Real-time monitoring dashboard for Proxmox VE, PBS, Docker, Kubernetes, TrueNAS and vSphere. Self-hosted, with alerts for failed backups, full disks, unhealthy containers and offline nodes.
Go aialertsdashboarddockerdocker-monitoringgohomelabinfrastructure-monitoringkubernetesmonitoringmspproxmoxproxmox-backup-serverproxmox-mail-gatewayproxmox-veself-hostedtruenastypescriptvspherewebhooks
Keep infrastructure credentials inside their configured HTTP origin
pulse-triage[bot]971d403d014e
diff --git a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.mdindex fc31225841..d58162dc6c 100644--- a/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md+++ b/docs/release-control/v6/internal/subsystems/security-privacy.md@@ -18,6 +18,33 @@## Purpose+### Infrastructure credentials remain within the configured HTTP origin++The shared `tlsutil.CreateHTTPClientWithTimeout` transport permits redirects+only within the first request's scheme, hostname and effective port. This+protects token and ticket headers, CSRF headers and replayable password bodies+before a redirected request reaches another service, subdomain or plaintext+endpoint. Redirect userinfo and invalid authorities are refused. Hostname+case, default ports and equivalent IPv6 literals are canonicalised; IPv6 zone+case remains significant. The existing ten-redirect limit and same-origin+proxy path/query redirects remain supported.++System CA checks, configured leaf pins, the TLS floor, explicit verification+opt-outs, initial HTTP configuration, DNS/proxy routing and independent cluster+member admission do not change. Guest-agent commands and backup-lock evidence+retain their stricter no-redirect policy, including same-origin redirects; an+ordinary read's policy cannot admit a redirected guest command.++`TestInfrastructureRedirectOriginPolicy`,+`TestInfrastructureRedirectChainAndLimit` and+`TestCreateHTTPClientRedirectAuthorityValidation` pin the shared boundary.+`TestInfrastructureRedirectRefusesConnectedOriginChanges` uses actual owned+TLS/plaintext sockets in CA, pin and explicit opt-out modes. PVE and PBS+`client_redirect_test.go` exercise actual token, ticket/CSRF and password+JSON/form flows plus retained same-origin proxy reads with synthetic credentials.+These are bounded source controls, not an installed connection or an observed+credential incident.+### Certificate capture uses the connection's socket authority`tlsutil.FetchFingerprint` selects an explicit HTTP(S) URL's host and port,diff --git a/pkg/tlsutil/fingerprint.go b/pkg/tlsutil/fingerprint.goindex d587d73b99..8f7a602939 100644--- a/pkg/tlsutil/fingerprint.go+++ b/pkg/tlsutil/fingerprint.go@@ -214,6 +214,52 @@ func proxyFromEnvironmentBypassingLocalInfrastructure(req *http.Request) (*url.Ureturn http.ProxyFromEnvironment(req)}+// Infrastructure requests can carry tokens, tickets, CSRF headers or replayable+// login bodies. Go's default redirect policy does not bind those to a port or+// scheme, and may forward some credentials to subdomains. Allow proxy path+// redirects only within the first request's origin, before any redirected dial.+func infrastructureRedirectPolicy(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {+ if len(via) >= 10 {+ return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")+ }+ if req == nil || len(via) == 0 || via[0] == nil {+ return fmt.Errorf("infrastructure redirects require an original request")+ }+ origin, originErr := infrastructureRedirectOrigin(via[0].URL)+ destination, destinationErr := infrastructureRedirectOrigin(req.URL)+ if originErr != nil || destinationErr != nil || origin != destination {+ return fmt.Errorf("infrastructure redirects must stay on the same origin")+ }+ return nil+}++func infrastructureRedirectOrigin(u *url.URL) (string, error) {+ if u == nil || u.User != nil || u.Opaque != "" || (u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https") || u.Hostname() == "" {+ return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid HTTP origin")+ }+ host := u.Hostname()+ if address, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {+ host = address.String() // Canonical IPv6, preserving zone case.+ } else {+ host = strings.ToLower(host)+ }+ port := u.Port()+ if port == "" {+ if strings.HasSuffix(u.Host, ":") {+ return "", fmt.Errorf("port is empty")+ }+ port = "443"+ if u.Scheme == "http" {+ port = "80"+ }+ }+ number, err := strconv.ParseUint(port, 10, 16)+ if err != nil || number == 0 {+ return "", fmt.Errorf("port must be between 1 and 65535")+ }+ return u.Scheme + "://" + net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.FormatUint(number, 10)), nil+}+// CreateHTTPClient creates an HTTP client with appropriate TLS configurationfunc CreateHTTPClient(verifySSL bool, fingerprint string) *http.Client {return CreateHTTPClientWithTimeout(verifySSL, fingerprint, 60*time.Second)@@ -253,7 +299,8 @@ func CreateHTTPClientWithTimeout(verifySSL bool, fingerprint string, timeout tim}return &http.Client{- Transport: transport,- Timeout: timeout,+ Transport: transport,+ Timeout: timeout,+ CheckRedirect: infrastructureRedirectPolicy,}}diff --git a/pkg/tlsutil/tlsutil_test.go b/pkg/tlsutil/tlsutil_test.goindex da4dbf4641..3109fa1ea1 100644--- a/pkg/tlsutil/tlsutil_test.go+++ b/pkg/tlsutil/tlsutil_test.go@@ -13,6 +13,55 @@ import ("time")+func TestCreateHTTPClientRedirectAuthorityValidation(t *testing.T) {+ for _, mode := range []struct {+ name string+ verify bool+ fingerprint string+ }{+ {"ca", true, ""},+ {"pin", true, strings.Repeat("a", 64)},+ {"explicit-opt-out", false, ""},+ } {+ t.Run(mode.name, func(t *testing.T) {+ client := CreateHTTPClient(mode.verify, mode.fingerprint)+ if client.CheckRedirect == nil {+ t.Fatal("infrastructure client uses the unrestricted default redirect policy")+ }+ for _, pair := range []struct {+ name, original, target string+ allowed bool+ }{+ {"default-port", "https://pve.test", "https://PVE.test:0443/path", true},+ {"ipv6", "https://[::1]:443", "https://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]/path", true},+ {"zone", "https://[fe80::1%25eth0]", "https://[fe80::1%25eth0]/path", true},+ {"zone-case", "https://[fe80::1%25eth0]", "https://[fe80::1%25ETH0]/path", false},+ {"empty-port", "https://pve.test", "https://pve.test:/path", false},+ {"zero-port", "https://pve.test", "https://pve.test:0/path", false},+ {"port-overflow", "https://pve.test", "https://pve.test:65536/path", false},+ } {+ t.Run(pair.name, func(t *testing.T) {+ original, err := url.Parse(pair.original)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+ target, err := url.Parse(pair.target)+ if err != nil {+ t.Fatal(err)+ }+ err = client.CheckRedirect(&http.Request{URL: target}, []*http.Request{{URL: original}})+ if (err == nil) != pair.allowed {+ t.Fatalf("origin comparison allowed=%t: %v", pair.allowed, err)+ }+ })+ }+ if client.CheckRedirect(nil, nil) == nil || client.CheckRedirect(&http.Request{}, []*http.Request{nil}) == nil {+ t.Fatal("missing origin evidence admitted a redirect")+ }+ })+ }+}+func TestFingerprintVerifier_NormalizesFingerprint(t *testing.T) {// Fingerprint with colonsfp1 := "AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF:00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77:88:99:AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF:00:11:22:33:44:55:66:77:88:99"