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Real-time monitoring dashboard for Proxmox VE, PBS, Docker, Kubernetes, TrueNAS and vSphere. Self-hosted, with alerts for failed backups, full disks, unhealthy containers and offline nodes.

Keep capped foreign redirects private and terminal

pulse-triage[bot]9188d0f442a5
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/notifications.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/notifications.md
index 7b840bb8cf..56d172017b 100644
--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/notifications.md
+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/notifications.md
@@ -24,8 +24,10 @@ is not permission to receive private alert bodies, custom authentication headers
or signed requests. HTTP/HTTPS changes are also refused. Same-origin paths and
queries remain supported, including default-port and equivalent IPv6 spellings;
the existing redirect limit, DNS pinning, URL validation and TLS checks remain.
-Foreign redirects stop before target DNS resolution, validation logging or a
-second request. A fixed configuration failure advises the operator to configure
+Foreign redirects stop before target DNS resolution, validation logging or any
+request to that receiver. Origin refusal precedes the redirect-count error, so
+an exhausted same-origin chain cannot expose its final foreign Location or
+change that refusal into an unknown/retryable error. A fixed configuration failure advises the operator to configure
the final destination URL, without copying the receiver-controlled Location.
That typed failure stops both enhanced transport retries and the queue's retry
@@ -37,7 +39,9 @@ Apprise retains the same safe guidance and existing opaque diagnostic policy.
redirect statuses, foreign ports/hostname aliases, authenticated HTTPS downgrade
with and without the existing TLS override, every sender path and the real
queue's firing/recovery dead-letter, audit and receipt lifecycle. Same-origin
-controls verify unchanged methods, payloads, credentials and signatures.
+controls verify unchanged methods, payloads, credentials and signatures. Capped
+chains exercise direct, enhanced-retry and HTTP Apprise paths; the unchanged
+same-origin redirect-count controls remain.
`notification_redirect_origin_test.go` covers origin equivalence and separation.
Existing redirect-chain controls now exercise paths on one receiver, not three
different receivers. This is source privacy/compatibility proof, not installed
diff --git a/internal/notifications/notification_redirect_test.go b/internal/notifications/notification_redirect_test.go
index 3b88e298fa..a2872baaae 100644
--- a/internal/notifications/notification_redirect_test.go
+++ b/internal/notifications/notification_redirect_test.go
@@ -371,3 +371,61 @@ func TestNotificationRedirectOriginQueue(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
+
+// The count limit must not hide an origin refusal: net/http attaches the final
+// Location to its error even when it never requests that receiver.
+func TestNotificationRedirectOriginAtLimit(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, status := range []int{http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, http.StatusPermanentRedirect} {
+ for _, path := range []string{"request", "enhanced-retry", "apprise"} {
+ t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%d/%s", status, path), func(t *testing.T) {
+ captured := captureAppriseLogs(t)
+ initial, final := &notificationRedirectCapture{}, &notificationRedirectCapture{}
+ sink := newIPv4HTTPServer(t, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ final.record(t, r)
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
+ }))
+ defer sink.Close()
+ origin := newIPv4HTTPServer(t, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ initial.record(t, r)
+ target := sink.URL + "/" + redirectPrivateLocation
+ switch r.URL.Path {
+ case "/same-origin-1":
+ target = "/same-origin-2"
+ case "/same-origin-2":
+ default:
+ target = "/same-origin-1"
+ }
+ http.Redirect(w, r, target, status)
+ }))
+ defer origin.Close()
+ n := notificationRedirectManager(t)
+ webhook := WebhookConfig{Name: "capped redirect fixture", URL: origin.URL + "/entry",
+ Headers: map[string]string{"X-Receiver-Key": redirectPrivateHeader}}
+ var err error
+ switch path {
+ case "request":
+ _, err = n.executeWebhookRequest(webhook, []byte(redirectPrivateBody), webhookRequestOptions{validateURL: true})
+ case "enhanced-retry":
+ err = n.sendWebhookWithRetry(EnhancedWebhookConfig{WebhookConfig: webhook, RetryCount: 1}, []byte(redirectPrivateBody), "fixture:alert")
+ case "apprise":
+ cfg := AppriseConfig{Enabled: true, Mode: AppriseModeHTTP, ServerURL: origin.URL, APIKey: redirectPrivateHeader, APIKeyHeader: "X-Receiver-Key", TimeoutSeconds: 5}
+ err = n.sendGroupedApprise(cfg, []*alerts.Alert{{ID: "capped-redirect", Message: redirectPrivateBody}})
+ }
+ assertNotificationRedirectRefused(t, err)
+ if len(initial.snapshot()) != WebhookMaxRedirects || len(final.snapshot()) != 0 {
+ t.Error("capped foreign redirect was retried or contacted its receiver")
+ }
+ assertNotificationRedirectPrivate(t, captured.String())
+ if path == "enhanced-retry" {
+ history := n.GetWebhookHistory()
+ if len(history) != 1 || history[0].Success || history[0].RetryAttempts != 0 {
+ t.Error("capped foreign redirect lost its one-attempt failure state")
+ }
+ if len(history) == 1 {
+ assertNotificationRedirectPrivate(t, history[0].ErrorMessage)
+ }
+ }
+ })
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/internal/notifications/notifications.go b/internal/notifications/notifications.go
index 577119100d..1262364a06 100644
--- a/internal/notifications/notifications.go
+++ b/internal/notifications/notifications.go
@@ -195,14 +195,17 @@ func (n *NotificationManager) createSecureWebhookClientWithURLDiagnostics(timeou
Timeout: timeout,
Transport: transport,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
- if len(via) >= WebhookMaxRedirects {
- return fmt.Errorf("stopped after %d redirects", WebhookMaxRedirects)
- }
// SSRF admission is not permission to forward private alert bodies,
// custom authentication headers or signatures to a different receiver.
if len(via) == 0 || via[0] == nil || !sameNotificationOrigin(via[0].URL, req.URL) {
return FailWithClass(NotificationFailureConfiguration, errNotificationRedirectOrigin)
}
+ // Origin refusal takes precedence even when the redirect budget is
+ // exhausted: a foreign Location must not enter diagnostics or become
+ // an unknown/retryable error instead of a local configuration failure.
+ if len(via) >= WebhookMaxRedirects {
+ return fmt.Errorf("stopped after %d redirects", WebhookMaxRedirects)
+ }
// Re-validate strictly on an admitted redirect, including DNS/IP
// changes. Foreign origins are rejected before resolution or logging.
return n.validateWebhookURL(req.URL.String(), diagnosticURL)