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Retain caller token files before installer lifecycle confirmation
pulse-triage[bot]8147f3929212
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.mdindex b8355cfbee..233114f542 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/agent-lifecycle.md@@ -30,13 +30,25 @@ state as before; confirmation does not widen trusted path-removal authority.Credential-free removal remains local-only, with or without a saved URL.`TestInstallSHUninstallRetainsCredentialsWhenSavedURLIsMissing` runs the-production admission, credential-presence, record-confirmation and initial-state-directory cleanup functions through `agent_uninstall_state.py`. Its-seventeen confined cases use private files and service/transport doubles,-not a privileged installer or native service manager. These checks do not+production argument parser, token-file ingress, admission, credential-presence,+record-confirmation and initial state-directory cleanup through+`agent_uninstall_state.py`. Its forty-eight confined cases use private files+and service/transport doubles, not a privileged installer or native service+manager. The legacy shell reader's root ownership is projected onto the private+fixture owner; root refusal runs as the ordinary proof user. These checks do notestablish Windows, actual TLS, saved-state discovery, a published fix orwhole-issue installed removal acceptance.+Reading `--token-file` is read-only, including in non-interactive mode and+before permission checks. Supplying a credential does not grant ownership of+its file: a missing URL, root refusal, refused or unknown server result, or+identity mismatch cannot erase it. Confirmed removal retains a caller-owned+file outside the authorised runtime state directory; tokens inside that state+are removed only by its existing post-confirmation path-authorised cleanup.+Installer-created temporary credentials still belong to the installer cleanup+trap. Generated setup commands already remove their own private bootstrap+files; this does not remove that caller-owned cleanup or widen token/TLS trust.+### Selected agent credential files retain their own authoritydiff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.mdindex 76208eb687..90b59db6ed 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/deployment-installability.md@@ -30,13 +30,25 @@ state as before; confirmation does not widen trusted path-removal authority.Credential-free removal remains local-only, with or without a saved URL.`TestInstallSHUninstallRetainsCredentialsWhenSavedURLIsMissing` runs the-production admission, credential-presence, record-confirmation and initial-state-directory cleanup functions through `agent_uninstall_state.py`. Its-seventeen confined cases use private files and service/transport doubles,-not a privileged installer or native service manager. These checks do not+production argument parser, token-file ingress, admission, credential-presence,+record-confirmation and initial state-directory cleanup through+`agent_uninstall_state.py`. Its forty-eight confined cases use private files+and service/transport doubles, not a privileged installer or native service+manager. The legacy shell reader's root ownership is projected onto the private+fixture owner; root refusal runs as the ordinary proof user. These checks do notestablish Windows, actual TLS, saved-state discovery, a published fix orwhole-issue installed removal acceptance.+Reading `--token-file` is read-only, including in non-interactive mode and+before permission checks. Supplying a credential does not grant ownership of+its file: a missing URL, root refusal, refused or unknown server result, or+identity mismatch cannot erase it. Confirmed removal retains a caller-owned+file outside the authorised runtime state directory; tokens inside that state+are removed only by its existing post-confirmation path-authorised cleanup.+Installer-created temporary credentials still belong to the installer cleanup+trap. Generated setup commands already remove their own private bootstrap+files; this does not remove that caller-owned cleanup or widen token/TLS trust.+### Docker server update plans preserve the saved deploymentdiff --git a/scripts/install.sh b/scripts/install.shindex 9ed853a20f..429bb241f1 100755--- a/scripts/install.sh+++ b/scripts/install.sh@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ Options:--retarget Point an existing agent at --url using saved identity and token--uninstall Remove the agent--non-interactive Skip TTY prompts (for automated/scripted installs)- --token-file <path> Read token from file (alternative to --token)+ --token-file <path> Read token from a private file; the caller owns its cleanup--pulse-url <url> Alias for --url--preflight-only Run preflight checks and exit (no install)--output <format> Output format: text (default) or json@@ -5214,10 +5214,9 @@ if [[ -n "$TOKEN_FILE_PATH" ]]; thenif [[ -z "$PULSE_TOKEN" ]]; thenfail "Token file must be a readable private regular file containing one bounded token: ${TOKEN_FILE_PATH}" "$EXIT_MISSING_ARGS"fi- # Clean up token file after reading in non-interactive mode (deploy bootstrap tokens are one-time use)- if [[ "$NON_INTERACTIVE" == "true" ]]; then- rm -f "$TOKEN_FILE_PATH" 2>/dev/null || true- fi+ # Reading a caller-supplied credential does not grant ownership of its+ # file. Keep it available after refusal and recovery; callers clean up+ # their own bootstrap files, while the installer trap owns only TMP_FILES.fiif [[ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN_FILE_PATH" ]]; thendiff --git a/scripts/installtests/agent_uninstall_state.py b/scripts/installtests/agent_uninstall_state.pyindex 530f5c4693..0f2b20e35a 100644--- a/scripts/installtests/agent_uninstall_state.py+++ b/scripts/installtests/agent_uninstall_state.py@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@Production credential detection, record confirmation and directory-authorityfunctions remain intact. Only transport and service/process operations areprivate doubles; deletion is confined to three owned temporary directories.-These controls are not native installation, TLS or provider acceptance.+The argument parser and token-file ingress also execute before the removal gate.+Root-trust is projected onto the private fixture owner for the shell reader;+these controls are not native installation, TLS or provider acceptance."""import os@@ -38,7 +40,9 @@ def snapshot(root):class UnixUninstallState(unittest.TestCase):source = SOURCE.read_text()- def exercise(self, credential="runtime", url="", reply="confirmed", authority=True):+ def exercise(self, credential="runtime", url="", reply="confirmed", authority=True,+ input_token=False, interactive=False, root_refusal=False, action="uninstall",+ ingress_only=False):source = self.source# Keep the real entry and all initial credential/service/state teardown.# Stop before unrelated platform boot/log cleanup; never run it on a host.@@ -73,6 +77,26 @@ class UnixUninstallState(unittest.TestCase):path.write_text("" if credential == "empty" else "synthetic-collector-credential\n")path.chmod(0 if credential == "unreadable" else 0o600)before = snapshot(root)+ ingress = ""+ arguments = []+ if input_token:+ parser = source.split("# --- Parse Arguments ---\n", 1)[1].split(+ '\nif [[ "$RETARGET_ONLY"', 1)[0]+ token_reader = source.split("# Read token from file if --token-file was provided\n", 1)[1].split(+ '\nif [[ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN_FILE_PATH" ]]', 1)[0]+ ingress = parser + "\n" + token_reader+ arguments = {"uninstall": ["--uninstall"], "install": [],+ "update": ["--update"], "runner": ["--uninstall-action-runner"]}[action]+ arguments += ["--token-file", str(path)]+ if not interactive:+ arguments.append("--non-interactive")+ if url:+ arguments += ["--url", url]+ if root_refusal:+ if os.geteuid() == 0:+ self.fail("root-refusal control requires the ordinary proof user")+ ingress += "\n" + source.split("# --- Check Root ---\n", 1)[1].split(+ '\nif [[ "$SAFE_PROFILE_ACTION" == "inspect" ]]', 1)[0]values = {"STATE_DIR": state, "PRIVILEGED_HELPER_STATE_DIR": helper,"PRIVILEGED_HELPER_CREDENTIAL_DIR": helper, "SAFE_PROFILE_STATE_DIR": profile,"STATE_DIR_REMOVAL_AUTHORITY": state if authority else "",@@ -83,14 +107,28 @@ class UnixUninstallState(unittest.TestCase):"EVENTS": root / "events", "SERVICE": service, "REPLY": reply}setup = "\n".join(f"{key}={shlex.quote(str(value))}" for key, value in values.items())functions = "\n".join(function(source, name) for name in names)+ if input_token:+ functions += "\n" + function(source, "read_collector_token_file_safely")# A whitelist protects the fixture even if production cleanup changes.shell = r'''set -euo pipefailUNINSTALL=true AGENT_NAME=pulse-agent EXIT_GENERAL=1 EXIT_MISSING_ARGS=16OUTPUT_FORMAT=text NON_INTERACTIVE=true+TOKEN_FILE_PATH="" UNINSTALL_ACTION_RUNNER=false UPDATE_ONLY=false+RETARGET_ONLY=false PREFLIGHT_ONLY=false SAFE_PROFILE_ACTION=""log_info() { :; }log_warn() { printf 'warning:%s\n' "$*"; }log_error() { printf 'error:%s\n' "$*"; }+# Project only the fixture's ownership onto the legacy root-file boundary.+# The production reader still performs its ordinary bounded read.+collector_lifecycle_binary() { return 1; }+trusted_private_lifecycle_regular_file() {+ [[ -f "$1" && ! -L "$1" ]] || return 1+ local mode="" owner=""+ mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f '%Lp' "$1") || return 1+ owner=$(stat -c '%u' "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f '%u' "$1") || return 1+ [[ "$owner" == "$EUID" && "$mode" =~ ^[0-7]{3,4}$ ]] && (( (8#$mode & 8#077) == 0 ))+}recover_agent_id_from_state_file() { printf 'owned-agent\n'; }run_collector_lifecycle_command() {printf 'request:%s\n' "$*" >> "$EVENTS"@@ -109,14 +147,25 @@ teardown_action_runner_service() { printf 'runner-stop\n' >> "$EVENTS"; }teardown_privileged_helper_service() { printf 'helper-stop\n' >> "$EVENTS"; }teardown_systemd_agent_service() { printf 'service-stop\n' >> "$EVENTS"; printf 'stopped\n' > "$SERVICE"; }rm() {+ if [[ $# == 2 && "$1" == -f && -n "$TOKEN_FILE_PATH" && "$2" == "$TOKEN_FILE_PATH" ]]; then+ [[ "$2" == "$RUNTIME_TOKEN_FILE" || "$2" == "$STATE_DIR/runtime.token" || "$2" == "$STATE_DIR/token" ]] || return 94+ printf 'input-token-remove\n' >> "$EVENTS"+ command rm "$@"+ return+ fi[[ $# == 3 && "$1" == -rf && "$2" == -- ]] || return 92[[ "$3" == "$STATE_DIR" || "$3" == "$PRIVILEGED_HELPER_STATE_DIR" || "$3" == "$SAFE_PROFILE_STATE_DIR" ]] || return 93printf 'state-remove\n' >> "$EVENTS"command rm "$@"}'''+ invocation = ""+ if input_token:+ invocation = "UNINSTALL=false NON_INTERACTIVE=false\nset -- " + shlex.join(arguments) + "\n" + ingress + "\n"+ if ingress_only:+ invocation += "exit 0\n"result = subprocess.run(["bash", "-c", shell + "\n" + setup + "\n" + functions +- "\nmain() {\n" + entry + "}\nmain\n"],+ "\nmain() {\n" + invocation + entry + "}\nmain\n"],capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)events = (root / "events").read_text() if (root / "events").exists() else ""after = snapshot(root)@@ -169,6 +218,67 @@ rm() {for name in ("state", "state/runtime.token", "state/agent-id", "state/connection.env"):self.assertEqual(after[name], before[name])+ def assert_retained(self, result, events, before, after, expected_exit, expected_events=""):+ self.assertEqual(result.returncode, expected_exit, result.stdout + result.stderr)+ self.assertNotIn("synthetic-collector-credential", result.stdout + result.stderr)+ self.assertEqual(events, expected_events)+ self.assertEqual(after, before)++ def test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_missing_url_refusal(self):+ for kind in ("selected", "runtime", "legacy"):+ with self.subTest(credential=kind):+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(kind, input_token=True)+ self.assertIn("same trusted Pulse instance", result.stdout)+ self.assert_retained(result, events, before, after, 16)++ def test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_unconfirmed_removal(self):+ for kind in ("selected", "runtime", "legacy"):+ for reply in ("refused", "lost-response", "empty", "mismatch"):+ with self.subTest(credential=kind, reply=reply):+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(+ kind, url="https://pulse.invalid", reply=reply, input_token=True)+ self.assert_retained(result, events, before, after, 1,+ "request:collector-uninstall --agent-id owned-agent --hostname owned-host\n")++ def test_confirmed_removal_retains_caller_owned_input_token(self):+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(+ "selected", url="https://pulse.invalid", input_token=True)+ self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stdout + result.stderr)+ self.assertEqual(events.splitlines()[0],+ "request:collector-uninstall --agent-id owned-agent --hostname owned-host")+ self.assertNotIn("input-token-remove", events)+ self.assertEqual(set(after), {"service", "unrelated", "selected-token"})+ self.assertEqual(after["selected-token"], before["selected-token"])+ self.assertEqual(after["unrelated"], before["unrelated"])++ def test_confirmed_removal_deletes_runtime_token_only_with_authorised_state(self):+ for kind in ("runtime", "legacy"):+ with self.subTest(credential=kind):+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(+ kind, url="https://pulse.invalid", input_token=True)+ self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stdout + result.stderr)+ self.assertEqual(events.splitlines()[0],+ "request:collector-uninstall --agent-id owned-agent --hostname owned-host")+ self.assertNotIn("input-token-remove", events)+ self.assertEqual(set(after), {"service", "unrelated"})+ self.assertEqual(after["unrelated"], before["unrelated"])++ def test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_root_refusal(self):+ for action in ("uninstall", "install", "update", "runner"):+ for kind in ("selected", "runtime", "legacy"):+ with self.subTest(action=action, credential=kind):+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(+ kind, input_token=True, root_refusal=True, action=action)+ self.assertIn("This script must be run as root", result.stdout)+ self.assert_retained(result, events, before, after, 1)++ def test_interactive_input_token_is_read_only_at_ingress(self):+ # Compare interactive ingress without invoking the unrelated TTY exit+ # prompt in a subprocess with no controlling terminal.+ result, events, before, after = self.exercise(+ "selected", input_token=True, interactive=True, ingress_only=True)+ self.assert_retained(result, events, before, after, 0)+if __name__ == "__main__":unittest.main()diff --git a/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go b/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.goindex 1feefce099..e2b05197ef 100644--- a/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go+++ b/scripts/installtests/install_sh_test.go@@ -8289,12 +8289,18 @@ func TestInstallSHUninstallRetainsCredentialsWhenSavedURLIsMissing(t *testing.T)"test_exact_confirmation_precedes_process_service_and_state_teardown","test_credential_free_local_only_removal_needs_no_url_or_request","test_server_confirmation_does_not_grant_unknown_path_removal",+ "test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_missing_url_refusal",+ "test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_unconfirmed_removal",+ "test_confirmed_removal_retains_caller_owned_input_token",+ "test_confirmed_removal_deletes_runtime_token_only_with_authorised_state",+ "test_noninteractive_input_token_survives_root_refusal",+ "test_interactive_input_token_is_read_only_at_ingress",} {if !strings.Contains(string(output), name+" (__main__.UnixUninstallState."+name+") ... ok") {t.Fatalf("Unix removal control %s did not pass:\n%s", name, output)}}- if !strings.Contains(string(output), "\nRan 5 tests in ") || !strings.Contains(string(output), "\nOK\n") {+ if !strings.Contains(string(output), "\nRan 11 tests in ") || !strings.Contains(string(output), "\nOK\n") {t.Fatalf("incomplete Unix removal state verdict:\n%s", output)}t.Logf("%s", output)