Real-time monitoring dashboard for Proxmox VE, PBS, Docker, Kubernetes, TrueNAS and vSphere. Self-hosted, with alerts for failed backups, full disks, unhealthy containers and offline nodes.
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Explain intentionally scoped Proxmox access without widening tokens
pulse-triage[bot]e320e3c685ba
diff --git a/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md b/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.mdindex 679fb6cc4d..07e14f2c2f 100644--- a/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md+++ b/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md@@ -1283,6 +1283,16 @@ administrator to inspect both sides, including inherited ACLs and theirpropagation, for that VM, storage or node. An administrator session oruser-only permission listing does not prove the token has access.+First distinguish a missing privilege on an intended target from an+**intentional access boundary**. Pulse 6.5.0 has no per-node include/exclude+setting for a Proxmox API connection: cluster discovery can list nodes outside+the token's authorised scope, and Pulse can still attempt to read them. Keep+a department-scoped token restricted to its intended nodes; **do not grant+access to other departments just to silence permission errors**. Table filters+and alert suppression do not stop API polling. Connecting to another member+of the same cluster does not limit discovery to that member. Denied readings+are unavailable, not evidence that those nodes are down or unhealthy.+Inspect the existing denial and compare it with the relevant read privileges:- Inventory and metrics: `Sys.Audit` and `Datastore.Audit`, on the relevantdiff --git a/frontend-modern/public/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md b/frontend-modern/public/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.mdindex 679fb6cc4d..07e14f2c2f 100644--- a/frontend-modern/public/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md+++ b/frontend-modern/public/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md@@ -1283,6 +1283,16 @@ administrator to inspect both sides, including inherited ACLs and theirpropagation, for that VM, storage or node. An administrator session oruser-only permission listing does not prove the token has access.+First distinguish a missing privilege on an intended target from an+**intentional access boundary**. Pulse 6.5.0 has no per-node include/exclude+setting for a Proxmox API connection: cluster discovery can list nodes outside+the token's authorised scope, and Pulse can still attempt to read them. Keep+a department-scoped token restricted to its intended nodes; **do not grant+access to other departments just to silence permission errors**. Table filters+and alert suppression do not stop API polling. Connecting to another member+of the same cluster does not limit discovery to that member. Denied readings+are unavailable, not evidence that those nodes are down or unhealthy.+Inspect the existing denial and compare it with the relevant read privileges:- Inventory and metrics: `Sys.Audit` and `Datastore.Audit`, on the relevantdiff --git a/scripts/tests/test_pve_backup_troubleshooting_docs.py b/scripts/tests/test_pve_backup_troubleshooting_docs.pyindex 05b3090552..c71856c7d6 100644--- a/scripts/tests/test_pve_backup_troubleshooting_docs.py+++ b/scripts/tests/test_pve_backup_troubleshooting_docs.py@@ -81,6 +81,21 @@ class BackupAgeEvaluationDocsTest(unittest.TestCase):class PVEBackupTroubleshootingDocsTest(unittest.TestCase):+ def test_intentionally_restricted_cluster_is_not_an_access_repair_recipe(self):+ trouble = (ROOT / "docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md").read_text()+ section = trouble.split("### Check Permissions (Proxmox)\n", 1)[1].split("\n### ", 1)[0]+ text = " ".join(section.split())+ for distinction in ("intentional access boundary", "no per-node include/exclude",+ "department-scoped token restricted to its intended nodes",+ "do not grant access to other departments",+ "Table filters and alert suppression do not stop API polling",+ "does not limit discovery to that member",+ "unavailable, not evidence that those nodes are down or unhealthy"):+ self.assertIn(distinction, text)+ self.assertNotIn("```", section, "inspect existing denials, not another live probe")+ self.assertEqual((ROOT / "docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md").read_bytes(),+ (ROOT / "frontend-modern/public/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md").read_bytes())+def test_replication_help_uses_existing_row_details_not_backup_commands(self):trouble = (ROOT / "docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md").read_text()section = trouble.split("#### Replication jobs are Pending, stale or missing\n", 1)[1].split("\n#### ", 1)[0]