true} {- for _, operation := range []string{"file read", "file write", "file append", "read exec", "legacy command"} {+ for _, operation := range []string{"file read", "read exec"} {t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/noServer=%t/%s", target, noServer, operation), func(t *testing.T) {server := &mockAgentServer{}config := ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{@@ -593,14 +214,8 @@ func TestCommandToolsPreserveMonitoringWhenAccessUnavailable(t *testing.T) {switch operation {case "file read":result, err = executor.executeFileRead(ctx, "/proc/meminfo", target, "")- case "file write":- result, err = executor.executeFileWrite(ctx, "/tmp/access-proof", "value", target, "", nil)- case "file append":- result, err = executor.executeFileAppend(ctx, "/tmp/access-proof", "value", target, "", nil)case "read exec":result, err = executor.executeReadExec(ctx, map[string]interface{}{"command": "uptime", "target_host": target})- case "legacy command":- result, err = executor.executeRunCommand(ctx, map[string]interface{}{"command": "uptime", "target_host": target})}require.NoError(t, err)require.True(t, result.IsError)diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/infrastructure_helpers_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/infrastructure_helpers_test.godeleted file mode 100644index 2f876fc994..0000000000--- a/internal/ai/tools/infrastructure_helpers_test.go+++ /dev/null@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@-package tools--import (- "encoding/json"- "strings"- "testing"-- "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"- "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"-)--func TestFormatDockerUpdateApprovalNeeded(t *testing.T) {- value := formatDockerUpdateApprovalNeeded("web", "node-1", "id-1")- require.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(value, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: "))-- raw := strings.TrimPrefix(value, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: ")- var payload map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &payload))-- assert.Equal(t, "approval_required", payload["type"])- assert.Equal(t, "id-1", payload["approval_id"])- assert.Equal(t, "web", payload["container_name"])- assert.Equal(t, "node-1", payload["docker_host"])- assert.Equal(t, "update", payload["action"])-}--func TestTrimLeadingSlash(t *testing.T) {- assert.Equal(t, "name", trimLeadingSlash("/name"))- assert.Equal(t, "name", trimLeadingSlash("name"))- assert.Equal(t, "", trimLeadingSlash(""))-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/invocation_policy_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/invocation_policy_test.goindex bc02e09d91..004aaaaacd 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/invocation_policy_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/invocation_policy_test.go@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ func TestAutonomousDenyMutationsCannotMutateDocker(t *testing.T) {updates := &mockUpdatesProvider{}exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{UpdatesProvider: updates})exec.SetControlLevel(ControlLevelAutonomous)- exec.SetAutonomousMode(true)exec.SetDenyInfrastructureMutations(true)text := executeBlockedText(t, exec, "pulse_docker", map[string]interface{}{@@ -125,14 +124,13 @@ func TestFabricatedEnumValuesFailClosedAtRuntime(t *testing.T) {func TestRetiredMutationProfileMatrixDeniesBeforeHandlers(t *testing.T) {profiles := []struct {- name string- level ControlLevel- profile ExecutionProfile- autonomous bool+ name string+ level ControlLevel+ profile ExecutionProfile}{{name: "interactive-read-only", level: ControlLevelReadOnly, profile: ProfileInteractiveAssistant},{name: "interactive-controlled", level: ControlLevelControlled, profile: ProfileInteractiveAssistant},- {name: "interactive-autonomous", level: ControlLevelAutonomous, profile: ProfileInteractiveAssistant, autonomous: true},+ {name: "interactive-autonomous", level: ControlLevelAutonomous, profile: ProfileInteractiveAssistant},{name: "patrol-detection", level: ControlLevelAutonomous, profile: ProfilePatrolDetection},{name: "patrol-investigation", level: ControlLevelAutonomous, profile: ProfilePatrolInvestigation},}@@ -152,7 +150,6 @@ func TestRetiredMutationProfileMatrixDeniesBeforeHandlers(t *testing.T) {t.Run(posture.name, func(t *testing.T) {exec := newInvocationPolicyExecutor(t)exec.SetControlLevel(posture.level)- exec.SetAutonomousMode(posture.autonomous)exec.ApplyExecutionProfile(posture.profile)for _, call := range calls {text := executeBlockedText(t, exec, call.tool, call.args)@@ -423,14 +420,9 @@ func TestRegistrationAuthorityIsSplitAndAppendOnly(t *testing.T) {func TestPatrolDetectionProfileEnforcesAllowlistedPulseState(t *testing.T) {exec := newInvocationPolicyExecutor(t)exec.SetControlLevel(ControlLevelAutonomous)- exec.SetAutonomousMode(true)exec.ApplyExecutionProfile(ProfilePatrolDetection)- // Applying a Patrol profile clears inherited autonomy and denies- // infrastructure outright.- if exec.isAutonomous {- t.Fatal("detection profile must clear inherited autonomous mode")- }+ // Applying a Patrol profile denies infrastructure outright.text := executeBlockedText(t, exec, "pulse_docker", map[string]interface{}{"action": "update", "container": "nginx", "host": "tower",})@@ -475,13 +467,8 @@ func TestPatrolDetectionProfileEnforcesAllowlistedPulseState(t *testing.T) {func TestPatrolInvestigationProfileIsStructurallyReadOnly(t *testing.T) {exec := newInvocationPolicyExecutor(t)exec.SetControlLevel(ControlLevelAutonomous)- exec.SetAutonomousMode(true)exec.ApplyExecutionProfile(ProfilePatrolInvestigation)- if exec.isAutonomous {- t.Fatal("investigation profile must clear inherited autonomous mode")- }-// No infrastructure mutations.text := executeBlockedText(t, exec, "pulse_kubernetes", map[string]interface{}{"type": "scale"})assert.Contains(t, text, "retired and denied")diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/kubernetes_control_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/kubernetes_control_test.goindex e8442bba06..d7cfbd2a59 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/kubernetes_control_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/kubernetes_control_test.go@@ -2,13 +2,9 @@ package toolsimport ("context"- "encoding/json""testing"- "time"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentcapabilities""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/models""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/unifiedresources""github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"@@ -159,559 +155,6 @@ func TestFindAgentForKubernetesCluster(t *testing.T) {})}-func TestExecuteKubernetesScale(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("MissingCluster", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{})- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "cluster is required")- })-- t.Run("MissingDeployment", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "test",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "deployment is required")- })-- t.Run("MissingReplicas", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "test",- "deployment": "nginx",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "replicas is required")- })-- t.Run("InvalidNamespace", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "test",- "deployment": "nginx",- "replicas": 3,- "namespace": "Invalid_NS",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "invalid namespace")- })-- t.Run("ReadOnlyMode", func(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelReadOnly- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "deployment": "nginx",- "replicas": 3,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "not available in read-only mode")- })-- t.Run("ControlledRequiresApproval", func(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1", DisplayName: "Cluster One"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelControlled- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "deployment": "nginx",- "replicas": 3,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "scale")- })-- t.Run("ExecuteSuccessVerified", func(t *testing.T) {- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' scale deployment 'nginx' --replicas=3" &&- cmd.TargetType == "agent"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "deployment.apps/nginx scaled",- }, nil)- // Read-after-write: the scale handler re-reads the deployment state.- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' get deployment 'nginx' -o 'jsonpath={.spec.replicas} {.status.readyReplicas}'" &&- cmd.TargetType == "agent"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "3 3",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "deployment": "nginx",- "replicas": 3,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- require.False(t, result.IsError)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- assert.Equal(t, true, resp["success"])- assert.Equal(t, "nginx", resp["deployment"])- verification, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{})- require.True(t, ok, "expected verification in response")- assert.Equal(t, true, verification["confirmed"])- assert.Equal(t, "kubectl_get", verification["method"])- observed, ok := verification["observed"].(map[string]interface{})- require.True(t, ok, "expected observed state in verification")- assert.Equal(t, float64(3), observed["replicas"])- assert.Equal(t, float64(3), observed["ready_replicas"])- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("ExecuteSuccessVerificationMismatch", func(t *testing.T) {- origSleep := kubernetesVerifySleepFn- kubernetesVerifySleepFn = func(context.Context, time.Duration) error { return nil }- t.Cleanup(func() { kubernetesVerifySleepFn = origSleep })-- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' scale deployment 'nginx' --replicas=3"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "deployment.apps/nginx scaled",- }, nil).Once()- // The re-read keeps observing a different desired replica count.- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' get deployment 'nginx' -o 'jsonpath={.spec.replicas} {.status.readyReplicas}'"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "1 1",- }, nil).Times(kubernetesVerifyMaxAttempts)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "deployment": "nginx",- "replicas": 3,- })- require.NoError(t, err)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- verification, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{})- require.True(t, ok, "expected verification in response")- assert.Equal(t, false, verification["confirmed"])- observed, ok := verification["observed"].(map[string]interface{})- require.True(t, ok, "expected observed state in verification")- assert.Equal(t, float64(1), observed["replicas"])- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("ExecuteSuccessVerificationReadError", func(t *testing.T) {- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' scale deployment 'nginx' --replicas=3"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "deployment.apps/nginx scaled",- }, nil).Once()- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' get deployment 'nginx' -o 'jsonpath={.spec.replicas} {.status.readyReplicas}'"- })).Return((*agentexec.CommandResultPayload)(nil), assert.AnError).Once()-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "deployment": "nginx",- "replicas": 3,- })- require.NoError(t, err)-- var resp map[string]interface{}- require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &resp))- // The scale itself succeeded; verification must report unconfirmed, not error out.- assert.Equal(t, true, resp["success"])- verification, ok := resp["verification"].(map[string]interface{})- require.True(t, ok, "expected verification in response")- assert.Equal(t, false, verification["confirmed"])- assert.NotEmpty(t, verification["note"])- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("ExecuteFailureNoVerification", func(t *testing.T) {- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' scale deployment 'nginx' --replicas=3"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 1,- Stderr: "Error from server (NotFound): deployments.apps \"nginx\" not found",- }, nil).Once()-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesScale(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "deployment": "nginx",- "replicas": 3,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "kubectl command failed")- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-}--func TestExecuteKubernetesRestart(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("MissingDeployment", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesRestart(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "test",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "deployment is required")- })-- t.Run("ExecuteSuccess", func(t *testing.T) {- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' rollout restart deployment/'nginx'"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "deployment.apps/nginx restarted",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesRestart(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "deployment": "nginx",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "Successfully initiated rollout restart")- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-}--func TestExecuteKubernetesDeletePod(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("MissingPod", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesDeletePod(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "test",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "pod is required")- })-- t.Run("ExecuteSuccess", func(t *testing.T) {- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' delete pod 'nginx-abc123'"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "pod \"nginx-abc123\" deleted",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesDeletePod(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "pod": "nginx-abc123",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "Successfully deleted pod")- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-}--func TestExecuteKubernetesExec(t *testing.T) {- ctx := context.Background()-- t.Run("MissingCommand", func(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: models.StateSnapshot{}}})- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesExec(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "test",- "pod": "nginx",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, result.IsError)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "command is required")- })-- t.Run("ExecuteWithoutContainer", func(t *testing.T) {- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' exec 'nginx-pod' -- sh -c 'cat /etc/nginx/nginx.conf'"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "server { listen 80; }",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesExec(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "pod": "nginx-pod",- "command": "cat /etc/nginx/nginx.conf",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "Command executed")- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "server { listen 80; }")- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("ExecuteWithContainer", func(t *testing.T) {- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'kube-system' exec 'coredns-pod' -c 'coredns' -- sh -c 'cat /etc/coredns/Corefile'"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: ".:53 { forward . /etc/resolv.conf }",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesExec(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "namespace": "kube-system",- "pod": "coredns-pod",- "container": "coredns",- "command": "cat /etc/coredns/Corefile",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "Command executed")- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("ExecEscapesMetacharacters", func(t *testing.T) {- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == "kubectl -n 'default' exec 'nginx-pod' -- sh -c 'cat /etc/nginx/nginx.conf; id'"- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "ok",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- })- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesExec(ctx, map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "pod": "nginx-pod",- "command": "cat /etc/nginx/nginx.conf; id",- })- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "Command executed")- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)- })-- t.Run("MismatchedApprovedIDDoesNotBypass", func(t *testing.T) {- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- approval.SetStore(store)- defer approval.SetStore(nil)-- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-1",- Command: "kubectl -n default exec nginx-pod -- whoami",- TargetType: "kubernetes",- TargetID: "nginx-pod",- }- require.NoError(t, store.CreateApproval(req))- _, err = store.Approve("approval-1", "tester")- require.NoError(t, err)-- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelControlled- })-- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesExec(ctx, agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "pod": "nginx-pod",- "command": "cat /etc/nginx/nginx.conf",- }, "approval-1"))- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")- mockAgent.AssertNotCalled(t, "ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything)- })-- t.Run("MatchingApprovedIDCarriesAuthorizationToAgentBoundary", func(t *testing.T) {- store, err := approval.NewStore(approval.StoreConfig{- DataDir: t.TempDir(),- DisablePersistence: true,- })- require.NoError(t, err)- approval.SetStore(store)- defer approval.SetStore(nil)-- kubeCmd := buildKubectlExecCommand("default", "nginx-pod", "", "cat /etc/nginx/nginx.conf")- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: "approval-2",- Command: kubeCmd,- TargetType: "kubernetes",- TargetID: "c1:default:pod:nginx-pod",- }- require.NoError(t, store.CreateApproval(req))- _, err = store.Approve("approval-2", "tester")- require.NoError(t, err)-- mockAgent := &mockAgentServer{- agents: []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{{AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "k8s-host"}},- }- mockAgent.On("ExecuteCommand", mock.Anything, "agent-1", mock.MatchedBy(func(cmd agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload) bool {- return cmd.Command == kubeCmd- })).Return(&agentexec.CommandResultPayload{- ExitCode: 0,- Stdout: "ok",- }, nil)-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- KubernetesClusters: []models.KubernetesCluster{- {ID: "c1", Name: "cluster-1", AgentID: "agent-1"},- },- }- exec := newConfiguredKubernetesExecutor(state, func(cfg *ExecutorConfig) {- cfg.AgentServer = mockAgent- cfg.ControlLevel = ControlLevelControlled- })-- result, err := exec.executeKubernetesExec(ctx, agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "pod": "nginx-pod",- "command": "cat /etc/nginx/nginx.conf",- }, "approval-2"))- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.NotContains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")- mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)-- // The mock agent boundary does not consume. Production agentexec consumes- // atomically before grant minting and dispatch; that replay behavior is- // covered by the agentexec/API authorization tests.- result, err = exec.executeKubernetesExec(ctx, agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(map[string]interface{}{- "cluster": "cluster-1",- "pod": "nginx-pod",- "command": "cat /etc/nginx/nginx.conf",- }, "approval-2"))- require.NoError(t, err)- assert.NotContains(t, result.Content[0].Text, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")- })-}-func TestExecuteKubernetesLogs(t *testing.T) {ctx := context.Background()@@ -815,13 +258,3 @@ func TestExecuteKubernetesLogs(t *testing.T) {mockAgent.AssertExpectations(t)})}--func TestFormatKubernetesApprovalNeeded(t *testing.T) {- result := formatKubernetesApprovalNeeded("scale", "nginx", "default", "production", "kubectl scale...", "approval-123")- assert.Contains(t, result, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED")- assert.Contains(t, result, "scale")- assert.Contains(t, result, "nginx")- assert.Contains(t, result, "default")- assert.Contains(t, result, "production")- assert.Contains(t, result, "approval-123")-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/purehelpers_branchcov0722am_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/purehelpers_branchcov0722am_test.goindex 73cbecae80..4236a76d61 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/purehelpers_branchcov0722am_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/purehelpers_branchcov0722am_test.go@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import ("testing""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/models""github.com/stretchr/testify/assert")@@ -20,45 +19,6 @@ import (// action_audit.go as approval.RequesterPulseAssistant ("pulse_assistant"); the// default-arm cases assert that literal so a constant change would surface here.-// TestBranchcov0722R2DockerRuntimeCommand covers every branch arm of-// dockerRuntimeCommand: the nil-host guard, both recognised switch cases-// ("podman", "docker"), the surrounding-whitespace + mixed-case normalisation-// path (TrimSpace + ToLower), an unrecognised runtime falling through to the-// default, and an empty runtime falling through to the default. Every arm is-// asserted against the exact command string it returns.-func TestBranchcov0722R2DockerRuntimeCommand(t *testing.T) {- tests := []struct {- name string- host *models.DockerHost- want string- }{- // --- nil-host guard: default command returned. ---- {name: "nil_host_returns_docker", host: nil, want: "docker"},-- // --- recognised switch arms (exact, already-canonical input). ---- {name: "podman_runtime_returns_podman", host: &models.DockerHost{Runtime: "podman"}, want: "podman"},- {name: "docker_runtime_returns_docker", host: &models.DockerHost{Runtime: "docker"}, want: "docker"},-- // --- normalisation: TrimSpace + ToLower route mixed input to a case. ---- {name: "podman_with_whitespace_and_mixed_case", host: &models.DockerHost{Runtime: " PoDmAn "}, want: "podman"},- {name: "docker_with_whitespace_and_upper_case", host: &models.DockerHost{Runtime: "\tDOCKER\n"}, want: "docker"},-- // --- default arm: unrecognised runtime falls through to "docker". ---- {name: "unrecognised_runtime_falls_through", host: &models.DockerHost{Runtime: "containerd"}, want: "docker"},-- // --- default arm: empty runtime falls through to "docker". ---- {name: "empty_runtime_falls_through", host: &models.DockerHost{Runtime: ""}, want: "docker"},- {name: "whitespace_only_runtime_falls_through", host: &models.DockerHost{Runtime: " "}, want: "docker"},- }-- for _, tc := range tests {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- got := dockerRuntimeCommand(tc.host)- assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got, "dockerRuntimeCommand mismatch")- })- }-}-// TestBranchcov0722R2ApprovalDecisionActor covers every branch arm of// approvalDecisionActor. The function implements a three-step precedence chain:// 1. req.DecidedBy (trimmed, if req != nil and non-empty) wins;diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/shared_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/shared_test.goindex 1f4870e130..b8b170cfc3 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/shared_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/shared_test.go@@ -28,15 +28,6 @@ func (m *mockStateProvider) ReadSnapshot() models.StateSnapshot {return args.Get(0).(models.StateSnapshot)}-type mockCommandPolicy struct {- mock.Mock-}--func (m *mockCommandPolicy) Evaluate(command string) agentexec.PolicyDecision {- args := m.Called(command)- return args.Get(0).(agentexec.PolicyDecision)-}-type mockAgentServer struct {mock.Mockagents []agentexec.ConnectedAgentdiff --git a/internal/ai/tools/strict_resolution_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/strict_resolution_test.goindex 10c97afa61..73d22c80d7 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/strict_resolution_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/strict_resolution_test.go@@ -1033,135 +1033,6 @@ func TestRoutingValidation_ExplicitGetShouldMarkAccess(t *testing.T) {t.Log("✓ Explicit get marks access - routing validation will block host ops")}-// TestWriteExecutionContext_BlocksNodeFallbackForLXC verifies that writes to an LXC-// are blocked when the routing would execute on the Proxmox node instead of inside the LXC.-//-// This catches the scenario where:-// 1. target_host="homepage-docker" (an LXC on pve-node)-// 2. An agent registered as "homepage-docker" matches directly-// 3. Command would run on pve-node's filesystem, not inside the LXC-func TestWriteExecutionContext_BlocksNodeFallbackForLXC(t *testing.T) {- // Create executor with state that knows homepage-docker is an LXC- state := models.StateSnapshot{- Nodes: []models.Node{{Name: "pve-node"}},- Containers: []models.Container{{- VMID: 141,- Name: "homepage-docker",- Node: "pve-node",- Status: "running",- }},- }-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- })-- // Simulate: routing resolved as "direct" (agent hostname match)- // This means the command would run directly on the agent, which is on the node- routing := CommandRoutingResult{- AgentID: "agent-pve-node",- TargetType: "agent", // Direct agent match -> "agent" type- TargetID: "", // No VMID- AgentHostname: "pve-node", // Agent is on pve-node- ResolvedKind: "agent", // Resolved as agent (direct match)- ResolvedNode: "", // No node info (direct match doesn't resolve)- Transport: "direct", // Direct execution- }-- // validateWriteExecutionContext should block this- err := executor.validateWriteExecutionContext("homepage-docker", routing)- if err == nil {- t.Fatal("Expected EXECUTION_CONTEXT_UNAVAILABLE error for LXC with direct transport")- }-- // Verify error structure- response := err.ToToolResponse()- if response.OK {- t.Error("Expected OK=false")- }- if response.Error.Code != "EXECUTION_CONTEXT_UNAVAILABLE" {- t.Errorf("Expected EXECUTION_CONTEXT_UNAVAILABLE, got %s", response.Error.Code)- }- if response.Error.Details["resolved_kind"] != "system-container" {- t.Errorf("Expected resolved_kind=system-container, got %v", response.Error.Details["resolved_kind"])- }- if response.Error.Details["auto_recoverable"] != nil {- t.Error("Expected auto_recoverable to be absent")- }- if response.Error.Details["policy_boundary"] == nil {- t.Error("Expected policy_boundary")- }-- t.Log("✓ Write to LXC blocked when routing would execute on node (no pct exec)")-}--// TestWriteExecutionContext_AllowsProperLXCRouting verifies that writes to an LXC-// are allowed when the routing correctly uses pct_exec.-func TestWriteExecutionContext_AllowsProperLXCRouting(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- Nodes: []models.Node{{Name: "pve-node"}},- Containers: []models.Container{{- VMID: 141,- Name: "homepage-docker",- Node: "pve-node",- Status: "running",- }},- }-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- })-- // Simulate: routing correctly resolved as LXC with pct_exec- routing := CommandRoutingResult{- AgentID: "agent-pve-node",- TargetType: "container",- TargetID: "141",- AgentHostname: "pve-node",- ResolvedKind: "system-container",- ResolvedNode: "pve-node",- Transport: "pct_exec",- }-- // validateWriteExecutionContext should allow this- err := executor.validateWriteExecutionContext("homepage-docker", routing)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Expected no error for proper container routing, got: %s", err.Message)- }-- t.Log("✓ Write to system container allowed when routing uses pct_exec")-}--// TestWriteExecutionContext_AllowsHostWrites verifies that writes directly to a host-// (not a child resource) are allowed normally.-func TestWriteExecutionContext_AllowsHostWrites(t *testing.T) {- state := models.StateSnapshot{- Nodes: []models.Node{{Name: "pve-node"}},- Hosts: []models.Host{{Hostname: "pve-node"}},- }-- executor := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- StateProvider: &mockStateProvider{state: state},- })-- // Simulate: writing to pve-node directly (it's a host, not LXC/VM)- routing := CommandRoutingResult{- AgentID: "agent-pve-node",- TargetType: "agent",- AgentHostname: "pve-node",- ResolvedKind: "node",- ResolvedNode: "pve-node",- Transport: "direct",- }-- err := executor.validateWriteExecutionContext("pve-node", routing)- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("Expected no error for host write, got: %s", err.Message)- }-- t.Log("✓ Write to Proxmox host allowed (target is the node itself)")-}-// TestCommandRoutingResult_ProvenanceFields verifies the execution provenance// structure is populated correctly for debugging.func TestCommandRoutingResult_ProvenanceFields(t *testing.T) {diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/tools_control.go b/internal/ai/tools/tools_control.goindex af349f326b..d16abbae78 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/tools_control.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/tools_control.go@@ -2,21 +2,13 @@ package toolsimport ("context"- "errors""fmt""net/url"- "strconv""strings"- "time"- "github.com/google/uuid""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentcapabilities""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/approval"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/safety"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/models""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/unifiedresources"- "github.com/rs/zerolog/log")// registerControlTools registers the pulse_control tool@@ -134,146 +126,6 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeControlResource(ctx context.Context, args map}), nil}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeNativeAppContainerControl(ctx context.Context, resource ResolvedResourceInfo, action string, approvalID string) (CallToolResult, error) {- if resource == nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("resolved resource is nil")), nil- }- if e.appContainerActionProvider == nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("native app-container control provider is not available")), nil- }-- validActions := map[string]bool{"start": true, "stop": true, "restart": true}- if !validActions[action] {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid app-container action: %s. Use start, stop, or restart", action)), nil- }- if e.controlLevel == ControlLevelReadOnly {- return NewTextResult("Resource control actions are not available in read-only mode."), nil- }-- resourceName := resolvedResourceDisplayName(resource)- resourceHost := strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetTargetHost())- command := fmt.Sprintf("truenas app %s %s", action, resourceName)- if resourceHost != "" {- command = fmt.Sprintf("%s on %s", command, resourceHost)- }- approvalTargetType := "app-container"- approvalTargetID := strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetResourceID())- if approvalTargetID == "" {- approvalTargetID = strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetProviderUID())- }-- preApproved := consumeApprovalWithValidation(agentcapabilities.WithApprovalArgument(nil, approvalID), e.orgID, command, approvalTargetType, approvalTargetID)- decision := agentexec.PolicyAllow- if e.policy != nil {- decision = e.policy.Evaluate(command)- if decision == agentexec.PolicyBlock {- return NewTextResult(formatPolicyBlocked(command, "This action is blocked by security policy")), nil- }- }- requiresApproval := !e.isAutonomous && (e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled || decision == agentexec.PolicyRequireApproval)-- if !preApproved && decision == agentexec.PolicyRequireApproval && !e.isAutonomous {- approvalID = e.createApprovalRecord(command, approvalTargetType, approvalTargetID, resourceName, fmt.Sprintf("%s app-container %s", action, resourceName))- return NewTextResult(formatAppContainerApprovalNeeded(resourceName, resourceHost, action, command, approvalID)), nil- }- if !preApproved && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- approvalID = e.createApprovalRecord(command, approvalTargetType, approvalTargetID, resourceName, fmt.Sprintf("%s app-container %s", action, resourceName))- return NewTextResult(formatAppContainerApprovalNeeded(resourceName, resourceHost, action, command, approvalID)), nil- }-- var actionResult *AppContainerActionResult- executionResult, err := e.executeNativeActionWithAudit(- ctx,- "pulse_control",- strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetResourceID()),- approvalID,- requiresApproval,- map[string]any{- "action": action,- "kind": resource.GetKind(),- "providerUid": resource.GetProviderUID(),- "host": resourceHost,- "platform": "truenas",- "approvalId": approvalID,- "requestedBy": "pulse_control",- },- "pulse_control",- fmt.Sprintf("%s app-container %s", action, resourceName),- func(ctx context.Context) (*unifiedresources.ExecutionResult, error) {- result, err := e.appContainerActionProvider.ExecuteAction(ctx, AppContainerActionRequest{- OrgID: e.orgID,- ResourceID: strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetResourceID()),- ProviderUID: strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetProviderUID()),- Name: resourceName,- Host: resourceHost,- Platform: "truenas",- Action: action,- })- if err != nil {- return nil, err- }- actionResult = result- return &unifiedresources.ExecutionResult{- Success: true,- Output: strings.TrimSpace(result.Output),- }, nil- },- )- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(err), nil- }- if actionResult == nil {- actionResult = &AppContainerActionResult{- ResourceID: strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetResourceID()),- ProviderUID: strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetProviderUID()),- Name: resourceName,- Host: resourceHost,- Platform: "truenas",- Action: action,- Output: strings.TrimSpace(executionResult.Output),- }- }- if strings.TrimSpace(actionResult.Output) == "" {- actionResult.Output = strings.TrimSpace(executionResult.Output)- }-- response := map[string]interface{}{- "success": executionResult.Success,- "type": "resource",- "resource_id": actionResult.ResourceID,- "resource": actionResult.Name,- "resource_type": resource.GetKind(),- "provider_uid": actionResult.ProviderUID,- "platform": actionResult.Platform,- "host": actionResult.Host,- "action": actionResult.Action,- "status": actionResult.Status,- "output": actionResult.Output,- "verification": map[string]interface{}{- "ok": executionResult.Success,- "method": "provider_refresh",- "observed_status": actionResult.Status,- },- }- return NewJSONResultWithIsError(response, !executionResult.Success), nil-}--func resolvedResourceControlIdentity(resource ResolvedResourceInfo, fallback string) string {- if resource == nil {- return strings.TrimSpace(fallback)- }- if providerUID := strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetProviderUID()); providerUID != "" {- return providerUID- }- for _, alias := range resource.GetAliases() {- alias = strings.TrimSpace(alias)- if alias != "" {- return alias- }- }- return strings.TrimSpace(fallback)-}-func resolvedResourceDisplayName(resource ResolvedResourceInfo) string {if resource == nil {return ""@@ -290,401 +142,6 @@ func resolvedResourceDisplayName(resource ResolvedResourceInfo) string {return strings.TrimSpace(resource.GetResourceID())}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeRunCommand(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- command, _ := args["command"].(string)- targetHost, _ := args["target_host"].(string)- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)- auditResourceID := strings.TrimSpace(targetHost)- if e.isAutonomous {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("raw command execution is unavailable in autonomous model sessions; use a typed governed action proposal")), nil- }-- if command == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("command is required")), nil- }-- // Validate resource is in resolved context- // Uses command risk classification: read-only commands bypass strict mode- // With PULSE_STRICT_RESOLUTION=true, write commands are blocked on undiscovered resources- if targetHost != "" {- validation := e.validateResolvedResourceForExec(targetHost, command, true)- if validation.IsBlocked() {- // Hard validation failure - return consistent error envelope- return NewToolResponseResult(validation.StrictError.ToToolResponse()), nil- }- if validation.ErrorMsg != "" {- // Soft validation - log warning but allow operation- log.Warn().- Str("target", targetHost).- Str("command", command).- Str("validation_error", validation.ErrorMsg).- Msg("[Control] Target resource not in resolved context - may indicate model hallucination")- }- if validation.Resource != nil && strings.TrimSpace(validation.Resource.GetResourceID()) != "" {- auditResourceID = strings.TrimSpace(validation.Resource.GetResourceID())- }-- // Validate routing context - block if targeting a host node when child resources exist- // This prevents accidentally executing commands on the host when user meant to target a container/VM- routingResult := e.validateRoutingContext(targetHost)- if routingResult.IsBlocked() {- return NewToolResponseResult(routingResult.RoutingError.ToToolResponse()), nil- }- }-- // Note: Control level read_only check is now centralized in registry.Execute()-- // Check security policy (skip block check - blocks cannot be pre-approved)- decision := agentexec.PolicyAllow- if e.policy != nil {- decision = e.policy.Evaluate(command)- if decision == agentexec.PolicyBlock {- return NewTextResult(formatPolicyBlocked(command, "This command is blocked by security policy")), nil- }- }-- requiresApproval := !e.isAutonomous && (e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled || decision == agentexec.PolicyRequireApproval)-- if targetHost == "" && e.agentServer != nil {- agents := e.agentServer.GetConnectedAgents()- if len(agents) > 1 {- return NewTextResult(formatTargetHostRequired(agents)), nil- }- }-- // Resolve topology even when no command connection is available.- routing := e.resolveTargetForCommandFull(targetHost)- if routing.AgentID == "" {- return unavailableCommandConnection(targetHost, routing), nil- }-- approvalTargetType, approvalTargetID, approvalTargetName := approvalTargetForCommand(targetHost, routing)-- // Check if this is a pre-approved execution with command hash validation.- // Final single-use consumption is owned by agentexec immediately before- // grant signing and WebSocket dispatch.- preApproved := consumeApprovalWithValidation(args, e.orgID, command, approvalTargetType, approvalTargetID)-- if !preApproved && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, approvalTargetType, approvalTargetID, approvalTargetName, "Control level requires approval")- return NewTextResult(formatApprovalNeeded(command, "Control level requires approval", approvalID)), nil- }- if !preApproved && decision == agentexec.PolicyRequireApproval {- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, approvalTargetType, approvalTargetID, approvalTargetName, "Security policy requires approval")- return NewTextResult(formatApprovalNeeded(command, "Security policy requires approval", approvalID)), nil- }-- log.Debug().- Str("target_host", targetHost).- Str("agent_id", routing.AgentID).- Str("agent_host", routing.AgentHostname).- Str("resolved_kind", routing.ResolvedKind).- Str("resolved_node", routing.ResolvedNode).- Str("transport", routing.Transport).- Str("target_type", routing.TargetType).- Str("target_id", routing.TargetID).- Msg("[pulse_control] Routing command execution")-- result, err := e.executeCommandWithAudit(- ctx,- "pulse_control",- func() string {- if auditResourceID != "" {- return auditResourceID- }- if targetHost != "" {- return targetHost- }- return routing.AgentHostname- }(),- approvalID,- requiresApproval,- routing.AgentID,- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: command,- TargetType: routing.TargetType,- TargetID: routing.TargetID,- },- "pulse_control",- fmt.Sprintf("run command %q on %s", command, func() string {- if strings.TrimSpace(targetHost) != "" {- return strings.TrimSpace(targetHost)- }- return strings.TrimSpace(routing.AgentHostname)- }()),- )- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(err), nil- }-- output := result.Stdout- if result.Stderr != "" {- output += "\n" + result.Stderr- }- if redacted, n := safety.RedactSensitiveText(output); n > 0 {- output = redacted + fmt.Sprintf("\n\n[redacted %d sensitive value(s)]", n)- }-- success := result.ExitCode == 0- response := map[string]interface{}{- "success": success,- "type": "command",- "command": command,- "target_host": targetHost,- "exit_code": result.ExitCode,- "output": output,- "execution": buildExecutionProvenance(targetHost, routing),- "verification": map[string]interface{}{"ok": success, "method": "exit_code", "exit_code": result.ExitCode},- }- return NewJSONResultWithIsError(response, !success), nil-}--// approvalTargetForCommand derives stable approval binding fields from resolved routing.-// This ensures replay protection hashes match the actual execution target.-func approvalTargetForCommand(targetHost string, routing CommandRoutingResult) (targetType, targetID, targetName string) {- targetType = routing.TargetType- targetID = strings.TrimSpace(routing.TargetID)-- if targetType == "" {- targetType = "agent"- }-- if targetType == "agent" {- // Agent-level executions do not carry routing.TargetID in ExecuteCommand payload.- // Use agent ID to bind approvals to a specific connected agent.- targetID = strings.TrimSpace(routing.AgentID)- if targetID == "" {- targetID = strings.TrimSpace(targetHost)- }- } else if targetID == "" {- // Defensive fallback for unexpected missing IDs.- targetID = strings.TrimSpace(targetHost)- }-- targetName = strings.TrimSpace(targetHost)- if targetName == "" {- targetName = strings.TrimSpace(routing.AgentHostname)- }- if targetName == "" {- targetName = strings.TrimSpace(routing.AgentID)- }-- return targetType, targetID, targetName-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeControlGuest(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- guestID, _ := args["guest_id"].(string)- action, _ := args["action"].(string)- force, _ := args["force"].(bool)- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)-- if guestID == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("guest_id is required")), nil- }- if action == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("action is required")), nil- }-- validActions := map[string]bool{"start": true, "stop": true, "shutdown": true, "restart": true, "delete": true}- if !validActions[action] {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid action: %s. Use start, stop, shutdown, restart, or delete", action)), nil- }-- // Validate resource is in resolved context- // With PULSE_STRICT_RESOLUTION=true, this blocks execution on undiscovered resources- validation := e.validateResolvedResource(guestID, action, true)- if validation.IsBlocked() {- // Hard validation failure - return consistent error envelope- return NewToolResponseResult(validation.StrictError.ToToolResponse()), nil- }- if validation.ErrorMsg != "" {- if validation.Resource != nil {- return NewErrorResult(errors.New(validation.ErrorMsg)), nil- }- // Soft validation - log warning but allow operation- log.Warn().- Str("guest_id", guestID).- Str("action", action).- Str("validation_error", validation.ErrorMsg).- Msg("[ControlGuest] Guest not in resolved context - may indicate model hallucination")- }-- // Note: Control level read_only check is now centralized in registry.Execute()-- guest, err := e.resolveGuest(guestID)- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("could not find guest '%s': %v", guestID, err)), nil- }-- // Build the command- cmdTool := "pct"- if guest.Type == "vm" {- cmdTool = "qm"- }-- // For delete action, verify guest is stopped first- if action == "delete" && guest.Status != "stopped" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("cannot delete %s (VMID %d) - it is currently %s; stop it first, then try deleting again", guest.Name, guest.VMID, guest.Status)), nil- }-- var command string- switch action {- case "start":- command = fmt.Sprintf("%s start %d", cmdTool, guest.VMID)- case "stop":- command = fmt.Sprintf("%s stop %d", cmdTool, guest.VMID)- case "shutdown":- command = fmt.Sprintf("%s shutdown %d", cmdTool, guest.VMID)- case "restart":- command = fmt.Sprintf("%s reboot %d", cmdTool, guest.VMID)- case "delete":- // Delete uses 'destroy' subcommand with --purge to also remove associated storage- command = fmt.Sprintf("%s destroy %d --purge", cmdTool, guest.VMID)- }-- if force && action == "stop" {- command = fmt.Sprintf("%s stop %d --skiplock", cmdTool, guest.VMID)- }-- approvalTargetID := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", guest.Node, guest.VMID)-- // Check if this is a pre-approved execution (agentic loop re-executing after user approval).- // Use consumeApprovalWithValidation to enforce command-bound, single-use approvals.- preApproved := consumeApprovalWithValidation(args, e.orgID, command, guest.Type, approvalTargetID)-- // Check security policy (skip if pre-approved)- if !preApproved && e.policy != nil {- decision := e.policy.Evaluate(command)- if decision == agentexec.PolicyBlock {- return NewTextResult(formatPolicyBlocked(command, "This command is blocked by security policy")), nil- }- if decision == agentexec.PolicyRequireApproval && !e.isAutonomous {- // Use guest.Node (the Proxmox host) as targetName so approval execution can find the correct agent- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, guest.Type, approvalTargetID, guest.Node, fmt.Sprintf("%s guest %s", action, guest.Name))- return NewTextResult(formatControlApprovalNeeded(guest.Name, guest.VMID, action, command, approvalID)), nil- }- }-- // Check control level - this must be outside policy check since policy may be nil (skip if pre-approved)- if !preApproved && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- // Use guest.Node (the Proxmox host) as targetName so approval execution can find the correct agent- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, guest.Type, approvalTargetID, guest.Node, fmt.Sprintf("%s guest %s", action, guest.Name))- return NewTextResult(formatControlApprovalNeeded(guest.Name, guest.VMID, action, command, approvalID)), nil- }-- requiresApproval := !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled-- if e.agentServer == nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("no agent server available")), nil- }-- agentID := e.findAgentForNode(guest.Node)- if agentID == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("no agent available on node '%s'; install Pulse Unified Agent on the node to enable control", guest.Node)), nil- }-- result, err := e.executeCommandWithAudit(- ctx,- "pulse_control",- fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", guest.Node, guest.VMID),- approvalID,- requiresApproval,- agentID,- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: command,- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "",- },- "pulse_control",- fmt.Sprintf("%s guest %s", action, guest.Name),- )- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(err), nil- }-- output := result.Stdout- if result.Stderr != "" {- output += "\n" + result.Stderr- }-- // Detect idempotent success: the guest is already in the desired state.- // Proxmox returns exit code 255 with "not running" for stop/shutdown on a stopped guest,- // or "already running" for start on a running guest. These aren't failures — the desired- // state is already achieved.- outputLower := strings.ToLower(output)- alreadyDone := false- switch action {- case "stop", "shutdown":- alreadyDone = strings.Contains(outputLower, "not running")- case "start":- alreadyDone = strings.Contains(outputLower, "already running")- }- if alreadyDone {- result.ExitCode = 0- output = fmt.Sprintf("%s\n(idempotent: desired state already set)", output)- }-- if redacted, n := safety.RedactSensitiveText(output); n > 0 {- output = redacted + fmt.Sprintf("\n\n[redacted %d sensitive value(s)]", n)- }-- verify := e.verifyGuestAction(ctx, agentID, cmdTool, guest.VMID, action)- verify["ok"] = result.ExitCode == 0- success := result.ExitCode == 0- response := map[string]interface{}{- "success": success,- "type": "guest",- "guest": guest.Name,- "guest_id": fmt.Sprintf("%d", guest.VMID),- "guest_type": guest.Type,- "node": guest.Node,- "action": action,- "command": command,- "exit_code": result.ExitCode,- "output": output,- "verification": verify,- }- return NewJSONResultWithIsError(response, !success), nil-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) verifyGuestAction(ctx context.Context, agentID, cmdTool string, vmID int, action string) map[string]interface{} {- expect := ""- switch action {- case "start", "restart":- expect = "running"- case "stop", "shutdown":- expect = "stopped"- case "delete":- expect = "deleted"- }-- statusCmd := fmt.Sprintf("%s status %d", cmdTool, vmID)- res, err := e.agentServer.ExecuteCommand(ctx, agentID, agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: statusCmd,- TargetType: "agent",- })- if err != nil {- return map[string]interface{}{"confirmed": false, "method": "status", "command": statusCmd, "note": err.Error()}- }- out := strings.TrimSpace(res.Stdout + "\n" + res.Stderr)- outLower := strings.ToLower(out)-- // Delete verification: status should fail with does-not-exist semantics.- if action == "delete" {- confirmed := res.ExitCode != 0 && (strings.Contains(outLower, "does not exist") || strings.Contains(outLower, "no such") || strings.Contains(outLower, "not found"))- return map[string]interface{}{"confirmed": confirmed, "method": "status", "command": statusCmd, "expected": expect, "raw": out}- }-- observed := ""- if strings.Contains(outLower, "status: running") {- observed = "running"- } else if strings.Contains(outLower, "status: stopped") {- observed = "stopped"- }- confirmed := res.ExitCode == 0 && observed != "" && observed == expect- return map[string]interface{}{"confirmed": confirmed, "method": "status", "command": statusCmd, "expected": expect, "observed": observed, "raw": out}-}-// Helper methods for control tools// CommandRoutingResult contains full routing information for command execution.@@ -892,22 +349,6 @@ func unavailableCommandConnection(target string, routing CommandRoutingResult) C})}-// resolveTargetForCommand resolves a target_host to the correct agent and routing info.-// Uses the authoritative resolveResourceLocation function.-// Returns: agentID, targetType ("agent", "container", or "vm"), targetID (vmid for LXC/VM)-//-// CRITICAL ORDERING: Same as resolveTargetForCommandFull — topology first, agent fallback second.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) resolveTargetForCommand(targetHost string) (agentID string, targetType string, targetID string) {- // Delegate to the full resolver and extract the triple- r := e.resolveTargetForCommandFull(targetHost)- return r.AgentID, r.TargetType, r.TargetID-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) findAgentForCommand(runOnHost bool, targetHost string) string {- agentID, _, _ := e.resolveTargetForCommand(targetHost)- return agentID-}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) readStateForControl() (unifiedresources.ReadState, error) {if rs := e.getReadState(); rs != nil {return rs, nil@@ -915,246 +356,6 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) readStateForControl() (unifiedresources.ReadState, ereturn nil, fmt.Errorf("read state not available")}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) resolveGuest(guestID string) (*GuestInfo, error) {- rs, err := e.readStateForControl()- if err != nil {- return nil, err- }-- vmID, convErr := strconv.Atoi(guestID)- for _, vm := range rs.VMs() {- if (convErr == nil && vm.VMID() == vmID) || vm.Name() == guestID || vm.ID() == guestID {- return &GuestInfo{- VMID: vm.VMID(),- Name: vm.Name(),- Node: vm.Node(),- Type: "vm",- Technology: "qemu",- Status: string(vm.Status()),- Instance: vm.Instance(),- }, nil- }- }-- for _, ct := range rs.Containers() {- if (convErr == nil && ct.VMID() == vmID) || ct.Name() == guestID || ct.ID() == guestID {- return &GuestInfo{- VMID: ct.VMID(),- Name: ct.Name(),- Node: ct.Node(),- Type: "system-container",- Technology: "lxc",- Status: string(ct.Status()),- Instance: ct.Instance(),- }, nil- }- }-- return nil, fmt.Errorf("no VM or container found with ID or name '%s'", guestID)-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) resolveDockerContainer(containerName, hostName string) (*models.DockerContainer, *models.DockerHost, error) {- rs, err := e.readStateForControl()- if err != nil {- return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("read state not available: %w", err)- }-- containersByHost := make(map[string][]*unifiedresources.DockerContainerView)- for _, container := range rs.DockerContainers() {- if container == nil {- continue- }- parentID := strings.TrimSpace(container.ParentID())- if parentID == "" {- continue- }- containersByHost[parentID] = append(containersByHost[parentID], container)- }-- type dockerMatch struct {- host models.DockerHost- container models.DockerContainer- }- matches := []dockerMatch{}-- for _, hostView := range rs.DockerHosts() {- if hostView == nil {- continue- }- if hostName != "" && !matchesDockerHostFilter(hostView, hostName) {- continue- }-- hostModel := dockerHostModelFromView(hostView)- for _, containerView := range containersByHost[hostView.ID()] {- container := dockerContainerModelFromView(containerView)- if container.Name == containerName ||- container.ID == containerName ||- strings.HasPrefix(container.ID, containerName) {- matches = append(matches, dockerMatch{host: hostModel, container: container})- }- }- }-- if hostName != "" {- if len(matches) == 0 {- return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("container '%s' not found on host '%s'", containerName, hostName)- }- match := matches[0]- return &match.container, &match.host, nil- }-- if len(matches) == 0 {- return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("container '%s' not found on any Docker host", containerName)- }- if len(matches) > 1 {- hostNames := make([]string, 0, len(matches))- seen := make(map[string]bool)- for _, match := range matches {- name := strings.TrimSpace(match.host.DisplayName)- if name == "" {- name = strings.TrimSpace(match.host.Hostname)- }- if name == "" {- name = strings.TrimSpace(match.host.ID)- }- if name == "" || seen[name] {- continue- }- hostNames = append(hostNames, name)- seen[name] = true- }- if len(hostNames) == 0 {- return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("container '%s' exists on multiple Docker hosts; specify host", containerName)- }- return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("container '%s' exists on multiple Docker hosts: %s. Specify host", containerName, strings.Join(hostNames, ", "))- }-- match := matches[0]- return &match.container, &match.host, nil-}--func matchesDockerHostFilter(host *unifiedresources.DockerHostView, filter string) bool {- if host == nil {- return false- }- if host.Hostname() == filter || host.Name() == filter {- return true- }- if host.ID() == filter || host.HostSourceID() == filter {- return true- }- return false-}--func dockerHostModelFromView(host *unifiedresources.DockerHostView) models.DockerHost {- if host == nil {- return models.DockerHost{}- }-- hostID := strings.TrimSpace(host.HostSourceID())- if hostID == "" {- hostID = strings.TrimSpace(host.ID())- }-- displayName := strings.TrimSpace(host.Name())- hostname := strings.TrimSpace(host.Hostname())- if hostname == "" {- hostname = displayName- }-- return models.DockerHost{- ID: hostID,- AgentID: strings.TrimSpace(host.AgentID()),- Hostname: hostname,- DisplayName: displayName,- Runtime: strings.TrimSpace(host.Runtime()),- Status: string(host.Status()),- LastSeen: host.LastSeen(),- Command: host.Command(),- Security: host.Security(),- }-}--func dockerContainerModelFromView(container *unifiedresources.DockerContainerView) models.DockerContainer {- if container == nil {- return models.DockerContainer{}- }-- containerID := strings.TrimSpace(container.ContainerID())- if containerID == "" {- containerID = strings.TrimSpace(container.ID())- }-- state := strings.TrimSpace(container.ContainerState())- if state == "" {- state = string(container.Status())- }-- ports := container.Ports()- portModels := make([]models.DockerContainerPort, 0, len(ports))- for _, p := range ports {- portModels = append(portModels, models.DockerContainerPort{- PrivatePort: p.PrivatePort,- PublicPort: p.PublicPort,- Protocol: p.Protocol,- IP: p.IP,- })- }-- networks := container.Networks()- networkModels := make([]models.DockerContainerNetworkLink, 0, len(networks))- for _, n := range networks {- networkModels = append(networkModels, models.DockerContainerNetworkLink{- Name: n.Name,- IPv4: n.IPv4,- IPv6: n.IPv6,- })- }-- mounts := container.Mounts()- mountModels := make([]models.DockerContainerMount, 0, len(mounts))- for _, m := range mounts {- mountModels = append(mountModels, models.DockerContainerMount{- Type: m.Type,- Source: m.Source,- Destination: m.Destination,- Mode: m.Mode,- RW: m.RW,- })- }-- var updateStatus *models.DockerContainerUpdateStatus- if status := container.UpdateStatus(); status != nil {- updateStatus = &models.DockerContainerUpdateStatus{- UpdateAvailable: status.UpdateAvailable,- CurrentDigest: status.CurrentDigest,- LatestDigest: status.LatestDigest,- Error: status.Error,- }- }-- return models.DockerContainer{- ID: containerID,- Name: container.Name(),- Image: container.Image(),- State: state,- Health: container.Health(),- CPUPercent: container.CPUPercent(),- MemoryUsage: container.MemoryUsed(),- MemoryLimit: container.MemoryTotal(),- MemoryPercent: container.MemoryPercent(),- UptimeSeconds: container.UptimeSeconds(),- RestartCount: container.RestartCount(),- ExitCode: container.ExitCode(),- Ports: portModels,- Labels: container.Labels(),- Networks: networkModels,- Mounts: mountModels,- UpdateStatus: updateStatus,- }-}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) findAgentForNode(nodeName string) string {if e.agentServer == nil {return ""@@ -1202,830 +403,4 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) findAgentForNode(nodeName string) string {return ""}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) findAgentForDockerHost(dockerHost *models.DockerHost) string {- if e.agentServer == nil {- return ""- }-- agents := e.agentServer.GetConnectedAgents()-- // First try to match by AgentID (most reliable)- if dockerHost.AgentID != "" {- for _, agent := range agents {- if agent.AgentID == dockerHost.AgentID {- return agent.AgentID- }- }- }-- // Fall back to hostname match- for _, agent := range agents {- if unifiedresources.HostnamesEquivalent(agent.Hostname, dockerHost.Hostname) {- return agent.AgentID- }- }-- return ""-}--// getAgentHostnameForDockerHost finds the agent hostname for a Docker host (for approval records)-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) getAgentHostnameForDockerHost(dockerHost *models.DockerHost) string {- if e.agentServer == nil {- return dockerHost.Hostname // fallback- }-- agents := e.agentServer.GetConnectedAgents()-- // Try to match by AgentID first- if dockerHost.AgentID != "" {- for _, agent := range agents {- if agent.AgentID == dockerHost.AgentID {- return agent.Hostname- }- }- }-- // Fall back to the docker host's hostname- return dockerHost.Hostname-}--// resolveDockerHostRoutingFull resolves a Docker host to the correct agent and routing info-// with full provenance metadata. If the Docker host is actually a system container or VM,-// it routes through the node agent with the correct TargetType and TargetID so commands-// are executed inside the guest.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) resolveDockerHostRoutingFull(dockerHost *models.DockerHost) CommandRoutingResult {- result := CommandRoutingResult{- TargetType: "agent",- Transport: "direct",- }-- if e.agentServer == nil {- return result- }-- // STEP 1: Check topology — is the Docker host actually a system container or VM?- if rs, err := e.readStateForControl(); err == nil {- // Check system containers- for _, ct := range rs.Containers() {- if ct.Name() == dockerHost.Hostname {- result.ResolvedKind = "system-container"- result.ResolvedNode = ct.Node()- result.TargetType = "container"- result.TargetID = fmt.Sprintf("%d", ct.VMID())- result.Transport = "pct_exec"- nodeAgentID := e.findAgentForNode(ct.Node())- if nodeAgentID != "" {- result.AgentID = nodeAgentID- result.AgentHostname = ct.Node()- log.Debug().- Str("docker_host", dockerHost.Hostname).- Str("node", ct.Node()).- Int("vmid", ct.VMID()).- Str("agent", nodeAgentID).- Str("transport", result.Transport).- Msg("Resolved Docker host as LXC, routing through Proxmox agent")- }- return result- }- }-- // Check VMs- for _, vm := range rs.VMs() {- if vm.Name() == dockerHost.Hostname {- result.ResolvedKind = "vm"- result.ResolvedNode = vm.Node()- result.TargetType = "vm"- result.TargetID = fmt.Sprintf("%d", vm.VMID())- result.Transport = "qm_guest_exec"- nodeAgentID := e.findAgentForNode(vm.Node())- if nodeAgentID != "" {- result.AgentID = nodeAgentID- result.AgentHostname = vm.Node()- log.Debug().- Str("docker_host", dockerHost.Hostname).- Str("node", vm.Node()).- Int("vmid", vm.VMID()).- Str("agent", nodeAgentID).- Str("transport", result.Transport).- Msg("Resolved Docker host as VM, routing through Proxmox agent")- }- return result- }- }- }-- // STEP 2: Docker host is not an LXC/VM — use direct agent routing- agentID := e.findAgentForDockerHost(dockerHost)- result.AgentID = agentID- result.ResolvedKind = "docker-host"- if agentID != "" {- // Try to get agent hostname- agents := e.agentServer.GetConnectedAgents()- for _, a := range agents {- if a.AgentID == agentID {- result.AgentHostname = a.Hostname- break- }- }- }- return result-}--// createApprovalRecord creates an approval record in the store and returns the approval ID.-// Returns empty string if store is not available (approvals will still work, just without persistence).-func createApprovalRecord(command, targetType, targetID, targetName, context string) string {- return createApprovalRecordForOrg("", command, targetType, targetID, targetName, context)-}--func createApprovalRecordForOrg(orgID, command, targetType, targetID, targetName, context string) string {- return createApprovalRecordForOrgWithExecutor(nil, orgID, command, targetType, targetID, targetName, context)-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) createApprovalRecord(command, targetType, targetID, targetName, context string) string {- orgID := ""- if e != nil {- orgID = e.orgID- }- return createApprovalRecordForOrgWithExecutor(e, orgID, command, targetType, targetID, targetName, context)-}--func createApprovalRecordForOrgWithExecutor(e *PulseToolExecutor, orgID, command, targetType, targetID, targetName, context string) string {- store := approval.GetStore()- if store == nil {- log.Debug().Msg("approval store not available, approval will not be persisted")- return ""- }-- approvalID := uuid.NewString()- now := time.Now().UTC()- req := &approval.ApprovalRequest{- ID: approvalID,- OrgID: strings.TrimSpace(orgID),- Command: command,- TargetType: targetType,- TargetID: targetID,- TargetName: targetName,- Context: context,- }- AttachApprovalActionPlan(req, now)-- if err := store.CreateApproval(req); err != nil {- log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("failed to create approval record")- return ""- }- if req.Plan != nil {- req.Plan.ExpiresAt = req.ExpiresAt.UTC()- if req.Plan.Message == "" {- req.Plan.Message = strings.TrimSpace(req.Context)- }- }-- log.Debug().Str("approval_id", req.ID).Str("command", command).Msg("created approval record")- if e != nil {- e.recordPendingApprovalAction(req)- }- return req.ID-}--func approvalBlastRadius(targetType, command string) []string {- targetType = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(targetType))- commandLower := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(command))- switch {- case strings.Contains(commandLower, "delete") || strings.HasPrefix(commandLower, "rm ") || strings.Contains(commandLower, " rm "):- return []string{"destructive target change"}- case strings.Contains(commandLower, "restart") || strings.Contains(commandLower, "reboot") || strings.Contains(commandLower, "shutdown"):- return []string{"service interruption on target"}- case targetType == "file":- return []string{"file contents on target"}- case targetType == "kubernetes":- return []string{"kubernetes workload state"}- case targetType == "docker":- return []string{"container runtime state"}- default:- return []string{"target resource state"}- }-}--func approvalRollbackAvailable(targetType, command string) bool {- targetType = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(targetType))- commandLower := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(command))- if targetType == "file" || strings.Contains(commandLower, "delete") || strings.HasPrefix(commandLower, "rm ") || strings.Contains(commandLower, " rm ") {- return false- }- return strings.Contains(commandLower, "restart") || strings.Contains(commandLower, "start") || strings.Contains(commandLower, "stop") || targetType == "docker"-}--func approvalContextConfidence(req *approval.ApprovalRequest) *approval.ContextConfidence {- if req == nil {- return nil- }- targetType := strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetType)- targetID := strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetID)- targetName := strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetName)- evidence := make([]string, 0, 3)- if targetType != "" {- evidence = append(evidence, fmt.Sprintf("Target type resolved as %s.", targetType))- }- if targetID != "" {- evidence = append(evidence, fmt.Sprintf("Target identifier bound to %s.", targetID))- }- if targetName != "" {- evidence = append(evidence, fmt.Sprintf("Display target resolved as %s.", targetName))- }-- level := approval.ContextConfidenceUnknown- summary := "Pulse Assistant could not bind this action to a resolved target."- switch {- case targetType != "" && targetID != "":- level = approval.ContextConfidenceVerified- summary = "Target was resolved to a concrete resource before approval."- case targetType != "" && targetName != "":- level = approval.ContextConfidencePartial- summary = "Target type and display name were resolved before approval."- case targetType != "" || targetName != "":- level = approval.ContextConfidenceInferred- summary = "Target context was inferred from the requested action."- }-- return &approval.ContextConfidence{- Level: level,- Summary: summary,- Evidence: evidence,- }-}--func approvalPreflight(req *approval.ApprovalRequest) *approval.ActionPreflight {- if req == nil {- return nil- }- target := approvalPreflightTarget(req)- intendedChange := strings.TrimSpace(req.Context)- if intendedChange == "" {- intendedChange = strings.TrimSpace(req.Command)- }- dryRunAvailable := approvalDryRunAvailable(req.TargetType, req.Command)- dryRunSummary := "No provider-supported dry run is available for this action; Pulse will hold execution until approval and validate the approval binding before dispatch."- if dryRunAvailable {- dryRunSummary = "Provider dry-run semantics are available for this action class before execution."- }-- // Default safety / verification copy applies to every action. Per-command- // class additions enrich it with concrete operational context the- // operator needs before approving (what "restart this service" actually- // touches, how Pulse will read back success).- safetyChecks := []string{- "Approval is scoped to the current organization.",- "Command hash must match before execution.",- "Approval can be consumed only once.",- "Target type and identifier must match the planned action.",- }- verificationSteps := []string{- "Persist unified action audit lifecycle.",- "Dispatch only after approval is granted.",- "Capture command result or execution error.",- "Require Assistant read-after-write verification before final response.",- }- if extraSafety, extraVerify := approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions(req.TargetType, req.Command); len(extraSafety) > 0 || len(extraVerify) > 0 {- safetyChecks = append(safetyChecks, extraSafety...)- verificationSteps = append(verificationSteps, extraVerify...)- }-- return &approval.ActionPreflight{- Target: target,- CurrentState: fmt.Sprintf("Resolved approval target: %s.", target),- IntendedChange: intendedChange,- DryRunAvailable: dryRunAvailable,- DryRunSummary: dryRunSummary,- SafetyChecks: safetyChecks,- VerificationSteps: verificationSteps,- GeneratedAt: time.Now().UTC(),- }-}--// VerificationCommandForCommand derives the read-after-write check Pulse-// will run after a successful dispatch. The check is keyed on the same-// command class as approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions, so the-// verification narrative the operator saw at approval time and the-// verification actually executed stay coherent. Returns "", false for-// classes without a derivable check; the broker must skip verification-// rather than fabricate one.-//-// Tool-layer-verified classes are intentionally excluded here:-// - Container classes (container-restart, container-stop) are verified-// by pulse_docker via per-container `docker inspect` at the tool-// layer.-// - Proxmox VM/CT classes (proxmox-vm-*, proxmox-ct-*) are verified by-// pulse_control via `verifyGuestAction` (which dispatches `qm status`-// or `pct status` already) at the tool layer.-//-// Adding a parallel broker-level dispatch for these would double-run the-// same check. The preflight copy authored by-// approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions still names what the-// tool-layer verification will read so the operator-facing narrative-// stays accurate.-func VerificationCommandForCommand(targetType, command string) (string, bool) {- class := classifyApprovalCommand(targetType, command)- switch class {- case "service-restart", "service-start", "service-reload", "service-stop":- unit := extractServiceUnitName(command)- if unit == "" {- return "", false- }- return "systemctl is-active " + shellQuoteSingle(unit), true- }- return "", false-}--// extractServiceUnitName parses the unit name out of a systemctl/service-// command. Supports the common shapes:-//-// "systemctl restart nginx" -> "nginx"-// "systemctl reload my.service" -> "my.service"-// "service restart redis" -> "redis"-//-// Returns empty string when the command does not parse cleanly so the-// caller can decline to verify rather than guess at the unit.-func extractServiceUnitName(command string) string {- fields := strings.Fields(strings.TrimSpace(command))- if len(fields) < 3 {- return ""- }- first := strings.ToLower(fields[0])- if first != "systemctl" && first != "service" {- return ""- }- // Service action verbs (restart/start/stop/reload) live at index 1 for- // "systemctl restart nginx" and at index 2 for "service restart nginx";- // the canonical form we recognize puts the action at index 1 and the- // unit at index 2.- verb := strings.ToLower(fields[1])- switch verb {- case "restart", "start", "stop", "reload":- return fields[2]- }- return ""-}--// shellQuoteSingle wraps the value in single quotes and escapes any-// embedded single quotes for shell-safe inclusion in the verification-// command. The verification path runs through the same agent dispatch as-// the original command, so the same shell-escape contract applies.-func shellQuoteSingle(value string) string {- if value == "" {- return "''"- }- return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(value, "'", `'\''`) + "'"-}--// classifyApprovalCommand maps a (targetType, command) pair to a stable-// class string used by approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions. Returns-// empty string for commands that do not match a known class — those keep-// the default preflight content rather than getting fabricated extras.-func classifyApprovalCommand(targetType, command string) string {- cmd := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(command))- if cmd == "" {- return ""- }- switch {- case strings.Contains(cmd, "systemctl restart"), strings.Contains(cmd, "service restart"):- return "service-restart"- case strings.Contains(cmd, "systemctl stop"), strings.Contains(cmd, "service stop"):- return "service-stop"- case strings.Contains(cmd, "systemctl start"), strings.Contains(cmd, "service start"):- return "service-start"- case strings.Contains(cmd, "systemctl reload"):- return "service-reload"- case strings.Contains(cmd, "docker restart"), strings.Contains(cmd, "podman restart"):- return "container-restart"- case strings.Contains(cmd, "docker stop"), strings.Contains(cmd, "podman stop"):- return "container-stop"- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "kubectl rollout restart"):- return "k8s-rollout-restart"- // Proxmox VM lifecycle (qm) — Pulse's primary monitored platform. Each- // verb has distinct operational semantics (graceful shutdown vs hard- // stop vs reboot) so they map to distinct classes rather than being- // folded into the generic service-* buckets.- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "qm reboot ") || strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "qm restart "):- return "proxmox-vm-reboot"- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "qm stop "):- return "proxmox-vm-stop"- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "qm start "):- return "proxmox-vm-start"- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "qm shutdown "):- return "proxmox-vm-shutdown"- // Proxmox LXC container lifecycle (pct). Same per-verb split as qm- // because pct shutdown initiates an in-guest shutdown via lxc-attach- // while pct stop is an immediate halt.- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "pct reboot ") || strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "pct restart "):- return "proxmox-ct-reboot"- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "pct stop "):- return "proxmox-ct-stop"- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "pct start "):- return "proxmox-ct-start"- case strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "pct shutdown "):- return "proxmox-ct-shutdown"- }- return ""-}--// approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions returns hand-authored safety and-// verification additions for known command classes. The text is concrete-// operational context the operator wants before approving — what the-// command actually touches, how Pulse will read back success — rather-// than generic boilerplate. Unknown classes return empty slices so the-// default preflight is not padded with fabricated assertions.-func approvalCommandClassPreflightAdditions(targetType, command string) (safetyChecks []string, verificationSteps []string) {- switch classifyApprovalCommand(targetType, command) {- case "service-restart":- return []string{- "Service will be briefly unavailable during the systemctl restart; no other unit dependencies are altered.",- "Restart applies only to the named unit on the named host; no fleet-wide propagation.",- }, []string{- "Read back `systemctl is-active <unit>` after dispatch.",- "Tail recent journal entries for the unit to confirm a clean restart and no crash loop.",- }- case "service-stop":- return []string{- "Service will remain stopped after dispatch; restart requires a follow-up approved action.",- "Stopping the unit may impact dependent services; verify the dependency tree before approving.",- }, []string{- "Read back `systemctl is-active <unit>` and confirm `inactive`.",- "Check journal for any auto-restart triggered by Restart=always policy.",- }- case "service-start":- return []string{- "Start applies only to the named unit; no other state changes.",- "Unit will run with the configuration currently on disk; uncommitted config drift will take effect.",- }, []string{- "Read back `systemctl is-active <unit>` and confirm `active`.",- "Tail journal for startup errors before the first request lands.",- }- case "service-reload":- return []string{- "Reload reads new configuration without dropping in-flight requests when supported by the unit.",- "Units without reload semantics fall back to restart; check unit type before approving.",- }, []string{- "Read back `systemctl status <unit>` and confirm `Active: active (running)` post-reload.",- "Tail recent journal entries for configuration parse errors.",- }- case "container-restart":- return []string{- "Container will be briefly unavailable during the restart; image and volume mounts are unchanged.",- "Restart applies only to the named container; no compose-stack-wide propagation.",- }, []string{- "Read back container state via `docker inspect` (or podman) and confirm `Status: running`.",- "Tail recent container logs for crash patterns or startup errors.",- }- case "container-stop":- return []string{- "Container will remain stopped after dispatch; image and volume mounts persist for next start.",- "Stopping a container may impact dependent containers in the same compose stack.",- }, []string{- "Read back container state and confirm `Status: exited`.",- "Check for any restart policy that may auto-restart the container.",- }- case "k8s-rollout-restart":- return []string{- "Pods are rolled in waves per the deployment strategy; service availability is preserved when readiness probes pass.",- "PodDisruptionBudget and HPA-driven scaling continue to apply during the rollout.",- }, []string{- "Watch `kubectl rollout status` until the deployment converges.",- "Verify pod readiness with `kubectl get pods -l <selector>` after rollout.",- }- case "proxmox-vm-reboot":- return []string{- "`qm reboot` performs an ACPI shutdown followed by a start; in-guest workloads see a clean OS reboot.",- "VM RAM state is not preserved (no live migration); guests with non-persistent state will lose it.",- }, []string{- "Read back `qm status <vmid>` and confirm `status: running`.",- "Verify the guest's monitoring agent reconnects (Pulse will detect and update the resource state).",- }- case "proxmox-vm-stop":- return []string{- "`qm stop` is an immediate hard stop, NOT a graceful shutdown — guest filesystems may be left dirty.",- "Use `qm shutdown` instead if the workload needs to flush state cleanly; only approve `qm stop` when the guest is unresponsive.",- }, []string{- "Read back `qm status <vmid>` and confirm `status: stopped`.",- "Verify no auto-start policy will immediately restart the VM.",- }- case "proxmox-vm-start":- return []string{- "VM will boot from disk with the configuration currently on the host; uncommitted config drift will take effect.",- "Boot order, attached disks, and network bridges all apply as currently defined — verify before approving.",- }, []string{- "Read back `qm status <vmid>` and confirm `status: running`.",- "Tail `journalctl -u qmeventd` for the start lifecycle event.",- }- case "proxmox-vm-shutdown":- return []string{- "`qm shutdown` issues an ACPI shutdown to the guest and waits for the VM to power off cleanly.",- "Default timeout is 60s; an unresponsive guest will force a stop after the timeout, leaving filesystems in the same state as `qm stop`.",- }, []string{- "Read back `qm status <vmid>` and confirm `status: stopped`.",- "Verify the shutdown was clean (exit code 0) rather than a forced stop after timeout.",- }- case "proxmox-ct-reboot":- return []string{- "`pct reboot` performs an in-guest reboot; container processes restart while the LXC instance stays managed by Proxmox.",- "Mounted bind-mounts and shared volumes persist through the reboot; only in-memory state is lost.",- }, []string{- "Read back `pct status <ctid>` and confirm `status: running`.",- "Verify the container's foreground service has come back up before treating the reboot as complete.",- }- case "proxmox-ct-stop":- return []string{- "`pct stop` is an immediate hard stop — in-guest processes do not get a chance to flush state cleanly.",- "Use `pct shutdown` instead for graceful in-guest shutdown; reserve `pct stop` for unresponsive containers.",- }, []string{- "Read back `pct status <ctid>` and confirm `status: stopped`.",- "Verify no on-boot auto-start policy will immediately restart the container.",- }- case "proxmox-ct-start":- return []string{- "Container will start with the configuration currently on the host; uncommitted config drift takes effect.",- "Mounted volumes, network bridges, and resource limits all apply as currently defined.",- }, []string{- "Read back `pct status <ctid>` and confirm `status: running`.",- "Verify the container's foreground service is reachable from the host network.",- }- case "proxmox-ct-shutdown":- return []string{- "`pct shutdown` issues a graceful in-guest shutdown via lxc-attach and waits for the container to halt.",- "Default timeout falls back to a hard stop on unresponsive containers, leaving processes in the same state as `pct stop`.",- }, []string{- "Read back `pct status <ctid>` and confirm `status: stopped`.",- "Verify the shutdown was clean rather than a forced stop after timeout.",- }- }- return nil, nil-}--func approvalPreflightTarget(req *approval.ApprovalRequest) string {- if req == nil {- return "unknown target"- }- parts := make([]string, 0, 3)- if targetType := strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetType); targetType != "" {- parts = append(parts, targetType)- }- if targetName := strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetName); targetName != "" {- parts = append(parts, targetName)- }- if targetID := strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetID); targetID != "" {- parts = append(parts, targetID)- }- if len(parts) == 0 {- return "Pulse runtime"- }- return strings.Join(parts, " / ")-}--func approvalDryRunAvailable(targetType, command string) bool {- targetType = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(targetType))- commandLower := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(command))- return targetType == "kubernetes" && strings.Contains(commandLower, "--dry-run")-}--// isPreApproved checks if the args contain a valid, approved approval_id.-// This is used when the agentic loop re-executes a tool after user approval.-// DEPRECATED: Use consumeApprovalWithValidation instead for replay protection.-func isPreApproved(args map[string]interface{}) bool {- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)- if approvalID == "" {- return false- }-- store := approval.GetStore()- if store == nil {- return false- }-- req, found := store.GetApproval(approvalID)- if !found {- log.Debug().Str("approval_id", approvalID).Msg("pre-approval check: approval not found")- return false- }-- if req.Status == approval.StatusApproved {- log.Debug().Str("approval_id", approvalID).Msg("pre-approval check: approved, skipping approval flow")- return true- }-- log.Debug().Str("approval_id", approvalID).Str("status", string(req.Status)).Msg("pre-approval check: not approved")- return false-}--// consumeApprovalWithValidation validates that an approved, org-bound record-// exists for this exact command and target. Final single-use consumption now-// happens inside agentexec immediately before grant minting and WebSocket-// dispatch, so no caller can turn a merely nonempty ID into authority.-func consumeApprovalWithValidation(args map[string]interface{}, orgID, command, targetType, targetID string) bool {- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)- if approvalID == "" {- return false- }-- store := approval.GetStore()- if store == nil {- return false- }-- req, found := store.GetApproval(approvalID)- if !found {- log.Warn().Str("approval_id", approvalID).Msg("failed to find approval for pre-approved execution")- return false- }-- if !approval.BelongsToOrg(req, orgID) {- log.Warn().- Str("approval_id", approvalID).- Str("request_org", approval.NormalizeOrgID(req.OrgID)).- Str("requested_org", approval.NormalizeOrgID(orgID)).- Msg("cross-org pre-approved execution rejected")- return false- }-- if req.Status != approval.StatusApproved || req.Consumed || time.Now().After(req.ExpiresAt) {- log.Warn().Str("approval_id", approvalID).Str("status", string(req.Status)).Bool("consumed", req.Consumed).Time("expires_at", req.ExpiresAt).Msg("approval is not dispatchable")- return false- }- actualHash := approval.ComputeCommandHash(command, targetType, targetID)- approvedHash := func() string {- if strings.TrimSpace(req.CommandHash) != "" {- return req.CommandHash- }- return approval.ComputeCommandHash(req.Command, req.TargetType, req.TargetID)- }()- if actualHash != approvedHash {- log.Warn().Str("approval_id", approvalID).Msg("approval command or target does not match dispatch")- return false- }- return true-}-// Formatting helpers for control tools--func enrichApprovalRequiredPayload(payload map[string]interface{}, approvalID string) map[string]interface{} {- if payload == nil {- payload = map[string]interface{}{}- }- req := approvalRequestForID(approvalID)- if req == nil {- return payload- }- if _, ok := payload["risk"]; !ok && req.RiskLevel != "" {- payload["risk"] = string(req.RiskLevel)- }- if _, ok := payload["description"]; !ok && strings.TrimSpace(req.Context) != "" {- payload["description"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.Context)- }- if strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetType) != "" {- payload["target_type"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetType)- }- if strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetID) != "" {- payload["target_id"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetID)- }- if strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetName) != "" {- payload["target_name"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.TargetName)- }- if req.Plan != nil {- payload["audit_id"] = strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.ActionID)- payload["plan"] = map[string]interface{}{- "action_id": strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.ActionID),- "request_id": strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.RequestID),- "summary": strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.Message),- "requires_approval": req.Plan.RequiresApproval,- "approval_policy": string(req.Plan.ApprovalPolicy),- "blast_radius": strings.TrimSpace(strings.Join(req.Plan.PredictedBlastRadius, ", ")),- "rollback_available": req.Plan.RollbackAvailable,- "plan_hash": strings.TrimSpace(req.Plan.PlanHash),- "expires_at": req.Plan.ExpiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),- }- }- if req.ContextConfidence != nil {- payload["context_confidence"] = map[string]interface{}{- "level": string(req.ContextConfidence.Level),- "summary": strings.TrimSpace(req.ContextConfidence.Summary),- "evidence": append([]string(nil), req.ContextConfidence.Evidence...),- }- }- if req.Preflight != nil {- payload["preflight"] = map[string]interface{}{- "target": strings.TrimSpace(req.Preflight.Target),- "current_state": strings.TrimSpace(req.Preflight.CurrentState),- "intended_change": strings.TrimSpace(req.Preflight.IntendedChange),- "dry_run_available": req.Preflight.DryRunAvailable,- "dry_run_summary": strings.TrimSpace(req.Preflight.DryRunSummary),- "safety_checks": append([]string(nil), req.Preflight.SafetyChecks...),- "verification_steps": append([]string(nil), req.Preflight.VerificationSteps...),- "generated_at": req.Preflight.GeneratedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),- }- }- return payload-}--func formatApprovalNeeded(command, reason, approvalID string) string {- payload := map[string]interface{}{- "approval_id": approvalID,- "command": command,- "reason": reason,- "how_to_approve": "Click the approval button in the chat to execute this command.",- }- payload = enrichApprovalRequiredPayload(payload, approvalID)- return agentcapabilities.FormatApprovalRequiredToolMarker(payload)-}--func formatPolicyBlocked(command, reason string) string {- payload := map[string]interface{}{- "command": command,- "reason": reason,- }- return agentcapabilities.FormatPolicyBlockedToolMarker(payload)-}--func collectAgentHostnames(agents []agentexec.ConnectedAgent, max int) (all []string, truncated []string) {- all = make([]string, 0, len(agents))- for _, agent := range agents {- name := strings.TrimSpace(agent.Hostname)- if name == "" {- name = strings.TrimSpace(agent.AgentID)- }- if name != "" {- all = append(all, name)- }- }-- truncated = all- if max >= 0 && len(all) > max {- truncated = all[:max]- }-- return all, truncated-}--func formatTargetHostRequired(agents []agentexec.ConnectedAgent) string {- const maxItems = 6- hostnames, list := collectAgentHostnames(agents, maxItems)- if len(hostnames) == 0 {- return "Multiple agents are connected. Please specify target_host."- }- message := fmt.Sprintf("Multiple agents are connected. Please specify target_host. Available: %s", strings.Join(list, ", "))- if len(hostnames) > maxItems {- message = fmt.Sprintf("%s (+%d more)", message, len(hostnames)-maxItems)- }- return message-}--// formatAvailableAgentHosts returns a hint listing connected agent hostnames.-func formatAvailableAgentHosts(agents []agentexec.ConnectedAgent) string {- const maxItems = 6- hostnames, list := collectAgentHostnames(agents, maxItems)- if len(hostnames) == 0 {- return "No agents are currently connected."- }- msg := fmt.Sprintf("Available targets: %s", strings.Join(list, ", "))- if len(hostnames) > maxItems {- msg = fmt.Sprintf("%s (+%d more)", msg, len(hostnames)-maxItems)- }- return msg-}--func formatControlApprovalNeeded(name string, vmID int, action, command, approvalID string) string {- payload := map[string]interface{}{- "approval_id": approvalID,- "guest_name": name,- "guest_vmid": vmID,- "action": action,- "command": command,- "how_to_approve": "Click the approval button in the chat to execute this action.",- }- payload = enrichApprovalRequiredPayload(payload, approvalID)- return agentcapabilities.FormatApprovalRequiredToolMarker(payload)-}--func formatDockerApprovalNeeded(name, host, action, command, approvalID string) string {- payload := map[string]interface{}{- "approval_id": approvalID,- "container_name": name,- "docker_host": host,- "action": action,- "command": command,- "how_to_approve": "Click the approval button in the chat to execute this action.",- }- payload = enrichApprovalRequiredPayload(payload, approvalID)- return agentcapabilities.FormatApprovalRequiredToolMarker(payload)-}--func formatAppContainerApprovalNeeded(name, host, action, command, approvalID string) string {- payload := map[string]interface{}{- "approval_id": approvalID,- "resource_name": name,- "resource_host": host,- "resource_type": "app-container",- "action": action,- "command": command,- "how_to_approve": "Click the approval button in the chat to execute this action.",- }- payload = enrichApprovalRequiredPayload(payload, approvalID)- return agentcapabilities.FormatApprovalRequiredToolMarker(payload)-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/tools_docker.go b/internal/ai/tools/tools_docker.goindex e0667c05a6..f125548d8e 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/tools_docker.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/tools_docker.go@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@ import ("time""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentcapabilities"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/safety"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/models""github.com/rs/zerolog/log")@@ -22,31 +19,9 @@ const (// dockerUpdateQueueRetryMaxDelay caps exponential backoff for queue retries.dockerUpdateQueueRetryMaxDelay = 250 * time.Millisecond-- // dockerUpdateVerifyMaxAttempts bounds post-queue verification polling of the- // update command status. Combined with dockerUpdateVerifyPollInterval this- // gives the agent one report cycle (~30s) to pick the command up plus time- // for small-image updates to finish; slower updates report as inconclusive.- dockerUpdateVerifyMaxAttempts = 30-- // dockerUpdateVerifyPollInterval is the delay between verification polls.- dockerUpdateVerifyPollInterval = 2 * time.Second-)--// Terminal docker host command statuses, mirroring the DockerCommandStatus*-// constants in internal/monitoring. Duplicated as literals because the tools-// package sits below monitoring in the wiring (monitoring satisfies the-// UpdatesCommandRunner interface defined here).-const (- dockerCommandStatusCompleted = "completed"- dockerCommandStatusFailed = "failed"- dockerCommandStatusExpired = "expired")-var (- dockerUpdateQueueSleepFn = sleepWithContext- dockerUpdateVerifySleepFn = sleepWithContext-)+var dockerUpdateQueueSleepFn = sleepWithContext// registerDockerTools registers the pulse_docker toolfunc (e *PulseToolExecutor) registerDockerTools() {@@ -117,231 +92,8 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeDocker(ctx context.Context, args map[string]i}}-// executeDockerControl handles start/stop/restart of Docker containers-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeDockerControl(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- containerName, _ := args["container"].(string)- hostName, _ := args["host"].(string)- operation, _ := args["operation"].(string)- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)-- if containerName == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("container name is required")), nil- }- if operation == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("operation is required (start, stop, restart)")), nil- }-- validOperations := map[string]bool{"start": true, "stop": true, "restart": true}- if !validOperations[operation] {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid operation: %s. Use start, stop, or restart", operation)), nil- }-- // Check if read-only mode- if e.controlLevel == ControlLevelReadOnly {- return NewTextResult("Docker control actions are not available in read-only mode."), nil- }-- container, dockerHost, err := e.resolveDockerContainer(containerName, hostName)- if err != nil {- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("Could not find Docker container '%s': %v", containerName, err)), nil- }-- runtimeCommand := dockerRuntimeCommand(dockerHost)- command := fmt.Sprintf("%s %s %s", runtimeCommand, operation, shellEscape(container.Name))- approvalTargetID := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", dockerHost.ID, container.Name)- if dockerHost.ID == "" {- approvalTargetID = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", dockerHost.Hostname, container.Name)- }-- // Check if this is a pre-approved execution (validated + single-use).- preApproved := consumeApprovalWithValidation(args, e.orgID, command, "docker", approvalTargetID)- requiresApproval := !e.isAutonomous && (e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled || (e.policy != nil && e.policy.Evaluate(command) == agentexec.PolicyRequireApproval))-- // Get the agent hostname for approval records- agentHostname := e.getAgentHostnameForDockerHost(dockerHost)-- // Skip approval checks if pre-approved- if !preApproved && e.policy != nil {- decision := e.policy.Evaluate(command)- if decision == agentexec.PolicyBlock {- return NewTextResult(formatPolicyBlocked(command, "This command is blocked by security policy")), nil- }- if decision == agentexec.PolicyRequireApproval && !e.isAutonomous {- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, "docker", approvalTargetID, agentHostname, fmt.Sprintf("%s Docker container %s", operation, container.Name))- return NewTextResult(formatDockerApprovalNeeded(container.Name, dockerHost.Hostname, operation, command, approvalID)), nil- }- }-- // Check control level- if !preApproved && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, "docker", approvalTargetID, agentHostname, fmt.Sprintf("%s Docker container %s", operation, container.Name))- return NewTextResult(formatDockerApprovalNeeded(container.Name, dockerHost.Hostname, operation, command, approvalID)), nil- }-- if e.agentServer == nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("no agent server available")), nil- }-- // Resolve the Docker host to the correct agent and routing info (with full provenance)- routing := e.resolveDockerHostRoutingFull(dockerHost)- if routing.AgentID == "" {- if routing.TargetType == "container" || routing.TargetType == "vm" {- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("Docker host '%s' is a %s but no agent is available on its Proxmox host. Install Pulse Unified Agent on the Proxmox node.", dockerHost.Hostname, routing.TargetType)), nil- }- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("No agent available on Docker host '%s'. Install Pulse Unified Agent on the host to enable control.", dockerHost.Hostname)), nil- }-- log.Debug().- Str("docker_host", dockerHost.Hostname).- Str("agent_id", routing.AgentID).- Str("agent_host", routing.AgentHostname).- Str("resolved_kind", routing.ResolvedKind).- Str("resolved_node", routing.ResolvedNode).- Str("transport", routing.Transport).- Str("target_type", routing.TargetType).- Str("target_id", routing.TargetID).- Msg("[pulse_docker] Routing docker command execution")-- result, err := e.executeCommandWithAudit(- ctx,- "pulse_docker",- func() string {- if dockerHost.ID != "" {- return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", dockerHost.ID, container.Name)- }- return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", dockerHost.Hostname, container.Name)- }(),- approvalID,- requiresApproval,- routing.AgentID,- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: command,- TargetType: routing.TargetType,- TargetID: routing.TargetID,- },- "pulse_docker",- fmt.Sprintf("%s docker container %s", operation, container.Name),- )- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(err), nil- }-- output := result.Stdout- if result.Stderr != "" {- output += "\n" + result.Stderr- }-- if redacted, n := safety.RedactSensitiveText(output); n > 0 {- output = redacted + fmt.Sprintf("\n\n[redacted %d sensitive value(s)]", n)- }-- verify := e.verifyDockerContainerState(ctx, routing, runtimeCommand, container.ID, operation)- verify["ok"] = result.ExitCode == 0-- response := map[string]interface{}{- "success": result.ExitCode == 0,- "action": "control",- "operation": operation,- "container": container.Name,- "container_id": container.ID,- "host": dockerHost.Hostname,- "command": command,- "exit_code": result.ExitCode,- "output": output,- "verification": verify,- }-- return NewJSONResultWithIsError(response, result.ExitCode != 0), nil-}--func dockerRuntimeCommand(dockerHost *models.DockerHost) string {- if dockerHost != nil {- switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(dockerHost.Runtime)) {- case "podman":- return "podman"- case "docker":- return "docker"- }- }- return "docker"-}-// ========== Docker Updates Handler Implementations ==========-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) verifyDockerContainerState(ctx context.Context, routing CommandRoutingResult, runtimeCommand, containerID, operation string) map[string]interface{} {- expectRunning := false- switch operation {- case "start", "restart":- expectRunning = true- case "stop":- expectRunning = false- }-- runtimeCommand = strings.TrimSpace(runtimeCommand)- if runtimeCommand == "" {- runtimeCommand = "docker"- }- inspectCmd := fmt.Sprintf("%s inspect -f '{{.State.Status}} {{.State.Running}}' %s", runtimeCommand, shellEscape(containerID))-- var lastOut string- var lastExit int- for attempt := 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++ {- res, err := e.agentServer.ExecuteCommand(ctx, routing.AgentID, agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: inspectCmd,- TargetType: routing.TargetType,- TargetID: routing.TargetID,- })- if err != nil {- return map[string]interface{}{"confirmed": false, "method": runtimeCommand + "_inspect", "command": inspectCmd, "note": err.Error()}- }- lastExit = res.ExitCode- lastOut = strings.TrimSpace(res.Stdout + "\n" + res.Stderr)-- fields := strings.Fields(strings.ToLower(lastOut))- observedRunning := false- observedStatus := ""- if len(fields) >= 1 {- observedStatus = fields[0]- }- if len(fields) >= 2 {- observedRunning = fields[1] == "true"- }-- if res.ExitCode == 0 && observedStatus != "" && observedRunning == expectRunning {- return map[string]interface{}{- "confirmed": true,- "method": runtimeCommand + "_inspect",- "command": inspectCmd,- "expected": map[string]interface{}{"running": expectRunning},- "observed": map[string]interface{}{"status": observedStatus, "running": observedRunning},- }- }-- // Allow a brief settle window for restart/start/stop to propagate.- waitTimer := time.NewTimer(500 * time.Millisecond)- select {- case <-ctx.Done():- if !waitTimer.Stop() {- select {- case <-waitTimer.C:- default:- }- }- return map[string]interface{}{"confirmed": false, "method": runtimeCommand + "_inspect", "command": inspectCmd, "note": "context canceled", "raw": lastOut, "exit_code": lastExit}- case <-waitTimer.C:- }- }-- return map[string]interface{}{- "confirmed": false,- "method": runtimeCommand + "_inspect",- "command": inspectCmd,- "expected": map[string]interface{}{"running": expectRunning},- "raw": lastOut,- "exit_code": lastExit,- }-}-func sleepWithContext(ctx context.Context, duration time.Duration) error {if ctx == nil {time.Sleep(duration)@@ -501,162 +253,6 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeCheckDockerUpdates(ctx context.Context, argsreturn NewJSONResult(response), nil}-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeUpdateDockerContainer(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- if e.updatesProvider == nil {- return NewTextResult("Docker update functionality not available. Ensure updates provider is configured."), nil- }-- containerArg, _ := args["container"].(string)- hostArg, _ := args["host"].(string)-- if containerArg == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("container is required")), nil- }- if hostArg == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("host is required")), nil- }-- // Check if update actions are enabled- if !e.updatesProvider.IsUpdateActionsEnabled() {- return NewTextResult("Docker container updates are disabled by server configuration. Set PULSE_DISABLE_DOCKER_UPDATE_ACTIONS=false or enable in Settings to allow updates."), nil- }-- // Resolve container and host- container, dockerHost, err := e.resolveDockerContainer(containerArg, hostArg)- if err != nil {- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("Could not find container '%s' on host '%s': %v", containerArg, hostArg, err)), nil- }-- containerName := trimContainerName(container.Name)-- // Controlled mode - require approval- if e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- command := fmt.Sprintf("docker update %s", containerName)- agentHostname := e.getAgentHostnameForDockerHost(dockerHost)- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, "docker", container.ID, agentHostname, fmt.Sprintf("Update container %s to latest image", containerName))- return NewTextResult(formatDockerUpdateApprovalNeeded(containerName, dockerHost.Hostname, approvalID)), nil- }-- // Autonomous mode - execute directly- cmdStatus, err := e.queueDockerUpdateCommandWithRetry(ctx, "queue container update", func() (DockerCommandStatus, error) {- return e.updatesProvider.UpdateContainer(dockerHost.ID, container.ID, containerName)- })- if err != nil {- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to queue update command: %v", err)), nil- }-- // The agent executes the update asynchronously: it pulls the image,- // recreates the container, verifies the replacement is running and healthy- // (rolling back otherwise), then acknowledges a terminal command status.- // Poll that status so we report verified success, verified failure, or an- // honest inconclusive - never unverified success.- verify := e.verifyDockerUpdateCommand(ctx, cmdStatus.ID, containerName)- outcome, _ := verify["outcome"].(string)-- var message string- switch outcome {- case "verified":- message = fmt.Sprintf("Update verified: container '%s' was updated, recreated, and is running again.", containerName)- case "failed":- reason := ""- if observed, ok := verify["observed"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {- if fr, ok := observed["failure_reason"].(string); ok && fr != "" {- reason = fr- } else if msg, ok := observed["message"].(string); ok {- reason = msg- }- }- if reason == "" {- reason = "the agent reported the update command as failed"- }- message = fmt.Sprintf("Update of container '%s' failed: %s", containerName, reason)- default:- message = fmt.Sprintf("Update command queued for container '%s', but it had not reached a terminal state within the verification window. Completion is NOT yet verified - re-check with pulse_docker action 'updates' or inspect the container before reporting success.", containerName)- }-- response := DockerUpdateContainerResponse{- Success: outcome != "failed",- TargetID: dockerHost.ID,- ContainerID: container.ID,- ContainerName: containerName,- CommandID: cmdStatus.ID,- Message: message,- Command: cmdStatus,- Verification: verify,- }-- return NewJSONResultWithIsError(response, outcome == "failed"), nil-}--// verifyDockerUpdateCommand polls the queued update command's status until it-// reaches a terminal state or the bounded verification window elapses. The-// returned map follows the same verification shape as-// verifyDockerContainerState / verifyGuestAction: confirmed only on observed-// terminal success, with an explicit outcome of "verified", "failed", or-// "inconclusive".-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) verifyDockerUpdateCommand(ctx context.Context, commandID, containerName string) map[string]interface{} {- verification := map[string]interface{}{- "confirmed": false,- "method": "command_status",- "command_id": commandID,- }-- if commandID == "" {- verification["outcome"] = "inconclusive"- verification["note"] = "queue returned no command ID, so the update outcome cannot be tracked"- return verification- }-- var lastObserved map[string]interface{}-- for attempt := 1; attempt <= dockerUpdateVerifyMaxAttempts; attempt++ {- status, ok := e.updatesProvider.GetCommandStatus(commandID)- if ok {- lastObserved = map[string]interface{}{"status": status.Status}- if status.Message != "" {- lastObserved["message"] = status.Message- }- if status.FailureReason != "" {- lastObserved["failure_reason"] = status.FailureReason- }-- switch status.Status {- case dockerCommandStatusCompleted:- verification["confirmed"] = true- verification["outcome"] = "verified"- verification["observed"] = lastObserved- verification["note"] = fmt.Sprintf("agent confirmed container '%s' was recreated and is running", containerName)- return verification- case dockerCommandStatusFailed, dockerCommandStatusExpired:- verification["outcome"] = "failed"- verification["observed"] = lastObserved- return verification- }- }-- if attempt == dockerUpdateVerifyMaxAttempts {- break- }- if err := dockerUpdateVerifySleepFn(ctx, dockerUpdateVerifyPollInterval); err != nil {- verification["outcome"] = "inconclusive"- verification["note"] = "verification canceled before the update reached a terminal state"- if lastObserved != nil {- verification["observed"] = lastObserved- }- return verification- }- }-- verification["outcome"] = "inconclusive"- if lastObserved != nil {- verification["observed"] = lastObserved- verification["note"] = "update command did not reach a terminal state within the verification window; completion is unverified"- } else {- verification["note"] = "update command status was not trackable within the verification window; completion is unverified"- }- return verification-}-// Helper methods for Docker updatesfunc (e *PulseToolExecutor) resolveDockerHostID(hostArg string) string {@@ -699,26 +295,6 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) getDockerHostName(hostID string) string {return hostID}-func formatDockerUpdateApprovalNeeded(containerName, hostName, approvalID string) string {- payload := map[string]interface{}{- "approval_id": approvalID,- "container_name": containerName,- "docker_host": hostName,- "action": "update",- "command": fmt.Sprintf("docker update %s (pull latest + recreate)", containerName),- "how_to_approve": "Click the approval button in the chat to execute this update.",- }- payload = enrichApprovalRequiredPayload(payload, approvalID)- return agentcapabilities.FormatApprovalRequiredToolMarker(payload)-}--func trimLeadingSlash(name string) string {- if len(name) > 0 && name[0] == '/' {- return name[1:]- }- return name-}-// ========== Docker Swarm Handler Implementations ==========func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeGetSwarmStatus(_ context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/tools_file.go b/internal/ai/tools/tools_file.goindex 798b6256c9..888c45757b 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/tools_file.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/tools_file.go@@ -2,16 +2,11 @@ package toolsimport ("context"- "crypto/sha256"- "encoding/base64"- "encoding/hex""fmt""strings"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentcapabilities""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/ai/safety"- "github.com/rs/zerolog/log")// ExecutionProvenance tracks where a command actually executed.@@ -31,126 +26,6 @@ type ExecutionProvenance struct {Transport string `json:"transport"` // "direct", "pct_exec", "qm_guest_exec"}-// registerFileTools registers the file editing tool-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) registerFileTools() {- e.registry.registerBuiltin(RegisteredTool{- Definition: Tool{- Name: agentcapabilities.PulseFileEditToolName,- Description: `Edit files on remote hosts, containers, VMs, and Docker containers safely.--Actions:-- append: Append content to the end of a file-- write: Write/overwrite a file with new content (creates if doesn't exist)--To READ a file, use pulse_read with action="file" instead; this tool is write-only.--This tool handles escaping automatically - just provide the content as-is.-Use this instead of shell commands for editing config files (YAML, JSON, etc.)--Routing: target_host can be a node (pve-node), a container name (homepage-docker), or a VM name. Commands are automatically routed through the appropriate agent.--Docker container support: Use container to access files INSIDE a Docker container. The target_host specifies where Docker runs.--Examples:-- Write to host: action="write", path="/tmp/test.txt", content="hello", target_host="pve-node"-- Write to Docker: action="write", path="/tmp/test.txt", content="hello", target_host="tower", container="nginx"`,- InputSchema: InputSchema{- Type: "object",- Properties: map[string]PropertySchema{- "action": {- Type: "string",- Description: "File action: append or write",- Enum: []string{"append", "write"},- },- "path": {- Type: "string",- Description: "Absolute path to the file",- },- "content": {- Type: "string",- Description: "Content to write or append (for append/write actions)",- },- "target_host": {- Type: "string",- Description: "Hostname where the file exists (or where Docker is running)",- },- "container": {- Type: "string",- Description: "Docker container name (for files inside containers)",- },- },- Required: []string{"action", "path", "target_host"},- },- },- Handler: func(ctx context.Context, exec *PulseToolExecutor, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("model-authored file mutation is retired and denied")), nil- },- RequireControl: true,- Governance: ToolGovernance{- ActionMode: ToolActionWrite,- ApprovalPolicy: ToolApprovalActionPlan,- ApprovalSummary: "hidden in read-only mode; approval required in controlled mode",- Summary: "Changes files through the governed file-edit path (append/write only); file inspection routes through the read-only pulse_read tool.",- },- })-}--// executeFileEdit handles file read/write operations-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeFileEdit(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- action, _ := args["action"].(string)- path, _ := args["path"].(string)- content, _ := args["content"].(string)- targetHost, _ := args["target_host"].(string)- dockerContainer, legacyContainerArg := resolveContainerArg(args)-- if path == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("path is required")), nil- }- if targetHost == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("target_host is required")), nil- }- if legacyContainerArg {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("app_container is no longer supported; use app-container")), nil- }-- // Validate path - must be absolute- if !strings.HasPrefix(path, "/") {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("path must be absolute (start with /)")), nil- }-- // Validate container if provided (simple alphanumeric + _ + -)- if dockerContainer != "" {- for _, c := range dockerContainer {- if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '_' || c == '-' || c == '.') {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid character '%c' in container name", c)), nil- }- }- }-- // Check control level (defense in depth; the registry blocks- // infrastructure mutations before this handler runs).- if e.controlLevel == ControlLevelReadOnly {- return NewTextResult("File editing is not available in read-only mode."), nil- }-- switch action {- case "read":- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("pulse_file_edit is write-only; read files with pulse_read action=\"file\"")), nil- case "append":- if content == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("content is required for append action")), nil- }- return e.executeFileAppend(ctx, path, content, targetHost, dockerContainer, args)- case "write":- if content == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("content is required for write action")), nil- }- return e.executeFileWrite(ctx, path, content, targetHost, dockerContainer, args)- default:- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("unknown action: %s. Use: append, write", action)), nil- }-}-// executeFileRead reads a file's contentsfunc (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeFileRead(ctx context.Context, path, targetHost, dockerContainer string) (CallToolResult, error) {@@ -225,358 +100,6 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeFileRead(ctx context.Context, path, targetHosreturn NewJSONResult(response), nil}-// fileMutationSpec captures how the append and write actions diverge inside-// the shared file-mutation pipeline. Approval command/detail strings must stay-// stable: pre-approval consumption matches on the exact command text.-type fileMutationSpec struct {- action string // response/validation verb: "append" / "write"- approvalCommand string // exact approval command text- approvalDetail string // human approval description- redirect string // shell redirect: ">>" / ">"- failureVerb string // error wrap: "append to file" / "write file"- auditDetail string // audit log description- verify func(ctx context.Context, routing CommandRoutingResult, path, dockerContainer, content string) map[string]interface{}-}--// executeFileAppend appends content to a file-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeFileAppend(ctx context.Context, path, content, targetHost, dockerContainer string, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- return e.executeFileMutation(ctx, path, content, targetHost, dockerContainer, args, fileMutationSpec{- action: "append",- approvalCommand: fmt.Sprintf("Append to file: %s", path),- approvalDetail: fmt.Sprintf("Append %d bytes to %s", len(content), path),- redirect: ">>",- failureVerb: "append to file",- auditDetail: fmt.Sprintf("append %d bytes to %s", len(content), path),- verify: e.verifyFileTailHash,- })-}--// executeFileWrite writes content to a file (overwrites)-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeFileWrite(ctx context.Context, path, content, targetHost, dockerContainer string, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- return e.executeFileMutation(ctx, path, content, targetHost, dockerContainer, args, fileMutationSpec{- action: "write",- approvalCommand: fmt.Sprintf("Write file: %s", path),- approvalDetail: fmt.Sprintf("Write %d bytes to %s", len(content), path),- redirect: ">",- failureVerb: "write file",- auditDetail: fmt.Sprintf("write %d bytes to %s", len(content), path),- verify: e.verifyFileSHA256,- })-}--// executeFileMutation runs the shared append/write pipeline: sensitive-path-// blocking, routing + resolved-resource validation, approval gating, base64-// transfer, audited execution, and post-write verification.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeFileMutation(ctx context.Context, path, content, targetHost, dockerContainer string, args map[string]interface{}, spec fileMutationSpec) (CallToolResult, error) {- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)-- if blocked, reason := safety.IsSensitivePath(path); blocked {- return NewToolResponseResult(NewToolBlockedError(- "SENSITIVE_PATH",- fmt.Sprintf("Refusing to write sensitive path '%s' (%s).", path, reason),- map[string]interface{}{- "path": path,- "reason": reason,- "policy_boundary": "Credential files cannot be modified through AI tools.",- },- )), nil- }-- // Validate routing context - block if targeting a host node when child resources exist- // This prevents accidentally writing files to the host when user meant to write to an container/VM- routingResult := e.validateRoutingContext(targetHost)- if routingResult.IsBlocked() {- return NewToolResponseResult(routingResult.RoutingError.ToToolResponse()), nil- }-- // Validate resource is in resolved context (write operation)- // With PULSE_STRICT_RESOLUTION=true, this blocks execution on undiscovered resources- validation := e.validateResolvedResource(targetHost, spec.action, true)- if validation.IsBlocked() {- // Hard validation failure - return consistent error envelope- return NewToolResponseResult(validation.StrictError.ToToolResponse()), nil- }- // Soft validation warnings are logged inside validateResolvedResource-- // Use full routing resolution - includes provenance for debugging- routing := e.resolveTargetForCommandFull(targetHost)- if routing.AgentID == "" {- return unavailableCommandConnection(targetHost, routing), nil- }-- // INVARIANT: If the target resolves to a child resource (container/VM), writes MUST execute- // inside that context via pct_exec/qm_guest_exec. No silent node fallback.- if err := e.validateWriteExecutionContext(targetHost, routing); err != nil {- return NewToolResponseResult(err.ToToolResponse()), nil- }-- approvalTargetID := fmt.Sprintf("host=%s|container=%s|path=%s", targetHost, dockerContainer, path)-- // Check if pre-approved (validated + single-use).- preApproved := consumeApprovalWithValidation(args, e.orgID, spec.approvalCommand, "file", approvalTargetID)- requiresApproval := !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled-- // Skip approval checks if pre-approved or in autonomous mode- if !preApproved && !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- target := targetHost- if dockerContainer != "" {- target = fmt.Sprintf("%s (container: %s)", targetHost, dockerContainer)- }- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(- spec.approvalCommand,- "file",- approvalTargetID,- target,- spec.approvalDetail,- )- return NewTextResult(formatFileApprovalNeeded(path, target, spec.action, len(content), approvalID)), nil- }-- // Use base64 encoding to safely transfer content- encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(content))- var command string- if dockerContainer != "" {- // Mutate inside Docker container - escape the full inner command to avoid nested quote breakage.- innerCommand := fmt.Sprintf("echo %s | base64 -d %s %s", shellEscape(encoded), spec.redirect, shellEscape(path))- command = fmt.Sprintf("docker exec %s sh -c %s", shellEscape(dockerContainer), shellEscape(innerCommand))- } else {- // For host/container/VM targets - agent handles sh -c wrapping for container/VM- command = fmt.Sprintf("echo %s | base64 -d %s %s", shellEscape(encoded), spec.redirect, shellEscape(path))- }-- result, err := e.executeCommandWithAudit(- ctx,- "pulse_file_edit",- func() string {- if dockerContainer != "" {- return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s", targetHost, dockerContainer, path)- }- return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", targetHost, path)- }(),- approvalID,- requiresApproval,- routing.AgentID,- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: command,- TargetType: routing.TargetType,- TargetID: routing.TargetID,- },- "pulse_file_edit",- spec.auditDetail,- )- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("failed to %s: %w", spec.failureVerb, err)), nil- }-- if result.ExitCode != 0 {- errMsg := result.Stderr- if errMsg == "" {- errMsg = result.Stdout- }- response := map[string]interface{}{- "success": false,- "action": spec.action,- "path": path,- "host": targetHost,- "exit_code": result.ExitCode,- "error": errMsg,- }- setContainerResponseFields(response, dockerContainer)- return NewJSONResultWithIsError(response, true), nil- }-- verify := spec.verify(ctx, routing, path, dockerContainer, content)-- response := map[string]interface{}{- "success": true,- "action": spec.action,- "path": path,- "host": targetHost,- "bytes_written": len(content),- "verification": verify,- }- setContainerResponseFields(response, dockerContainer)- // Include execution provenance for observability- response["execution"] = buildExecutionProvenance(targetHost, routing)- return NewJSONResult(response), nil-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) verifyFileSHA256(ctx context.Context, routing CommandRoutingResult, path, dockerContainer, content string) map[string]interface{} {- expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(content))- expectedHex := hex.EncodeToString(expected[:])-- // Use a portable command chain; not all systems have sha256sum.- hashCmd := fmt.Sprintf("sha256sum %s 2>/dev/null || shasum -a 256 %s 2>/dev/null || openssl dgst -sha256 %s 2>/dev/null", shellEscape(path), shellEscape(path), shellEscape(path))- if dockerContainer != "" {- hashCmd = fmt.Sprintf("docker exec %s sh -c %s", shellEscape(dockerContainer), shellEscape(hashCmd))- }-- res, err := e.agentServer.ExecuteCommand(ctx, routing.AgentID, agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: hashCmd,- TargetType: routing.TargetType,- TargetID: routing.TargetID,- })- if err != nil {- return map[string]interface{}{- "ok": true,- "method": "exit_code",- "note": fmt.Sprintf("sha256 verification unavailable: %v", err),- }- }- combined := strings.TrimSpace(res.Stdout + "\n" + res.Stderr)- actualHex := ""- if fields := strings.Fields(combined); len(fields) > 0 {- actualHex = fields[0]- }- if res.ExitCode != 0 || actualHex == "" {- return map[string]interface{}{- "ok": true,- "method": "exit_code",- "note": "sha256 verification unavailable on target (missing tools or non-zero exit)",- }- }- ok := strings.EqualFold(actualHex, expectedHex)- return map[string]interface{}{- "ok": ok,- "method": "sha256",- "expected": expectedHex,- "actual": actualHex,- }-}--func (e *PulseToolExecutor) verifyFileTailHash(ctx context.Context, routing CommandRoutingResult, path, dockerContainer, appended string) map[string]interface{} {- // Verify that the file's trailing bytes match what we appended, without re-reading the full file.- n := len(appended)- if n <= 0 {- return map[string]interface{}{"ok": true, "method": "tail_sha256", "note": "no appended content"}- }- expected := sha256.Sum256([]byte(appended))- expectedHex := hex.EncodeToString(expected[:])-- tailCmd := fmt.Sprintf("tail -c %d %s 2>/dev/null | (sha256sum 2>/dev/null || shasum -a 256 2>/dev/null)", n, shellEscape(path))- if dockerContainer != "" {- tailCmd = fmt.Sprintf("docker exec %s sh -c %s", shellEscape(dockerContainer), shellEscape(tailCmd))- }-- res, err := e.agentServer.ExecuteCommand(ctx, routing.AgentID, agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: tailCmd,- TargetType: routing.TargetType,- TargetID: routing.TargetID,- })- if err != nil {- return map[string]interface{}{"ok": true, "method": "exit_code", "note": fmt.Sprintf("tail sha256 verification unavailable: %v", err)}- }- combined := strings.TrimSpace(res.Stdout + "\n" + res.Stderr)- actualHex := ""- if fields := strings.Fields(combined); len(fields) > 0 {- actualHex = fields[0]- }- if res.ExitCode != 0 || actualHex == "" {- return map[string]interface{}{"ok": true, "method": "exit_code", "note": "tail sha256 verification unavailable on target (missing tools or non-zero exit)"}- }- ok := strings.EqualFold(actualHex, expectedHex)- return map[string]interface{}{- "ok": ok,- "method": "tail_sha256",- "expected": expectedHex,- "actual": actualHex,- }-}--// ErrExecutionContextUnavailable is returned when a write operation targets a child resource-// (container/VM) but the execution cannot be properly routed into that resource context.-// This prevents silent fallback to node-level execution, which would write files on the-// host node instead of inside the container/VM.-type ErrExecutionContextUnavailable struct {- TargetHost string // What the model requested- ResolvedKind string // What the state says it is (system-container, vm)- ResolvedNode string // Which hypervisor node it's on- Transport string // What transport we got (should be pct_exec but might be "direct")- Message string-}--func (e *ErrExecutionContextUnavailable) Error() string {- return e.Message-}--func (e *ErrExecutionContextUnavailable) ToToolResponse() ToolResponse {- return NewToolBlockedError(ErrCodeExecutionContextUnavailable, e.Message, map[string]interface{}{- "target_host": e.TargetHost,- "resolved_kind": e.ResolvedKind,- "resolved_node": e.ResolvedNode,- "transport": e.Transport,- "policy_boundary": "Cannot write files to this target because the execution context is not reachable through the governed container/VM transport.",- })-}--// validateWriteExecutionContext ensures write operations execute inside the correct context.-//-// INVARIANT: If state.ResolveResource says the target is an container/VM, writes MUST use-// pct_exec/qm_guest_exec to run inside that container. A "direct" transport on a child-// resource means we'd write to the host node's filesystem instead — which is always wrong.-//-// This catches the scenario where:-// 1. target_host="homepage-docker" (a system container)-// 2. An agent on the node matches "homepage-docker" as a direct hostname-// 3. Command runs on the node without pct exec → writes to node filesystem-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) validateWriteExecutionContext(targetHost string, routing CommandRoutingResult) *ErrExecutionContextUnavailable {- if !e.hasReadState() {- return nil // Can't validate without state- }-- loc := e.resolveResourceLocation(targetHost)- if !loc.Found {- return nil // Unknown resource, nothing to validate- }-- // Only validate for child resources (system containers / VMs)- isChildResource := loc.ResourceType == "system-container" || loc.ResourceType == "vm"- if !isChildResource {- return nil- }-- // For child resources, the routing MUST use pct_exec or qm_guest_exec- // If it resolved as "direct" (agent-level type), that means we'd execute on the node, not inside the container/VM- if routing.Transport == "direct" && routing.TargetType == "agent" {- log.Warn().- Str("target_host", targetHost).- Str("resolved_kind", loc.ResourceType).- Str("resolved_node", loc.Node).- Str("agent_hostname", routing.AgentHostname).- Str("transport", routing.Transport).- Msg("[FileWrite] BLOCKED: Write would execute on node, not inside child resource. " +- "Agent matched target hostname directly, but state says target is container/VM.")-- return &ErrExecutionContextUnavailable{- TargetHost: targetHost,- ResolvedKind: loc.ResourceType,- ResolvedNode: loc.Node,- Transport: routing.Transport,- Message: fmt.Sprintf(- "'%s' is a %s on node '%s', but the write would execute on the host node instead of inside the %s. "+- "This happens when an agent matches the hostname directly instead of routing via pct exec. "+- "The file would be written to the node's filesystem, not the %s's filesystem.",- targetHost, loc.ResourceType, loc.Node, loc.ResourceType, loc.ResourceType),- }- }-- // Also validate: if resolved as a guest but no agent found for the node- if routing.AgentID == "" {- return &ErrExecutionContextUnavailable{- TargetHost: targetHost,- ResolvedKind: loc.ResourceType,- ResolvedNode: loc.Node,- Transport: "none",- Message: fmt.Sprintf(- "'%s' is a %s on node '%s', but no agent is available on that node. "+- "Install the Pulse Unified Agent on '%s' to enable file operations inside the %s.",- targetHost, loc.ResourceType, loc.Node, loc.Node, loc.ResourceType),- }- }-- return nil-}-// buildExecutionProvenance creates provenance metadata for tool responses.// This makes it observable WHERE a command actually executed.func buildExecutionProvenance(targetHost string, routing CommandRoutingResult) map[string]interface{} {@@ -596,17 +119,3 @@ func shellEscape(s string) string {// Use single quotes and escape any existing single quotesreturn "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, "'", "'\"'\"'") + "'"}--// formatFileApprovalNeeded formats an approval-required response for file operations-func formatFileApprovalNeeded(path, host, action string, size int, approvalID string) string {- payload := map[string]interface{}{- "approval_id": approvalID,- "action": "file_" + action,- "path": path,- "host": host,- "size": size,- "message": fmt.Sprintf("File %s operation requires approval", action),- }- payload = enrichApprovalRequiredPayload(payload, approvalID)- return agentcapabilities.FormatApprovalRequiredToolMarker(payload)-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/tools_file_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/tools_file_test.goindex 39a6173ed7..cfa6643daa 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/tools_file_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/tools_file_test.go@@ -1,13 +1,8 @@package toolsimport (- "context"- "encoding/json"- "strings""testing"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec"- "github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/models""github.com/stretchr/testify/assert")@@ -24,135 +19,3 @@ func TestFileTools_Registry(t *testing.T) {}assert.False(t, found, "retired model file mutation tool must not be registered")}--func TestExecuteFileEdit_Validation(t *testing.T) {- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{})-- tests := []struct {- name string- args map[string]interface{}- wantErr string- }{- {- name: "Missing Path",- args: map[string]interface{}{"action": "read", "target_host": "h1"},- wantErr: "path is required",- },- {- name: "Missing TargetHost",- args: map[string]interface{}{"action": "read", "path": "/etc/config"},- wantErr: "target_host is required",- },- {- name: "Relative Path",- args: map[string]interface{}{"action": "read", "path": "etc/config", "target_host": "h1"},- wantErr: "path must be absolute",- },- {- name: "Invalid Docker Container",- args: map[string]interface{}{"action": "read", "path": "/f", "target_host": "h1", "container": "bad name!"},- wantErr: "invalid character",- },- {- name: "Legacy AppContainer Rejected",- args: map[string]interface{}{"action": "read", "path": "/f", "target_host": "h1", "app_container": "nginx"},- wantErr: "app_container is no longer supported; use app-container",- },- {- name: "Unknown Action",- args: map[string]interface{}{"action": "dance", "path": "/f", "target_host": "h1"},- wantErr: "unknown action",- },- {- name: "Append Missing Content",- args: map[string]interface{}{"action": "append", "path": "/f", "target_host": "h1"},- wantErr: "content is required",- },- {- name: "Write Missing Content",- args: map[string]interface{}{"action": "write", "path": "/f", "target_host": "h1"},- wantErr: "content is required",- },- }-- for _, tc := range tests {- t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {- res, err := exec.executeFileEdit(context.Background(), tc.args)- // Implementation returns error result (NewErrorResult), err is usually nil- assert.NoError(t, err)- assert.True(t, res.IsError)- assert.NotEmpty(t, res.Content)- assert.Contains(t, res.Content[0].Text, tc.wantErr)- })- }-}--func TestValidateWriteExecutionContext_Blocked(t *testing.T) {- // This tests the security invariant: don't write to host when target is LXC-- state := models.StateSnapshot{- Containers: []models.Container{- {VMID: 100, Name: "my-lxc", Node: "pve1", Status: "running"},- },- Nodes: []models.Node{- {Name: "pve1"},- },- }-- stateProvider := &mockStateProvider{state: state}- agentServer := &mockAgentServer{}- agentServer.agents = []agentexec.ConnectedAgent{- {AgentID: "agent-1", Hostname: "my-lxc"}, // Agent hostname matches LXC name! Risks confusion.- }-- exec := NewPulseToolExecutor(ExecutorConfig{- AgentServer: agentServer,- StateProvider: stateProvider,- })-- // We expect resolveTargetForCommandFull to map "my-lxc" to agent-1- // But since agent-1 matches hostname "my-lxc" directly, it might be resolved as "direct".- // Wait, resolveTargetForCommandFull logic logic isn't mocked, it's real code in executor.go using state.-- // If ResolveResource says it's an LXC on pve1.- // And FindAgent says agent-1 (hostname=my-lxc) exists.- // The fallback logic in resolveTarget might pick agent-1 if it matches hostname directly?-- // Actually, `resolveTargetForCommandFull` calls `ResolveResource`.- // Then checks if agent exists for that resource.-- // If I want to trigger the BLOCK, I need:- // 1. ResolveResource returns LXC.- // 2. Routing returns "direct" transport on "agent" type.-- // This happens if `findAgent` returns an agent that is NOT the node agent?- // Or if the node agent is found via hostname match of the LXC name?-- // Let's manually invoke validateWriteExecutionContext to test logic in isolation.-- err := exec.validateWriteExecutionContext("my-lxc", CommandRoutingResult{- Transport: "direct",- TargetType: "agent", // Agent matched directly as an agent target- AgentHostname: "my-lxc",- AgentID: "agent-1",- ResolvedKind: "system-container", // But resolving matched system container- ResolvedNode: "pve1",- })-- assert.NotNil(t, err)- assert.Contains(t, err.Message, "write would execute on the host node instead of inside the system-container")-}--func TestFormatFileApprovalNeeded_JSONSafe(t *testing.T) {- formatted := formatFileApprovalNeeded(`/tmp/"cfg".json`, `host"name`, "write", 42, "approval-1")- assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(formatted, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: "))-- raw := strings.TrimPrefix(formatted, "APPROVAL_REQUIRED: ")- var payload map[string]interface{}- assert.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &payload))- assert.Equal(t, "approval_required", payload["type"])- assert.Equal(t, "file_write", payload["action"])- assert.Equal(t, `/tmp/"cfg".json`, payload["path"])- assert.Equal(t, `host"name`, payload["host"])- assert.Equal(t, float64(42), payload["size"])-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/tools_kubernetes.go b/internal/ai/tools/tools_kubernetes.goindex 9cc64229e2..6885bc7a02 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/tools_kubernetes.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/tools_kubernetes.go@@ -3,27 +3,13 @@ package toolsimport ("context""fmt"- "strconv""strings"- "time""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentcapabilities""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/agentexec""github.com/rcourtman/pulse-go-rewrite/internal/unifiedresources")-const (- // kubernetesVerifyMaxAttempts bounds read-after-write verification reads- // after a kubectl control action, mirroring verifyDockerContainerState.- kubernetesVerifyMaxAttempts = 3-- // kubernetesVerifySettleDelay is the pause between verification attempts,- // letting the API server settle before re-reading.- kubernetesVerifySettleDelay = 500 * time.Millisecond-)--var kubernetesVerifySleepFn = sleepWithContext-type kubernetesClusterTarget struct {ID stringAgentID string@@ -498,446 +484,6 @@ func validateKubernetesResourceID(value string) error {return nil}-// buildKubectlExecCommand builds a kubectl exec command safely.-// It runs the command via "sh -c" inside the pod and shell-escapes all-// user-controlled values to prevent host shell injection.-func buildKubectlExecCommand(namespace, pod, container, command string) string {- base := fmt.Sprintf("kubectl -n %s exec %s", shellEscape(namespace), shellEscape(pod))- if container != "" {- base += fmt.Sprintf(" -c %s", shellEscape(container))- }- return base + fmt.Sprintf(" -- sh -c %s", shellEscape(command))-}--// executeKubernetesScale scales a deployment-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeKubernetesScale(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- clusterArg, _ := args["cluster"].(string)- namespace, _ := args["namespace"].(string)- deployment, _ := args["deployment"].(string)- replicas := intArg(args, "replicas", -1)- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)-- if clusterArg == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("cluster is required")), nil- }- if deployment == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("deployment is required")), nil- }- if replicas < 0 {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("replicas is required and must be >= 0")), nil- }- if namespace == "" {- namespace = "default"- }-- // Validate identifiers- if err := validateKubernetesResourceID(namespace); err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid namespace: %w", err)), nil- }- if err := validateKubernetesResourceID(deployment); err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid deployment: %w", err)), nil- }-- // Check control level- if e.controlLevel == ControlLevelReadOnly {- return NewTextResult("Kubernetes control operations are not available in read-only mode."), nil- }-- agentID, cluster, err := e.findAgentForKubernetesCluster(clusterArg)- if err != nil {- return NewTextResult(err.Error()), nil- }-- // Build command- command := fmt.Sprintf("kubectl -n %s scale deployment %s --replicas=%d", shellEscape(namespace), shellEscape(deployment), replicas)- clusterScope := cluster.ID- if clusterScope == "" {- clusterScope = clusterArg- }- approvalTargetID := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:deployment:%s", clusterScope, namespace, deployment)-- // Check if pre-approved (validated + single-use).- preApproved := consumeApprovalWithValidation(args, e.orgID, command, "kubernetes", approvalTargetID)- requiresApproval := !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled-- // Request approval if needed- if !preApproved && !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- displayName := cluster.DisplayName- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, "kubernetes", approvalTargetID, displayName, fmt.Sprintf("Scale deployment %s to %d replicas", deployment, replicas))- return NewTextResult(formatKubernetesApprovalNeeded("scale", deployment, namespace, displayName, command, approvalID)), nil- }-- if e.agentServer == nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("no agent server available")), nil- }-- result, err := e.executeCommandWithAudit(- ctx,- "pulse_kubernetes",- fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:deployment:%s", clusterScope, namespace, deployment),- approvalID,- requiresApproval,- agentID,- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: command,- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "",- },- "pulse_kubernetes",- fmt.Sprintf("scale deployment %s to %d replicas", deployment, replicas),- )- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("failed to execute kubectl: %w", err)), nil- }-- output := result.Stdout- if result.Stderr != "" {- output += "\n" + result.Stderr- }-- if result.ExitCode != 0 {- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("kubectl command failed (exit code %d):\n%s", result.ExitCode, output)), nil- }-- // Read-after-write: re-read the deployment's replica state through the- // same agent instead of asserting unverified success.- verify := e.verifyKubernetesScale(ctx, agentID, namespace, deployment, replicas)- verify["ok"] = true-- response := map[string]interface{}{- "success": true,- "action": "scale",- "cluster": cluster.DisplayName,- "namespace": namespace,- "deployment": deployment,- "requested_replicas": replicas,- "command": command,- "exit_code": result.ExitCode,- "output": output,- "verification": verify,- }- return NewJSONResult(response), nil-}--// verifyKubernetesScale re-reads the deployment's replica state after a scale-// command, mirroring the read-after-write idiom of verifyGuestAction and-// verifyDockerContainerState. Confirmed means the desired replica count is-// persisted on the deployment spec; readiness is reported observationally-// since pods may still be starting or terminating.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) verifyKubernetesScale(ctx context.Context, agentID, namespace, deployment string, expectedReplicas int) map[string]interface{} {- verifyCmd := fmt.Sprintf("kubectl -n %s get deployment %s -o %s",- shellEscape(namespace), shellEscape(deployment), shellEscape("jsonpath={.spec.replicas} {.status.readyReplicas}"))-- var lastOut string- var lastExit int- for attempt := 1; attempt <= kubernetesVerifyMaxAttempts; attempt++ {- res, err := e.agentServer.ExecuteCommand(ctx, agentID, agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: verifyCmd,- TargetType: "agent",- })- if err != nil {- return map[string]interface{}{"confirmed": false, "method": "kubectl_get", "command": verifyCmd, "note": err.Error()}- }- lastExit = res.ExitCode- lastOut = strings.TrimSpace(res.Stdout + "\n" + res.Stderr)-- if res.ExitCode == 0 {- fields := strings.Fields(lastOut)- if len(fields) >= 1 {- observedReplicas, parseErr := strconv.Atoi(fields[0])- if parseErr == nil {- readyReplicas := 0- if len(fields) >= 2 {- if ready, readyErr := strconv.Atoi(fields[1]); readyErr == nil {- readyReplicas = ready- }- }- observed := map[string]interface{}{"replicas": observedReplicas, "ready_replicas": readyReplicas}- if observedReplicas == expectedReplicas {- return map[string]interface{}{- "confirmed": true,- "method": "kubectl_get",- "command": verifyCmd,- "expected": map[string]interface{}{"replicas": expectedReplicas},- "observed": observed,- }- }- if attempt == kubernetesVerifyMaxAttempts {- return map[string]interface{}{- "confirmed": false,- "method": "kubectl_get",- "command": verifyCmd,- "expected": map[string]interface{}{"replicas": expectedReplicas},- "observed": observed,- }- }- }- }- }-- if attempt == kubernetesVerifyMaxAttempts {- break- }- if err := kubernetesVerifySleepFn(ctx, kubernetesVerifySettleDelay); err != nil {- return map[string]interface{}{"confirmed": false, "method": "kubectl_get", "command": verifyCmd, "note": "context canceled", "raw": lastOut, "exit_code": lastExit}- }- }-- return map[string]interface{}{- "confirmed": false,- "method": "kubectl_get",- "command": verifyCmd,- "expected": map[string]interface{}{"replicas": expectedReplicas},- "raw": lastOut,- "exit_code": lastExit,- }-}--// kubernetesResourceAction captures how the namespaced kubectl actions-// (deployment restart, pod delete) diverge inside the shared-// approval/audit/execution pipeline. The kubectl command text doubles as the-// approval command, so command construction must stay stable per action.-type kubernetesResourceAction struct {- argKey string // resource argument name: "deployment" / "pod"- kindLabel string // approval target kind segment: "deployment" / "pod"- approvalAction string // formatKubernetesApprovalNeeded action: "restart" / "delete_pod"- command func(namespace, name string) string- approvalDetail func(name string) string- auditDetail func(name string) string- successMessage func(name, namespace, output string) string-}--// executeKubernetesRestart restarts a deployment via rollout restart-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeKubernetesRestart(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- return e.executeKubernetesResourceAction(ctx, args, kubernetesResourceAction{- argKey: "deployment",- kindLabel: "deployment",- approvalAction: "restart",- command: func(namespace, name string) string {- return fmt.Sprintf("kubectl -n %s rollout restart deployment/%s", shellEscape(namespace), shellEscape(name))- },- approvalDetail: func(name string) string { return fmt.Sprintf("Restart deployment %s", name) },- auditDetail: func(name string) string { return fmt.Sprintf("restart deployment %s", name) },- successMessage: func(name, namespace, output string) string {- return fmt.Sprintf("✓ Successfully initiated rollout restart for deployment '%s' in namespace '%s'. Action complete - pods will restart gradually.\n%s", name, namespace, output)- },- })-}--// executeKubernetesDeletePod deletes a pod-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeKubernetesDeletePod(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- return e.executeKubernetesResourceAction(ctx, args, kubernetesResourceAction{- argKey: "pod",- kindLabel: "pod",- approvalAction: "delete_pod",- command: func(namespace, name string) string {- return fmt.Sprintf("kubectl -n %s delete pod %s", shellEscape(namespace), shellEscape(name))- },- approvalDetail: func(name string) string { return fmt.Sprintf("Delete pod %s", name) },- auditDetail: func(name string) string { return fmt.Sprintf("delete pod %s", name) },- successMessage: func(name, namespace, output string) string {- return fmt.Sprintf("✓ Successfully deleted pod '%s' in namespace '%s'. If managed by a controller, a new pod will be created.\n%s", name, namespace, output)- },- })-}--// executeKubernetesResourceAction runs the shared namespaced kubectl action-// pipeline: argument validation, control-level gating, cluster agent-// resolution, approval gating, and audited execution.-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeKubernetesResourceAction(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}, spec kubernetesResourceAction) (CallToolResult, error) {- clusterArg, _ := args["cluster"].(string)- namespace, _ := args["namespace"].(string)- name, _ := args[spec.argKey].(string)- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)-- if clusterArg == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("cluster is required")), nil- }- if name == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("%s is required", spec.argKey)), nil- }- if namespace == "" {- namespace = "default"- }-- // Validate identifiers- if err := validateKubernetesResourceID(namespace); err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid namespace: %w", err)), nil- }- if err := validateKubernetesResourceID(name); err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid %s: %w", spec.argKey, err)), nil- }-- // Check control level- if e.controlLevel == ControlLevelReadOnly {- return NewTextResult("Kubernetes control operations are not available in read-only mode."), nil- }-- agentID, cluster, err := e.findAgentForKubernetesCluster(clusterArg)- if err != nil {- return NewTextResult(err.Error()), nil- }-- // Build command- command := spec.command(namespace, name)- clusterScope := cluster.ID- if clusterScope == "" {- clusterScope = clusterArg- }- approvalTargetID := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%s:%s", clusterScope, namespace, spec.kindLabel, name)-- // Check if pre-approved (validated + single-use).- preApproved := consumeApprovalWithValidation(args, e.orgID, command, "kubernetes", approvalTargetID)- requiresApproval := !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled-- // Request approval if needed- if !preApproved && !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- displayName := cluster.DisplayName- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(command, "kubernetes", approvalTargetID, displayName, spec.approvalDetail(name))- return NewTextResult(formatKubernetesApprovalNeeded(spec.approvalAction, name, namespace, displayName, command, approvalID)), nil- }-- if e.agentServer == nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("no agent server available")), nil- }-- result, err := e.executeCommandWithAudit(- ctx,- "pulse_kubernetes",- approvalTargetID,- approvalID,- requiresApproval,- agentID,- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: command,- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "",- },- "pulse_kubernetes",- spec.auditDetail(name),- )- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("failed to execute kubectl: %w", err)), nil- }-- output := result.Stdout- if result.Stderr != "" {- output += "\n" + result.Stderr- }-- if result.ExitCode == 0 {- return NewTextResult(spec.successMessage(name, namespace, output)), nil- }-- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("kubectl command failed (exit code %d):\n%s", result.ExitCode, output)), nil-}--// executeKubernetesExec executes a command inside a pod-func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeKubernetesExec(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {- clusterArg, _ := args["cluster"].(string)- namespace, _ := args["namespace"].(string)- pod, _ := args["pod"].(string)- container, _ := args["container"].(string)- command, _ := args["command"].(string)- approvalID := agentcapabilities.ApprovalArgument(args)-- if clusterArg == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("cluster is required")), nil- }- if pod == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("pod is required")), nil- }- if command == "" {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("command is required")), nil- }- if namespace == "" {- namespace = "default"- }-- // Validate identifiers- if err := validateKubernetesResourceID(namespace); err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid namespace: %w", err)), nil- }- if err := validateKubernetesResourceID(pod); err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid pod: %w", err)), nil- }- if container != "" {- if err := validateKubernetesResourceID(container); err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("invalid container: %w", err)), nil- }- }-- // Check control level- if e.controlLevel == ControlLevelReadOnly {- return NewTextResult("Kubernetes control operations are not available in read-only mode."), nil- }-- agentID, cluster, err := e.findAgentForKubernetesCluster(clusterArg)- if err != nil {- return NewTextResult(err.Error()), nil- }-- // Build kubectl command safely to prevent shell metacharacter breakout on the host.- kubectlCmd := buildKubectlExecCommand(namespace, pod, container, command)- clusterScope := cluster.ID- if clusterScope == "" {- clusterScope = clusterArg- }- approvalTargetID := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:pod:%s", clusterScope, namespace, pod)-- // Check if pre-approved (validated + single-use).- preApproved := consumeApprovalWithValidation(args, e.orgID, kubectlCmd, "kubernetes", approvalTargetID)- requiresApproval := !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled-- // Request approval if needed- if !preApproved && !e.isAutonomous && e.controlLevel == ControlLevelControlled {- displayName := cluster.DisplayName- approvalID := e.createApprovalRecord(kubectlCmd, "kubernetes", approvalTargetID, displayName, fmt.Sprintf("Execute command in pod %s", pod))- return NewTextResult(formatKubernetesApprovalNeeded("exec", pod, namespace, displayName, kubectlCmd, approvalID)), nil- }-- if e.agentServer == nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("no agent server available")), nil- }-- result, err := e.executeCommandWithAudit(- ctx,- "pulse_kubernetes",- fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:pod:%s", clusterScope, namespace, pod),- approvalID,- requiresApproval,- agentID,- agentexec.ExecuteCommandPayload{- Command: kubectlCmd,- TargetType: "agent",- TargetID: "",- },- "pulse_kubernetes",- fmt.Sprintf("execute command in pod %s", pod),- )- if err != nil {- return NewErrorResult(fmt.Errorf("failed to execute kubectl: %w", err)), nil- }-- output := result.Stdout- if result.Stderr != "" {- output += "\n" + result.Stderr- }-- // Always show output explicitly to prevent LLM hallucination- if result.ExitCode == 0 {- if output == "" {- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("Command executed in pod '%s' (exit code 0).\n\nOutput:\n(no output)", pod)), nil- }- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("Command executed in pod '%s' (exit code 0).\n\nOutput:\n%s", pod, output)), nil- }-- if output == "" {- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("Command in pod '%s' exited with code %d.\n\nOutput:\n(no output)", pod, result.ExitCode)), nil- }- return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("Command in pod '%s' exited with code %d.\n\nOutput:\n%s", pod, result.ExitCode, output)), nil-}-// executeKubernetesLogs retrieves pod logsfunc (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeKubernetesLogs(ctx context.Context, args map[string]interface{}) (CallToolResult, error) {clusterArg, _ := args["cluster"].(string)@@ -1010,18 +556,3 @@ func (e *PulseToolExecutor) executeKubernetesLogs(ctx context.Context, args map[return NewTextResult(fmt.Sprintf("kubectl logs failed (exit code %d):\n%s", result.ExitCode, output)), nil}--// formatKubernetesApprovalNeeded formats an approval-required response for Kubernetes operations-func formatKubernetesApprovalNeeded(action, resource, namespace, cluster, command, approvalID string) string {- payload := map[string]interface{}{- "approval_id": approvalID,- "action": action,- "resource": resource,- "namespace": namespace,- "cluster": cluster,- "command": command,- "how_to_approve": "Click the approval button in the chat to execute this action.",- }- payload = enrichApprovalRequiredPayload(payload, approvalID)- return agentcapabilities.FormatApprovalRequiredToolMarker(payload)-}diff --git a/internal/ai/tools/tools_storage_test.go b/internal/ai/tools/tools_storage_test.goindex 517c9a1a85..a06ad03714 100644--- a/internal/ai/tools/tools_storage_test.go+++ b/internal/ai/tools/tools_storage_test.go@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package toolsimport ("context""encoding/json"- "strings""testing""time"@@ -458,28 +457,6 @@ func TestDockerUpdateTools(t *testing.T) {if checkResp.CommandID != "cmd1" || checkResp.TargetID != "host1" {t.Fatalf("unexpected check response: %+v", checkResp)}-- executor.controlLevel = ControlLevelAutonomous- result, _ = executor.executeUpdateDockerContainer(context.Background(), map[string]interface{}{- "host": "Docker One",- "container": "c1",- })- var updateResp DockerUpdateContainerResponse- if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(result.Content[0].Text), &updateResp); err != nil {- t.Fatalf("decode update response: %v", err)- }- if updates.lastUpdateName != "nginx" || updateResp.CommandID != "cmd2" {- t.Fatalf("unexpected update response: %+v", updateResp)- }-- updates.enabled = false- result, _ = executor.executeUpdateDockerContainer(context.Background(), map[string]interface{}{- "host": "Docker One",- "container": "c1",- })- if !strings.Contains(result.Content[0].Text, "updates are disabled") {- t.Fatalf("unexpected disabled response: %s", result.Content[0].Text)- }}func TestDockerUpdatesResponseUsesCanonicalEmptyCollections(t *testing.T) {diff --git a/internal/api/contract_test.go b/internal/api/contract_test.goindex df67f9edb2..e5e74a2391 100644--- a/internal/api/contract_test.go+++ b/internal/api/contract_test.go@@ -19161,12 +19161,10 @@ func TestContract_UpdateFunnelTelemetryStaysContentFree(t *testing.T) {}}-// TestContract_ExecutorPostCompletionCallback pins the seam the SSE-// bridge depends on. The executor must expose SetOnActionCompleted-// and the action_audit hot path must dispatch the callback for every-// terminal-state record (success, runtime fail, plan-drift refusal,-// remediation-lock refusal). Removing or in-lining the callback-// breaks the bridge silently.+// TestContract_ExecutorPostCompletionCallback pins the executor-side+// seam the API layer attaches the agent SSE bridge to. The Assistant+// executor no longer dispatches action audits itself (typed actions+// plan through Pulse Actions), so this pins only that the seam exists.func TestContract_ExecutorPostCompletionCallback(t *testing.T) {executor, err := os.ReadFile("../ai/tools/executor.go")if err != nil {@@ -19176,29 +19174,6 @@ func TestContract_ExecutorPostCompletionCallback(t *testing.T) {if !strings.Contains(executorSrc, "func (e *PulseToolExecutor) SetOnActionCompleted(cb func(unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord))") {t.Error("executor must expose SetOnActionCompleted so the API layer can bridge action completion into the agent SSE stream")}-- audit, err := os.ReadFile("../ai/tools/action_audit.go")- if err != nil {- t.Fatalf("read action_audit.go: %v", err)- }- auditSrc := string(audit)- if !strings.Contains(auditSrc, "func (e *PulseToolExecutor) publishActionCompleted(record unifiedresources.ActionAuditRecord)") {- t.Error("action_audit.go must define publishActionCompleted helper so terminal-state writers route through one bridge point")- }- if !strings.Contains(auditSrc, "go cb(record)") {- t.Error("post-completion callback must run on its own goroutine to keep the dispatch hot path off any consumer's slowness")- }- // Pin the terminal persistence sites and the shared completion publisher.- terminalSites := []string{- `persistFailedActionAudit(e.actionAuditStore, record, requestedBy, "plan drift refused")`,- `e.actionAuditStore.RecordActionExecutionResult(completed, event)`,- `persistFailedActionAudit(e.actionAuditStore, record, requestedBy, remediationLockLifecycleMessage(refusal))`,- }- for _, site := range terminalSites {- if !strings.Contains(auditSrc, site) {- t.Errorf("action_audit.go must call publishActionCompleted at every terminal-state site; missing block:\n%s", site)- }- }}// TestContract_AgentEventActionCompletedKindIsStable pins the@@ -22002,7 +21977,6 @@ func TestContract_PulseMCPAdapterProjectsAgentCapabilitiesManifest(t *testing.T)`Name: agentcapabilities.PulseControlToolName`,`Name: agentcapabilities.PulseDiscoveryToolName`,`Name: agentcapabilities.PulseDockerToolName`,- `Name: agentcapabilities.PulseFileEditToolName`,`Name: agentcapabilities.PulseKubernetesToolName`,`Name: agentcapabilities.PulseKnowledgeToolName`,`Name: agentcapabilities.PulseMetricsToolName`,diff --git a/internal/unifiedresources/code_standards_test.go b/internal/unifiedresources/code_standards_test.goindex 8b911ca2a2..ee43aa0841 100644--- a/internal/unifiedresources/code_standards_test.go+++ b/internal/unifiedresources/code_standards_test.go@@ -322,7 +322,6 @@ func TestCanonicalActionPlanConstructionCannotBypassPolicyProvenancePlanner(t *t// Boundary-only compatibility conversions and retired command-shaped// audit history remain readable but are not canonical action producers."../api/router_routes_ai_relay.go": true,- "../ai/tools/action_audit.go": true,// Graph-owned mock records are immutable presentation fixtures. They do// not admit, approve, or dispatch executable actions."../mock/action_fixtures.go": true,@@ -2579,13 +2578,6 @@ func TestV6DirectHostAliasValidatorCoverage(t *testing.T) {`app_container is no longer supported; use app-container`,},},- {- path: filepath.Join(repoRoot, "internal", "ai", "tools", "tools_file_test.go"),- requiredSnippets: []string{- `Legacy AppContainer Rejected`,- `app_container is no longer supported; use app-container`,- },- },{path: filepath.Join(repoRoot, "internal", "ai", "chat", "context_prefetch_additional_test.go"),requiredSnippets: []string{