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Real-time monitoring dashboard for Proxmox VE, PBS, Docker, Kubernetes, TrueNAS and vSphere. Self-hosted, with alerts for failed backups, full disks, unhealthy containers and offline nodes.

Retain caller token files before installer lifecycle confirmation

pulse-triage[bot]8147f3929212
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
index b8355cfbee..233114f542 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md
@@ -30,13 +30,25 @@ state as before; confirmation does not widen trusted path-removal authority.
Credential-free removal remains local-only, with or without a saved URL.
`TestInstallSHUninstallRetainsCredentialsWhenSavedURLIsMissing` runs the
-production admission, credential-presence, record-confirmation and initial
-state-directory cleanup functions through `agent_uninstall_state.py`. Its
-seventeen confined cases use private files and service/transport doubles,
-not a privileged installer or native service manager. These checks do not
+production argument parser, token-file ingress, admission, credential-presence,
+record-confirmation and initial state-directory cleanup through
+`agent_uninstall_state.py`. Its forty-eight confined cases use private files
+and service/transport doubles, not a privileged installer or native service
+manager. The legacy shell reader's root ownership is projected onto the private
+fixture owner; root refusal runs as the ordinary proof user. These checks do not
establish Windows, actual TLS, saved-state discovery, a published fix or
whole-issue installed removal acceptance.
+Reading `--token-file` is read-only, including in non-interactive mode and
+before permission checks. Supplying a credential does not grant ownership of
+its file: a missing URL, root refusal, refused or unknown server result, or
+identity mismatch cannot erase it. Confirmed removal retains a caller-owned
+file outside the authorised runtime state directory; tokens inside that state
+are removed only by its existing post-confirmation path-authorised cleanup.
+Installer-created temporary credentials still belong to the installer cleanup
+trap. Generated setup commands already remove their own private bootstrap
+files; this does not remove that caller-owned cleanup or widen token/TLS trust.
+
### Selected agent credential files retain their own authority
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md
index 76208eb687..90b59db6ed 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md
@@ -30,13 +30,25 @@ state as before; confirmation does not widen trusted path-removal authority.
Credential-free removal remains local-only, with or without a saved URL.
`TestInstallSHUninstallRetainsCredentialsWhenSavedURLIsMissing` runs the
-production admission, credential-presence, record-confirmation and initial
-state-directory cleanup functions through `agent_uninstall_state.py`. Its
-seventeen confined cases use private files and service/transport doubles,
-not a privileged installer or native service manager. These checks do not
+production argument parser, token-file ingress, admission, credential-presence,
+record-confirmation and initial state-directory cleanup through
+`agent_uninstall_state.py`. Its forty-eight confined cases use private files
+and service/transport doubles, not a privileged installer or native service
+manager. The legacy shell reader's root ownership is projected onto the private
+fixture owner; root refusal runs as the ordinary proof user. These checks do not
establish Windows, actual TLS, saved-state discovery, a published fix or
whole-issue installed removal acceptance.
+Reading `--token-file` is read-only, including in non-interactive mode and
+before permission checks. Supplying a credential does not grant ownership of
+its file: a missing URL, root refusal, refused or unknown server result, or
+identity mismatch cannot erase it. Confirmed removal retains a caller-owned
+file outside the authorised runtime state directory; tokens inside that state
+are removed only by its existing post-confirmation path-authorised cleanup.
+Installer-created temporary credentials still belong to the installer cleanup
+trap. Generated setup commands already remove their own private bootstrap
+files; this does not remove that caller-owned cleanup or widen token/TLS trust.
+
### Docker server update plans preserve the saved deployment
diff --git a/scripts/install.sh b/scripts/install.sh
index 9ed853a20f..429bb241f1 100755
--- a/scripts/install.sh
+++ b/scripts/install.sh
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ Options:
--retarget Point an existing agent at --url using saved identity and token
--uninstall Remove the agent
--non-interactive Skip TTY prompts (for automated/scripted installs)
- --token-file <path> Read token from file (alternative to --token)
+ --token-file <path> Read token from a private file; the caller owns its cleanup
--pulse-url <url> Alias for --url
--preflight-only Run preflight checks and exit (no install)
--output <format> Output format: text (default) or json
@@ -5214,10 +5214,9 @@ if [[ -n "$TOKEN_FILE_PATH" ]]; then
if [[ -z "$PULSE_TOKEN" ]]; then
fail "Token file must be a readable private regular file containing one bounded token: ${TOKEN_FILE_PATH}" "$EXIT_MISSING_ARGS"
fi
- # Clean up token file after reading in non-interactive mode (deploy bootstrap tokens are one-time use)
- if [[ "$NON_INTERACTIVE" == "true" ]]; then
- rm -f "$TOKEN_FILE_PATH" 2>/dev/null || true
- fi
+ # Reading a caller-supplied credential does not grant ownership of its
+ # file. Keep it available after refusal and recovery; callers clean up
+ # their own bootstrap files, while the installer trap owns only TMP_FILES.
fi
if [[ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN_FILE_PATH" ]]; then
diff --git a/scripts/installtests/agent_uninstall_state.py b/scripts/installtests/agent_uninstall_state.py
index 530f5c4693..0f2b20e35a 100644
--- a/scripts/installtests/agent_uninstall_state.py
+++ b/scripts/installtests/agent_uninstall_state.py
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
Production credential detection, record confirmation and directory-authority
functions remain intact. Only transport and service/process operations are
private doubles; deletion is confined to three owned temporary directories.
-These controls are not native installation, TLS or provider acceptance.
+The argument parser and token-file ingress also execute before the removal gate.
+Root-trust is projected onto the private fixture owner for the shell reader;
+these controls are not native installation, TLS or provider acceptance.
"""
import os
@@ -38,7 +40,9 @@ def snapshot(root):
class UnixUninstallState(unittest.TestCase):
source = SOURCE.read_text()
- def exercise(self, credential="runtime", url="", reply="confirmed", authority=True):
+ def exercise(self, credential="runtime", url="", reply="confirmed", authority=True,
+ input_token=False, interactive=False, root_refusal=False, action="uninstall",
+ ingress_only=False):
source = self.source
# Keep the real entry and all initial credential/service/state teardown.
# Stop before unrelated platform boot/log cleanup; never run it on a host.
@@ -73,6 +77,26 @@ class UnixUninstallState(unittest.TestCase):
path.write_text("" if credential == "empty" else "synthetic-collector-credential\n")
path.chmod(0 if credential == "unreadable" else 0o600)
before = snapshot(root)
+ ingress = ""
+ arguments = []
+ if input_token:
+ parser = source.split("# --- Parse Arguments ---\n", 1)[1].split(
+ '\nif [[ "$RETARGET_ONLY"', 1)[0]
+ token_reader = source.split("# Read token from file if --token-file was provided\n", 1)[1].split(
+ '\nif [[ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN_FILE_PATH" ]]', 1)[0]
+ ingress = parser + "\n" + token_reader
+ arguments = {"uninstall": ["--uninstall"], "install": [],
+ "update": ["--update"], "runner": ["--uninstall-action-runner"]}[action]
+ arguments += ["--token-file", str(path)]
+ if not interactive:
+ arguments.append("--non-interactive")
+ if url:
+ arguments += ["--url", url]
+ if root_refusal:
+ if os.geteuid() == 0:
+ self.fail("root-refusal control requires the ordinary proof user")
+ ingress += "\n" + source.split("# --- Check Root ---\n", 1)[1].split(
+ '\nif [[ "$SAFE_PROFILE_ACTION" == "inspect" ]]', 1)[0]
values = {"STATE_DIR": state, "PRIVILEGED_HELPER_STATE_DIR": helper,
"PRIVILEGED_HELPER_CREDENTIAL_DIR": helper, "SAFE_PROFILE_STATE_DIR": profile,
"STATE_DIR_REMOVAL_AUTHORITY": state if authority else "",
@@ -83,14 +107,28 @@ class UnixUninstallState(unittest.TestCase):
"EVENTS": root / "events", "SERVICE": service, "REPLY": reply}
setup = "\n".join(f"{key}={shlex.quote(str(value))}" for key, value in values.items())
functions = "\n".join(function(source, name) for name in names)
+ if input_token:
+ functions += "\n" + function(source, "read_collector_token_file_safely")
# A whitelist protects the fixture even if production cleanup changes.
shell = r'''
set -euo pipefail
UNINSTALL=true AGENT_NAME=pulse-agent EXIT_GENERAL=1 EXIT_MISSING_ARGS=16
OUTPUT_FORMAT=text NON_INTERACTIVE=true
+TOKEN_FILE_PATH="" UNINSTALL_ACTION_RUNNER=false UPDATE_ONLY=false
+RETARGET_ONLY=false PREFLIGHT_ONLY=false SAFE_PROFILE_ACTION=""
log_info() { :; }
log_warn() { printf 'warning:%s\n' "$*"; }
log_error() { printf 'error:%s\n' "$*"; }
+# Project only the fixture's ownership onto the legacy root-file boundary.
+# The production reader still performs its ordinary bounded read.
+collector_lifecycle_binary() { return 1; }
+trusted_private_lifecycle_regular_file() {
+ [[ -f "$1" && ! -L "$1" ]] || return 1
+ local mode="" owner=""
+ mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f '%Lp' "$1") || return 1
+ owner=$(stat -c '%u' "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f '%u' "$1") || return 1
+ [[ "$owner" == "$EUID" && "$mode" =~ ^[0-7]{3,4}$ ]] && (( (8#$mode & 8#077) == 0 ))
+}
recover_agent_id_from_state_file() { printf 'owned-agent\n'; }
run_collector_lifecycle_command() {
printf 'request:%s\n' "$*" >> "$EVENTS"
@@ -109,14 +147,25 @@ teardown_action_runner_service() { printf 'runner-stop\n' >> "$EVENTS"; }
teardown_privileged_helper_service() { printf 'helper-stop\n' >> "$EVENTS"; }
teardown_systemd_agent_service() { printf 'service-stop\n' >> "$EVENTS"; printf 'stopped\n' > "$SERVICE"; }
rm() {
+ if [[ $# == 2 && "$1" == -f && -n "$TOKEN_FILE_PATH" && "$2" == "$TOKEN_FILE_PATH" ]]; then
+ [[ "$2" == "$RUNTIME_TOKEN_FILE" || "$2" == "$STATE_DIR/runtime.token" || "$2" == "$STATE_DIR/token" ]] || return 94
+ printf 'input-token-remove\n' >> "$EVENTS"
+ command rm "$@"
+ return
+ fi
[[ $# == 3 && "$1" == -rf && "$2" == -- ]] || return 92
[[ "$3" == "$STATE_DIR" || "$3" == "$PRIVILEGED_HELPER_STATE_DIR" || "$3" == "$SAFE_PROFILE_STATE_DIR" ]] || return 93
printf 'state-remove\n' >> "$EVENTS"
command rm "$@"
}
'''
+ invocation = ""
+ if input_token:
+ invocation = "UNINSTALL=false NON_INTERACTIVE=false\nset -- " + shlex.join(arguments) + "\n" + ingress + "\n"
+ if ingress_only:
+ invocation += "exit 0\n"
result = subprocess.run(["bash", "-c", shell + "\n" + setup + "\n" + functions +
- "\nmain() {\n" + entry + "}\nmain\n"],
+ "\nmain() {\n" + invocation + entry + "}\nmain\n"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
events = (root / "events").read_text() if (root / "events").exists() else ""
after = snapshot(root)
@@ -169,6 +218,67 @@ rm() {
for name in ("state", "state/runtime.token", "state/agent-id", "state/connection.env"):
self.assertEqual(after[name], before[name])
+ def assert_retained(self, result, events, before, after, expected_exit, expected_events=""):
+ self.assertEqual(result.returncode, expected_exit, result.stdout + result.stderr)
+ self.assertNotIn("synthetic-collector-credential", result.stdout + result.stderr)
+ self.assertEqual(events, expected_events)
+ self.assertEqual(after, before)
+
+ def test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_missing_url_refusal(self):
+ for kind in ("selected", "runtime", "legacy"):
+ with self.subTest(credential=kind):
+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(kind, input_token=True)
+ self.assertIn("same trusted Pulse instance", result.stdout)
+ self.assert_retained(result, events, before, after, 16)
+
+ def test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_unconfirmed_removal(self):
+ for kind in ("selected", "runtime", "legacy"):
+ for reply in ("refused", "lost-response", "empty", "mismatch"):
+ with self.subTest(credential=kind, reply=reply):
+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(
+ kind, url="https://pulse.invalid", reply=reply, input_token=True)
+ self.assert_retained(result, events, before, after, 1,
+ "request:collector-uninstall --agent-id owned-agent --hostname owned-host\n")
+
+ def test_confirmed_removal_retains_caller_owned_input_token(self):
+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(
+ "selected", url="https://pulse.invalid", input_token=True)
+ self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stdout + result.stderr)
+ self.assertEqual(events.splitlines()[0],
+ "request:collector-uninstall --agent-id owned-agent --hostname owned-host")
+ self.assertNotIn("input-token-remove", events)
+ self.assertEqual(set(after), {"service", "unrelated", "selected-token"})
+ self.assertEqual(after["selected-token"], before["selected-token"])
+ self.assertEqual(after["unrelated"], before["unrelated"])
+
+ def test_confirmed_removal_deletes_runtime_token_only_with_authorised_state(self):
+ for kind in ("runtime", "legacy"):
+ with self.subTest(credential=kind):
+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(
+ kind, url="https://pulse.invalid", input_token=True)
+ self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stdout + result.stderr)
+ self.assertEqual(events.splitlines()[0],
+ "request:collector-uninstall --agent-id owned-agent --hostname owned-host")
+ self.assertNotIn("input-token-remove", events)
+ self.assertEqual(set(after), {"service", "unrelated"})
+ self.assertEqual(after["unrelated"], before["unrelated"])
+
+ def test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_root_refusal(self):
+ for action in ("uninstall", "install", "update", "runner"):
+ for kind in ("selected", "runtime", "legacy"):
+ with self.subTest(action=action, credential=kind):
+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(
+ kind, input_token=True, root_refusal=True, action=action)
+ self.assertIn("This script must be run as root", result.stdout)
+ self.assert_retained(result, events, before, after, 1)
+
+ def test_interactive_input_token_is_read_only_at_ingress(self):
+ # Compare interactive ingress without invoking the unrelated TTY exit
+ # prompt in a subprocess with no controlling terminal.
+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(
+ "selected", input_token=True, interactive=True, ingress_only=True)
+ self.assert_retained(result, events, before, after, 0)
+
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
diff --git a/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go b/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go
index 1feefce099..e2b05197ef 100644
--- a/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go
+++ b/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go
@@ -8289,12 +8289,18 @@ func TestInstallSHUninstallRetainsCredentialsWhenSavedURLIsMissing(t *testing.T)
"test_exact_confirmation_precedes_process_service_and_state_teardown",
"test_credential_free_local_only_removal_needs_no_url_or_request",
"test_server_confirmation_does_not_grant_unknown_path_removal",
+ "test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_missing_url_refusal",
+ "test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_unconfirmed_removal",
+ "test_confirmed_removal_retains_caller_owned_input_token",
+ "test_confirmed_removal_deletes_runtime_token_only_with_authorised_state",
+ "test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_root_refusal",
+ "test_interactive_input_token_is_read_only_at_ingress",
} {
if !strings.Contains(string(output), name+" (__main__.UnixUninstallState."+name+") ... ok") {
t.Fatalf("Unix removal control %s did not pass:\n%s", name, output)
}
}
- if !strings.Contains(string(output), "\nRan 5 tests in ") || !strings.Contains(string(output), "\nOK\n") {
+ if !strings.Contains(string(output), "\nRan 11 tests in ") || !strings.Contains(string(output), "\nOK\n") {
t.Fatalf("incomplete Unix removal state verdict:\n%s", output)
}
t.Logf("%s", output)