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Real-time monitoring dashboard for Proxmox VE, PBS, Docker, Kubernetes, TrueNAS and vSphere. Self-hosted, with alerts for failed backups, full disks, unhealthy containers and offline nodes.

Guard the documentation link rewrite security boundary

pulse-triage[bot]f7ece79c30f8
diff --git a/frontend-modern/src/features/docs/__tests__/docMarkdownSecurity.test.ts b/frontend-modern/src/features/docs/__tests__/docMarkdownSecurity.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4649537589
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frontend-modern/src/features/docs/__tests__/docMarkdownSecurity.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { renderDocMarkdown, resolveDocLink } from '../docMarkdown';
+
+// The stored-XSS annotation on the post-sanitization href setter must be
+// assessed at that setter, not just with a script-tag test. Both arguments
+// are treated as untrusted here, including the document route itself.
+const currentPaths = [
+ 'README',
+ 'i18n/de/README',
+ '../../README',
+ '//untrusted.invalid/README',
+ 'https://untrusted.invalid/README',
+ 'javascript:globalThis.__docSecurityProbe=1/README',
+ 'data:text/html,<script>probe()</script>/README',
+ '..\\..\\untrusted.invalid/README',
+ '%2e%2e/%2e%2e/README',
+ 'README"><img src=x onerror="probe()">/README',
+];
+const relativeLinks = [
+ 'INSTALL.md',
+ './FAQ.md',
+ '../SECURITY.md#reporting',
+ '../../TERMS.md?return=javascript:probe()',
+ '/docs/CONFIGURATION.md#api-tokens',
+ '//untrusted.invalid/INSTALL.md',
+ '\\untrusted.invalid\\INSTALL.md',
+ 'java\tscript:probe.md',
+ 'java\nscript:probe.md',
+ '%6aavascript%3aprobe.md',
+ '%2e%2e/%2e%2e/INSTALL.md',
+ '%2f%2funtrusted.invalid/INSTALL.md',
+ 'INSTALL.md#javascript:probe()',
+ 'INSTALL.md#"><img src=x onerror="probe()">',
+ 'INSTALL.md?x=" onfocus="probe()',
+ 'INSTALL.md#%22%3E%3Cscript%3Eprobe()%3C/script%3E',
+];
+const bases = ['http://pulse.invalid/', 'https://pulse.invalid/prefix/'];
+
+function articleAt(baseUrl: string, html: string): HTMLDivElement {
+ // Use the DOM's URL properties as well as URL(), without altering the test
+ // runner's own base URL or enabling script execution in a fixture.
+ const owner = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument();
+ const base = owner.createElement('base');
+ base.href = baseUrl;
+ owner.head.appendChild(base);
+ const article = owner.createElement('div');
+ article.innerHTML = html;
+ owner.body.appendChild(article);
+ return article;
+}
+
+function linkHtml(href: string): string {
+ const anchor = document.createElement('a');
+ anchor.setAttribute('href', href);
+ anchor.textContent = 'Document';
+ return anchor.outerHTML;
+}
+
+describe('documentation rewritten-link security boundary', () => {
+ it.each(bases)('keeps resolved URLs non-executable and same-origin at %s', (base) => {
+ for (const currentPath of currentPaths) {
+ for (const href of relativeLinks) {
+ const label = JSON.stringify({ currentPath, href, base });
+ const resolved = resolveDocLink(currentPath, href);
+ expect(resolved, label).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(resolved, label).toMatch(/^\/docs\//);
+ const url = new URL(resolved!, base);
+ expect(url.protocol, label).toBe(new URL(base).protocol);
+ expect(url.origin, label).toBe(new URL(base).origin);
+ }
+ }
+ });
+
+ it.each(bases)('keeps the actual rendered href setter safe at %s', (base) => {
+ let rewritten = 0;
+ for (const currentPath of currentPaths) {
+ for (const href of relativeLinks) {
+ const label = JSON.stringify({ currentPath, href, base });
+ const article = articleAt(base, renderDocMarkdown(linkHtml(href), currentPath));
+ const anchor = article.querySelector('a')!;
+ expect(anchor, label).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(anchor.textContent, label).toBe('Document');
+ // DOMPurify may remove an obfuscated scheme before the rewrite. If
+ // an href survives, the emitted DOM, not only the resolver, is safe.
+ if (!anchor.hasAttribute('href')) continue;
+ rewritten += 1;
+ expect(anchor.hasAttribute('data-doc-link'), label).toBe(true);
+ expect(anchor.getAttribute('href'), label).toMatch(/^\/docs\//);
+ expect(anchor.protocol, label).toBe(new URL(base).protocol);
+ expect(anchor.origin, label).toBe(new URL(base).origin);
+ expect(article.querySelector('script, svg, [onerror], [onfocus]'), label).toBeNull();
+ }
+ }
+ // Prevent a sanitizer that removes every link from passing vacuously.
+ expect(rewritten).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(120);
+ });
+
+ it('rejects explicit executable schemes rather than treating them as documents', () => {
+ for (const href of [
+ 'javascript:probe.md',
+ 'JaVaScRiPt:probe.md#fragment',
+ 'data:text/html,probe.md',
+ 'vbscript:probe.md',
+ 'file:probe.md',
+ 'blob:probe.md',
+ 'https://untrusted.invalid/probe.md',
+ 'mailto:probe.md',
+ ]) {
+ expect(resolveDocLink('README', href), href).toBeNull();
+ }
+ });
+
+ it('removes entity- and whitespace-obfuscated executable hrefs before rewriting', () => {
+ for (const href of [
+ 'javascript:probe.md',
+ 'jav&#x61;script:probe.md',
+ 'java&#x09;script:probe.md',
+ 'java&#x0a;script:probe.md',
+ 'java&#x0d;script:probe.md',
+ 'data:text/html,probe.md',
+ 'vbscript:probe.md',
+ ]) {
+ // Deliberately raw HTML: entities must pass through the real parser,
+ // not through linkHtml's escaping or a replacement sanitizer.
+ const article = articleAt(
+ bases[1],
+ renderDocMarkdown(`<a href="${href}">Document</a>`, 'README'),
+ );
+ const anchor = article.querySelector('a')!;
+ expect(anchor.textContent, href).toBe('Document');
+ expect(anchor.hasAttribute('href'), href).toBe(false);
+ expect(anchor.hasAttribute('data-doc-link'), href).toBe(false);
+ }
+ });
+
+ it('keeps HTML inert through sanitization, link mutation and a second HTML parse', () => {
+ const article = articleAt(
+ bases[1],
+ renderDocMarkdown(
+ [
+ '<script>globalThis.__docSecurityProbe=1</script>',
+ '<img src="x" onerror="globalThis.__docSecurityProbe=2">',
+ '<svg><a href="javascript:probe()">bad</a></svg>',
+ '<div><a href="INSTALL.md#&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=probe()&gt;" onclick="probe()">Install</a></div>',
+ '<iframe srcdoc="<script>probe()</script>"></iframe>',
+ ].join('\n'),
+ 'README',
+ ),
+ );
+ expect(article.querySelector('script, svg, iframe, [onclick], [onerror]')).toBeNull();
+ const link = article.querySelector('a[data-doc-link]')!;
+ expect(link.textContent).toBe('Install');
+ expect(link.getAttribute('href')).toBe('/docs/INSTALL#"><img src=x onerror=probe()>');
+ expect(link.origin).toBe(new URL(bases[1]).origin);
+ expect(article.querySelectorAll('img')).toHaveLength(1);
+ });
+});