ServerKit is a lightweight, modern server control panel for managing web applications, databases, and services on your VPS or dedicated server. Built with Python/Flask backend and React frontend.
Python astracloudflarecontrol-panelcyberpaneldnsfablehosting-control-panelhosting-panelkimi-k3server-managementserverkitubuntu-web-panelwebserver
docs: consent-gate matrix + seam lifecycle in EXTENSIONS.md
Juan Denis065b6ed61b1d
diff --git a/docs/EXTENSIONS.md b/docs/EXTENSIONS.mdindex 1f9b5279..073520d8 100644--- a/docs/EXTENSIONS.md+++ b/docs/EXTENSIONS.md@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ it, remove the old entry once nothing references it.| Verdict | Meaning | Install behavior ||---|---|---|| `verified` | Signature valid under a pinned key | Installs; no extra friction |-| `unsigned` | No signature present | Installs behind the existing consent surfaces (preview card badge, registry risk dialog) — never a hard block |+| `unsigned` | No signature present | Installs behind the existing consent surfaces (preview card badge, registry risk dialog) — never a hard block. For **first-party** registry entries it is a 409 consent gate (possible downgrade); community **reviewed** entries stay exempt because the review stamp already binds a maintainer verdict to the artifact's exact sha256 || `untrusted_key` | Signed, but the publisher key isn't pinned | Registry: 409 consent ("install anyway"); manual: consent card warns || `invalid` | Malformed envelope, key-id mismatch, or verify failed | **Hard failure, always.** Acknowledgment can never override a bad signature |@@ -661,10 +661,11 @@ verification stays visible after install. The sha256 runtime-frontend hashcheck is unaffected — signatures cover the zip, `_frontend_hashes` still pinsthe served `.mjs` bundle bytes.-Honesty note (D2): a signature verifies *when present*. Until every-first-party release is signed, an unsigned first-party index entry still-installs on the strength of the index itself (TLS + the registry repo's PR-review), so the index's integrity remains part of the trust story.+Honesty note (D2): a signature verifies *when present*. An unsigned+first-party registry entry installs only behind the explicit 409 consent step+(acknowledge-risk), and the same gate covers the update path — but the+acknowledgment itself still rests on the index's integrity (TLS + the+registry repo's PR review) until every first-party release is signed.### Docker note