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Compose API Access lifetime repair with session withdrawal
pulse-triage[bot]881edc49da2e
diff --cc docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.mdindex 2cc02cdc3d,af874be32a..44e38b8431--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/api-contracts.md@@@ -13487,34 -13486,33 +13487,65 @@@ value grammars, detached projections, lownership. Consuming browser evidence exercises the unchanged download controlwith the exact synthetic native ZIP; it is not installed/customer recovery.+### Logged-out sessions cannot retain confidential live reads++Successful route authentication records the exact selected browser session in+server-only request context. The existing protected WebSocket, agent-event,+System Logs, progress and Assistant stream/result boundaries retain that+session's store, creation identity, principal and recovery kind. Each protected+write (and existing idle recheck) refuses a deleted, expired, replaced or+rebound session. Reads never extend session expiry, re-authenticate with a+fallback credential or refresh an identity provider. Recovery reads retain their+original direct-loopback/IP binding. Proxy/basic/development admission and+explicit-token precedence are unchanged; an ambient cookie or response header+cannot establish session authority.++Before a synchronous result commits, session withdrawal returns generic `401`+and withholds handler-specific headers; an admitted stream ends without new+private data or an appended HTTP error. Monitoring WebSocket uses its existing+`1008`/`Monitoring access ended` close, so its current web consumer returns to+sign-in; System Logs observes EOF and a denied reconnect, not live monitoring.+An already-admitted write can be in flight. This does not erase previously+received data, cancel independent jobs/legacy executions, introduce dynamic+role-policy rechecks or qualify installed/identity-provider recovery. Chat+retains its existing request-bound work lifetime.++`session_read_authority_test.go` covers detached identity, secure-cookie choice,+expiry without sliding extension, replacement, recovery/store withdrawal,+credential precedence and idle/result closure. `session_read_logout_test.go`+and the native Assistant/Logs/event cases exercise real persisted logout and+independent sessions. `TestContractSessionReadLogoutBoundary` asserts native+HTTP/WS logout, private-line withholding and fresh denial, optionally exporting+safe wire evidence for the existing browser consumers; the browser-only fixture+is retained evidence, not product source.+++ ### API token panel requests retain their confirmed context++ The existing API Access token inventory and create, rename, scope-edit and revoke+ calls accept an abort signal and expected organisation. They use the ordinary+ credentials, retain backend permission/scope/owner checks, and do not automatically+ retry a refusal or switch a confirmation to the default organisation. CSRF+ preparation must finish without dispatching an aborted or differently scoped+ write. The Relay/mobile issuer and token detail API are unchanged.++ The consuming panel rejects results after disposal, an organisation/user change+ or management-authority change, including leave-and-return cycles. Only one write+ runs at once; an inventory read interrupted by a write resumes as a new read,+ never an old snapshot. An unreadable inventory remains unknown and read-only+ accounts retain explicit inventory recovery. These guarantees are exercised by+ `security.transport.test.ts`, `security.test.ts`, `APITokenLifetimes.test.tsx`+ and the registered API token panel tests; browser proof covers the actual API+ Access consumer with synthetic responses, not installed administrator recovery.++ Authority and authenticated-user watchers compare their effective primitive+ values, not the containing security-status object's identity. An ordinary status+ refresh or primary-token hint change with the same user/permission must not+ withdraw a confirmed token or start another inventory read. The registered+ unchanged-principal status-refresh test pins this boundary.++ Accepted token rows retain their inventory-read generation across confirmed+ scope/name replacements. Keyed desktop-table reconciliation may retain the+ earlier raw object; that current-read object remains usable for the same live+ ID. A later full read, context withdrawal or deletion invalidates the old+ confirmation. The registered sequential scope-edit/revoke consumer regression+ and earlier-read rejection test cover both sides without ID-only admission.